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1.1 Project outline 
This dissertation investigates the dynamics of naval competition between the United States 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during a thirty-five year period that even-
tually led to the U.S. Navy’s adoption of the Reagan era Maritime Strategy.1 Its focus is on the 
long-term pattern of military interaction between the military organizations that had primary 
responsibility for pursuing the Cold War competition at sea, the United States Navy (USN) 
and the Voyenno-morskoy flot SSSR (“Military Maritime Fleet of the USSR”, henceforth: VMF). 
Throughout the period in question, these two powerful organizations prepared for war in the 
empty wastes of the North Atlantic, the Western Pacific and their peripheral seas. If that con-
flict had come to pass, it would have been the first naval war to feature guided missiles and 
nuclear weapons – and perhaps also the last. It would have revolved around one of the most 
vexing problems that the geography and the strategic realities of the Cold War confrontation 
imposed on the Western alliance. As a sea power separated from the likely theaters of conflict 
by millions of square kilometers of water, the United States relied on forward-deployed forces 
 
1  The first ‘official’ version of The Maritime Strategy came together in the autumn of 1982, but the basic tenets 
had been under discussion for some time. For a detailed review of the process of formulating and refining 
the forward Maritime Strategy, see John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy 1977-
1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004). 
 





to reassure its NATO allies and deter attacks that might not meet the criteria for a full-scale 
nuclear response.2 While the permanent elements of this forward posture could provide a 
“tripwire”3 in case of Soviet military encroachment, reinforcing them in a crisis and sustaining 
them in a conflict would not have been a trivial matter. Regardless of the exact circumstances, 
it demanded the application of superior seapower to secure NATO’s sea lines of communica-
tion (SLOCs) across the Atlantic and to reliably overcome what Mearsheimer has called “the 
stopping power of water.”4 Framed in terms of 21st defense debates, it would have required 
operational access – that is, “[t]he ability to project military force into [the] operational area with 
sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission.”5 In Cold War terms, Western analysts 
expected to find themselves fighting a Third Battle of the Atlantic, not unlike those fought 
during the world wars.6  
 This investigation will advance the case that this analogy of the Third Battle can serve 
as a useful framework for thinking about the U.S.-Soviet naval competition for only part of the 
Cold War era. To be more specific, the Cold War at sea can reasonably be divided into three 
 
2  For the purposes of this dissertation, the term ‘sea power’ will denote an actor in possession of ‘seapower’, 
which we agree “can be usefully defined as military power that is brought to bear at [and from the, MH] sea.” 
Hedley Bull, “Sea Power and Political Influence,” Adelphi Paper 16, no. 122 (1976), 
doi:10.1080/05679327608457271, 1. While this is admittedly a relatively narrow definition, it provides clarity 
where more recent attempts at definitions have been deliberately wooly and all-encompassing. To define 
seapower broadly, in terms of “the capacity to influence the behavior of other people or things by what one 
does at or from the sea,” as Till proposes, leaves little room for a conception of ‘maritime power’ that can 
encompass civil aspects much more conspicuously and appropriately. Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the 
Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2009), 21. For his discussion of related concepts and terminology, 
which is generally excellent, see ibid., 20-38. 
3   The concept was originally associated with the Eisenhower Administration’s nuclear-centric New Look. 
See Richard A. Bitzinger, “Assessing the Conventional Balance in Europe, 1945-1975” (RAND, Santa Monica, 
CA, 1989), 11. On the New Look and the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’, see e.g. Samuel F. Wells, “The 
Origins of Massive Retaliation,” Political Science Quarterly 96, no. 1 (1981), doi:10.2307/2149675, 31-51; Andreas 
Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1997), esp. 13-84, 105-20.   
4  John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001), 113-19. 
5  Department of Defense, “Joint Operational Access Concept: Version 1.0” (Washington, DC, 2012), 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf, 1. The most comprehen-
sive study of questions of strategic and operational access is Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering 
A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013). 
6  The term is used repeatedly throughout the literature on the Cold War at sea, but it is now most promi-
nently associated with Cote’s excellent study of the competition in undersea warfare, which will be referenced 
repeatedly in this study. Owen R. Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle 
with Soviet Submarine, Newport Papers 16 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003). 
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periods. During the first period (c. 1946-1960), the U.S. Navy began to focus on power projec-
tion against Soviet land targets and the Soviet Union built a layered sea denial system that 
began to reach out further into the North Atlantic towards the end of this timeframe. During 
the second period (c. 1961-1981), the U.S. Navy effectively shifted its capability for nuclear 
strike from carrier battlegroups to its submarine force. Meanwhile, the VMF continued to de-
velop an oceanic defense perimeter, which included a limited capability for nuclear strikes 
against targets in the continental United States. Towards the end of this phase, however, came 
a Soviet paradigm shift. Instead of investing further resources into an ever more expansive 
system of oceanic defense, the VMF’s efforts were refocused on the near-seas zone. By the late 
1970s, the VMF’s far-seas defense capability was approaching high tide, largely as a result of 
decisions made in the late 1950s and early 1960s. But the focus of Soviet naval ambitions had 
returned to the Barents Sea and, in the far east, the Sea of Okhotsk. During the third and final 
phase (1981-1991), the Reagan era Maritime Strategy attempted to exploit this shift for strategic 
advantage. While the first two phases can be reasonably described as encompassing prepara-
tions at the level of naval postures for the eventuality of a Third Battle of the Atlantic, the third 
phase – which has received much of the attention of Western naval analysts, not least due to 
its bureaucratic significance for the U.S. Navy – is difficult to frame in those terms.  
The focus of the present investigation is on the two phases that preceded the Soviet 
Union’s tacit admission that it could not – and, perhaps, need not – effectively compete with 
the U.S. Navy on the high seas. Rather than during the third phase, as has often been claimed, 
it must have been during these earlier phases that the high-seas competition was essentially 
decided. The eventual outcome of the struggle for a meaningful naval advantage in the North 
Atlantic area raises important questions: How did the U.S. Navy manage to maintain its military 
advantage in this area over the long term? Or, if we endeavor to see the issue through the eyes of a 
continental challenger of U.S. naval supremacy, why did the Soviet Union fail to develop an effective 
system for keeping the U.S. Navy’s projection forces at bay? These are the questions that this dis-
sertation will explore in the form of a theoretically informed analysis of the first two phases of 
the Cold War at sea. Specifically, we will be looking at the contest between the VMF’s posture 
 





of oceanic “sea denial”7 – a more traditional, less controversial, and slightly narrower term 
than “anti-access/area denial”8 – and the U.S. Navy’s posture of sea control through “transo-
ceanic”9 power projection.  This introductory chapter will briefly familiarize the reader with 
the setting of the Cold War at sea, lay out the purpose of the investigation and research design 
in some detail, explore the current state of research into this and related topics, and provide a 
brief overview of the chapters that follow. 
 
SEAPOWER IN A NUCLEAR CONTEXT 
The working assumption of many observers on both sides of the Cold War divide was – and 
had to be – that any major war between the superpowers was likely to escalate to a full-scale 
nuclear exchange, possibly with very little warning.10 In effect, the superpowers would have 
moved from a state of peace or increased tension to full-scale nuclear war with only token 
involvement of all other conceivable levels of conflict.11 But there existed at the heart of the 
 
7  One of Corbett’s principles was that “[t]he object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly 
either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.” Julian S. Corbett, Principles 
of Maritime Strategy (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004[1911]), 87. For a detailed discussion of sea denial postures and 
strategies, see Milan N. Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2019); 
Ian Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare (London: Routledge, 2019), 118-22. On the specific requirements of 
sea control and sea denial in marginal and constricted seas, see also Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Oper-
ations in Narrow Seas (London: Routledge, 2003), 110-28. 
8  For an extended discussion and history of the concept, see Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare, 32-74. 
9  Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” USNI Proceedings 80, no. 5 (1954), 
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1954/may/national-policy-and-transoceanic-navy. 
10  See e.g. Stephen J. Cimbala, Strategic Impasse: Offense, Defense, and Deterrence Theory and Practice (New York, 
NY: Greenwood, 1989), 53. 
11  For an understanding of what potential escalation levels were present, we can look to Nitze’s  “hierarchy 
of potential violence” that comprises ten levels. Paul Nitze, “The Relationship of Strategic and Theater Nu-
clear Forces,” International Security 2, no. 2 (1977), doi:10.2307/2538729, 122-23. Reordered here in ascending 
order of conflict intensity, they are: “10. Political, economic, and psychological warfare; 9. Civil war or guer-
rilla war in its various forms; 8. Conventional war with client states only participating; 7. Conventional war 
with only a single superpower actively participating; 6. Conventional war with both superpowers actively 
participating; 5. Unilateral use by the country attacked of tactical nuclear weapons in self-defense on and over 
its own territory; 4. Forward Edge of the Battlefield (FEBA) nuclear war with both sides primarily using 
shorter range weapons close to the line of contact between the opposing forces; neither superpower using its 
intercontinental or gray-area weapons, and both superpowers avoiding the territory of the other; 3. Theater 
nuclear war in which intermediate gray-area weapons, such as the SS-20, Backfire, G-Class submarines, FB-
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Cold War balance of “mutual assured destruction”12 a series of paradoxes that could under-
mine the stabilizing logic of nuclear fear: What if the very stability of deterrence at the “strate-
gic”13 level – which threatened the use of nuclear weapons against the likely adversary’s 
civilian population, industrial strength, and opposing strategic nuclear forces – made war 
more likely at lower levels of conflict?14 What, in other words, if strategic nuclear deterrence 
worked too well and the other side arrived at the conclusion that it could get away with some 
forms of conventional aggression without triggering a massive nuclear response? What if, on 
reflection, the limitation of a conflict that had resulted from one of the more plausible scenarios 
– accident, miscalculation, or deterrence failure – looked like a better option than sacrificing 
hundreds of millions of lives to make a point about one’s “nuclear resolve”15? What if there 
had been a use of nuclear weapons and both sides had decided that they had had enough, but 
the fighting had not stopped?16 While some of the best strategic minds of the era tried to iron 
 
111, intermediate range cruise missiles, and the like, are used; 2. Intercontinental, primarily counterforce, 
nuclear war; 1. Intercontinental, primarily countervalue, nuclear war.” ibid. Kahn famously came up with a 
much more elaborate, 44-step ‘escalation ladder’. Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2017[1965]). 
12  Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), 74-82.  
13  There is some confusion as to what exactly it is that differentiates the ‘strategic’ level from the ‘tactical’ and 
‘theater’ levels. Logically, strategic forces are those that are earmarked to be used for strategic effect, i.e. to 
directly affect the opponent’s ability to continue fighting. On strategic effects, see Colin S. Gray, “Understand-
ing Airpower: Bonfire of the Fallacies,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 2, no. 4 (2008), 51-52. Gray is right to insist 
that “[t]he critical difference between the strategic and the tactical is the quality of instrumentality. Strategic 
effect is distinctive in kind or quality from tactical effect, not in quantity. A vehicle does not become strategic 
because it is intercontinental in range rather than merely intraregional or even intracontinental. A weapon, a 
capability, a project, is strategic only in its consequences.” ibid., 51. Emphasis added. 
14  The seminal statement of this so-called ‘stability-instability paradox’ is Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and 
Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961). For a contrasting 
view, although not one that manages to dispel the paradox convincingly, is Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear 
Revolution, 19-22, 78-79. 
15  Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), 193. 
On accidental nuclear war, see Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1993); Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1987), 104-53; Alexander George, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1974), 534-49. 
16  One need not be a proponent of what was known as ‘broken-backed war’ to see this as a plausible turn of 
events.  The latter concept was advanced primarily by naval officers who saw a long war as plausible – not 
least of all for bureaucratic reasons. See John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-
1964 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 144; Richard Moore, The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons (London: Routledge, 
2015), 65-93. For a critique of the concept, see Kahn, On Escalation; Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 2010[1960]), 38. 
 





out these and other major wrinkles in the otherwise sturdy cloth of nuclear deterrence, the 
truth was (and remains) that very little is known or understood about a world in which nuclear 
war is no longer a set of intellectual complications confined to “the deep, dark pit of nuclear 
strategy”17 and becomes instead a part of the real world. 
As a result, both U.S. and Soviet decision-makers soon discovered that they were not 
actually willing to rely on nuclear deterrence in any of its pure forms, and both sides made 
massive, sustained investments in conventional forces.18 While U.S. and Soviet navies were 
both deeply involved in the grim business of strategic nuclear deterrence, they were also sure 
to play a central role in any conflict that remained limited to conventional or tactical nuclear 
options for more than a few days. In fact, in any ‘protracted war’ scenario, the survival of the 
Western alliance would have become successively more dependent on replenishment sealift 
with every gallon of fuel that was consumed and every shot that was fired.19 Moreover, given 
NATO’s dependence on strategic warning and prior mobilization to offset Soviet conventional 
strength, the same would apply in an extended crisis as well.20 While it is true that a naval war 
in the North Atlantic would have been an alliance effort, the burden of maintaining naval su-
premacy with such scenarios in mind fell squarely on the shoulders of the U.S. Navy. There 
 
17  Fred M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 373. 
18  According to the CIA’s estimates, Soviet average spending on the strategic offensive mission never ex-
ceeded 12.3 percent in any period during 1951-1990. Noel E. Firth and James H. Noren, Soviet Defense Spend-
ing: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990 (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1998), 112. In 
the United States, there were three fiscal years during the 1945 to 1978 period in which procurement funding 
for strategic forces – as opposed to total spending – slightly exceeded or equalled that for general purpose 
forces. The shares were relatively even during 1945-50 and 1954-1961 and began to permanently diverge 
thereafter, with an overhang towards general purpose forces funding of roughly 10 billion per fiscal year on 
average (excluding additional spending for the war in South East Asia). Congressional Budget Office, “As-
sessing the Warsaw Pact/NATO Military Balance” (Budget Issue Paper for Fiscal Year 1979, CBO, Washing-
ton, DC, 1979), 47. 
19  On protracted war see Richard Hegmann, “Reconsidering the Evolution of the US Maritime Strategy 1955–
1965,” Journal of Strategic Studies 14, no. 3 (1991), doi:10.1080/01402399108437454, 303-305; John V. Hall, “Why 
the Short-War Scenario is Wrong for Naval Planning” (Professional Paper 354, Center for Naval Analyses, 
Alexandria, VA, 1982). See also Joel J. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO, 
1949-80 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 125-76; Paul H. Nitze and Leonard Sullivan, Securing 
the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), 344-45, 376. 
20  See e.g. Barry R. Posen, “Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in 
Threat Assessment,” International Security 9, no. 3 (1984), doi:10.2307/2538587, 94-102. 
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can be little doubt that the most critical missions would have overwhelmingly fallen to Amer-
ican seamen and naval aviators, with the Royal Navy making by far the largest alliance con-
tribution and other navies providing capabilities to free up as many U.S. assets as possible for 
higher priority missions.21 
If power projection from the sea – including, but not limited to the nuclear aspect – was 
one part of the raison d'être of what Samuel Huntington called “the transoceanic navy […], a 
navy oriented away from the oceans and toward the land masses on their far side,”22 assuring 
operational access was the other. In practice, they soon became folded into one, as a new con-
ception of “sea-air power”23 began to frame carrier strikes against land targets as the best 
means of ensuring sea control.24 This development was, in a very real sense, at the heart of the 
Cold War dynamic at sea during 1946-1981. Given the relative positions of the North American 
and Eurasian landmasses, and the difficulties of moving heavy forces and bulky materiel by 
 
21  On the naval debate in NATO into the late 1960s, see Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, 7-47; Robert S. 
Jordan, Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension (New York, NY: St 
Martin's Press, 1990). On British awareness of the Royal Navy’s limited role in countering Soviet submarines 
in the 1980s, see Peter Hennessy and James Jinks, The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service since 1945 
(London: Allen Lane, 2015), 559. On the Royal Navy in the Cold War, the gold standard work is still Eric 
Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987). 
While alliance burden sharing did extend into the naval arena to some extent, other alliance contributions are 
much more doubtful than the British one, certainly from an operational perspective. Focusing mostly on de-
fensive sea control and supporting tasks, other European navies stood ready to take up some of the slack 
once the U.S. Navy shifted into high gear, but to claim that they were in a position to decisively influence a 
naval war between East and West is to engage in alliance politics. For an overview of NATO allies’ compar-
atively modest naval capabilities at the height of the Maritime Strategy debates in the 1980s, see Stephen 
Roberts, “Western European and NATO Navies, 1982” (Professional Paper No. 399, Center for Naval Anal-
yses, Alexandria, VA, 1982).  
22  Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy”. Reduced to its essentials, seapower has always 
been about power projection against the land, as Corbett has emphasized: “Since men live upon the land and 
not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest cases 
– either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what 
the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.” Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, 14. The fundamental 
change in naval affairs that was wrought by 20th century technology – namely carrier aviation, guided mis-
siles, and nuclear weapons – was that navies are no longer limited to the role of enabler and can now threaten 
the enemy’s territory and national life directly and much more decisively than a slow-acting blockade ever 
could. At the same time, Corbett’s insistence that “the object and end of naval warfare is the control of com-
munications” (ibid., 91) continues to hold true in most cases short of strategic nuclear war. 
23  Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 208. 
24  The basic outlines of this story are told extremely well in George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: 
The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 288-90. 
 





air, it was reasonable to assume that a struggle for access would focus on the maritime ap-
proaches to the continental battlefield. It was not unreasonable to expect that the USSR, for its 
part, would make every effort to interfere with NATO’s Atlantic “lifeline”25 in case of war. 
 
Fig. 1: The North Atlantic was the pivotal theater of the Cold War at sea. (Own work/NASA WorldWind) 
 
The basic geostrategic setting of the confrontation is depicted in Figure 1 above. As readers 
with a background in strategic studies or military history will appreciate, there are unmistak-
able echoes of the two previous Battles of the Atlantic.26 There are also critically important 
differences, however, which we will examine in some detail in Chapters 4 and 5. What all three 
scenarios had in common was a continental challenger on the Eurasian landmass, who was in 
a position to contest the Western sea powers’ vital “control of communications”27 across the 
 
25  Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, 126.  
26  An excellent overview of the Second Battle of the Atlantic from a strategic and operational perspective is 
Marc Milner, Battle of the Atlantic (Stroud: The History Press, 2014). For a more exhaustive study, see Clay 
Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War: Volume 1: The Hunters, 1939-1942 (New York, NY: Random House, 1996); Clay Blair, 
Hitler's U-Boat War: Volume 2: The Hunted, 1942-1945 (New York, NY: Random House, 2000). On the First 
Battle of the Atlantic, see. e.g. Edwyn Gray, The Killing Time: The U-Boat War, 1914-18 (London: Seeley, 1972). 
An integrated view of the German submarine campaigns that facilitates comparison is provided by V. E. 
Tarrant, The U-Boat Offensive, 1914-1945 (London: Arms and Armour, 1989).  
27  Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, 90. 
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Atlantic. But, ultimately, the history of the Cold War at sea has much less in common with 
these earlier cases than a superficial look at various similarities would suggest. Far from pos-
ing a repeat of earlier continental challenges to Western naval supremacy, the introduction of 
nuclear weapons and of the means to deliver them from the sea fundamentally reshaped the 
dynamic of naval competition in the North Atlantic area over time, in ways that are not widely 
understood even today. 
 
A ‘SECURITY DILEMMA AT SEA’ 
For a start, it may come as a surprise to some readers that the most crucial mission the Soviet 
Navy was tasked with by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR throughout the 
Cold War period was not the interdiction of Western sea lines of communication, but homeland 
defense against nuclear-armed carrier strike groups and ballistic-missile carrying submarines 
(SSBNs).28 While SLOC interdiction was often mentioned as a secondary or tertiary task, the 
consensus among Soviet  naval planners was that it should only be pursued once the more 
essential objectives of defending the homeland and – later on – assuring the naval potential 
for strategic deterrence had been met.29 In practice, this meant that there were never enough 
resources allocated to embark on the full-fledged ‘Third Battle’ against the Western lifeline 
that many U.S. and NATO planners feared. While this may sound like a controversial finding, 
 
28  Some naval analysts realized this early on, but at an organizational level, the US Navy began to accept this 
only in the 1980s. Two notable sources making this case as early as the 1960s are Robert W. Herrick, Soviet 
Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968), esp. 92-105; 
Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Research and Reports, Soviet Naval Strategy and Its Effects on the Devel-
opment of Naval Forces, 1953-63, October 22, 1963, CIA/RR ER SC 63-3, CIA Historical Collection, TOP SECRET 
(declassified 21 May 2012), 65-119. This issue will be touched upon repeatedly in Chapters 4 and 5.  
29  For an excellent overview of the evolution of the VMF’s Cold War mission structure, see Robert W. Herrick, 
“Roles and Missions of the Soviet Navy: Historical Evolution, Current Priorities, and Future Prospects,” in 
The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s, ed. James L. George (Annapolis, MD: Na-
val Institute Press/Center for Naval Analyses, 1986), 9-36. 
 





recently declassified documents show that Western intelligence agencies eventually came to 
much the same conclusion.30 
As things stood, the possibility that the VMF might move against the SLOCs and the 
real challenge to Western command of the seas that it posed were sufficient to require a deter-
mined response. NATO’s alliance politics demanded that the United States provide sufficient 
assurances of continued support for the alliance in case of a long war that could not be pursued 
unless the SLOCs remained open.31 The Soviet leadership, on the other hand, could not accept 
the untrammeled naval supremacy of the United States and its allies up to its coast, at a time 
when U.S. aircraft carriers had also become nuclear delivery systems.32 The overarching con-
sequence of the two sides’ incompatible strategic imperatives was what one of the drafters of 
the Reagan administration’s forward Maritime Strategy, CAPT (ret.) Peter Swartz, retrospec-
tively describes as “a security dilemma at sea.”33 As the United States developed a carrier-
centric posture designed to dispose of the prospective Soviet submarine threat to Western 
SLOCs across the Atlantic, the Soviet Union began to push its defensive perimeter outward to 
prevent carrier-borne strikes on its territory. In the process of doing so, the VMF acquired 
many of the same capabilities that it would presumably have employed in an offensive anti-
SLOC campaign.34 In the absence of an accurate understanding of the Soviet Union’s naval 
force posture, it was reasonable to assume that this was indeed a high-priority goal of the 
burgeoning Soviet fleet. As we now know, it was not. Hence, the security dilemma logic of 
 
30  Central Intelligence Agency, The Role of Interdiction at Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations: An Intelli-
gence Assessment, May 1978, CIA Historical Collection, TOP SECRET (declassified 16 June 2017); Central In-
telligence Agency/National Foreign Assessment Center, The Soviet Attack Submarine Force and Western Sea 
Lines of Communication, April 1979, CIA Historical Collection, SECRET (declassified 14 June 2017). This study 
is among the first to make use of these newly released sources.  
31  See e.g. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, esp. Chapters 1-2. 
32  According to Norris and Kristensen, carriers still deployed with roughly 100 nuclear weapons during the 
later stages of the competition, i.e. long after they had been taken off strategic nuclear alert duties. Robert S. 
Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Declassified: US Nuclear Weapons at Sea during the Cold War,” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 72, no. 1 (2016), doi:10.1080/00963402.2016.1124664, 60. 
33  Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN (ret.), interview with the author (Arlington, VA, 12 May 2016). I am grateful 
to Peter for suggesting this as a useful frame of reference. For a state-of-the-art review of the concept of the 
security dilemma, see Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust 
in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). The role of the security dilemmas in long-term mil-
itary competitions is further discussed in Chapter 2.  
34  Ibid. 
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states “arm[ing] for the sake of security”35 and rendering each other progressively less secure 
in the process would indeed seem to apply to the situation at hand. Although it is hardly the 
end of the story, it nonetheless provides a useful starting point for our analysis of the dynamics 
of naval interaction during the Cold War era. 
The U.S. Navy eventually came to accept the essentially defensive nature of the Soviet 
naval build-up as a result of a decisive intelligence breakthrough in the late 1970s and early 
1980s – a “special source”36 that the select few who are privy to the details are still unable to 
comment on. In reality, the VMF was not so much shifting from an offensive to a defensive 
posture, as from an attempt at far-seas defense to a near-seas defense, thereby reversing its 
earlier shift in the opposite direction. In essence, once it became clear that enemy SSBNs were 
fundamentally unlike enemy carriers and could not be effectively countered by means of an 
oceanic defense system, the weight of the strategic defense effort was rebalanced in favor of 
the protection of the Soviet Union’s own SSBNs. With a capability to launch from home waters 
against targets in the continental United States from the mid-1970s onwards, this could take 
the form of a near-seas defense in what Western analysts came to call “bastions”37 well north 
of the Arctic circle. In other words, Soviet planners had come to recognize that the aspect of 
U.S. naval superiority that was most important for them to counter – the ability to strike the 
Soviet homeland with nuclear weapons – could not be broken by naval means focused on sea 
denial.  
 
35  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: Random House, 1979), 186.  
36 Two theories that have been discussed repeatedly revolve around the tapping of undersea cables by U.S. 
submarines inside Soviet territorial waters and the recruitment of one or several moles in the highest reaches 
of the Soviet General Staff. Both theories are plausible, and both may be accurate. See, e.g. Hennessy and 
Jinks, The Silent Deep, 531. For an account of U.S. cable-tapping operations, see Sherry Sontag and Christopher 
Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Operations (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1998). 
37  For the basic outline of the story, see Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy 1977-
1986, 23-36; Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, The Admirals’ Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational Intelli-
gence in World War II and the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 77-108.  
 






Fig. 2: The Cold War naval confrontation in the North Atlantic area as a security dilemma. (Own work/NASA 
WorldWind.) 
 
There is, however, more to this story than meets the eye. U.S. naval initiatives that long pre-
dated the 1980s Maritime Strategy played an important role in bringing about this outcome. 
The U.S. Navy’s adaptations to the Soviet threat made sure that the Soviet zone defense system 
ultimately failed in its main purpose: to pose a sufficient threat of conventional and tactical 
nuclear “denial”38 – that is, to convince the U.S. Navy that the kind of far-forward, offensive 
naval strategy that was originally developed in the late 1940s and early 1950s would be too 
difficult and too costly to succeed. Without these various adaptations, it would have been 
much more difficult to reprise such a strategy from the early 1980s onwards and the Soviet 
threat of oceanic denial would have loomed considerably larger than it ultimately did. Hence, 
there are important conclusions to be drawn from this aspect of the competition as well. It is 
hoped that, to the extent that this dissertation manages to combine the various strands of the 
Cold War dynamic at sea into an analytical narrative, it will make a valuable contribution to 
 
38 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 14.  
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our understanding of this defining case of naval competition under the conditions of the nu-
clear age. Having said that, to successfully guide the investigation and keep it focused squarely 
on its object, the research questions and approach need to be set out more closely. This will be 
the task of the next section. 
 
1.2 Research problem and approach 
Ultimately, the superpowers were fortunate enough never to find out exactly how the other 
would employ its naval forces in times of war. The interaction between the naval postures of 
the East and West nevertheless played a critical role in shaping the military and political real-
ities of the Cold War era. The only sustained, large-scale naval rivalry to take place since the 
dawn of the “missile age,”39 the competition between the superpowers played a pivotal role in 
the evolution of naval warfare after 1945. Although direct analogies are difficult, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that it was as significant in that respect as the Anglo-German naval race of 
1898-1914 or the U.S.-Japanese antagonism of the interwar period.40 For this reason alone, re-
search into the Cold War at sea should be a core part of any 21st century strategic studies re-
search agenda concerned with developments in naval forces.  
The purpose of this dissertation is, however, more specific. It seeks to make sense of a 
puzzling outcome that may – or may not – repeat itself in this century. It starts from the obser-
vation that the U.S. Navy entered the Cold War with a clear-cut advantage over any potential 
 
39 The concept can be traced to Brodie’s classic Strategy in the Missile Age and, in its original context, it has a 
nuclear connotation. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007) Applied to 
naval warfare, self-propelled missiles had played an important role long before, of course – the torpedo being 
the foremost example. According to Watts, “the earliest instances of combat success with recognizably modern 
guided munitions occurred in 1943 [when] the German Navy introduced the first acoustic-homing torpedo, 
the G7e/T4 Falke.” Barry D. Watts, “Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and 
Prospects” (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC, 2007), 3 (emphasis added). 
For the purposes of this study, the term should be read to denote both the wholesale replacement of guns, for 
both offensive and defensive uses, by various types of guided missiles in the aftermath of World War II, and 
the potential nuclear dimension of missile combat at sea. 
40 For an overview, see Peter Padfield, The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914 (New 
York, NY: D. McKay, 1974); David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in 
the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), Chapters 8-13. 
 





challenger, or a plausible constellation of challengers. Such advantages have been difficult to 
maintain over a period of decades in the face of a determined challenge. Looking back in his-
tory, Britain’s naval supremacy in the North Sea and the United States’ position in the Pacific 
each came under severe pressure within less than a decade of being openly challenged by 
Germany and Japan, respectively. Compared to these two pre-nuclear cases, the Soviet chal-
lenger defined its aims narrowly and focused very considerable resources on an objective that 
should have been relatively comparatively easy to attain: to raise the costs of far-forward naval 
operations against the Soviet Union sufficiently to force the U.S. Navy to lower its aim in that 
particular regard. Yet, after some thirty-five years of Soviet investment into a focused sea de-
nial capability that was largely without equal in history, the U.S. Navy  of the early 1980s 
nevertheless found itself in the position to propose a posture designed for far-forward, offen-
sive operations no less ambitious than that envisioned during the late 1940s, which had 
spurred the Soviet defense establishment into action in the first place. Why, given the significant 
technological and operational strides that the VMF made, did the long-term naval competition between 
the Cold War superpowers end with U.S. naval supremacy largely intact? Conversely, why did the 
VMF’s ultimately reimagine its defensive system in terms of the much more circumscribed, near-seas 
defensive bastions of the 1980s, given that the task of oceanic perimeter defense should not have been 
insurmountable, given its largely negative aims and the sheer lethality of missile age weaponry? To 
provide answers to these questions, the thesis will explore in detail the Soviet Navy’s attempts 
to undermine U.S. naval supremacy and the U.S. Navy’s efforts to keep a meaningful ad-
vantage over its opponent through several long modernization cycles, focusing on the two 
functional areas that were expected to pose the greatest challenges in any conflict with the 
Soviet Union: the contest between submarines and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces, and 
the competition between Soviet naval aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles and U.S. fleet air 
defenses.41 
 
41  For pragmatic reasons, the study does not give the same weight to anti-surface warfare (ASuW), as the 
main threat posed by Soviet surface combatants to U.S. surface units was their heavy missile armament, 
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THE CONCEPT OF POSTURE CHANGE 
This dissertation proposes to study the dynamics of the competition for military advantage 
between the Cold War superpowers from a particular conceptual angle – namely, that of 
change in naval postures. By naval posture we mean the product of decisions about the principles of 
naval force employment, the types of naval forces to acquire, and the manner in which they are to be 
deployed.42 A naval posture is not a strategy – it does not specify how particular political-military 
aims are to be pursued in war or in peacetime.43 Rather, it is designed to provide military 
options to decision-makers. Postures set out, and thereby also narrow, the range of military 
ways and means that are plausibly available for strategists to work with. Hence, naval postures 
shape naval strategies in critical ways, but they do not determine them. Conversely, strategic 
choices – including those at the levels of grand strategy and national military strategy – pro-
vide political-military direction for posture planning. Hence, the relationship between the two 
concepts is really quite intimate, but they are not the same thing. 
Even though the concept of strategy has been so diluted as to mean all things to all 
people, the proper realm of strategy is the particular: a strategy must be closely adapted to the 
challenges at hand. At the same time, strategy-making also requires sufficient flexibility to 
adapt to an evolving situation. “In historical practice,” Gray finds, “strategies constantly need 
to be drafted for, and adapted to, dynamic circumstances.”44 Strategies can and sometimes must 
change practically overnight. A posture is usually developed over a period of years and even 
 
which is covered as part of the anti-air warfare (AAW) problem set. It also does not include a detailed dis-
cussion of amphibious operations. On the history of amphibious warfare during the Cold War era, see Joseph 
H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare, 1945-1991 (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995). For a functional overview of modern amphibious operations, see Ian Speller 
and Christopher Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics from Gallipoli to Iraq (London: Amber Books, 
2014).  
42  Stratmann provides a workable definition of posture as encompassing the material and immaterial com-
ponents of organization, equipment, armaments, tactics, command and control, and operational planning. 
His inclusion of strategy as a component of posture – rather than an intimately related, but analytical separate 
category – is, however, puzzling and requires a departure. Karl-Peter Stratmann, “Die Sicherheit des NATO-
Abschnitts Mitteleuropa als strategisches Problem: Untersuchungen zur Glaubwürdigkeit der gegenwärtigen 
NATO-'Posture'” (Doctoral dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 1978), 6. 
43  Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18. 
44  Ibid., 41. 
 





its most flexible element by far – the pattern of force deployment – can take weeks or months 
to adjust. Because “you go to war with the [forces] you have – not the [forces] you might want 
or wish to have at a later time,”45 posture planning must be sufficiently broad-based to allow 
for the implementation of different strategies in different contextual settings. At the same time, 
there are only so many strategic options that a posture can support. Thus, there are many 
strategies that a well-designed coastal defense posture can serve well, but those that require 
escorting convoys across the Atlantic in force 10 gales will most likely fall outside its scope. A 
blue-water, sea control navy will be much more expensive to develop, but it will struggle al-
most as badly when it is sent into a vicious coastal scenario. A long-term military competition, 
in this perspective, involves the search for advantages in force posture that can support a range 
of plausible strategies that might be pursued in a crisis or conflict. The product of those strat-
egies, when implemented, is strategic effect.46 The product of military posture planning, on the 
other hand, is credible options for the use of force. It is the process by which these options are 
created, and by which postures are adapted over the long term, that will be at the heart of the 
research effort.  
 
RESEARCHING THE DYNAMICS OF COLD WAR NAVAL POSTURES 
Based on a detailed reconstruction of the U.S. Navy’s efforts to maintain its starting position 
of naval supremacy in the “rimlands”47 of Eurasia, and of the Soviet Navy’s attempts to sow 
pervasive doubts about the U.S. Navy’s prospects in a naval war so as to undermine that po-
sition, this dissertation seeks to unearth the patterns of naval posture change and to provide 
an improved understanding of why the Soviet challenge fell short of its ambition during the 
first and second phases of the Cold War at sea. To do so, we must first conceptualize the pro-
cess of posture change and lay down some guidelines for the analysis of the extensive primary 
and secondary evidence that is available on the Cold War at sea. As we will see, there is no 
 
45  Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 645. 
46  See n. 12. 
47  The concept is most prominently associated with the geostrategist Nicholas Spykman. See Saul Bernard 
Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided (New York, NY: Random House, 1963), 46-49.  
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one theory or approach that we can adopt ‘off the rack’ to accomplish this and lay a solid 
foundation for an analysis of naval posture change that is theoretically informed and systematic 
in approaching the research problem, but that also retains sufficient empirical richness and ac-
curacy to provide a detailed account. Hence, the approach that is eventually selected amounts 
to what Scharpf has called a “modular framework”48 that deliberately seeks to combines as-
pects of different theories to maximize our ability to reprise a complex historical reality in a 
structured manner and analyze it in a way that does justice to our subject. This framework, 
which is summarized in Figure 3, combines elements of neoclassical realism with insights from 
organization theory. The main components of this framework are (1) the insistence that, in a 
long-term strategic rivalry, external military threats are a primary driver of state behavior, (2) 
the realization that military advantages are created and maintained by the actors themselves, 
rather than by technological or military change per se, (3) a focus on navies as bureaucratic 
actors that are motivated by a complex mixture of self-interest and state-level responsibilities, 
and (4) the expectation that military organizations’ reactions to external threats will be shaped 
by their perception of the external environment and by the mélange of interests that drive them, 
but also by intrastate developments that are not under their direct control. 
 




48  Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1997), 30-31. 
 





The framework will be developed step-by-step in the course of a more detailed engagement 
with several strands of the theoretical literature in Chapter 2 and will be further specified in 
Chapter 3, which will also discuss the methods that will be used throughout the empirical 
chapters. While the main method will be process tracing, this will be combined with insights 
provided by a number of supporting methods that were originally developed by Cold War 
naval analysts, such as hardware analysis and literary analysis. These methods will also be out-
lined in greater detail in Chapter 3. In the next step, we will see how this effort can be located 
within the existing literature and why the synthetic approach that is proposed here will make 
a significant contribution to the state of knowledge in the field of international security and 
strategic studies.  
 
1.3 Literature review 
While geostrategic rivalries between sea powers and land powers – as well as among rival sea 
powers – have preoccupied generations of statesmen, naval strategists, and historians, they 
have evinced only sporadic interest among contemporary social scientists. The interdiscipli-
nary field of strategic studies, preoccupied first with the vexing questions raised by the nuclear 
revolution and then with the crumbing of its nuclear-centric research agenda in the 1990s, has 
been only a partial exception in this regard.49 Naval competition has been an even less promi-
nent subject in the subdiscipline of security studies more broadly. There is a significant poten-
tial, however, for combining theoretical and historical approaches in search of a better 
understanding of the phenomenon in general, and of the Cold War case in particular. In the 
following, we will briefly review the different strands of the existing literature in turn. 
  
 
49 Among the ‘academic strategists’ of the second half of the 20th century, Bernard Brodie and Colin Gray are 
prominent exceptions in this regard. The overall picture is a different one, however: In their comprehensive 
review of the evolution of the security and strategic studies field, Buzan and Hansen can get away with not 
mentioning seapower as a relevant factor even once. Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of Interna-
tional Security Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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NAVAL COMPETITION AS A SUBJECT OF HISTORICAL ENQUIRY 
Naval history is a rich subfield of military history that has brought forth a very considerable 
number of works that are of relevance to this investigation. While naval historians have tradi-
tionally focused on providing detailed analyses of naval battles and campaigns – a genre with 
a long pedigree that quite literally comprises thousands of works, which inevitably vary 
widely in depth and quality – the field has seen an impressive diversification over the last 
several decades.50 In fact, some of the most relevant works in establishing the historical context 
of the present investigation do not neatly qualify as naval histories, in a narrow sense. Partic-
ularly relevant in this regard is a small number of works that explore the history of leading sea 
powers, and of competitions between sea and land powers, in a macrohistorical perspective.51 
Equally pertinent is a subset of the historical literature that explores interrelated issues of strat-
egy, doctrine, administration, and technology development, sometimes in a very well-orga-
nized and integrated manner.52 Some of these works provide deep insights into the dynamics 
of naval posture change and the pursuit of naval competitions that students of these matters 
would ignore at their peril. At the same time, the analyst should be wary of directly grafting 
insights from the historical literature onto the Cold War case, given the radical changes in 
warfare that shaped the U.S.-Soviet competition.   
A third subset of works, which partially overlaps with the second, has explored partic-
ular instances of past naval competitions in considerable detail. Although other cases are also 
 
50  For recent and fairly comprehensive overview, see Richard Harding, Modern Naval History: Debates and 
Prospects (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016). See also the papers in John B. Hattendorf, ed., Doing Naval 
History: Essays Toward Improvement (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995).  
51  Particularly worthy of mention are Clark Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime 
Empires (New York, NY: Morrow & Co, 1974), Peter Padfield, Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the West-
ern Mind: Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World, 1588-1782 (London: John Murray, 1999); and Andrew 
D. Lambert, Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict that Made the Modern World 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018). Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History may also be 
said to qualify, but despite its undeniable influence to this day, it is much more narrowly focused overall. A. 
T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York, NY: Dover, [1894]2012). 
52 Notable examples include Roger Morriss, The Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy: Resources, Logistics 
and the State, 1755-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of 
Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy 1889-1914 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
[1989]2014); and William M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
 





relevant, studies of the Anglo-German and U.S.-Japanese rivalries – particularly those with a 
focus on strategy, technology and operational planning – have been most useful in preparing 
this dissertation.53 There is, of course, a significant historical literature on the Cold War naval 
competition as well, which is briefly discussed below. These works are often excellent in cap-
turing particular aspects or phases of a competition, and many of them were instrumental in 
preparing this study. At the same time, it must be said that the number of historical works that 
manage to combine breadth and analytical depth in an attempt to cover the entire Cold War 
at sea, or large parts of it, has remained relatively small.54 Many of the more narrowly focused 
works are of very high quality and, collectively, they provide a wealth of evidence for an at-
tempt at synthesis. 
 
NAVAL COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC STUDIES 
The second relevant field of enquiry, which is rooted in the tradition of strategic and military 
studies, is primarily concerned with the theory and uses of seapower. These works often ex-
plore the nature of seapower and the missions of navies in war and peace in fairly general 
terms and provide a solid overview of the peculiarities of naval forces and naval warfare, and 
the foundational concepts of naval analysis. Some of the broad surveys of the topic continue 
to shape current debates. Booth’s Navies and Foreign Policy, Gray’s The Leverage of Sea Spower, 
Till’s Modern Sea Power, and Uhlig’s How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and its Allies are among 
 
53 On the Anglo-German rivalry, see e.g. Padfield, The Great Naval Race; Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-
German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (New York, NY: Humanity Books, 1988); Shawn T. Grimes, Strategy and War 
Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2012); Matthew S. Seligmann, Frank 
Nägler and Michael Epkenhans, eds., The Naval Route to the Abyss: The Anglo-German Naval Race 1895-1914 
(London: Routledge, 2016). On the U.S.-Japanese rivalry see Evans and Peattie, Kaigun; Edward S. Miller, War 
Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy To Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, [1991]2013). 
All of these works provide deep insights into naval operational concepts, technology and organization. On a 
somewhat less prominent case, see Nicholas Papastratigakis, Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military 
Strategy and the Build-Up to the Russian-Japanese War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 
54 Some notable exceptions to the rule are Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 275-444; Jeffrey G. Barlow, 
From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945-1955 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2009); and – with a stronger focus on an elaborate narrative – Michael T. Isenberg, Shield of the Republic: 
The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, 1945-1962 (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 
1993).  
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the best examples in this regard.55 They are complemented by a set of more specialized works 
on tactics and operational art, which accomplish the same at lower levels of analysis.56 How-
ever, none of these contributions come close to providing, individually or collectively, a well-
specified theory of great power naval competition. 
Two subfields of the strategic and military studies literature are of particular im-
portance in laying the foundation for such a theory. The first analyzes naval rivalries through 
the prism of arms racing and arms control.57 While this is a relatively small body of research, 
it provides a distinct view of the competitive and reactive aspect of the phenomenon and, as a 
result, proves useful in examining the Cold War at sea. Like the literature on arms races more 
generally, this approach tends to direct attention towards specific armaments programs, how 
they interact with one another, and how they eventually become a contributing cause of insta-
bility and war.58 This framing is particularly well-suited to the Anglo-German naval race of 
1898-1914 and, to a lesser extent, the U.S.-Japanese competition in the 1930s. It accurately de-
scribes certain aspects of the Cold War naval rivalry, but does not work well as a standalone 
 
55  Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm, 1977); Geoffrey Till, Modern Sea Power: An 
Introduction (London: Brassey's Defence, 1987); Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage 
of Navies in War (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1992); Frank Uhlig, How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and its Allies 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994). Other important works include: Edward Luttwak, The Political 
Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990); Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 
3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2013); Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare. 
56 Wayne P. Hughes and Robert Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2018); Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2017). 
57 See, e.g.: Matthew S. Seligmann, “The Anglo-German Naval Race, 1898-1914,” in Mahnken; Maiolo; Steven-
son, Arms Races in International Politics, 21-40; Joseph Maiolo, “Naval Armaments Competition Between the 
Two World Wars,” in Mahnken; Maiolo; Stevenson, Arms Races in International Politics, 93-114; Emily O. Gold-
man, Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control Between the Wars (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity Press, 1994); Geoffrey Till, Asia's Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making?, Adelphi Paper 432-433 
(London: Routledge/IISS, 2012). 
58 For an excellent overview of these debates, see Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military 
Technology and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan/IISS, 1987), 69-131. See also Barry Buzan and 
Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Jeffrey A. Larsen and 
James J. Wirtz, Arms Control and Cooperative Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009). 
 





explanation of the complex dynamics of posture change over a number of decades.59 While it 
was, at times, marked by the immediate urgency and escalatory momentum that is often asso-
ciated with an arms race, this rivalry was primarily a process of prolonged posturing for rela-
tive advantage in which changes in force structures, operational concepts, war plans and 
deployment patterns often came together gradually. Technology was one driver among others 
and threat perceptions were chronic, with some interspersed bouts of acute alarm. Naval arms 
control became a serious concern only briefly and then only in the waning days of the compe-
tition.60 As a result, the contribution of the arms race and arms control literature will be to 
inform this study, rather than to provide the main analytical blueprint to work from.  
The second subset of strategic studies looks at the evolution of specific naval strategies 
in much greater detail, often at a national level. While there is some overlap with the historical 
literature, these studies tend to be more systematic and more narrowly focused. Perhaps the 
best example of such a study of the U.S. Navy during the Cold War is Hegmann’s In Search of 
Maritime Strategy.61 As far as the its Soviet competitor is concerned, Robert Herrick’s works on 
the history of Soviet naval strategy and doctrine perhaps come closest to providing an equiv-
alent.62 Some more recent analyses of U.S. naval strategy include Haynes’ Toward a New Mari-
time Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era and Bruns’ U.S. Navy Strategy & 
American Sea Power from “The Maritime Strategy’ (1982-1986) to ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower’ (2007), both of which engage with the Maritime Strategy debates of the 
 
59 For an analysis of the U.S.-Soviet competition that is explicitly guided by arms race and arms control con-
cepts, see Richard W. Fieldhouse and Shunji Taoka, Superpowers at Sea: An Assessment of the Naval Arms Race 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). It should be noted that this particular framing coincided with at-
tempts at making naval forces part of a more comprehensive arms control agenda and was never a prevalent 
approach in analysing superpower naval strategies. Peter Rudolf, Amerikanische Seemachtpolitik und maritime 
Rüstungskontrolle unter Carter und Reagan (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1990). 
60 For an overview of the Soviet proposals and the ensuing debate, see Ronald O'Rourke, “Naval Arms Con-
trol: A Bilateral Limit on Attack Submarines?” (Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 1990); 
Fieldhouse and Taoka, Superpowers at Sea. 
61  Richard Hegmann, “In Search of Strategy: The Navy and the Depths of the Maritime Strategy” (Doctoral 
Thesis, Brandeis University, September 1990). 
62  His book-length treatments of the subject are Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy; Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval 
Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Inheritance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989); Robert Waring Herrick, 
Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy, 1956-1986, 3 vols. (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003).  
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1980s, but have little overlap with the present study.63 The two works also share a focus on 
analyzing successive high-level strategic documents in their respective context and both draw 
on the CNA Capstone Strategy Series – a comprehensive review of U.S. Navy strategic docu-
ments from 1970-2010 prepared by CAPT (ret.) Peter Swartz.64 Although formal strategy doc-
uments, which should be seen as distinct from naval postures ‘on the ground’ or at sea, are not 
a focal point of the analysis, portions of the series have also been used as background material 
and evidence in preparing this dissertation.  
Another important pillar of the literature directly addresses questions of maritime op-
erational access and anti-access (or counter-projection) strategies. The main hub for this line of 
enquiry has been the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, DC.65 A 
number of detailed, policy-focused studies of current and future anti-access threats have also 
been undertaken at the RAND Corporation and other think tanks.66 The most comprehensive 
take on the anti-access problem is Tangredi’s Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strate-
gies.67 Though clearly driven by the policy debate, Tangredi goes deeper in contextualizing this 
debate than most other authors have done and provides a framework for understanding anti-
 
63  Peter D. Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era (Annap-
olis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015); Sebastian Bruns, “U.S. Navy Strategy & American Sea Power from 
“The Maritime Strategy“ (1982-1986) to “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (2007): Politics, 
Capstone Documents, and Major Naval Operations 1981-2011” (Doctoral dissertation, Christian-Albrechts-
Universität zu Kiel, 2014), accessed August 27, 2018, https://macau.uni-kiel.de/servlets/MCRFile-
NodeServlet/dissertation_derivate_00006090/Bruns_American_Seapower_1981-2011.pdf.  
64  The entire series of seventeen extensive Powerpoint briefings is available online: https://www.cna.org/re-
search/capstone-strategy-series. 
65 See, e.g. Andrew F. Krepinevich and Robert O. Work, “A New US Global Defense Posture for the Second 
Transoceanic Era” (CSBA/Office of Net Assessment, Washington, DC, 2007); Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Why 
AirSea Battle?” (CSBA/Office of Net Assessment, Washington, DC, 2010); Jan van Tol et al., “AirSea Battle: A 
Point-of-Departure Operational Concept” (CSBA/Office of Net Assessment, Washington, DC, 2010); John Stil-
lion and Bryan Clark, “What it Takes to Win: Succeeding in 21st Century Battle Network Competitions” 
(CSBA/Office of Net Assessment, Washington, DC, 2015). 
66 Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United 
States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007); Roger Cliff et al., Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth: Chinese 
Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011); Eric V. Larson et al., As-
suring Access in Key Strategic Regions: Toward a Long-Term Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004); Peter 
Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan Martinson, eds., China's Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: 
U.S. Naval War College/China Maritime Studies Institute, 2014). 
67 Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare. 
 





access threats that is not bound to a single threat or historical context.68 While his analysis is 
far from complete, and his focus is on analyzing campaigns more than the peacetime military 
competitions that tend to precede them, his work also provides useful background material 
for this study. Finally, there also large and sophisticated technical literature on ship design, 
naval weapon systems and sensors, and developments in force structure and organization, 
which was indispensable in preparing this study and which will be referenced as necessary.69 
All of the works mentioned above make important contributions to their respective 
subfields. However, none of them manage to systematically relate their analysis of naval com-
petitions for access to broader concerns in the security studies field. As a result, they largely 
fail to bridge the gap between the academic and policy worlds in the way that such landmark 
studies as Pape’s Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War or Biddle’s Military Power: 
Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle have done for the employment of airpower and 
landpower, respectively.70 
 
NAVAL COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES 
While seminal academic works on the subject are few and far between, it is nonetheless worth 
looking beyond the specialized naval literature and considering the subject of the study in a 
broader international security framing as well. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the state of the litera-
ture that directly touches upon the question becomes considerably more threadbare as we en-
ter into the territory of ‘academic’ security studies proper. Given the pervasive impact of 
transoceanic power projection on real-world international politics and the fact that the current, 
 
68 Ibid., 75-106.   
69 Important works in this category include: Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weap-
ons Systems (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989); Siegfried Breyer and Norman Polmar, Guide to the 
Soviet Navy (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens Ltd, 1977); Norman Polmar, The Naval Institue Guide to the Ships and 
Aircraft of the United States Fleet (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993); J. E. Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 
(London: Jane's Information Group); David R. Frieden, Principles of Naval Weapon Systems (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1985).    
70 Robert Anthony Pape, Bombing To Win: Air Power and Coercion In War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1996); Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006).  
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U.S.-led global security system is fundamentally shaped by its maritime geography, this is a 
serious deficit that must be pointed out. It is perhaps understandable that liberal, institution-
alist, and constructivist scholars of IR would not ordinarily dwell at length on the relationship 
between the availability of military power and the ability to bring it to bear in far-flung corners 
of the planet, central though that relationship has been to the evolution of the global system 
under both European and U.S. leadership.71 
However, the same cannot be said of the realist school of thought, which claims deep 
insights into the workings of power politics and inter-state security systems. In fact, despite 
their concern with military capabilities, most mainstream realists remain astonishingly vague 
in their accounts of how military power is actually converted into political outcomes. They 
also tend to practice a far-reaching agnosticism as to the “physical playing field”72 on which 
the real-world struggle for global influence necessarily takes place. Notable exceptions are 
Boulding’s Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, select passages in Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy 
of Great Power Politics, and important contributions by Levy, Modelski, and Thompson.73 The 
latter in particular offer a considerably more nuanced treatment of the specific contributions 
of naval power projection, which they effectively link to the broader debate about ‘long cycles’ 
 
71 Interestingly, economists like Findlay and O’Rourke seem more attuned to this reality than many IR schol-
ars; see Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the 
Second Millennium (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). On maritime affairs, Wendt’s construc-
tivism contributes only the idea that “[g]roups lacking navigational technology […] will find their borders 
constrained by oceans, whereas sea-faring groups will not.” Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 213. While this may well be true, it arguably falls 
short of establishing him as an expert on the subject. That said, the social self-construction of sea and land 
powers is a rather fascinating topic that would arguably be worthy of serious enquiry by scholars of the 
constructivist persuasion. English-school theorist Martin Wight deserves some credit for discussing the di-
chotomy of seapower and landpower in some detail, even if one does not concur with his judgment that the 
utility of seapower has long been overstated and that it has been “[credited] with results that were due rather 
to propitious circumstances.” Martin Wight, Power Politics (New York, NY: Leicester University Press, 
Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc., 1978), 71. 
72 G. R. Sloan and Colin S. Gray, eds., Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategic History (London: Frank Cass, 1999). 
73  Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper, 1962); Mearsheimer, The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics, esp. 114-25; George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Seapower in Global 
Politics: 1494 -1993 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988); Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Hegemonic 
Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005), 
doi:10.1080/09636410591001465; Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do 
States Ally against the Leading Global Power?,” International Security 35, no. 1 (2010), 
doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00001, 7-43. 
 





and hegemonic succession, that can otherwise be found in the security studies literature.74 
However, much of the work in question is of a quantitative empirical nature, and thus primar-
ily a treasure trove of data linked to an internally consistent – if not necessarily comprehensive 
– analysis of hegemonic systems. In a 2010 article, Thompson, in conjunction with Jack Levy, 
expands on this earlier work by providing a well thought-out theoretical account of the bal-
ancing dynamics in the “global maritime system.”75 Levy and Thompson argue that sea pow-
ers generally do not provoke the kind of vigorous external balancing behavior that is often 
seen in continental systems, because they are seen as inherently less threatening: “Maritime 
powers have smaller armies, fewer capabilities for invading and occupying, and fewer incen-
tives to do so. They pose significantly weaker threats to the territorial integrity of other states, 
particularly to other great powers, but greater threats to each other than to leading land-based 
powers.”76  
While they make a strong case that alliance building is indeed less likely against lead-
ing maritime powers, their well-specified theory obviously has little to say about internal bal-
ancing – that is, the acquisition of capabilities and the development of doctrinal concepts 
designed to offset the sea power’s comparative military advantage.77 In the following, the 
reader will find abundant evidence of Soviet internal balancing directed specifically against 
U.S. naval capabilities. It will also become evident that, even though sea powers may well be 
seen as relatively less threatening compared to proximate land powers that exert a similar level 
of military effort, the presence of an array of offensively-oriented projection forces within strik-
ing range of one’s home territory does not inspire any particular trust in absolute terms. (In 
fact, if naval projection forces were perceived as inherently non-threatening, they would de-
liver a very poor return on investment, as far as deterrence and compellence are concerned.) 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this review of the existing literature is that naval 
competition has not been – and most probably cannot be – adequately captured by mainstream 
 
74 The other classic treatment of that debate is: Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981).  
75 Levy and Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea”, 8. 
76  Ibid., 16. 
77  The differentiation is first introduced in Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 168. 
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IR scholarship. Assessing the dominant sea power’s ability to uphold its advantage in naval 
power projection in the face of organized resistance requires a more tailored and fine-grained 
approach. At the same time, we will see that relevant analytical instruments do exist and can 
readily be adapted to the task at hand. Having said that, none of the literatures discussed 
above can claim to provide a suitable framework that would allow us to analyze the Cold War 
at sea without reference to the other literatures. To put it somewhat pointedly, neither a tradi-
tional historical account, nor a winding discussion of the true meaning of seapower, nor a 
deliciously parsimonious structural theory is likely to provide the best answers to the ques-
tions we are pondering here. Rather, it is the combination of appropriate elements and insights 
from international security studies, strategic studies, and more narrowly focused naval anal-
yses that holds the promise of significantly improving our understanding of the historical dy-
namics of the Cold War at sea. As a result, this investigation treads an intermediate path, and 
proposes a modular theory that can capture the naval competition between the superpowers 
to an extent that no individual approach can. On the downside, the resultant framework will 
not allow for sweeping generalizations. On the upside, it can be expected to reflect real-world 
dynamics more closely than a reliance on sparse structural theories or a conceptual discussion 
of seapower would do, while still providing considerable analytical leverage. 
 
EXISTING STUDIES OF THE COLD WAR AT SEA 
The literature on the Cold War at sea itself, some of which has already been referenced, is 
rather voluminous, often sophisticated, and densely packed with relevant information. At the 
same time, it also extremely fragmented and much of the available information has never been 
properly woven together into readable syntheses. While this is a deficit that is difficult to rem-
edy – except perhaps by a monumental, multi-volume history – progress is certainly possible. 
As far as this present investigation is concerned, the number of high-quality sources that we 
can draw on is in the hundreds. For the period from 1946-1960, Barlow’s From Hot War to Cold 
and Palmer’s Origins of the Maritime Strategy cover much the same ground in the form of more 
 





general, analytical histories.78 For the period from 1950-1970, Hegmann’s In Search of Maritime 
Strategy accomplishes much the same thing, in an even more explicitly analytical format.79 
None of these studies focus on competitive posture change, but all of them provide essential 
background knowledge and the outlines of a narrative. Hattendorf’s collections of key docu-
ments for the 1970s and 1980s, and on the Maritime Strategy in particular, are all extremely 
useful as well.80 Swartz’s briefing slides cover some of the same ground in a different but sim-
ilarly detailed format.81 On the other hand, the three volumes that came out of Michael 
MccGwire’s Dalhousie seminars remain a key source of insight into Soviet naval strategy.82 
The same is true of Herrick’s book-length treatments of Soviet naval strategy.83 His three-vol-
ume literary analysis of Soviet statements on naval strategy and doctrine is an essential re-
source. The extensive collection of reports from the Center for Naval Analyses, which is 
referenced throughout, makes a similarly important contribution.  
Professional periodicals like the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) Proceedings and Naval War 
College Review, and yearbooks like Brassey’s Annual are other indispensable sources of insight 
and factual information about the Cold War at sea. The same can increasingly be said of the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s Historical Collection, the relevant contents of which have grown 
considerably and which is now also searchable online.84 The U.S. Navy’s own Operational Ar-
chives were difficult to access for much of the duration of this study, but some relevant pri-
mary documents could be obtained from other sources. Oral histories collected by the Naval 
Institute and the Naval Historical Foundation (NHF) can add another important element to a 
 
78  Barlow, From Hot War to Cold; Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy: The Development of Amer-
ican Naval Strategy, 1945-955 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990). 
79  Hegmann, “In Search of Strategy: The Navy and the Depths of the Maritime Strategy”. 
80  John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30 (Newport, 
RI: Naval War College Press, 2007); John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 19780s: Selected Docu-
ments, Newport Papers 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008); Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. 
Navy's Maritime Strategy 1977-1986.  
81 See n. 64. 
82 Michael MccGwire, ed., Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context (New York, NY: Praeger, 1973); 
Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth and John McDonnell, eds., Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New 
York, NY: Praeger, 1975); Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell, eds., Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and 
Foreign Dimensions (New York, NY: Praeger, 1977). 
83 Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy. 
84  Central Intelligence Agency, “Electronic Reading Room”, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/. 
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well-rounded picture.85 A range of other sources bear mentioning but, for the sake of relative 
brevity, they will be introduced in the text as appropriate. 
Overall, it is fair to say that the ground that is covered by this study is well-tilled and 
that most of it has been covered before in some form or other – for the most part while the 
Cold War competition was still ongoing or soon thereafter. That an extensive bibliography 
could be compiled during the research process serves to demonstrate this. However, in provid-
ing a theoretically informed, analytical account of the U.S.-Soviet naval rivalry during the 
1946-1981 period with a distinct focus on the competitive interaction in naval postures, and in 
drawing together a highly fragmented knowledge base into a single narrative, this study 
makes a significant and original contribution to the field of security and strategic studies. It is 
the author’s hope that this can be further built on by future research. 
 
1.4 Plan of the dissertation 
The main parts of the investigation will be laid out in four chapters. Two of those chapters are 
conceptually focused. In Chapter 2, we will review the pertinent theoretical literature. After 
first looking into the phenomenon of long-term strategic competition and the origins of mili-
tary advantages, the chapter makes the case for a hybrid approach that combines elements of 
systemic and organizational theories to arrive at the best possible balance between analytical 
leverage and empirical accuracy in our consideration of the historical evidence. Chapter 3 will 
first explicate the assumptions that underpin the hybrid approach and present a causal model 
as a guide for the empirical parts of the dissertation. It will then discuss the primary method 
– namely, process tracing – and the supporting methods, which are derived from the work of 
leading naval analysts. The evidence itself is presented in the two chapters that follow. Chapter 
4 details the process tracing outcomes for the 1946-1960 period, looking at anti-submarine war-
fare and anti-air warfare in turn, and laying bare the foundations of the U.S. Navy’s long-term 
 
85  U.S. Naval Institute, “The U.S. Naval Institute Oral History Program,” https://www.usni.org/press/oral-
histories/about; Naval Historical Foundation, “Oral History Program,” http://www.navyhistory.org/pro-
grams/oral-histories/. 
 





advantage, which can largely be traced to this first phase. Chapter 5 will review the process 
tracing evidence for the 1960-1981 period in a similar fashion, especially as it relates to VMF’s 
shift from a near-seas posture to a more ambitious, oceanic posture and back again. By exam-
ining this second phase, which in many ways proved decisive, in detail we can identify many 
of the trends and decision points that resulted in the VMF’s ultimate retrenchment and the 
U.S. Navy’s successful defense of its long-term advantage at sea. Finally, in Chapter 6, will once 
again summarize the most important findings and provide an assessment of their relevance 
from a 21st century perspective. 
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[2] 
   The dynamics of military competition 
    ENGAGING THE LITERATURE 
 
 
2.1 The challenge: tracing competitive adaptation of naval postures 
This thesis seeks to understand the United States Navy’s overall success in maintaining a 
meaningful military advantage over its Soviet counterpart across the two most important func-
tional dimensions – anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense – of an intense naval compe-
tition that spanned more than four decades. Such an investigation can only be based on a 
detailed understanding of the specific geographic, strategic and technological realities of the 
U.S.-Soviet competition at sea, which in turn shaped the processes of competitive adaptation 
that unfolded between 1946 and 1981. In itself, the recourse to some high-level theory of state 
behavior that was designed to apply across a wide range of historical settings and circum-
stances is therefore unlikely to provide answers of sufficient granularity to meet the objective 
of this study. 1 To understand the U.S.-Soviet competition at sea, we must – above all – engage 
with the historical record. 
 
1  As Krause maintains, few scholars in the field of strategic studies have embraced the so-called ‘scientific turn’ 
and most have remained wedded to an understanding of the political and military spheres that is rather indifferent 
to the requirements of formal explanatory power. Joachim Krause, “Strategische Wissenschaft,” in Handbuch der 
Internationalen Politik, ed. Carlo Masala, Frank Sauer and Andreas Wilhelm (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwis-
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At the same time, to provide a solid foundation for this undertaking, an analytical as-
sessment of the U.S.-Soviet naval rivalry should be guided by a structured and explicit frame-
work for research that is both internally consistent and open to peer criticism. Moreover, it 
stands to reason that such a framework should not itself be derived from evidence provided 
by the case that is under investigation, which would render it self-confirming, and should rest 
on a broader evidentiary and theoretical base. Many elements of such a framework can be 
gleaned from an extensive literature on the dynamics of military competition between states, 
the main strands of which will be parsed for valuable insights below. We will use these theories 
extensively to guide and enrich our analysis, which Donald Puchala would remind us “is not 
the same thing as theorizing.”2 Some of the methods we will draw on were developed for the 
specific purpose of analyzing the Soviet navy or modern navies more generally. While the 
synthesis of theories, conceptual tools, approaches and methods that this chapter arrives at 
does not reflect an exclusive attachment to any one school of thought, it is firmly rooted in the 
strategic and military studies tradition, as well as in the security studies literature more 
broadly. Couched in the terms of political science methodology, this approach can be likened 
to the “modular”3 explanatory strategies proposed by actor-centered institutionalists, who 
 
senschaften, 2010), 192. Ayson agrees that “[t]he issues that animate strategic studies reflect an overdeveloped in-
terest in practice rather than theory.” Robert Ayson, “Strategic Studies,” in The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University Press, 2009), 558. That said, scholars in 
strategic studies have frequently engaged with and used existing theories, without slavishly adhering to any of 
them. On the scientific turn in international relations, see Andrew Linklater, “General Introduction,” in International 
Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science, ed. Andrew Linklater (London: Routledge, 2000), 2-3. The tenets of 
social science orthodoxy after the turn are notably expressed in Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, 
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
This intellectually inflexible and monistic approach has increasingly come under attack even from within the ranks. 
See e.g. Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).  
2   Donald J. Puchala, Theory and History in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2003), 4. 
3   Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1997), 30-31. Scharpf argues that such an approach is particularly relevant where multiple levels of analysis 
come into play and no single theory or causal mechanism provides a good grip on the entirety of the policy problem. 
He further suggests that any partial theories will usually have to be linked together by an overarching narrative. 
See also Adrienne Héritier, “Causal Explanation,” in Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist 
Perspective, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 73-75. 
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share with the proponents of strategic studies a keen interest in understanding complex policy 
problems.4 
Given its aim of unraveling the intricate dynamics of U.S.-Soviet competitive adapta-
tion in the naval domain in some detail, the investigation is designed as an in-depth case study 
with empirical richness and accuracy in mind. In other words, even though its findings may 
be relevant in the context of other naval competitions – past, present, or future –, no quasi-
scientific generalization is intended and no direct analogies are implied.5 To provide a perti-
nent example, it is as yet unclear whether the emerging U.S.-China competition will exhibit 
similar patterns of competitive adjustment over the long term. While analysts of current events 
may want to carefully note both similarities and differences with past cases as this naval ri-
valry under 21st century conditions continues to take shape, nothing in these pages is intended 
as a ‘blueprint’ for how to compete, or not to compete, with China in the naval sphere. As 
Scharpf notes, in “comparative policy research […] the number of different constellations of 
situational and institutional factors will be extremely large – so large, in fact, that it is rather 
unlikely that exactly the same factor combination will appear in many empirical cases.”6 Any 
attempt at generalization should therefore be approached with the utmost caution and humil-
ity. As Lawrence Freedman reminds us, a failure to heed these limitations is likely to add to a 
graveyard of misplaced ambitions: “This is the problem with international relations theory 
masquerading as science: Too many variables; too few cases.”7  
 
4   Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play, 30-31.  
5   One of the few leading thinkers who successfully straddled the divide between academic IR and strategic studies 
emphasized that “the test for an academic contribution to International Relations is that it should have either his-
torical or theoretical depth.” Hedley Bull, “International Relations as an Academic Pursuit,” Australian Outlook 26, 
no. 3 (1972), doi:10.1080/10357717208444445, 264. Which kind of depth the investigator should primarily aim for 
can only be determined with reference to the nature of the research problem. As far as the present study is con-
cerned, not only is a single case study the most appropriate way to get to the bottom of the research problem – 
given the lack of truly comparable cases, there are also few viable alternatives. In methodological terms, the US-
Soviet case was selected for its intrinsic importance in studying naval competition under missile-age conditions, its 
data richness, and its potential policy relevance as a foil against which to assess newly emerging naval competitions. 
On formal case selection criteria in political science, see Stephen van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political 
Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 77-88.  
6   Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play, 23.  
7   Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 45. 
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The framework that is developed step-by-step in this chapter and laid down in the next 
is appropriately restrained in its scope and made up of four main components: a small number 
of assumptions, a notional causal model to guide our effort at historical reconstruction, an 
overall analytical approach that relies on a process tracing methodology, and a set of support-
ing methods that are largely inherited from leading Western naval analysts of the Cold War 
period. The resulting toolkit is practically oriented and pragmatic, rather than theoretically 
ambitious or elegantly scientific. It may not be free from imperfections, but it is well suited to 
the task at hand: to provide a theoretically informed, analytically driven account of the struggle for 
naval advantage in the main, North Atlantic theater of the Cold War at sea, as it expressed itself in the 
competitive adaptation of U.S. and Soviet naval postures.  
In this chapter, we will engage with the pertinent literature, much of it of a conceptual 
and theoretical nature, in detail to carve out an appropriate approach for dealing with the 
research problem. The first part of the chapter will explore the nature of peacetime rivalries 
and the origins of military advantages that develop, or are lost, in their course. The second 
part of the chapter will review several strands of the literature on the dynamics of military 
interaction between states and military organizations. While no one approach allows us to 
understand the subject matter with sufficient granularity to satisfactorily address the research 
problem, the insights that we can draw out of these literatures ultimately allow for a solid grip 
on the issues at hand. The outlines of the approach that emerges from this chapter are then 
concretized further in Chapter 3, which will also introduce the methodical framework of the 
dissertation in some detail.  
 
2.2 Strategic rivalry and peacetime military competition 
2.2.1 Long-term strategic rivalries 
Why do states compete for military advantage in the first place and why should we study this 
military aspect, rather than some other element of interstate competition? Before we embark 
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on a discussion of how to research the naval component of any such contest in detail, we should 
briefly address these questions and, once again, underscore that the Cold War competition at 
sea did not take place in a vacuum. While the competition for military advantage – including, 
but certainly not limited to, the naval element – was in many ways central to the confrontation 
between the Cold War-era superpowers, it should be properly contextualized. A frame of ref-
erence that allows us to do so is provided by the literature on long-term strategic rivalries, which 
is notable for combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies rather productively.8 As 
recent historical research has once more reminded us, strategic rivalries have been a funda-
mental reality of successive international systems throughout the last 2,500 years of recorded 
history.9 Not all competitive military moves in the international system are linked to long-
standing rivalries – but, as we will see, a surprisingly high proportion of them are. In the fol-
lowing, we will review the key features of strategic rivalries, like the one that unfolded be-
tween the United States and the USSR after 1945, and look into the role of peacetime military 
competition as a shaping force within them. 
 As is the case for most key concepts in the social sciences, there is no generally accepted 
definition of what constitutes an interstate strategic rivalry. There is, however, broad agree-
ment on a number of core criteria: a strategic rivalry is an antagonistic state of relations that is 
entrenched, enduring, and most often militarized. Rivalries are entrenched because “hardening 
attitudes and increased belligerence”10 with regard to an underlying conflict of interest have 
led to strong expectations of future hostility that are difficult to reverse, even as domestic and 
 
8   Some authors have preferred the term enduring rivalries to refer to essentially the same phenomenon. For an 
extended discussion of the concept and research program, see William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Ri-
valries in World Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001), doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00214, 559-68; Gary 
Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies 
Quarterly 37, no. 2 (1993), doi:10.2307/2600766, 147-71; Paul F. Diehl, “Introduction: Overview and Some Theoretical 
Guidelines,” in The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, ed. Paul F. Diehl (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 
1-28; Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 3-23.  
9   For an overview of some of the most consequential strategic rivalries, see James Lacey, ed., Great Strategic Rival-
ries: From the Classical World to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Also see the chapters in Paul 
F. Diehl, ed., The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998) and William R. 
Thompson, ed., Great Power Rivalries (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999).  
10   Lacey, Great Strategic Rivalries, 3. 
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international circumstances change over time. The rival actors, in effect, become “prisoners of 
the past and future.”11 Hence, rivalries that have taken hold also tend to be enduring, in that 
they will persist through many cycles of interaction that can easily span decades – in some 
cases even centuries. Finally, such rivalries are either already militarized from an early stage, 
or in constant danger of becoming so, because the parties have come to see their respective 
opponent as a serious threat to their security interests.12 They observe each other warily even 
in their peacetime interactions as “each state bases its security-related calculations on plans 
and actions it attributes to its rival.”13 Whereas some scholars have seen overt militarization as 
a constitutive element of strategic rivalries, others have required only a potential for future 
militarization.14 
Irrespective of which of these two schools of thought one identifies with, it is militari-
zation that provides the most compelling reason to study long-term strategic rivalries thor-
oughly and in depth. As a succession of major studies has found, they are strongly correlated 
with the incidence of interstate armed conflicts – more so than any other type of interstate 
relationship. Of ninety-five interstate wars they identified for the period of 1823 to 2003, 
Thompson and Dreyer find that 78 percent had among their participants at least one pair of 
strategic rivals fighting each other.15 They conclude that “rivals become disproportionately 
likely to become engaged in conflict.”16 Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson identify forty-seven 
interstate wars in the 20th century, of which they see 87 percent as linked to strategic rivalries, 
 
11    Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” 569. Emphasis added. The dynamics created 
by successive “hardline” policy choices and their importance in making major wars more likely are also elucidated 
in Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 35-55. 
12   Maoz and Mor, Bound by Struggle, 7-8.  
13   Ibid., 7.  
14   Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” 569-73; Lacey, Great Strategic Rivalries, 5. Lacey 
argues that any set of repeated competitive interactions, including in the commercial sphere, can increase the like-
lihood of militarization and that particular analytical attention should be paid to competitions in which overt mili-
tarization is avoided. While this view has practical merit, it also blurs the definitional boundaries between strategic 
rivalries and other types of international competition and is therefore conceptually unhelpful. 
15  William R. Thompson and David R. Dreyer, Handbook of International Rivalries, 1494-2010 (Los Angeles, CA: CQ 
Press, 2012), 6.  
16  Ibid., 2.  
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and twenty-seven wars after 1945, of which 93 percent involved rivals of long standing.17 Maoz 
and Mor agree that enduring rivalries constitute “a small group of [interstate] dyads [that] is 
responsible for a disproportionately large number of conflicts and wars.”18 In fact, many of the 
prominent historical cases discussed in the literature involved not just an individual conflict, 
but a succession of major wars. This pattern of serial crises and “conflict recidivism”19 is his-
torically intuitive, but – unlike the broader phenomenon of war-prone rivalries – it has not 
been studied across the entire universe of cases.20 
It is almost equally important to note that, while most wars are fought by strategic 
rivals, less than half of the rivalries observed since the early 19th century have resulted in armed 
conflict. In fact, 54 percent of the rivalries that Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson examined did 
not result in war, even though more than 85 percent gave rise to militarized disputes.21 At the 
same time, recent research has once again confirmed that the prospects of managing rivalries 
short of war are particularly bleak when one of the rivals is a leading power in fear of displace-
ment. Looking at the subset of strategic competitions that involved challenges to the status 
quo by a rising powers, the Thucydides Trap Project at Harvard University found that twelve 
out of sixteen cases (75 percent) resulted in war.22 Among a second group of fourteen less clear-
cut cases that have not been considered in detail so far, only half led to war.23 It is, of course, 
 
17   Michael P. Colaresi, Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space 
and Conflict Escalation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 21. 
18   Maoz and Mor, Bound by Struggle, 3.  
19   William R. Thompson, “Why Rivalries Matter and What Great Power Rivalries Can Tell Us about World Poli-
tics,” in Great Power Rivalries, ed. William R. Thompson (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 
4.  
20   Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics, 131. On serial crises, see also Michael P. 
Colaresi and William R. Thompson, “Hot Spots or Hot Hands? Serial Crisis Behavior, Escalating Risks, and Ri-
valry,” The Journal of Politics 64, no. 4 (2002), doi:10.1111/1468-2508.00168, 1175–98. The peculiarities of rivals’ crisis 
behavior are further explored in Michael P. Colaresi and William R. Thompson, “Strategic Rivalries, Protracted 
Conflict, and Crisis Escalation,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 3 (2016), doi:10.1177/0022343302039003002, 263-87.  
21   Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics, 90-91.   
22   “Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? Case File,” Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs, accessed July 3, 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/methodology/thucydides-trap-poten-
tial-additional-cases. It appears that the probability of escalation to war is considerably higher across all dyads 
consisting of two major powers, compared to those involving a “minor-minor” or “major-minor” constellation. 
Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics, 90. 
23   “Case File: Potential Additional Cases,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, accessed July 3, 2019, 
https://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/methodology/thucydides-trap-potential-additional-cases. 
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deliciously ironic that a motif identified by an ancient Greek historian based on his intimate 
knowledge of a single-case study should have this kind of general, enduring relevance for 
contemporary security studies research.24  
From a policy-focused perspective, the empirical evidence raises important questions 
as to how strategic rivalries can be managed short of war, be it by military or non-military 
means. Interestingly enough, outside the well-known literatures on nuclear deterrence and 
short-term crisis management, there appears to have been little systematic research into this 
problem set.25 The present study was not primarily designed with this deficit in mind, but an 
understanding of the dynamics of Cold War military interaction at sea can certainly contribute 
to our understanding of why this particular rivalry did not result in war. For the time being, 
suffice it to say that the U.S.-Soviet case clearly falls within the broad confines of the historical 
pattern: while it did not ultimately end in a major war, it was militarized from an early stage 
and resulted in vigorous military competition, as well as repeated military clashes between 
the main protagonists.26 When it is seen as an instance of potential hegemonic displacement of 
 
24   The relevant passage has been quoted time and again. Thucydides states that “[t]he real cause [of the Pelopon-
nesian War], however, I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power 
of Athens, and the alarm which this caused in Sparta, made war inevitable.” Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark 
Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York, NY: Free Press, 2008); A Newly Revised 
Edition of the Richard Crawley Translation with Maps, Annotations, Appendices, and Encyclopedic Index, 16.  
25   Allison’s historically grounded approach for managing U.S.-China relations is relevant and timely, but given 
the current trajectory of this crucial relationship, it can be no more than one of a number of starting points. His 
recent monograph is Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (Boston, 
MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2017). Rasler, Thompson and Ganguly look into some of the factors that were present in 
rivalries that were ultimately defused. Unfortunately they present the results of their sophisticated theory-building 
exercise in such a way as to render them largely irrelevant in an off-campus environment. Karen A. Rasler, William 
R. Thompson and Sumit Ganguly, How Rivalries End (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
Overall, Thompson’s own statement of two decades ago that “[d]escalation dynamics are probably even less well 
understood than the factors leading to escalation” remains in force – certainly as far as policy-relevant research is 
concerned. Thompson, “Why Rivalries Matter and What Great Power Rivalries Can Tell Us about World Politics,” 
18.   
26   It is now sometimes forgotten that, despite the sobering influence of the nuclear revolution on strategic affairs, 
the superpowers did engage in direct military action against one another on numerous occasions. Notable examples 
include hundreds of air-to-air engagements involving the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps during the Korean 
War, numerous surface-to-air missile engagements of U.S. aircraft by Soviet personnel during the Vietnam War, 
and the shoot down of more than two dozen U.S. and Soviet aircraft outside active combat zones. Although these 
clashes pale in comparison to many of the sustained military conflicts that marked earlier strategic rivalries, it 
would be misleading to claim that nuclear weapons reliably prevented the use of force by one superpower against 
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the leading power, the case is one of only four that were ultimately resolved short of major 
war, but given the small number of cases overall, this hardly makes it an outlier.27  
 To properly contextualize the military element of strategic rivalries, we should also 
review the literature’s findings concerning the substance of such confrontations. The exact mix-
ture of motivations that fuels and sustains a rivalry is, of course, case-specific. It is nevertheless 
useful to think through the range of possibilities in general terms. Colaresi, Rasler and Thomp-
son contribute an analytical distinction between rivalries that are chiefly driven by spatial, po-
sitional, or ideological concerns, although they have to admit that – in practice – all three may 
well come into play.28 The spatial component is driven by conflicts over territorial interests, 
the positional contest is about the actors’ international standing, and the ideological dimension 
is about the projection of their preferred value systems.29 In addition, they also posit a number 
of secondary types. For the purposes of the present study, the most interesting of these is the 
rivalry over access.30 Such rivalries “are at least in part about contests over territory regarded 
to have strategic importance and/or providing a route toward some desired location.”31 Given 
that one of the main protagonists was an extraregional power that depended on strategic and 
operational access to be able to shape the conflict in accordance with its interests, and to defend 
its allies in case of war, it is difficult not to see the Cold War confrontation in those terms. It is 
therefore interesting to see that some of the leading scholars in the field fail to make this con-
nection and believe that access rivalries have become less relevant since the 19th century.32 At 
 
the other. For an overview of aerial warfare incidents, see Appendix I in James E. Wise and Scott Baron, Dangerous 
Games: Faces, Incidents, and Casualties of the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010). For a chronology 
of incidents at sea, which were often violent but generally did not involve exchanges of live fire, see David F. Win-
kler, Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Cooperation with Russia and China, 1945-2016 (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2017), 215-52. 
27  The other cases that were resolved short of war in Allison’s tally are the rivalries between Portugal and Spain in 
the 15th century, the U.S.-UK rivalry in the late 19th century and France/UK versus Germany after German unifica-
tion in the 1990s. See Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Can America and China Escape Thucyd-
ides's Trap?”.  
28   Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics, 78-80.   
29   Ibid. 
30   Ibid., 79. The other secondary motivations they make out are ethnic strife, competition for resources, and the 
harboring of dissidents.  
31   Ibid., 81.   
32   Ibid. 
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the same time it should also be acknowledged that access is probably best seen not as an orig-
inal motivation of U.S.-Soviet rivalry but as a necessary precondition for the United States in 
order to pursue the rivalry successfully. As such it became a key factor in maintaining a rivalry 
that had its origins in the superpowers’ incompatible conceptions of the postwar international 
order. As far as the overall picture is concerned, Lacey is undoubtedly correct in emphasizing 
the complex and somewhat contingent interplay of “fear, honor and interest”33 on both sides 
of a rivalry and the resulting dynamics, rather than any one particular type of motivation.  
This complexity and contingency is ultimately replicated at the level of ways and 
means as well: military competition is only one of the instruments which states rely on in pur-
suing whatever mixture of spatial, positional, ideological, access, or other concerns may moti-
vate them. In many cases, commercial competition, alliance politics, adversarial diplomacy 
and propaganda will be of similar or perhaps even greater importance. All the same, it is their 
potential for militarization and the likelihood of their escalation to major war that sets long-
term strategic rivalries apart from other types of interstate relationships and arguably makes 
them the most important type of relationship to study. Clearly, the militarized aspects of stra-
tegic rivalries are of particular interest if we are to understand the dynamics that fuel them 
and turn them into a systemic risk factor for the incidence of interstate wars. In the next step, 
we will examine how military advantages are created in the course of a peacetime strategic 






33   Lacey, Great Strategic Rivalries, 7-8. This is, of course, is another Thucydidean motif – one which, it must be 
remembered, is mustered by the Athenians in defense of their extensive empire building. See Strassler, The Land-
mark Thucydides, 43. For a sophisticated engagement with this view, see Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of 
Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 65-114; Michael W. Doyle, Ways 
of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York, NY: Norton, 1998), 49-91. Gray aptly describes it as 
“one of literary history’s greatest feats of inspired reductionism.” Colin S. Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning: Meet-
ing the Challenge of Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 170. 
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2.2.2  The origins of military advantage 
At the heart of this study is the question of why and how the U.S. Navy managed to maintain 
a meaningful military advantage over its Soviet competitor. This raises a number of basic ques-
tions: what is a meaningful military advantage, where do such advantages come from, and how are they 
preserved or lost over time? The answer to the first of these questions is relatively straightfor-
ward. As even the most cursory survey of military history would tell us, military advantages 
come in many guises. Hence, this study will define a military advantage simply as an area of 
superior capability and/or competence with regard to the use of force. Following Max Weber’s well-
established definition of power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests,”34 having a military advantage can be seen as a specific form of 
power between nations (or “conflict groups”35 more broadly). Military advantages, like other 
forms of power, are necessarily relative: they can be assessed only with reference to some ex-
pected opponent or conflict scenario. Like other forms of power, the existence of a military 
advantage does not determine outcomes, it merely reflects an increased chance of shaping the 
social relationship in question – a militarized competition or conflict of some sort – in favor of 
the party that holds the advantage. A meaningful military advantage, then, is not one that 
guarantees a particular outcome, but one that allows a military organization to maintain a suf-
ficient level of confidence in its ability to perform its missions in the face of enemy resistance and 
accomplish its main objectives in a timely manner, without suffering unacceptable losses in 
the process. Because, within the framework of a long-term strategic rivalry, this is an aim that 
both sides will regularly aspire to, some level of competition is almost inevitable. 
 
34   Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., Max Weber – Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 
Volume 1 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 53. See also Richard Swedberg, The Max Weber Dic-
tionary: Key Words and Central Concepts, with the assistance of Ola Agevall (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2005), 205. 
35 Robert G. Gilpin, “No One Loves a Political Realist,” Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996), 
doi:10.1080/09636419608429275, 7-8. 
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Perhaps the most critical analytical questions that we need to examine before this inves-
tigation can go ahead is where military advantages come from – and how they can be maintained, or 
lost in turn. The fact that military competitions tend to be both an expression and a key feature 
of strategic rivalries tells us little about why they unfold the way they do. We need a working 
theory of how advantages come about and how actors in the international system can harness 
them for their strategic purposes. Interestingly enough, there are two alternative and largely 
incompatible views on the origin of military advantage in the security and strategic studies 
literature. The first is held mainly by the disciples of offense-defense theory and based on the 
idea that military advantage is a systemic phenomenon – that is, a reflection of the overall state 
of military technology. The resulting balance of advantage cannot be traced to the actions that 
any one state takes,36 but it can be reduced to a simple measure: the relative ease of offense 
versus defense. The second is most clearly expressed by Shimshoni’s military entrepreneurship 
theory, according to which military advantages are “manufactured and destroyed by the actors 
themselves, endogenously.”37 As we will see, this is a far more accurate and useful take on the 
problem than offense-defense theorists can muster. 
 
THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE AND SYSTEMIC ADVANTAGE 
Offense-defense theory (ODT) is an approach deployed by some mainstream security/strategic 
studies scholars to account for the impact of military technology on interstate relations. First 
proposed by Robert Jervis in 1978, ODT is basically an attempt to differentiate between two 
different states of the international system: one that instigates and rewards international ag-
gression, and one that militates against it.38 Which of the two states an international system is 
in depends on the offense-defense balance – that is, the relative ease of engaging in offensive or 
 
36 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (1995), 
doi:10.1080/09636419509347600, 690. 
37   Jonathan Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneur-
ship,” International Security 15, no. 3 (1990), doi:10.2307/2538911, 187-215.  
38  See Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 02 (1978), 
doi:10.2307/2009958, 167-214.  
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defensive military operations.39 In other words, ODT assumes a system-wide offensive or de-
fensive advantage, based on what technologies that are available at the time. In Jervis’ formu-
lation, “[w]hen we say that the offense has the advantage, we simply mean that it is easier to 
destroy the other's army and take its territory than it is to defend one's own. When the defense 
has the advantage, it is easier to protect and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and 
take.”40 From a Clausewitzian perspective, this is an absurd proposition. Assuming, as many 
adherents to the strategic studies tradition still do today, that there is “an essential unity to all 
strategic experience,”41 Clausewitz believed that the balance between offense and defense re-
flects the innermost logic of military conflict. He went to considerable lengths to show that, 
due to its more circumscribed aims, “the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the 
offense.”42 The central passages of Book VI of On War are devoted to this thesis, on which much 
of his theory of war rests. Starting from what Butfoy describes as their “relatively mechanistic 
approach to strategic analysis,”43 offensive-defense theorists have remained sanguine about 
the inconsistency of their views with what this considerably more developed body of military 
 
39    The core texts on ODT include Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance 
and How Can We Measure It?,” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998), doi:10.1162/isec.22.4.44, 44-82; Jervis, “Coop-
eration under the Security Dilemma”; Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A 
Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1984), doi:10.2307/2600696, 219-38; 
Keir A. Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2008); Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” 660-91; George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the 
International System (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 2002); Scott D. Sagan, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, 
and Instability,” International Security 11, no. 2 (1986), doi:10.2307/2538961, 151-75; Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Re-
lations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security 9, no. 1 (1984), doi:10.2307/2538637, 108-
46; Stephen van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9, 
no. 1 (1984), doi:10.2307/2538636, 58-107; Stephen van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” Interna-
tional Security 22, no. 4 (1998), doi:10.1162/isec.22.4.5, 5-43; James W. Davis et al., “Correspondence: Taking Offense 
at Offense-Defense Theory,” International Security 23, no. 3 (1999), doi:10.1162/isec.23.3.179, 179-206. Glaser’s ra-
tional theory of international politics also depends heavily on ODT. Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International 
Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).  
40   Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 187. What this formulation immediately lays bare is that the 
offense-defense debate has been almost exclusively focused on land warfare from the outset. This has largely re-
mained so.   
41   Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 15. 
42   Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), ed. and transl. Michael Howard 
and Peter Paret, 358. Emphasis in the original. Scott Sagan recognized relatively early in the debate that this poses 
a serious problem for ODT. Sagan, “1914 Revisited,” 161.  
43   A. Butfoy, “Offence-Defence Theory and the Security Dilemma: The Problem with Marginalizing the Context,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 18, no. 3 (2007), doi:10.1080/13523269708404168, 39.  
 
 The dynamics of military competition  
 
    
 [46] 
 
thought.44 Jervis goes on to formulate two tests – both of them rather simplistic, one may ven-
ture to say – to establish the nature of the offense-defense balance in each particular empirical 
instance:  
“First, does the state have to spend more or less than one dollar on defensive forces to 
offset each dollar spent by the other side on forces that could be used to attack? If the state 
has one dollar to spend on increasing its security, should it put it into offensive or defen-
sive forces? Second, with a given inventory of forces, is it better to attack or to defend? Is 
there an incentive to strike first or to absorb the other's blow? These two aspects are often 
linked: if each dollar spent on offense can overcome each dollar spent on defense, and if 
both sides have the same defense budgets, then both are likely to build offensive forces 
and find it attractive to attack rather than to wait for the adversary to strike.”45  
 
Much of the debate among the proponents of ODT, and between them and their critics, has 
flowed from these passages. Two concerns in particular have stood out in the academic debate: 
can the offense-defense balance be measured at all?46 And is it the objective balance that matters 
or is it states’ perceptions of it that influence their behavior?47 While these are fascinating de-
bates in themselves, and both of them remain to some extent unresolved, a more important 
finding for the purposes of the present study is that there are serious problems with the idea 
of system-wide advantages based primarily on technological factors.48 Nor is it at all clear that 
leaders view the state of military technology as an exogenous constraint that is to be accepted, 
rather than a resource that can be manipulated for strategic advantage. 
 
 
44   The potential responses from the ODT perspective are laid out in Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its 
Critics,” 688-89. 
45   Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 188.  
46   For the opposing view, see Glaser and Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We 
Measure It?”; Keir A. Lieber, “Mission Impossible: Measuring the Offense-Defense Balance with Military Net As-
sessment,” Security Studies 20, no. 3 (2011), doi:10.1080/09636412.2011.599193, 451-59.  
47  See e.g. Shiping Tang, “Offence-Defence Theory: Towards a Definitive Understanding,” The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 3, no. 2 (2010), doi:10.1093/cjip/poq004, 237-44; Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Mil-
itary Technology,” 222, 233; Davis et al., “Correspondence,” 324-25. 
48   Perhaps most damning is the fact that this has occurred even to scholars who would basically retain Jervis’ logic. 
Hence, Taliaferro has to admit that “it makes little sense to speak of a systemwide offense-defense balance in mili-
tary technology.” Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” Interna-
tional Security 25, no. 3 (2001), doi:10.1162/016228800560543, 138.  
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FROM SYSTEMIC TO ENDOGENOUS ADVANTAGES 
The prevailing doubts concerning the systemic nature of military advantages are fueled by 
some of the best mixed-methods research in the field. In his cutting-edge study of the deter-
minants of victory and defeat in modern warfare, Biddle finds that force employment explains 
battlefield outcomes far better than technology does.49 In an earlier review of ODT, he con-
cluded that “the large literature built around notions of the offense-defense balance rests on 
an unsound foundation: technological change is unlikely to induce the sweeping political con-
sequences so widely attributed to it.”50 If we accept his conclusions, which are based on a far 
deeper engagement with the empirical record than offense-defense theorists have attempted, 
there is no reason to believe that the balance would be the same across an international system. 
On the contrary, if we acknowledge that the way in which states employ their military forces 
will account for a significant part of their battlefield performance – a view that most military 
historians would think entirely uncontroversial – the balance will be different for each dyad 
of states.51 
Shimshoni raises two of additional and related concerns, which ultimately lead him to 
develop an alternative theory. His first concern mirrors the findings of Biddle’s study: clearly, 
advantages are not based on technology alone, but on a combination of technological possibil-
ities, operational and tactical force employment concepts, and competent planning. While 
technologies may eventually spread throughout the international system, the other two factors 
are undoubtedly shaped by unit-level processes.52 The second concern is that, at the level of 
operational implementation, the idea of ‘offensive’ versus ‘defensive’ strategies starts to fall 
apart almost immediately. To achieve strategic aims, military organizations almost always 
 
49   Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2006), 192-96. Lieber agrees that military outcomes do not appear to be primarily driven by technology. See 
Lieber, War and the Engineers, 150-52. This view is also notably supported by one of the very few explicit historical 
reviews. Mark Herman et al., “Military Advantage in History” (Booz Allen Hamilton/Director of Net Assessment, 
2002). 
50   Stephen Biddle, “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory,” The Journal of Politics 63, no. 3 (2001), 
doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00086, 743. 
51   Ibid., 743. 
52   Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I,” 189.  
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have to combine offensive and defensive action at the lower levels of warfare.53 The deeper we 
go into the empirics of operational design, the more threadbare the notion of “generic defense 
and offense”54 starts to look. In fact, the notion of distinguishability is problematic even at the 
lowest tactical levels, where serious analysts have long found it difficult – even impossible – 
to draw a meaningful distinction between offensive and defensive weaponry, which many 
variants of ODT also require.55 If strategic success actually hinges on the effective combination 
of offensive and defensive actions across all levels of warfare, and advantages are not primar-
ily a product of system-wide technological change but instead shaped by unit-level variables, 
ODT ends up explaining very little. Together, Biddle and Shimshoni provide the basic ele-
ments of an alternative approach that is far more empirically accurate and credible than ODT, 
and which is outlined below. 
Doubts have also been cast on another central idea of ODT, namely, that political and 
military leaders base their strategic decision-making on the system-wide technological bal-
ance, passively adapting to either the objective state of the balance or their interpretation of it. 
In one of the few broad-based empirical reviews of the theory, Gortzak, Haftel and Sweeny 
find that “[t]he perceived ODB [offense-defense balance], often argued to be the more im-
portant of the two measures, has no discernable effect on war or [military interstate dispute] 
onset.”56 Lieber goes on to turn the notion on its head: “[P]olitical and military elites tend not 
to shape their strategies on the basis of military technology, but rather to view the utility of 
new technologies through the lens of their current strategies.”57 Shiping Tang similarly be-
lieves that offense-defense theorists have it backwards and that leaders’ focus on offensive 
 
53   Ibid., 191-92. The main mechanism that adherents of ODT propose to explain broad-based shifts in the relative 
strength of offense and defense is technological change leading to increases in mobility or firepower. See e.g. Lieber, 
War and the Engineers, 34-45. If the operational impact of such changes does not neatly translate into strategic effects 
of the same nature – if, for example, greater operational mobility can also be employed for strategically defensive 
purposes, as indeed it has been – the picture is complicated very considerably. 
54   Ibid., 192.  
55   See John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 24-27; Colin S. 
Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 1993), 
Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I,” 192 n. 11.  
56   Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z. Haftel, and Kevin Sweeney, “Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2016), doi:10.1177/0022002704271280, 86. 
57   Lieber, War and the Engineers, 153.  
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military options is likely to result from their expansive political aims, rather than the other 
way around.58 If these criticisms are valid, they severely undermine the view that leader’s ac-
tions are shaped by the balance, or their perception of it, rather than the other way around. In 
the end, even a staunch defender of ODT is forced to admit that “[t]here may be considerable 
truth in the view that states try to shape the offense-defense balance to create the offensive or 
defensive advantages that they deem necessary for their strategies.”59 
Overall, then, ODT’s central claim – that military advantages are systemic phenomena 
and lead states to favor either offensive or defensive strategies across the board – does not hold 
up well under scrutiny. The same is true of the supporting claim that the observable variations 
in states’ approaches are due to political leaders’ interpretations (and misinterpretations) of 
the objective balance. Lieber believes that ODT has remained attractive mainly because “it of-
fers a compelling argument for why intense security competition among states is not an inev-
itable consequence of the structure of the international system.”60 Be that as it may, it certainly 
does not provide a compelling – let alone fine-grained – explanation for why security compe-
tition unfolds the way it does in any particular strategic relationship.  
 Conversely, Shimshoni’s alternative take on the origins of military advantage goes a 
long way in this regard. His core thesis, which is adopted by the present study, is that military 
advantages are created and sustained at the unit level by military leaders and organizations.61 From an 
extensive review of offense-defense theory and its many inadequacies, Shimshoni derives four 
elementary statements on the nature of military advantage, which are worth quoting at length:  
 
58   Tang, “Offence-Defence Theory,” 241-43. 
59   Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” 690. Lynn-Jones promises “a comprehensive rebuttal” 
(663) to this and other major challenges to ODT, but falls far short of this ambition. His rebuttal of Shimshoni is 
particularly feeble. The fact that “some technological changes which influence the offense-defense balance are not 
the result of state-sponsored attempts at military innovation” (690) is hardly a knock-out punch against Shimshoni’s 
alternative theory, which does not limit its aperture to technology as the main source of advantage to begin with. 
The assertion that the offense-defense balance, whatever its residual relevance may amount to, “is not shaped by 
the efforts of one state to develop advantages” (ibid.) will have left the critics similarly unfazed – and their case 
completely intact. Overall, the fact that this was the strongest defense that could be mustered in a seminal article 
written with the express intention of keeping ODT alive in the face of mounting criticism is devastating.   
60   Keir A. Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security,” 
International Security 25, no. 1 (2000), doi:10.1162/016228800560390, 103.  
61   Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I”. 
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“First, [the advantage] must serve a grand strategic goal, or purpose. Second, it must be 
or may be created or engineered. Third, in producing it, leaders must take account of 
factors outside their control, adapt to these, and concentrate on manipulating three basic 
elements within their control: doctrine, war plans, and technology. Fourth, ‘advantage’ is 
relative to an opponent and fleeting, and therefore creating it is a never-ending competitive 
enterprise. […] This characteristic is perhaps the most significant. I argue that there is room 
for true entrepreneurship in this competitive process, and that the military advantage 
normally goes to the more entrepreneurial state.”62 
 
This perspective finally provides us with a glimpse of how peacetime military competitions 
take shape, how they are conducted, and why they produce a particular set of observable out-
comes. Two implications of this alternative perspective stand out in particular. The first is that 
hard work is required to consciously uphold existing advantages, which will quickly begin to 
erode if the efforts made to sustain them are insufficient, or if the resources – intellectual and 
material – that are invested in sustaining them are inadequate. The second implication is that, 
far from applying all across an international system, advantages must be specifically tailored 
to one’s competitor or competitors, as well as to the external parameters of the competition. In 
Shimshoni’s words,  
“[s]tates do (or should) determine their military solutions in response to their strategic 
environment and in pursuit of grand strategic goals. Potential enemies, alliances, and the 
distribution of power constitute the strategic environment; also important are geography 
and topography, and socio-cultural constraints on (or advantages in) the use and appli-
cation of force. Always remembering that ‘advantage’ is a relative notion, a central piece 
of the analysis must be devoted to one's opponents—their environment, their capabilities, 
their military doctrine. Armed with goals and this analysis, military leaders must find a 
way to execute the strategy. This entails the construction or creation of an integrated sys-
tem of technology, doctrine, and war plans.”63 
 
In the context of a long-term strategic rivalry, the competitors will go through successive cycles 
of advantage-seeking and mutual adaptation, the outcomes of which will depend on the spe-
cific steps that are taken by each of the parties in search of a meaningful advantage, as well as 
 
62   Ibid., 197. Emphasis added. Biddle endorses a very similar view, although he places primary importance on 
force employment. See Biddle, “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory,” 743.  
63   Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I”. 
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the interactions between those various steps. This search for advantage may or may not rise to 
the standard of actual military entrepreneurship, which aims for maximum surprise and disrup-
tion, for “consistently rejuvenated theories of victory.”64 But whether it is pursued vigorously 
and creatively by both sides or not, it will inexorably shape that aspect of a strategic rivalry 
that is pursued in peacetime with predominantly military means – the subject of our investi-
gation, in the most general terms. To understand this process in detail, so that we may retrace 
it based on the available historical data on the U.S.-Soviet competition at sea, we can draw on 
several preexisting bodies of theory. As was discussed above, we will then go on to combine 
elements of those theories into a modular framework that provides greater explanatory power 
that any of them can provide individually, with respect to the case at hand. 
 
2.3 Military interaction cycles: competing theories 
2.3.1 The international system and unit-level strategic adjustment  
Where should we begin our search for appropriate analytical instruments and approaches to 
investigate the long-term dynamics of the U.S.-Soviet competition for military advantage at 
sea? Although Shimshoni would immediately and with good reason direct our attention to-
wards military organizations as key actors, the default unit of analysis in modern international 
relations is the state. Similarly, the level of analysis that is most commonly examined to explain 
the outcomes of strategic competition involves the interaction of states at the system level.65 If 
competitions for military advantage can be successfully traced at this aggregate level, there is 
no need to go into greater detail and break down the main political units down into their com-
ponent parts to understand historical outcomes after the fact. Since many of the most estab-
lished theories in security studies operate at this level, we should at least explore the 
 
64   Ibid., 199. 
65   The classic treatment of levels of analysis in the security studies literature remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the 
State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001).  
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possibility. Once it has become clear that a structural explanation will not do, we will then 
strike out in search of a more tenable, hybrid paradigm that accounts for state-level influences 
as well as systemic pressures.  
 
THE FALSE ALLURE OF BALANCE-OF-POWER THEORY 
The process by which the modern state came to dominate the international system, and schol-
ars’ ideas of it, was itself characterized by intense competitive adaptation over a period span-
ning roughly four centuries.66 The dominant form of political organization that came out of 
this this process claimed “precise, hard boundaries”67 and “absolute sovereignty”68 within 
those borders. As a result, modern states could be conceived and theorized as a “unitary ac-
tors”69 interacting in an international system that conditioned them to behave in ways that 
would ensure their long-term viability. In reality, it is difficult to overlook that the political 
and administrative structures of modern states are anything but monolithic. Even though he 
assumes otherwise in his defining take on balance-of-power theory, Kenneth N. Waltz himself 
clarifies: “We can freely admit that states are in fact not unitary, purposive actors.”70 Given that 
Waltz’s structural realist theory has long been a key reference point for explaining competitive 
state behavior in the international system and that social science orthodoxy would have us 
“seek parsimony first, and then add on complexity,”71 it is nevertheless worth considering 
what this most prominent theory in the security studies canon can tell us about the subject at 
hand. As will quickly become apparent, a detailed analysis of the naval element of an interstate 
 
66   See, e.g. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International 
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 256-66; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 
900-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). 
67   Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 244. 
68   Ibid., 244-45. 
69   Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: Random House, 1979), 118. 
70   Ibid., 119. Emphasis added. Waltz can admit this because such “assumptions are not factual. One cannot there-
fore legitimately ask if they are true, but only if they are useful” (117-18). 
71   Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. 
Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 188.  
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competition for military advantage will require us to move beyond such highly generalized 
theoretical constructs and engage the historical record using a more tailored framework. 
The structural realist theory proposed by Waltz has few moving parts. Donnelly aptly 
observes that “[t]he structuralist project […] rests on maximum abstraction. The theoretical 
strategy is to make the fewest assumptions possible and use the smallest imaginable number 
of explanatory variables. Structural realists self-consciously sacrifice richness and depth for a 
simple, rigorous theory that holds widely across time and space.”72 The basic elements of 
Waltzian realism have been stated so many times that it is at risk of turning into a caricature 
of itself: states are “like units”73 that interact under conditions of international “anarchy”74 and 
maximize their aggregate “capabilities”75 by means of “internal”76 or “external balancing”77 to 
ensure their survival in the face of opposing concentrations of power. While this intellectual 
austerity may have held considerable appeal in its own time, it is probably fair to say that 
Waltz did the realist tradition a disservice when he resolved to reduce it to the equivalent of 
“a theory of the market built up from assumptions about the behavior of individuals."78 
In effect, structural realists can examine strategic adjustment only in the aggregate, as 
the abstract product of all unit-level actions undertaken to ensure the survival of the unit. 
“Since balance of power theory seeks to explain large-scale patterns of state action over long 
periods of time,” Keohane maintains, “we could hardly expect the precision from it that we 
 
72   Jack Donnelly, Realism in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 107. 
73   Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 95-96. 
74   Ibid., 111-16. 
75   Ibid., 97-99. 
76   Ibid., 168. 
77   Ibid.  
78   Ibid., 110. Although the point is hardly original, it should nonetheless be remembered that the realist school of 
political thought originated with what Doyle described as the ‘complex realism’ of Thucydides. Doyle, Ways of War 
and Peace, 49-92. See also Robert G. Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” International Organ-
ization 38, no. 2 (1984), doi:10.1017/S0020818300026710; Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, In-
terests, and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). The radical reduction of realism to its structural 
and systemic elements was touted as a necessary step on the way to a ‘better’ kind of social science but, in the 
context of this deeply rooted tradition, could scarcely count as progress. Against this backdrop, it is hard not to 
credit William Wohlforth’s suggestion that Gilpin’s War and Change in World Politics might have made a better 
springboard for a realist revival. See: William C. Wohlforth, “Gilpinian Realism and International Relations,” Inter-
national Relations 25, no. 4 (2011), doi:10.1177/0047117811411742. 
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expect from theories whose domains have been narrowed.”79 Structural realism provides an 
explanation of why states engage in balancing behavior, but it cannot explain why they chose 
to balance in certain ways, or emphasizing certain means over others – or why they sometimes 
fail to balance at all.80 Because there is no functional differentiation among units and their in-
ternal makeup lies outside the purview of Waltz’s theory, states are expected to react to envi-
ronmental stimuli in roughly the same, predictable fashion. Structural realism provides what 
Resende-Santos describes as “a latent theory of [military] emulation,”81 no more and no less 
than that. Specifically, Waltz holds that “[t]he possibility that conflict will be conducted by 
force leads to competition in the arts and the instruments of force. Competition produces a 
tendency toward the sameness of the competitors.”82 What, then, explains the enduring asymme-
tries in the U.S. and Soviet approaches to naval warfare in the missile age? To provide a satisfactory 
answer to what from a structuralist perspective can only be described as a puzzle, we have to 
embrace a considerably greater degree of complexity in our analytical approach. In fact, as 
Biddle has argued, the very idea of a single, undifferentiated ‘balance of power’ based some 
compound measure of military power should be viewed with suspicion: “[The] whole notion 
of a simple, unitary ‘capability’ fundamentally misrepresents military potential, which is in-
herently multidimensional.”83 What we can take away from Waltz’s balance-of-power theory 
is that states will usually find it difficult to ignore systemic pressures for very long – all the 
more so in a threat-driven environment like the one that characterized the Cold War confron-
tation.84 But, clearly, the structuralist perspective can provide at best a bare-bones account of 
 
79   Keohane, “Theory of World Politics,” 187-88. 
80   For a neoclassical realist take on this phenomenon of ‘underbalancing’, see Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered 
Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
81   Jõao Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 13. 
82   Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127. 
83   Biddle, Military Power, 192.  
84   In his test of structural realism against the historical record of Russian/Soviet empire building, Wohlforth found 
that the adaptation processes observed in this case were, at an aggregate level, broadly compliant with the theory’s 
predictions. However, even in the context of this favorable outcome, he is sure to remind the reader that “[n]eore-
alist  theory  does  not  predict  the  precise  nature  of institutions  and  ideas;  it  merely  predicts  the  rough  
manner  in  which  states  will  be shaped by the international system." William C. Wohlforth, “The Russian-Soviet 
Empire: A Test of Neorealism,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 5 (2001), doi:10.1017/S0260210501008099, 213-
35. 
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why U.S. and Soviet naval forces (or other aspects of the competition, for that matter) evolved 
the way they did. 
 
TOWARDS A HYBRID FRAMEWORK 
Ultimately, we cannot begin to comprehend why the U.S. and Soviet approaches to warfare at 
and from the sea developed in such different directions without allowing that a number of 
additional variables were at play and that each of them had a highly significant impact – from 
the distinction between sea powers and land powers, to the importance of geographic position 
and historical experience, to the very different roles and organization of the opposing naval 
forces, to name just a few of the most important ones.85 To understand the processes that 
shaped force structures, doctrines and deployment patterns – unit-level properties one and all 
– in any detail, we first have to let go of the ‘unitary actor’ and ‘like units’ assumptions. As 
Waltz himself would readily have conceded, threat-driven interactions at the system level can 
only explain aggregate international outcomes – that is, the fact that extensive military balanc-
ing behavior took place between the United States and the Soviet Union.86 To claim that sys-
temic pressures alone, as opposed to a combination of systemic pressures and specific unit-
level properties, account for the massive variance in how the two sides adapted to the threat 
environment would be deeply implausible. 
As they began to recapture the richness of the realist school of thought and move be-
yond the rudimentary balance-of-power narrative of Theory of International Politics, realists 
 
85   As Levy and Thompson demonstrate, the introduction of the land power/sea power distinction into the struc-
turalist framework goes a long way towards explaining why alliance formation and balancing behaviors are far 
from uniform across different types of international systems. See Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balanc-
ing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?,” International Security 35, no. 1 (2010), 
doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00001. That said, to explain the balancing dynamics in a particular global maritime system in 
detail once again requires going into considerably greater empirical depth.  
86   This why IR theories have long been subdivided into theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy. 
See: Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (2007), 
doi:10.1080/09636419608429298, 54-57; Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World 
Politics 51, no. 1 (1998), doi:10.1017/S0043887100007814, 145. 
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themselves found Waltz’s sparse structuralism wanting.87 By the early 1990s, Jack Snyder had 
concluded that 
“recent exponents of Realism in international relations have been wrong in looking exclu-
sively to states as the irreducible atoms whose power and interests are to be assessed. […] 
Contemporary political scientists are beginning to conceive of the state not as a unitary 
billiard ball in a system of other billiard balls, but as a pivot adjudicating between inter-
national and domestic pressures.”88  
 
In time, this renewed interest in the effects of state structure and intrastate political processes 
on foreign policy behavior gave rise to a new variant of realist theory that explicitly seeks to 
account for observed variances in strategic adjustment by including unit-level variables. 
Using the structuralist understanding of strategic adjustment as their baseline, this new 
generation of realist scholars found that much of the variance in outcomes at the unit level 
could be explained by what they conceptualized as intervening variables. Their “neoclassical 
 
87   See, e.g. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1991); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Randall L. 
Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994), 
doi:10.2307/2539149; Randall L. Schweller, “New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's 
Balancing Proposition,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997), doi:10.2307/2952176; Randall L. Schweller, 
Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1998). Levy and Thompson’s articles on power balancing and the land power/sea power distinction as a further 
development of Walt’s balance-of-threat theory are also in this tradition. See Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, 
“Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005), 
doi:10.1080/09636410591001465; Levy and Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea”. Unsurprisingly, the true 
disciples of a ‘scientific’ school of thought in international relations construed this return to a broader conception 
of realist thought as evidence of theoretical ‘degeneration’. See John Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degen-
erative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Propo-
sition,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997), doi:10.2307/2952172; Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew 
Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?,” International Security 24, no. 2 (1999), doi:10.1162/016228899560130. For a 
response, see Peter D. Feaver et al., “Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),” 
International Security 25, no. 1 (2000), doi:10.1162/016228800560426. Schweller also expertly responded to the charge 
in a separate chapter. Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in Interna-
tional Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Miriam Fendius Elman and Colin Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2003), 311-47. The ‘degeneration’ argument is alive and well, and has predictably been deployed against more re-
cent, neoclassical realist scholarship as well. See Kevin Narizny, “On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics: A 
Critique of the Newest Realism,” International Security 42, no. 2 (2017), doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00296; Davide Fiammen-
ghi et al., “Correspondence: Neoclassical Realism and Its Critics,” International Security 43, no. 2 (2018), 
doi:10.1162/isec_c_00332.  
88   Snyder, Myths of Empire, 19. Emphasis in the original. 
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realism”89 (NCR) has since established itself as a major alternative to both structuralist and 
liberal theories of international relations.90 Most of the research undertaken under the umbrella 
of this relatively new addition to the realist school of thought has focused either on the impact 
of “elite calculations and perceptions of relative power and domestic constraints”91 on state 
behavior, or on the limits imposed by the state’s “extraction and mobilization capacity”92 – that 
is, its ability to actually make use of the latent power resources in its domestic environment. 
The result has been a considerably more fine-grained understanding of the strategic 
adjustment process and its observable ‘imperfections’ both  the level of theory as well as in 
terms of detailed case study research.93 The metaphor that is often deployed to illustrate this 
 
89   The term is generally traced to Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”. Rose’s first cut at 
defining the new approach was based on his reading of a number of early works that are now often seen as foun-
dational, including Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-Amer-
ican Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Schweller, Deadly Imbalances; William C. 
Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); 
Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1999). Another important, but less widely noted, reference point was Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist 
Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997), 
doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00031, 1-26. 
90  On liberalism, see: Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997), doi:10.1162/002081897550447; Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 205-313. 
91   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, 
and Foreign Policy,” in Lobell; Ripsman; Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, 28. See also 
Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 157-61. A somewhat similar approach that is explicitly 
not in the realist ‘camp’ is taken in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
92   Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, 
and Foreign Policy,” in Lobell; Ripsman; Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, 39. See also 
Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 161-65; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Fu-
ture Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006), 
doi:10.1080/09636410601028370.  
93   The outstanding theoretical work, and the best statement of an expansive vision of the utility and applicability 
of NCR, is now Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of Interna-
tional Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). A useful theoretical study that takes a more limited perspec-
tive of the role and utility of NCR is Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the 
Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (2008), 
doi:10.1080/09636410802098917. Works that notably combine NCR theory with in-depth case study research include 
Schweller, Unanswered Threats; Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan, British Foreign Policy, National Identity, and Neoclassical 
Realism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold 
War Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Paolo Rosa, Neoclassical Realism and the Underdevelopment of 
China's Nuclear Doctrine (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Asle Toje and Barbara Kunz, eds., Neoclassical Realism 
in European Politics: Bringing Power Back In (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012); Thomas Juneau, Squan-
dered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2015).  
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difference is that of a “transmission belt.”94 In the structuralist paradigm, systemic pressures 
are expected to translate relatively smoothly into unit-level actions designed to manage them. 
In neoclassical realism, any reactions to external stimuli for action are expected to be moder-
ated and, more likely than not, modified by structures and preferences at the unit level.95 To 
understand why each unit ultimately responded the way it did, we need to make the admin-
istrative and political structures of the state and the priorities set by key decision-making bod-
ies an integral part of our analysis. The focus of NCR theorists has generally been on high-
level political decision-makers – the so-called foreign policy executive (FPE), 96 which formulates 
and adjusts a state’s grand strategy and its overall security strategy. 
A small number of NCR-based studies have attempted to explain changes in states’ 
military doctrines and postures based on this approach. In his recent study of China’s nuclear 
doctrines, Rosa found that during the two historical phases he examined “different patterns of 
elite politics that dominated the Chinese political system […] have decisively affected the ca-
pacity of policymakers to develop a nuclear doctrine.”97 Because the Chinese process for for-
mulating nuclear doctrine was exceptionally politicized, a straightforward application of NCR 
goes at least part of the way in explaining the ‘underdeveloped’ state of China’s nuclear doc-
trine.98 China is probably best seen an outlier in this respect. It is not clear that the same ap-
proach would work equally well for cases in which military organizations have a higher level 
of professional influence over the evolution of doctrine, as has arguably been the case in most 
modern administrative states at most times. This is also the direction that another NCR-based 
study of a similar subject matter would points us in: Narang choses as one of his intervening 
variables the nature of civil-military relations with regard to nuclear posture development.99 
He expects regional states in which military forces have greater independent decision-making 
 
94   Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 147. 
95   Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, 58-79. 
96   Steven E. Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” in Lobell; 
Ripsman; Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, 56.  
97   Rosa, Neoclassical Realism and the Underdevelopment of China's Nuclear Doctrine, 43.  
98   Ibid., 149-50. 
99   Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 2017), 36-39.  
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authority to arrive at substantially different nuclear postures.100 Perhaps the most useful of the 
NCR-based approaches is suggested by Sten Rynning in his investigation of doctrinal change 
in the French Fifth Republic. As Rynning recognizes, even though politics may at times be the 
determinative factor, “[p]inpointing patterns of military influence is […] essential to a study 
of military doctrine.”101 While much of what he has to say is case-specific, he nonetheless lights 
the way in proposing a framework that looks beyond the foreign policy executive to the role 
of professional military officers to explain the dynamics of doctrinal change.  
By allowing for the introduction of intervening variables, the neoclassical realist project 
comes much closer to providing a viable analytical framework for understanding why a state 
adapts to perceived threats in certain ways and not others. What NCR-based studies focused 
on military change ultimately demonstrate is that, to fully grasp the dynamics of competitive 
military adaptation, we need to disaggregate the state even further. Although the decisions of 
the foreign policy executive provide the outlines of military policy, the details of a state’s mil-
itary posture are not generally determined by the political leadership itself but shaped by mil-
itary organizations’ interactions with their political masters, as well as with other military 
organizations in the external and domestic environments.102 Under most circumstances, then, 
military organizations should be seen as key actors alongside the foreign policy executive, where the 
formulation of military doctrine and the competitive adaptation of military postures is con-
cerned.  
 The most relevant examples of such an approach are provided by works that adopt 
approaches that are structurally similar to NCR, but that self-confidently dispense with some 
 
100   Ibid., 53. 
101   Sten Rynning, Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic France, 1958-2000 (West-
port, CT: Praeger, 2002), 15. 
102  Once again, Rynning states this case eloquently. Even in circumstances of limited military influence (e.g. due to 
a painful historical experience of military interference), he believes that “military officers can influence the process 
of change by offering ideas to policy-makers searching for new policies, by withholding support and thus implicitly 
contesting political legitimacy, and by drawing on the daily contacts with foreign militaries to be inspired and 
shape doctrinal thinking within national institutions.” Ibid., 17. Clearly, this case can be made even more strongly 
where such experiences are absent and where the role of military professionals in formulating military doctrine is 
well developed. On different modes in civil-military relations, more generally, see: Samuel P. Huntington, The Sol-
dier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2008[1957]), 80-97.  
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of the constraints imposed by the high-level theoretical debates in the security studies litera-
ture. A particularly rich and apposite understanding of strategic adjustment at the unit level 
is outlined by the chapters in Trubowitz, Goldman and Rhodes’ edited volume on The Politics 
of Strategic Adjustment. They criticize realists for framing “the process by which states select 
their grand strategies [as] remarkably bloodless, unencumbered by the political divisions, fric-
tions, and cleavages that plague policymaking on the domestic front. Such a view is too styl-
ized, mechanical, and apolitical.”103 While neoclassical realists would very much agree with 
their sense that “[t]he nonunitary and bureaucratic character of state institutions also limits and 
shapes the state’s ability to react to changing and ambiguous external threats,”104 Trubowitz 
and Rhodes go further in their desire to capture the complex institutional setup of the modern 
state. Unencumbered by possible charges of paradigmatic degeneration, they freely 
acknowledge the relevance of military organizations as well as other domestic pressure 
groups. Like March and Olsen in their classic essay, they see bureaucratic organizations as 
“political actors in their own right.”105  
At the same time, they are careful to avoid a cardinal mistake that has marred much of 
the literature on military innovation and civil-military relations: to unthinkingly credit and 
lazily reproduce “simplistic accounts of institutional behavior that presume bureaucratic or-
ganizations face insurmountable obstacles to undertaking self-conscious, intelligent, nonincre-
mental adjustment in response to changed threats.”106 Their alternative view is all the more 
valuable because they can demonstrate its direct applicability to the question of naval posture 
change in their preceding chapters.107 Unfortunately, from the point of view of the present 
 
103 Peter Trubowitz and Edward Rhodes, “Explaining American Strategic Adjustment,” in Trubowitz; Goldman; 
Rhodes, The Politics of Strategic Adjustment, 9. 
104   Ibid., 12.  
105  James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” Amer-
ican Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984), doi:10.2307/1961840, 738.  
106   Peter Trubowitz and Edward Rhodes, “Explaining American Strategic Adjustment,” in Trubowitz; Goldman; 
Rhodes, The Politics of Strategic Adjustment, 13.  
107  The most clear-cut example of this is Smith’s chapter, which focuses on the Navy’s capacity to formulate and 
implement meaningful conceptual and structural changes in the early 1990s. Due to the volume’s historical setting 
and interest in understanding strategic adjustment in a more relaxed threat environment, the Cold War case itself 
was not examined. Edward A. Smith, “…From the Sea: The Process of Defining a New Role for Naval Forces in the 
Post-Cold War World,” in Trubowitz; Goldman; Rhodes, The Politics of Strategic Adjustment, 267-301.  
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study, all of these consider phases in the history of the U.S. Navy that featured threat environ-
ments considerably less severe than that of the Cold War era. It is highly likely that unit level 
factors would be more clearly expressed under these circumstances than we can reasonably 
expect to find during any of the three phases of the Cold War at sea.108 Hence, the specific 
findings presented in Trubowitz, Goldman, and Rhodes’ volume are expected to be of limited 
relevance for our investigation. What is required, then, is a workable synthesis between NCR’s 
continued focus on systemic factors, on the one hand, and the need to capture the ability of military 
organizations to shape the search for military advantage within the broad parameters set out by the 
political level, on the other.  
 Such a synthesis finally emerges when we engage with the Kimberly Marten Zisk’s 
remarkable study of the Soviet General Staff’s attempts to counter successive evolutions of 
Western air-land doctrine during the period from 1955 to 1991.109 From her reading of organi-
zational theory, and of the peculiar nature and responsibilities of military organizations, she 
deduces a crucially important hypothesis:  
“Military organizations are likely to develop innovative doctrines on their own, in the absence of 
civilian intervention, when they interpret a foreign doctrinal shift as a threat to the success of their 
current war plans. Because senior professional military officers believe that their institu-
tion’s primary role is to defend state security, their interests extend beyond a narrow bu-
reaucratic focus.”110 
 
In effect, the military planners’ perceptions of the threat environment and their ingrained re-
sponsibility to counter severe threats posed by other military organizations will play a key role 
 
108   On the importance of the external threat level as a scope condition, from an NCR perspective, see: Norrin M. 
Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, “Conclusion: The State of Neoclassical Realism,” in Lobell; 
Ripsman; Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, 280-87. For a slightly more nuanced view, see 
Emily O. Goldman, “International Competition and Military Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919-1945,” in Creat-
ing Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 162-66. 
109   Marten Kimberley Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).  
110   Ibid., 26. Emphasis added. 
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in shaping organizational responses and, by extension, the dynamic of a competition for mili-
tary advantage that takes place in such an elevated threat environment.111 Given that Zisk’s 
framework was itself designed with the Cold War environment in mind, we can adopt this 
perspective with a high degree of confidence in its applicability to our investigation. The full 
significance of this outlook in bridging the divide between the systemic ‘push’ factors realists 
have emphasized and observable military initiatives will become apparent if we examine the 
search for military advantage from an organizational, rather than a state-level perspective. 
 
 2.3.2 Innovation, adaptation, and organizational survival 
Much of the debate about military change since the early 1980s has revolved around a tug-of-
war between structural realism and organization theory. In what is now considered the classic 
treatment of the subject, Barry Posen explicitly contrasts the two perspectives in a theory-test-
ing format.112 His The Sources of Military Doctrine undoubtedly set the tone for an important 
research program and, in doing so, has spawned a fruitful debate. At the same time, the main 
limitation of this highly influential work – its focus on the relative explanatory power of struc-
turalist and organizational explanations, about which it ultimately does not have much to say 
– has cast an equally long shadow.113 While we cannot fault Posen’s logic when he states that 
“in the realm of theory these explanations are competitive, not complementary,”114 the very 
 
111   For some fascinating case studies of how military organizations may perceive, or misperceive, foreign military 
change, see Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). On conceptual aspects, see pages 5-17. The prickly question of as-
sessing opponents’ intentions has more recently been tackled by Yarhi-Milo, although not specifically from the 
perspective of military intelligence. Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of 
Intentions in International Relations (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2014), esp. 14-43.  
112   Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), 34-80.  
113   Posen’s main conclusion on this count is that in his subjective judgement “balance of power theory is a slightly 
more powerful tool than organization theory for the study of doctrine.” Ibid., 239. This is a slightly dissatisfying 
finding, given that a decision to combine both, instead of conducting a rather toothless theory test, could have 
yielded an analytical instrument much stronger than either of the two perspectives individually. 
114   Ibid., 7. Emphasis in the original.   
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structure of his study stands in the way of an understanding of competitive military change 
as it is brought about in practice. 
As has already been argued, to retrace the dynamics of Cold War naval competition 
(and perhaps those of other relevant cases as well) a hybrid framework is far more useful. 
Given that our case featured perceptions of a severe threat on both sides, we can assume – as 
neoclassical realism does – that systemic factors played a rather important role in shaping unit-
level responses. At the same time, we have seen that a purely structural framework could pro-
vide at best a rough outline of the dynamics that took shape.115 The next question that we will 
need to consider, then, is whether and to what extent existing organizational theories can fill 
in the many blank spaces that balance-of-power theory would leave us with, and contribute to 
a sufficiently rich and accurate understanding of the dynamics of military competition. In the 
next step, we will take a bottom-up view of how competition is pursued by military organiza-
tions and explore how this literature can add to our ‘modular’ analytical framework. 
 
BUREAUCRATIC ESSENTIALISM VERSUS THE ORGANIC METAPHOR  
So far, it has been established that military advantages are created at the unit – i.e., intrastate 
– level and that military organizations play a more important role in shaping competitive re-
sponses to external pressures than established realist theories would lead us to believe. But 
how exactly does organizational behavior impact the search for meaningful military advantages? Ac-
cording to most statements of the organizational perspective in the political science literature, 
one should expect organizational behavior to function primarily as an impediment to military 
 
115  Kier argues that the international system is altogether “indeterminate” as far as the selection of offensive or 
defensive doctrines is concerned. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 11-12. Strictly speaking, this is correct: a structural theory alone 
cannot explain why states act as they do in a military competition, and why they chose specific options among a 
range of possible alternatives. That said, her cultural theory would lead us to consistently understate the importance 
of systemic pressures in bringing about military change, as well as the extent to which other states’ actions narrow 
down the range of viable responses.  
 
 The dynamics of military competition  
 
    
 [64] 
 
change. In fact, military organization are often seen as prime examples of bureaucratic inertia. 
Jensen summarizes this view well:  
“The modern military, like all bureaucracy, is an iron cage prone to crowding out inno-
vation in an effort to promote efficiency and existing processes. Civilian bureaucrats and 
military officers are expected to be unwilling or reluctant to escape this iron cage. This 
organizational resistance to change should be especially pronounced in peacetime, when 
there are few incentives to challenge existing routines and uncertainty about where or 
when the next war will be. Change in military organizations should be an anomaly.”116 
 
 
Few scholars in security and strategic studies have deviated from this accepted interpretation. 
According to Posen’s reading of organization theory, major change is likely only if it is im-
posed from the outside by civilian intervention or by defeat in battle.117 Even Stephen Rosen, 
who is much more willing to concede the possibility of self-administered change than Posen, 
concedes that “in bureaucracies the absence of innovation is the rule, the natural state.”118 Wil-
son, who takes a significantly broader view of bureaucratic institutions than either of his afore-
mentioned colleagues, similarly believes that “[w]e should not be surprised that organizations 
resist innovation. They are supposed to resist it.”119 As for navies more specifically, Jervis re-
minds his readers that “[i]t is a commonplace that navies are even more hide-bound than most 
bureaucracies.”120 All of these scholars ultimately ask: how does innovation happen in spite of 
a military organization’s ingrained resistance to change? At the same time, none of them 
would go so far as to claim that militaries never change of their own accord. In fact, Zisk and 
Jensen argue convincingly that significant changes in the military doctrines of the land forces 
 
116  Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2016), 3.  
117  Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 57. A clear opportunity for bureaucratic expansion is also seen as a po-
tential external trigger for innovation. While it appears to be an option in such situations, Posen finds that it is “not 
necessarily a preferred one.” Ibid., 47.  
118  Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1994), 5. 
119  James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York, NY: Basic Books, 
2000), 221. 
120  Robert Jervis, “Navies, Politics, and Political Science,” in Doing Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement, ed. 
John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995), 47. 
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of both Cold War superpowers occurred throughout the Cold War, although at different fre-
quencies.121 How are we to resolve this tension? 
 To understand why militaries are willing to adapt in some circumstances and why they 
vigorously resist major changes of the kind most scholars define as innovative, we need to take 
a closer look at what exactly it is that they are resisting. Because they have been created to per-
form a spectrum of tasks that thus becomes a constitutive element of their bureaucratic being 
at the creation, all organizations cherish their basic missions and enviously protect them from 
outside interference. If possible, they will seek to expand the scope of their responsibilities 
further, both as a defensive buffer for the status quo and as a way of further increasing their 
influence, or preventing potential rivals from doing so.122 The core responsibilities that set the 
organization apart from its rivals are at the heart of what Halperin calls organizational essence, 
or “the view held by the dominant group within the organization of what its missions and 
capabilities should be.”123 This view may not be shared fully by different constituencies within 
the organization, nor is it impervious to change over time, but the basic purpose of the organ-
ization will be quite settled at most times during its existence. Because it is at the heart of their 
self-conception and seen as critical to their bureaucratic well-being, organizations will vigor-
ously resist any perceived challenge to their organizational essence.124 
 
121  Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 180; Jensen, Forging the Sword, 3-7. 
122  Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, with the assistance of Arnold 
Kanter (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 38-39. 
123  Ibid., 27. 
124  Unsurprisingly, there is an entire literature on the interactions of bureaucratic organizations within the domestic 
environment as well. Relevant works in this vein include Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic 
Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics 24, S1 (1972), doi:10.2307/2010559, 40–79; Morton 
H. Halperin, “The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration,” 
World Politics 25, no. 1 (1972), doi:10.2307/2010431, 62–95; Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign 
Policy: A Critique,” Policy Sciences 4, no. 4 (1973), doi:10.1007/BF01728472, 467–490; Lawrence Freedman, “Logic, 
Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Model,” International Affairs 52, no. 3 
(1976), doi:10.2307/2616555, 434–49; Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bu-
reaucratic Politics in Perspective,” World Politics 33, no. 2 (1981), doi:10.2307/2010371, 234–52; J. G. Clifford, “Bu-
reaucratic Politics,” The Journal of American History 77, no. 1 (1990), doi:10.2307/2078648,161-68; David A. Welch, 
“The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect,” International Security 
17, no. 2 (1992), doi:10.2307/2539170, 112-46; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, NY: Longman, 1999), 143-96; Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in 
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 What this means for the prospect of innovation now largely becomes a matter of defi-
nition. As Wilson shows, organizations are often perfectly willing to embrace changes that do 
not pose an immediate challenge to their essence.125 That is why he defines innovation not as 
“any new program or technology, but only those that involve the performance of new tasks or 
a significant alteration in the way in which existing tasks are performed.”126 By the standard 
he applies, the successive changes in the U.S. Army’s basic doctrine during the Cold War era 
– which Jensen and Zisk explicitly investigate as cases of doctrinal innovation – do not qualify 
at all: “[A]t a deeper level, very little changed. […] Every alteration in doctrine and structure 
was based on the assumption that the war for which the army should prepare itself was a 
conventional war on the plains of Germany.”127 Because the U.S. Army was already committed 
to this task and comfortable with it, it did not resist changes that enabled it to better compete 
with its Soviet adversary. This perspective is compatible with the main findings of “profes-
sionalist”128 scholars like Stephen Rose, who have argued that major innovations are possible 
even in the absence of outside interventions or defeats, if a new task is established from within 
the organization.  
This discussion raises two important points. First, we must conclude that what a suc-
cession of scholars in security and strategic studies have discussed under the heading of mili-
tary innovation only very partially overlaps with what we have described as the search for 
military advantage within the framework of a long-term strategic rivalry. The development of the 
U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which was driven by a 
few determined individuals and involved a significant change of posture vis-à-vis the Soviet 
armed forces, would certainly count as a competitive adaptation of the entrepreneurial kind 
 
Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics, with the assistance of Laura Gaughran, and 
Patricia S. Weitsman (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003); I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign 
Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015); Bill Jenkins and Andrew 
Gray, “Bureaucratic Politics and Power: Developments in the Study of Bureaucracy,” Political Studies 31, no. 2 
(2016), doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1983.tb01340.x, 177–193. While this is a fascinating literature in itself, its findings are 
for the most part either self-evident or highly contradictory.  
125  Wilson, Bureaucracy, 222.  
126  Ibid.  
127  Ibid., 220.  
128  Jeffrey A. Isaacson, Christopher Layne, and John Arquilla, “Predicting Military Innovation” (Documented Brief-
ing, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1999), 19-20. 
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in Shimshoni’s book.129 For Zisk – and, in her telling, for the Soviet General Staff – this was one 
of the most important competitive moves of the entire Cold War period.130 It did not, however, 
involve a challenge to the organizational essence of either the Army or Air Force. If a rear-
rangement of core tasks, or creation of new tasks, is required for an organizational change to 
count as innovative, a great many cases of highly relevant competitive adjustments fall 
through the cracks. The implication is clear: military innovation is not – or not necessarily – 
the kind of military change that we should be concerned with in this study. We will explore 
this point further in the next section. 
The second point that emerges is that to understand the type of change we should be 
examining – competitive military adaptation to create or maintain an advantage over a specific 
adversary or threat – we will have to embrace a different way of looking at organizations. The 
military innovation debate defines military organizations in terms of what we might call bu-
reaucratic essentialism – i.e., their innate tendency to fight any attempt at changing their basic 
conception of themselves. The cases that are selected for examination generally involve organ-
izations fighting fundamental changes that are perceived as threatening by the senior leader-
ship at the time. Competitive adaptation, for the most part, does not involve such immediate 
challenges to the organizational essence. At the same time, it still goes far beyond opportunis-
tic adjustments or routine updates of plans and hardware, even in the short-term. The signifi-
cance of what is being undertaken is apparent to the actors involved. Cumulatively, over time, 
repeated competitive adaptation can effect striking and conspicuous changes. Perhaps most 
importantly, understanding this type of change requires us to relate organizational behavior 
to the external environment to a much greater extent than the military innovation literature 
has traditionally done. 
This focal shift also raises another very important question: what if adaptive behavior 
in military organizations is actually much more common than the narrow focus on a few major 
 
129  For an excellent overview of this development, see: Richard Lock-Pullan, “How to Rethink War: Conceptual 
Innovation and AirLand Battle Doctrine,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2007), doi:10.1080/01402390500301087, 
679-702. See also: Robert R. Tomes, US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation 
and the New American Way of War, 1973-2003 (London: Routledge, 2007), 58-124; Jensen, Forging the Sword, 56-86. 
130  Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 120-77. 
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innovations, which “were simply the most important in the history of the particular military 
organization,”131 would suggest? After all, it is hardly surprising that such mega-changes are 
few and far between, and that many of them were vigorously resisted at first. But if the per-
spective of military innovation studies is unrepresentative of how military organizations most 
often change over time and how they interact with their environment, how can we better grasp 
their behavior? This is where the organic metaphor comes into play.132 This is an analytical lens 
that would invite us to think of organizations “as living systems, existing in a wider environ-
ment on which they depend for the satisfaction of various needs.”133 In the case of military 
organizations, which are tasked with defending against outside threats, they can be seen as a 
subsystem of a larger organism – the state – on which they depend for the fulfilment of even 
their most basic needs, such as adequate budgetary and personnel. In the medium to long 
term, this continued flow of resources depends on the ability of the subsystem to perform the 
tasks it has been assigned as part of the organism’s functional differentiation. The need for the 
subsystem to be responsive in order to ensure its own success, as well as that of the organism 
as a whole, is likely to be highest where the perceived severity of external threats is high and 
where there is some level of functional redundancy in the military subsystem of the body pol-
itic – that is, where the same tasks could potentially be performed by another service.134 
Because the external threat environment changes over time, the capacity of the subsys-
tem to fulfil its assigned role in the survival of the organism as a whole depends on its being 
able to evolve. Morgan defines such evolution in terms of “an ability to move to more complex 
forms of differentiation and integration, and greater variety in the system facilitating its ability 
to deal with challenges and opportunities posed by the environment. This involves a cyclical 
process of variation, selection, and retention of the selected characteristics.”135 The evolution-
ary analogy does not depend on this process being efficient. In fact, some proponents have 
 
131  Rosen, Winning the Next War, 7. 
132  The classic summary of this perspective is: Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 
1997), 33-71. 
133  Ibid., 33.  
134  Ibid., 61. 
135  Ibid., 41. For an extremely comprehensive overview of organizational evolution, see the chapters in Joel A. C. 
Baum and Jitendra V. Singh, eds., Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).  
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themselves pointed to “the importance of inertial pressures that often prevent organizations 
from changing in response to their environment.”136 Morgan also emphasizes that “[m]ost or-
ganizations are not as functionally unified as organisms.”137 This would seem to underline the 
possibility of competition among subsystems that some military innovation thinkers – notably 
Owen Cote – have emphasized as a source of change.138 Moreover, the adaptation process is 
likely to be subject to some level of perceptual bias, which is a common feature of organiza-
tional behavior.139 To what extent biases and organizational pathologies will skew the adapta-
tion process is impossible to predict with any accuracy, but with hindsight, it would be quite 
possible to identify the imprints of such distortions. 
Overall, the analogy is far from perfect (few analogies are), but it nonetheless serves to 
draw attention to the related internal and external pressures military organizations face for 
continuous and significant evolutionary change. Participation in this adaption process is nec-
essary to ensure the systemic relevance, and ultimately the viability, of a subsystem in the long 
term. Military organizations may be able to resist demands for immediate, radical change 
almost all of the time, but they cannot afford to become outmoded as external challengers modern-
ize and the other services seek to expand their resource base. As far as the military innovation 
research program is concerned, to ignore such adaptive change because it is ‘merely evolu-
tionary’ and does not lead to some immediate recasting of the organization’s essence is deeply 
misguided. 
This leads us back to Zisk’s hypotheses about military officers’ willingness to embrace 
change in the absence of any manifest civilian intervention or catastrophic shocks to the sys-
tem. In line with the professionalist interpretation, she expects senior officers “will react both 
to perceived threats to state security from abroad and to perceived bureaucratic threats to the 
 
136  Morgan, Images of Organization, 62. See also Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, “The Population Ecology of 
Organizations,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 5 (1977), doi:10.1086/226424, 929–64. 
137  Morgan, Images of Organization, 74.  
138  Owen R. Cote, “The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The U.S. Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles” (Doc-
toral dissertation, MIT, 1996), 70-94. 
139  The classic treatment of perceptual biases and pathologies is still Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 319-406. 
 
 The dynamics of military competition  
 
    
 [70] 
 
military organization from within the domestic policy-making system.”140 In terms of organi-
zational behavior, she further expects that organizations will favor solutions that simultane-
ously increase their resource base and that they tend to react to domestic threats to their 
essence first.141 This, she believes, is because decisions to shift resources or responsibilities 
away from the organization would leave it internally weakened and potentially unable to 
tackle the external threat.142 These hypotheses are both sensible and compatible with the or-
ganic perspective we have discussed above. 
The overall picture that emerges is one of military organizations that are highly reluc-
tant to embrace radical change, but much more willing to evolve in ways that mesh with their 
organizational essence, both to ensure the security and well-being of the state and their own 
continued relevance. The latter is inseparably tied to the former, by way of two mechanisms: 
The first is their being an organic part of a functionally differentiated whole that is seen as 
being threatened from the outside and for the defense of which they have been assigned direct 
responsibility. The second is their utter dependency on resources that are parceled out by the 
body politic and that may eventually be shifted or withheld if they are perceived to underper-
form in relation to what is required of them, or in relation to what other ‘organs’ in the military 
subsystem are thought to be capable of. In the next section, we will attempt to further set apart 
the type of change that results from this cyclical adaptation to the environment from other 
types of military change.  
 
DELINEATING POSTURE CHANGE 
Given that different ideas and definitions of what qualifies as military innovation remain prev-
alent in the literature, it is important that we further attune our analytical instruments to the 
specific type of change we will be studying. In what follows, we will review three main types 
of military change, namely fundamental change, posture change, and responsive military 
 
140  Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 14.  
141  Ibid., 26-27. 
142  Ibid., 27.  
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change. All are clearly worthy of consideration and study; but the purposes, extent and organ-
izational implications of change differ markedly between them. As a result, they will not only 
occur with dissimilar frequencies and different levels of external visibility – they are also likely 
to involve different causal chains, which should be reason enough for researchers not to con-
flate them. 
The first type of military change is fundamental change, which corresponds to the “major 
innovations”143 that have generally been favored as study cases. What most clearly sets 
changes of this type apart is that they are “by definition unprecedented. Even if that innovation 
takes place in wartime, there will not have been much relevant previous experience.”144 The 
most prominent works in the military innovation literature, including Posen’s The Sources of 
Military Doctrine, Rosen’s Winning the Next War, and Parker’s The Military Revolution, have 
looked into this type of change almost exclusively.145 While these accounts differ both in their 
approach and their assessment of the roots of fundamental change, they are all concerned with 
the same type of phenomenon: the introduction of technologies and operational paradigms 
that fundamentally reshaped military organization and established new types of capabilities 
that often had pervasive consequences for how wars are fought. Essentially, this type of 
change reconfigures the organization’s essence, or important aspects of it, and is likely to be 
contested as a result. Posen’s case studies of change are the British implementation of the first 
integrated air defense system, Nazi Germany’s development of a doctrine of armored deep 
penetration (Blitzkrieg), and France’s reliance on the Maginot Line, “the first fortress system of 
 
143  Rosen, Winning the Next War, 7. 
144  Ibid., 25. 
145  Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of 
the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Rosen, Winning the Next War. Other key entries 
in this literature include: Cote, “The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine”; Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and 
the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1988), esp. 22-49; Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on 
the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). For a 
slightly dated, but otherwise excellent, overview of the research program as a whole, see Adam Grissom, “The 
Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2007), doi:10.1080/01402390600901067, 
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its kind,”146 for strategic defense. Rosen’s cases include inter alia the introduction of airmobile 
forces into the U.S. Army and of an effective paradigm for amphibious assault in the U.S. Ma-
rine Corps, of carrier aviation and submarine commerce raiding in the U.S. Navy, and of stra-
tegic bombing in the U.S. Army Air Forces. Because of their scope and far-reaching 
organizational impact, most analysts of military change would agree with Posen’s hypothesis 
that shifts of this magnitude will be “rare”147 and many would also share his conviction that 
they are a product of extreme circumstances or high-level interventions.148  
Meanwhile, Parker presents his interpretation of a change with even more wide-ranging 
implications. He sees in the coming of disciplined, infantry-centric mass armies, scientific siege 
warfare, and long-range naval forces the outlines of an epochal shift in the organization of 
violence that underpinned the rise of the European nation states and their successful quest for 
global preeminence.149 While parts of this particular account have been criticized as overstated 
or inaccurate, the early 1990s spawned a whole new debate about revolutions in military affairs 
(RMAs), which were now though to occur with much greater frequency.150 The participants in 
this debate agree that an RMA is a particularly momentous form of major innovation: a tech-
nological and organizational change of such comprehensive and disruptive nature as to render 
an entire paradigm of warfare virtually irrelevant. There is little agreement, however, as to the 
 
146  Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 106. 
147  Ibid., 54. 
148  Ibid., 55-57. 
149  Parker, The Military Revolution, 6-44. Many of the key contributions to this debate, including Michael Robert’s 
initial take, have been collected in Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military 
Transformation of Early Modern Europe, History and warfare (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).  
150  On this debate, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment” 
(CSBA/Office of Net Assessment, Washington, DC, 1992[2002]);  Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in 
Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass, 2002); Jan Helmig and Niklas Schörnig, Die Trans-
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Affairs" (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2008); Keith L. Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jeffrey Collins and Andrew Futter, eds., Reassessing the Revolution in 
Military Affairs: Transformation, Evolution and Lessons Learnt (London: Springer, 2015). The classic study of the much 
needed historical context is MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 
1300-2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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exact criteria that an innovation, or complex of innovations, must fulfill to qualify for this rar-
efied category.151 At a minimum, the thorough industrialization of warfare before and during 
World War I, the introduction of nuclear weapons, and the triumph of information technology 
from the 1970s onward are thought to have resulted in such revolutions during the 20th cen-
tury.152 While this was a highly relevant debate that, in a much more muted form, has contin-
ued into the 2010s, there is no need to add to it by introducing further dubious cases. The Cold 
War at sea did reflect the outlines of the nuclear and reconnaissance-strike revolutions, but the 
fact that these developments were taking place does not tell us why exactly the two navies 
evolved the way they did – and not some other way that would also have been consistent with the 
wider evolution of the military sphere. 
Returning to the established minimum standard for fundamental changes – far-reaching 
structural and functional change to an existing service or “warfare community,”153 or creation 
of a new set of tasks and corresponding service branch – the last century saw at least four such 
changes in naval warfare, which often featured important interlinkages: 
▪ the submarine warfare revolution of the 1900s and 1910s,154 
▪ the introduction of sea-based and land-based naval aircraft in the 1910s,155 
 
151  Murray and Knox’s differentiation military revolutions and associated, but more circumscribed, revolutions in 
military affairs manages reconcile some of the internal contradictions of the debate, but even this conceptually ma-
ture approach does not fully resolve them all. Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, “Thinking about Revolu-
tions in Warfare,” in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, ed. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6-14. 
152  Krepinevich, “The Military-Technical Revolution,” 4-5. 
153  Rosen uses the term ‘combat arm’ to denote “a functional division within the military [specifically within a 
military service, MH] in which one weapon system dominates the way in which its units fight.” Rosen, Winning the 
Next War, 7. The term ‘warfare communities’ is preferred in the U.S. naval context to describe the three main combat 
arms of naval aviation (centered on the carrier and its air wing), surface warfare (centered on cruisers and destroy-
ers) and submarines (centered on nuclear-powered submarines of fast attack or ballistic missile-carrying type).  
154  See e.g. Richard Compton-Hall, The Submarine Pioneers: The Beginnings of Underwater Warfare (Penzance: Peri-
scope, 2003); Karl Lautenschläger, “The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001,” International Security 11, no. 3 
(1986), doi:10.2307/2538886, 94-140; Lawrence Goldstone, Going Deep: John Philip Holland and the Invention of the At-
tack Submarine (New York, NY: Pegasus Books, 2018).  
155  See e.g. Douglas V. Smith, One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2013), 5-93; Stéphane Nicolaou, Flying Boats & Seaplanes: A History from 1905 (Osceola, WI: MBI, 1998); Mark Lardas 
and Paul Wright, World War I Seaplane and Aircraft Carriers (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); Mark R. Peattie, Sunburst: 
The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 1-20. 
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▪ the replacement of the battleship by the aircraft carrier as the capital ship of the world’s 
leading navies during the early 1940s,156  
▪ the introduction of sea-based nuclear weapons from the late 1940s onwards.157  
 
While some might want to add to that list, and the term ‘revolution’ in particular has been 
bandied about more liberally that perhaps it should have, these are the only clear-cut cases of 
major change, as Rosen would define it.158 Each of these innovations ultimately led to the im-
plementation of far-reaching structural shifts and changed how leading navies approach war-
fare at and from the sea. Together, they resulted in the creation of naval forces that were both 
far more powerful and, at the same time, far more relevant to happenings on land than during 
any previous period in history.  
 
156  See e.g.  Geoffrey Till, “Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American, and Japanese Case Studies,” in 
Murray; Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 191–226; Thomas C. Hone, “Replacing Battleships with 
Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific in World War II,” Naval War College Review 66, no. 1 (2013), 56–69; David C. Evans 
and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 291-352; Peattie, Sunburst, 129-67; James H. Belote and William M. Belote, Titans 
of the Seas: The Development and Operations of Japanese and American Carrier Task Forces during World War II (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1975). I deliberately do not include amphibious forces in this tally, although they do provide some 
fascinating case studies in their own right. On developments towards a fully rounded operational paradigm for 
amphibious warfare that Rosen is right to count as a major innovation, see Allan R. Millett, “Assault from the Sea: 
The Development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars – the American, British, and Japanese Experiences,” 
in Murray; Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, 50-95. See also Rosen, Winning the Next War, 80-85.  
157  The introduction and evolution of sea-based strategic weapons is well-documented, especially on the American 
side. See e.g. Graham Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). The Soviet case is poorly understood in the West and is discussed in 
much greater detail below. Tactical nuclear war at sea remains a relatively underexplored area of research. The best 
discussion of the implication of tactical nuclear use at sea is still Desmond Ball, “Nuclear War at Sea,” International 
Security 10, no. 3 (1985), doi:10.2307/2538940, 3-31. We will have more to say on this subject as well in Chapters 4-5.  
158   An excellent case in point is the much-touted Dreadnought ‘revolution.’ The development of the Dreadnought-
type battleship was undoubtedly a highly significant event with far-reaching ramifications. But while it left previ-
ous classes of battleships outmatched and vulnerable, it did not fundamentally change how naval officers thought 
about war at sea, nor did it create a new service branch or, in an organizational sense, transform an existing one. 
The idea that “[s]upremacy at sea must, after all, be measured by the number of battleships we can put into the 
line,” as the First Lord of the Admiralty from 1886-1892, George Hamilton put it, had been established long before 
Dreadnought was launched. Quoted in Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (Columbia, SC: Uni-
versity of South Carolina Press, 1999), 19. Nothing that transpired in the battleship race after 1905 qualifies as a 
fundamental military change. Had the Royal Navy fully replaced its ships of line with battlecruisers, the case for a 
major innovation would be much stronger, but it did no such thing. The battlecruiser issue has, of course, remained 
an eternal bone of contention among naval historians. Lambert’s claim that this actual ‘revolution’ may have been 
close at hand has found its apologists as well as its detractors. Nicholas A. Lambert, “Admiral Sir John Fisher and 
the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909,” in Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond, ed. 
Phillips P. O'Brien (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 72.  
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It is equally important to emphasize, however, that the introduction of submarine forces 
or naval air arms, and of doctrines for their tactical and operational employment, does not 
explain with any degree of accuracy why naval competitions since the 1910s have unfolded as 
they did. Even in the case of nuclear weapons – some would say particularly in the case of 
nuclear weapons – we need to look far beyond the initial, fundamental shift to understand 
how we got to where we are today. While a major change that is adopted by one or more actors 
will often be a starting point for increased competition, it does not in any meaningful sense 
account for how that competition develops in the medium to long term. While they form the 
backdrop for nearly everything that will be said in this monograph, the innovations mentioned 
above – which, by 1946, had either already taken hold or had already become visible on the 
horizon – are therefore not the primary subject of our investigation. Rather than with these 
more fundamental shifts per se, we are concerned with a second type of military change, which 
we will call posture change.  
A military organization’s posture is the living manifestation of its operational and strate-
gic priorities. It is the functional expression of how leaders believe the organizational essence 
should be cross-referenced with the strategic aims passed down from the political level and 
translated into (1) operational approaches and doctrine, (2) force structure, and (3) deployment pat-
terns.159 Posture change will mostly be a top-down process in which military elites operate 
these three main levers of adaptation to maintain or improve their ability to execute estab-
lished missions and protect their established organizational essence in the face of emerging 
threats. In the context of a long-term strategic rivalry, a service level effort at creating or sus-
taining an advantage over their expected opponent will express itself in repeated adjustments 
in some or all of these dimensions. 
Cumulatively, this may result in very significant changes to the strategic outlook and 
operational mindset of the organization, as well as to its acquisition priorities. Given that we 
will study naval competition specifically, we will mostly deal with posture at the service level 
 
159  This understanding of the concept of posture may not be universally accepted, but it is sensible nonetheless. 
Tang’s definition comes close (Tang, “Offence-Defence Theory,” 219).  
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and, to some extent, at the level of warfare communities. As has already been argued, repeated 
posture changes can also plant the seeds for a fundamental change. But the intention of such 
changes falls well short of bringing about a radical transformation of the organization in whole 
or in part. Thus, the development of AirLand Battle and of the technologies to support it in 
practice, may have constituted an important point of departure for what later turned into the 
so-called revolution in military affairs. But it was undertaken to offset the concrete threat 
posed by the numerical superiority of Soviet mechanized forces along the European Central 
Front, not to induce a revolution in military affairs. Ironically, that revolution eventually cre-
ated pressures to drastically reorganize the US military away from the AirLand Battle paradigm 
and get rid of many of its heavy units.160 Whatever its second- and third-order consequences 
may be, the fact remains that posture change is essentially geared towards improving the or-
ganization’s relative position within a well-understood, competitive context. To this end, the 
organization will seek ways of employing existing forces more effectively and recapitalizing 
its force structure to better correspond to the foreseeable threat environment. Whereas funda-
mental changes are rare and the organizational costs of implementing it will often be consid-
ered prohibitive by the incumbent leadership, posture change can be a product of perfectly 
‘normal’ organizational routines, or it can involve entrepreneurial efforts that do not amount 
to a fundamental challenge.161 Previously examined cases of U.S. Navy innovation confirm that 
an important entrepreneurial component is usually present in cases of posture change, as well 
as those of major change.162 The processes that collectively result in posture changes – obser-
vation of the external environment, threat assessment, operational concept development, pro-
curement and deployment planning, renegotiation of the resource base – will take place almost 
continuously in any functioning military bureaucracy faced with a serious, identifiable threat. 
 
160  See e,g, William M. Donnelly, Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force, 1991-2005 (Washington, 
DC: Center of Military History/United States Army, 2007). 
161  Pierce makes a related distinction between sustaining and disruptive innovations that is apposite here. Terry C. 
Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 24-27. His view is 
the former “reinforce the capabilities of the organization, while disruptive innovations require new skills and rou-
tines.” Ibid., 25.  
162  See Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases (Denver, CO: University of Denver, 1966), 33-
36; Bradd C. Hayes, “Conclusion,” in The Politics of Naval Innovation, ed. Bradd C. Hayes and Douglas V. Smith 
(Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College/Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1994), 91-93. 
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This should be true even where that bureaucracy is highly conservative as far as its core mis-
sions, main weapon systems, and basic organizational structures are concerned. 
It is interesting to note that, while the concern with foundational change in general and 
RMAs in particular has given rise to a targeted and sustained research program, the same has 
not been true with regard to posture change. As a consequence, the concept of military inno-
vation has become largely synonymous with fundamental change and the innovation litera-
ture offers little in way of explicit theoretical guidance for studying posture change. It can be 
argued that some works that have been framed as contributions to the traditional military 
innovation literature actually deal with posture change.163 But given that posture change is 
actually a much more frequent and pervasive, there is still a conceptual deficit in need of cor-
rection. Perhaps the most important difference between the two literatures is that the fact that 
a change led to an innovation of some kind is not necessarily of primary interest when we are 
studying the competitive adaptation of military postures. Because the latter perspective is all 
about the dynamics of interstate competition, rather than some abstract idea of capability or 
organizational progress, the question of whether a change is adequate to create, preserve or de-
construct a meaningful advantage will be much more central to the analysis. The resulting shift 
in perspective is significant enough to require different conceptual tools and a tailored analyt-
ical framework. 
Finally, there is a third type of change that has received considerable attention over the 
last two decades in particular: reactive military adaptation comprises limited, ad hoc modifica-
tions of existing procedures and systems that are often undertaken in a bottom-up fashion, as 
a reaction to immediate threats at the tactical or operational level. Recent wartime examples 
include the efforts undertaken by US and allied forces to keep their counterinsurgency pos-
tures viable in the face of escalating attacks featuring improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
 
163  Without embarking on a wholesale renegotiation, this can arguably be said of some chapters in notable works 
like Williamson R. Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996); Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, 
Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); and Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., The Diffusion of 
Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
 
 The dynamics of military competition  
 
    
 [78] 
 
during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.164 In other areas like electronic warfare (EW) 
and cyber operations, similar dynamics may take place in peacetime as well – once a new 
emitter or capability is detected, it may have to be countered immediately to manage an emerg-
ing vulnerability. Reactive adaptation efforts may originate at the lowest tactical levels. Some 
of them eventually develop into major, concerted programs, while others remained localized. 
While they can have important implications at higher levels of an organization and culminate 
in a major investment of resources, they tend to be reactive in a very immediate sense and 
usually do not result in the articulation of a positive vision for far-reaching adaptation at the 
service level. That said, it is nonetheless possible for short-term adaptation efforts to eventu-
ally spawn a posture change.165 For example, the reintroduction of the long-forgotten practice 
of convoying was an immediate reaction to the German campaign of unrestricted submarine 
warfare during 1917-1918, reluctantly adopted once a number of other approaches had been 
tried and found ineffective.166 Yet, it also led to the development of an operational posture for 
defensive sea control that formed the basis of Allied strategy and operations in two successive 
Battles of the Atlantic – and would have played a role in a third one, between NATO and the 
Soviet Union, had it come to pass. The broad ramifications of the German turn towards elastic 
 
164  On that case specifically, see Andrew Smith, Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational 
Surprise and Institutional Response, Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College/Strategic Studies Institute, 
2011).  
165  Important works examining this type of change and its broader implications include Williamson Murray, Mili-
tary Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Chad C. Serena, A Rev-
olution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011); 
Theo Farrell, Frans P. B. Osinga and James A. Russell, eds., Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 2013); Raphael D. Marcus, Israel's Long War with Hezbollah: Military Innovation and Adaptation 
under Fire (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018); Aimée Fox-Godden, Learning to Fight: Military 
Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-1918, Cambridge Military Histories (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2018). 
166  See e.g. Lawrence Sondhaus, German Submarine Warfare in World War I: The Onset of Total War at Sea (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 119-126; Dwight R. Messimer, Find and Destroy: Antisubmarine Warfare in World War I 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001). Very interestingly, Abbatiello also traces the attack-at-source posture 
to World War I initiatives. See John J. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I: British Naval Aviation and 
the Defeat of the U-Boats (London: Routledge, 2006), 59-80. 
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defense and infiltration tactics (Sturmtruppentaktik) in World War I are another excellent exam-
ple.167 Hence, it would seem that adaptive countermeasures are no less ‘upwardly mobile’ in 
principle than posture changes that provide the kindling for a major innovation.  
Having outlined and specified the type of military change that is to be investigated here, 
and having delineated it to the best of our abilities, there is one more theoretical question to 
answer: To what extent are the strategic competitors in a long-term militarized rivalry actually in 
control of the dynamic process of cyclical posture changes that they embark on? And even if the actors 
are fully in the driver’s seat to begin with, can they remain so as the competition unfolds? These ques-
tions, which once again confronts us with the prickly challenge of reconciling unit-level agency 
with the inevitable presence of structural forces unleashed at the systemic level, will be the 
subject of the next section. 
 
2.3.3 Structural accelerators in the search for advantage  
The danger of interstate military competitions slipping beyond the conscious control of polit-
ical and military leaders on both sides and ‘getting out of hand’ is a long-standing motif in the 
study of international politics. The most prominent examples of this apparent take-over of 
structural forces are of conflicts that resulted from failed efforts to manage a militarized crisis. 
Lebow has called this the loss-of-control pathway to war.168 Ever since the establishment of the 
discipline, of which international relations (IR) was itself a collateral consequence of World 
War I, generations of scholars and politicians have been reared on the lessons of the July Crisis, 
 
167  See Timothy T. Lupfer, “The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First 
World War” (Leavenworth Paper No. 4, U.S. Army Command and Staff College/Combat Studies Institute, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, 1981); Patrick T. Stackpole, “German Tactics in the "Michael" Offensive” (M.A. dissertation, U.S. 
Army Command and Staff College, 1993); David T. Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Opera-
tional Level of War (London: Routledge, 2006); Biddle, Military Power, 78-107. 
168  Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 
75-103. 
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as they were put forth in such landmark works as Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August.169 
Other accounts have adopted a macro-perspective of this key event and have emphasized that 
powerful structural forces were at play long before the descent into crisis. Some have empha-
sized what has more recently been framed as the Thucydides trap, or something close to it.170 A 
second strand of the literature has examined the armaments policies of the great powers, and 
the Anglo-German naval arms race in particular.171 As Mulligan has aptly summarized, the 
basic proposition is that “[t]he arms race before the First World War was a fundamental struc-
tural problem in the international system, which undermined peace between the great pow-
ers.”172 The exact contribution of the naval race between Britain and Germany in the eventual 
march to war is impossible to determine, but it has traditionally been seen as no less important 
 
169  Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (London: Penguin, 2014[1962]). John F. Kennedy famously used his per-
sonal read-out of Guns of August as a heuristic before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis. See Richard E. Neustadt 
and Ernest R. May, Thinking In Time: The Uses Of History For Decision Makers (New York, NY: Free Press, 1986), 15. 
He also had copies “placed in every one of the officers’ day rooms on U.S. military bases around the world.” Richard 
Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1993), 306. The loss-of-control theory of the 
entry into World War I has seen a recent revival, notably in Christopher M. Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe 
Went to War in 1914 (London: Penguin, 2014). Other notable contributions have questioned this narrative and em-
phasized the very considerable degree of fully conscious agency that was involved in precipitating the war. Partic-
ularly valuable is Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).  
170  See fn. 22 above. For Allison’s take on World War I, see Allison, Destined for War, 55-87. For an interpretation 
from the perspective of the strategic rivalries literature, see Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Strategic 
Rivalries and Complex Causality in 1914,” in The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-
making, ed. Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 65-86.  
171  Perhaps the definitive work in this tradition is David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-
1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). See also David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First 
World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). On the naval race more specifically, see E. L. Wood-
ward, Great Britain and the German Navy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935); Arthur J. Marder, From the Dread-
nought to Scapa Flow: Volume 1: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press/Seaforth, 2013 [1962]); Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet 
(London: Macdonald, 1966); Volker Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (London: Macmillan, 1973); 
Barry H. Steiner, Arms Races, Diplomacy, and Recurring Behavior: Lessons from Two Cases (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 
1973), SAGE Professional Paper No. 2; Peter Padfield, The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-
1914 (New York, NY: D. McKay, 1974); Holger H. Herwig, "Luxury" Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918 
(New York, NY: Humanity Books, 1987); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 
(New York, NY: Humanity Books, 1988); Grant T. Hammond, Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in International 
Politics, 1840-1991, Studies in international relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993); 
N.A.M. Rodger, “Deutsch-englische Flottenrivalität, 1960-1914,” in Skagerrakschlacht: Vorgeschichte, Ereignis, Verar-
beitung, ed. Michael Epkenhans, Jörg Hillmann and Frank Nägler (München: Oldenbourg, 2011); Matthew S. Selig-
mann, “The Anglo-German Naval Race, 1898-1914,” in Mahnken; Maiolo; Stevenson, Arms Races in International 
Politics, 21-40; Matthew S. Seligmann, Frank Nägler and Michael Epkenhans, eds., The Naval Route to the Abyss: The 
Anglo-German Naval Race 1895-1914 (London: Routledge, 2016). 
172  William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 126.  
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than the continental arms race. This strand of the literature is of particular interest to us, for 
two reasons. The first reason is that it has a direct bearing on our assessment of the search for 
military advantage and of the role of structure and agency within it. The second is that it has 
been explicitly argued that the U.S.-Soviet rivalry at sea constituted a naval arms race, which 
would further increase the relevance and applicability of any findings from existing historical 
case study work.173 
There are two partially overlapping phenomena to discuss here: The first is the security 
dilemma, which may induce states to see each other’s defensive preparations as potentially ag-
gressive. The second is the arms dynamic more specifically, which can potentially result in self-
sustaining patterns of action and reaction, and may leave the contenders with an irrational 
superabundance of certain types of armaments in exchange for reduced security all around. 
Together, these related debates provide several important, if circumscribed, insights.  
 
THE WAGES OF FEAR 
Can states’ responses to perceived military threats ever be fully rational and calculated? The 
findings of a century of security and strategic studies research suggest that the pervasive pres-
ence of uncertainty and fear in interstate relations make a perfectly balanced response to an-
other state’s military initiatives perhaps the least likely outcome of all – even if we were to 
implausibly put the irrationalities of organizational behavior and the frailties of human deci-
sion-making to one side for a moment. Because the stakes in a militarized competition between 
states are bound to be high and the consequences of underreaction are potentially catastrophic, 
overreaction is always a distinct possibility. On the other hand, a strong reaction designed to 
deter aggression may well end up exacerbating tensions and heightening insecurity overall – 
especially if one’s counterpart did not, in fact, harbor any aggressive military designs to begin 
 
173  This argument is most explicitly laid out in Richard W. Fieldhouse and Shunji Taoka, Superpowers at Sea: An 
Assessment of the Naval Arms Race (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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with. The structural difficulty of getting an armed opponent’s intentions right based on incom-
plete and possibly contradictory information has long been theorized as the security dilemma.174 
Tang has accurately described this as “one of the most important theoretical ideas in interna-
tional relations.”175 John Herz’s original formulation of that dilemma is still worth quoting at 
length: 
“Groups or individuals living [alongside each other without being organized into a 
higher unity] must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being at-
tacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to 
attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order 
to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure 
and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in 
such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of se-
curity and power accumulation is on.”176 
 
The literature is rich in variations on this theme, but the basic ingredients – anarchy, “irreduc-
ible uncertainty,”177 cascading fear178, action and reaction – are always the same. Credit for the 
pithiest framing of the military implications, and for the clearest linkage of the security di-
lemma and arms racing logics, should go to Waltz’s version, “in which states, unsure of one 
another’s intentions, arm for the sake of security and in doing so set a vicious circle in motion. 
Having armed for the sake of security, states feel less secure and buy more arms because the means 
to anyone’s security is a threat to someone else who in turn responds by arming.”179 While some 
 
174  On the security dilemma in general, see John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” 
World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950), doi:10.2307/2009187; Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” Charles L. 
Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997), doi:10.1017/S0043887100014763, 171-201; 
Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009), 
doi:10.1080/09636410903133050, 587-623; Evan B. Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, 
Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security 31, no. 2 (2006), doi:10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.151, 
151-85; Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics (Ba-
singstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). On the question of perceptions, Jervis’ classic account of spiral and deterrence 
logics remains very impressive. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 58-113.  
175  Tang, “The Security Dilemma,” 587.  
176  Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” 157. 
177  Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” 195.   
178  On concepts of fear in modern realist thought, see Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, Realism and Fear in Interna-
tional Relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).  
179  Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 186. Emphasis added.  
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thoughtful criticisms of have been offered over the years, none have sought to dispel the notion 
that security dilemmas do occur and that they can contribute to a fraying of relations that may 
then result in an extended competition and, with some probability, a military conflict down 
the line.180  
One basic conceptual problem that remains unresolved is that the security dilemma 
can be variously interpreted as a cause, a catalyst, or a symptom of militarized competition – 
perhaps even all of the above, and all at once. ‘Defensive’ realists have often seen it as a source 
of conflicts that could otherwise be prevented.181 Conversely, ‘offensive’ realists would em-
phasize the essential rationality of expansionist security strategies. For this second group of 
thinkers, the security dilemma merely exacerbates patterns of competition between power-
maximizing states that are, for all intents and purposes, inescapable.182 For the purposes of this 
study, we can state with some confidence that the search for security provides only a partial 
explanation of superpower behavior. As will become apparent, we find a thorough blend of 
offensive and defensive motives on both sides of the Cold War confrontation – both in the 
lead-up to, and in the course of, the long-term strategic competition.183 Hence, at the levels of 
both grand strategy and national military strategy, the security dilemma is better understood 
as a contributing factor, rather than a standalone guide to a complex and multilayered set of 
interactions. Interestingly enough, it is at the level of naval postures that we find the most 
convincing evidence of a collision of essentially defensive considerations. Contrary to Booth 
and Wheeler’s interpretation in their state-of-the-art 2008 study, this also implies the dilemma 
of interpretation does not come to an end once the competitors have identified one another as 
a strategic challenge.184 We will explore this aspect further in the next chapter. 
 
180  Constructivists, in particular, have argued that security dilemmas are largely self-imposed and avoidable. See 
e.g. Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995), 
doi:10.2307/2539217, 77.  
181  Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 187-88. For a study of the crucial July Crisis case from this 
perspective, see Jack L. Snyder, “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914,” in Psychology and Deterrence, ed. 
Robert Jervis, Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 153-
179. 
182  John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001), 35-36. 
183  Directly on this issue, from a standard security dilemma perspective, see Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a 
Security Dilemma?,” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 1 (2001), doi:10.1162/15203970151032146.  
184   Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, 9-10.  
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Another serious issue that needs to be addressed in the context of this present study is 
to do with Jervis’ idea that the severity of the security dilemma is modulated by the state of 
the offense-defense balance.185 Given that we have rejected the idea of systemic military ad-
vantages as empirically untenable, can we say anything about the state of the competition and its 
impact at the level of the security dilemma? Here, the fact that the security dilemma has as its 
reference point a dyadic constellation, rather than the system as a whole, works very much in 
favor of the perspective adopted here. The key to bringing security dilemma thinking into our 
modular analytical framework is Biddle’s finding that “different pairs of potential opponents 
face different offense-defense balances.”186 In fact, as Shimshoni points out, a military ad-
vantage might only apply to some partial aspect of a dyadic competition or only under some 
circumstances. As a result, there could be a number of different offense-defense balances exist-
ing in parallel for each dyad, depending on the operational sphere and the scenario in ques-
tion.187 In either case, if we accept that the balance is determined by the interaction of the 
opponents’ postures in each dyadic constellation, we can also retain the link to the security 
dilemma, as far as that particular dyad is concerned.  
This rejection of a systemic deus ex machina – in the form of a priori defense dominance 
and the even more problematic idea of distinguishability of defensive weaponry – also has a 
bearing on the question of whether security dilemmas can be overcome at all, and if they can 
be overcome, how. Offensive realists arguably take the strongest position on this issue, with 
Mearsheimer declaring that “little can be done to ameliorate the security dilemma.”188 Biddle 
himself does see a potential for its mitigation, but not for elimination.189 Starting from his dy-
adic theory, he concludes that “states cannot signal benign intentions unambiguously via their 
military policies. The strategic choices identified here as most defense-conducive require states 
to implement tactics that could also enable successful attack against neighbors who fail to avail 
 
185   Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 186-214; See also Marco Nilsson, “Offense–Defense Balance, 
War Duration, and the Security Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 3 (2012), 
doi:10.1177/0022002712438350, 467-89.  
186   Biddle, “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory,” 743. 
187   Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I,” 189. 
188   Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 36.  
189   Biddle, “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory,” 769.  
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themselves of appropriate strategies and tactics themselves.”190 While we should not expect to 
be able to simply transpose this finding to the naval domain, we will explore the implications 
of the dyadic perspective for the Cold War naval case in the following chapters.  
Not entirely surprisingly, Booth and Wheeler provide a more pluralistic, and altogether 
more optimistic, set of answers in their inclusive review of security dilemma thinking. In fact, 
they devote much of their study to what they call mitigator and transcender logics found in 
English School/institutionalist and emancipatory accounts, respectively.191 Their assessment 
that “the security dilemma cannot ultimately be escaped, but it can be transcended”192 is worth 
restating. Their advocacy for what they call “security dilemma sensibility”193 is particularly 
well-taken and relevant far beyond the academic debate. However, as far as entrenched rival-
ries are concerned, the grounds for optimism on this count are very limited. While major wars 
are never structurally preordained – and as a result can often be avoided, be it as a result of 
sensible competitive measures that make military conflict less attractive or of cooperative 
schemes – the underlying, severe and broad-based conflicts of interest are often intractable. 
Even if the security dilemma itself can indeed be transcended, which Biddle and others are 
skeptical about for good reasons, the grounds for competition and conflict would remain.194 
For the most part, then, we should expect regime- and trust-building measures to improve the 
climate within which competitions are being pursued, with the attendant positive side effects, 
rather than to resolve or transform militarized rivalries as such. 
Finally, it is important to clarify how the potential presence of a security dilemma will 
figure in our hybrid model of military competition, which is populated by military organiza-
tions that are interacting with one another and their respective domestic environments based 
on a combination of threat-based and organizational considerations. As seen from this per-
spective, it is certainly possible – even likely – that the security dilemma will be one of the 
 
190   Ibid. 
191   Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, 14-18, 83-257.  
192   Ibid., 296. 
193   Ibid. 
194   For a discussion of conflicts of interest and the need to see them as conceptually distinct from the security 
dilemma, even from a defensive realist perspective, see Tang, “The Security Dilemma,” 598-603. 
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structural drivers that provide high-level motivations for a search for military advantage. 
Moreover, the security dilemma may also directly come into play at the level of naval postures 
that we are primarily concerned with. At the same time, this is entirely compatible with our 
expectation that structural factors will not, in any real sense, account for the content of unit-
level responses to the security environment, which will be determined by the hybrid causal 
chain outlined above (and further clarified below). In the next subsection, we will weigh the 
possible contributions of the closely-related literature on the security dilemma at sea and arms 
races. 
 
A NAVAL ARMS RACE?  
The arms race phenomenon has been a subject of extensive study in both security and strategic 
studies, and for good reason. According to Buzan’s succinct take on the subject, “arms racing 
lies at the heart of what Strategic Studies is about: the way the instruments of force affect rela-
tions among the states that possess them.”195 The primary concern of the debate about arms 
races, which we have already traced to a lasting preoccupation with the origins of World War 
I, has generally been with their impact on the likelihood of conflict. The outcomes of this long-
standing research effort are much less uniform than one might expect. While some scholars 
have gone so far as to claim that arms races almost always lead to war,196 others have presented 
a much more nuanced picture, in which intense arms competition has sometimes made wars 
 
195   Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan/IISS, 1987), 71.  
196   This is the position that Richardson took in his classic study, which also outlined one of the first formal, math-
ematical models of arms races. See Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and 
Origins of War, 1960 vols. (Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood Press). On Richardson’s approach, see also Michael D. Intri-
ligator and Dagobert L. Brito, “Richardsonian Arms Race Models,” in Midlarsky, Handbook of War Studies, 219-38; 
Craig Etcheson, Arms Race Theory: Strategy and Structure of Behavior (New York, NY: Greenwood, 1989). For a some-
what less extreme version of the same position, see Michael D. Wallace, “Arms Races and Escalation: Some New 
Evidence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 1 (1979), doi:10.1177/002200277902300101, 3-16; Michael D. Wallace, 
“Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses,” International Studies Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1982), 
doi:10.2307/2600598, 37-56. 
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more likely and sometimes not.197 Hammond’s account is significant for challenging the com-
mon view that arms races’ net effect is usually negative altogether, and claiming that their 
effects have just as often been stabilizing.198 Glaser does not go quite as far, but agrees that 
arms racing can be a rational strategy and that “failing to build up arms can sometimes reduce 
a state’s security.”199 Overall, the state-of-the-art in arms race research still presents a highly 
ambiguous picture as far as this crucial problem is concerned. 
This picture is further confounded by the fact that arms races are believed to be closely 
linked to the phenomenon of strategic rivalries, which we have identified as a set of particu-
larly war-prone interstate dyads above. It is not immediately apparent whether, and to what 
extent, arms races are responsible for this outcome. After all, “[i]t is political antagonism […] 
that defines the risk of war. Military competition is merely a symptom.”200 Even if one were to 
reject this basic reality, Colaresi and Thompson convincingly argue that an arms build-up is 
usually only one of a number of significant factors in the lead-up to a conflict, and that the 
exact contribution of each of those factors is extremely difficult to sort out.201 Their preliminary 
empirical finding, which should be taken with several grains of salt, is that competitive arms 
build-ups are associated with an increased risk of war only when they take place in a rivalry 
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setting that features recurrent crises.202 In another ambitious study of strategic rivalries – spe-
cifically those that involved high-intensity conventional arms races – Gibler, Rider and 
Hutchison conclude that the dyads that featured an arms race were, in fact, much more war-
prone.203 However, while they claim to have controlled for the level of perceived threat, they 
did so only by selecting cases of strategic rivalry.204 Hence, there is a real chance that they 
might still have it backwards – i.e. that arms races were indeed a symptom of increased hostility 
in a subset of cases within the general category of strategic rivalries that featured the most 
severe threat perceptions to begin with, as opposed to an independent or contributing cause 
of war in those dyads. Not entirely to our surprise, the use of statistical methods falls far short 
of sorting out the complexity that is present in those cases and ultimately resolves very little.  
Moreover, none of the studies that purport to establish a heightened risk of war even 
attempt to answer an important practical question first raised by Weede in his 1979 critique of 
Wallace’s early entry into the genre of statistical arms race studies: what about “the effects of 
unilaterally opting out of an arms race or of not racing fast enough to keep up a military bal-
ance?”205 We simply do not know if and under what conditions the refusal to engage in an 
arms competition, or to continue engaging in it, reduces the probability of conflict. While such 
behavior might lead to a desirable outcome in some dyads, specifically those that are made up 
of two status quo powers, it may well lead to increased aggression in dyads that include a 
revisionist opponent.206 There is little terra firma here for policy recommendations of any kind 
– least of all for a recommendation not to engage in some level of competition where it appears 
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prudent to do so. Clearly, the current state of research into arms races and their role in modi-
fying the severity and war-proneness of rivalries still leaves much to be desired. 
We will next look into a matter that is of critical importance for the present study and 
does not presuppose a reliable understanding of the relationship between arms races and war 
initiation. So far, we have considered the possibility that structural pressures could act as an 
accelerator for potentially irrational action-reaction dynamics in the context of the security di-
lemma. Arms races – even those that do not lead to war – are often seen as an extreme subset 
of cases involving such dynamics. As Gray has summarized, they are thought to “[work] by 
[their] own systemic logic or grammar, not by the policy logic of responsible statecraft.”207 In 
other words, it is assumed that the actors have forfeited effective control of their “abnormally 
intense”208 competitive military behavior, not just in a short-term perspective of days or weeks, 
as would be the case in a military crisis management situation, but for the entire duration of 
an arms competition (or, at a minimum, some phases of it). Although there is no necessary 
connection to the probability of conflict, such a takeover of structural dynamics would pose 
serious problems for our view that posture change results from unit-level, organizational reactions 
to somewhat underspecified structural incentives. If this found to be a real possibility, we would 
then have to consider whether the U.S.-Soviet naval competition might qualify as such a case.  
Is the view that arms races are a supercharged version of the security dilemma that the 
actors have essentially lost control over justified? Based on some of the more detailed and 
comprehensive reviews available to us, there is reason for skepticism on this count. There are 
two main problems with this widespread claim. The first problem is one of differentiation. As 
Buzan and Herring have found, “[o]ne of the striking things about the literature on the topic 
is that much of the subject matter does not fit comfortably within the metaphor of a race.”209 
Gray takes this one step further: “I remain unpersuaded that arms race phenomena either can 
be defined usefully – a negative judgment which includes my own attempt at definition – or 
can be shown to ‘work’ in ways and to ends distinct from other conditions of strategic rivalry. 
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In other words […] arms races comprise a non-subject.”210 While this line of argument is partly 
polemical, his point that there are no objective, or even circumstantially compelling, criteria 
for differentiating arms races from other forms of military competition is a valid one. Of eight 
definitional criteria proposed by Hammond, the only one that attempts to establish a level of 
intensity at which a military competition turns into an arms race – “an extraordinary and con-
sistent increase in the level of defense effort of 8 percent of GNP [gross national product] per 
annum for both parties”211 – is purportedly based on his empirical research but it remains far 
from convincing.212 The other seven criteria could just as well be applied to a militarized rivalry 
that does not qualify as an arms race. Other authors have not done any better.  
For example, in his study of the 21st century naval modernization in Asia, Till suggests 
seven criteria that can all apply to ‘lesser’ forms of arms competition, with the possible excep-
tion of a criterion for intensity that remains totally unspecified in practice:  
▪ “driven by international rather than domestic imperatives; 
▪ usually bilateral; 
▪ intense in terms of effort, rapidity and expression; 
▪ associated with high levels of political tension;  
▪ operationally specific; 
▪ indicative of high strategic stakes, and 
▪ regarded as such.”213 
 
All of this throws into doubt the idea that arms races have a peculiar trajectory which leads to 
military competitions essentially spiraling out of control. Other than a perception that a compe-
tition has in some sense become “hypertrophic,”214 it is not clear that the structural mechanisms 
that underpin arms races are substantially different from those in other competitive scenar-
ios.215 In fact, Buzan and Herring ultimately reject the call to abandon the concept of arms races 
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altogether, not based on their identification of a distinctive Eigendynamik216 of some sort, but 
because arms racing is “an expression of intensified political rivalry and because arms racing con-
sumes more resources than less intense manifestations of the arms dynamic.”217 Overall, then, 
the suspicion that military competitions may have turned into arms races as a consequence of 
a deteriorating political-strategic situation is reinforced, rather than dispelled, as we zoom in 
more closely on the arms race phenomenon.  
A second problem is closely related to the first and results in a dilemma for those who 
would posit a take-over of structural factors: On the one hand, unless one can demonstrate that 
arms races involve a distinctive pattern of self-sustaining and irrational overreactions, their 
internal logic does not, in any real sense, set them apart from other types of military competi-
tions. In that case, they are best seen as a reflection of the political-strategic arc of a rivalry and 
correspond to the higher end of one and the same spectrum of arms dynamics.218 In other words, 
this would make them a somewhat fuzzy subcategory of a much broader phenomenon. On the 
other hand, if they reflect a distinctly irrational and excessive approach to military competition, 
it is difficult to see in what sense they are caused by systemic pressures at all. On the contrary, 
we would have to conclude that they almost certainly originate in unit-level political or bu-
reaucratic idiosyncrasies on one or both sides of the equation, as proponents of a “domestic 
structure model”219 of arms racing have long claimed. In effect, then, arms races would repre-
sent cases of overbalancing that result from unit-level threat perceptions that are out of whack 
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with any systemic incentives that are actually present. Rather than structural pressures crowd-
ing out unit-level factors, political-strategic irrationalities would serve to magnify any sys-
temic effects far beyond the requirements of a modestly ‘rational’, ‘calculated’ or ‘strategic’ 
response to the prevalent systemic pressures. The content, as well as the magnitude, of any 
such overbalancing decisions would have been determined at the unit-level. The pathologies 
of those unit-level processes would then begin to spread through the system, and in time could 
establish a self-sustaining and potentially self-magnifying feedback loop. However, while 
there is a systemic component in this process, the causal chain in question has little in common 
with structuralist accounts and everything to do with the imperfections of the ‘transmission 
belt’ between the systemic and unit levels, as emphasized by neoclassical realists.  
The same is actually true if excessive balancing results from a lack of information or 
from faulty intelligence: any decisions concerning the ‘adequate’ responses would again have 
been made at the unit-level. Rather than giving the actors too little choice over their actions and 
eliminating effective control over the process, the problem would come about because the sys-
tem is providing them with too much interpretive leeway, thus giving free rein to all manner 
of unit-level biases and distortions in the course of the adaptation process. While this may not 
be a desirable outcome from the perspective of international stability, it is one that our hybrid 
model is well-equipped to handle. To briefly summarize, although there is a widespread belief 
to the contrary, there is little reason to think that arms competitions ever spiral out of control as a 
result of structural pressures that somehow overwhelm states’ usual margin for interpretation and pre-
meditated action.  
 If this finding is accurate, the hybrid model of military posture change is likely to apply 
whether a situation has been classified as an arm race or not. That said, we should nonetheless 
briefly establish whether the U.S.-Soviet naval competition can be qualified as an arms race – 
that is, “an extreme manifestation of the arms dynamic,”220 to follow Buzan and Herring’s sen-
sible, middle-of-the-road approach. Unfortunately, this is not a straightforward question to 
answer, mainly because of the interconnectedness of the naval aspect of the Cold War strategic 
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rivalry with its nuclear aspect in general, and with the competition in strategic nuclear weap-
ons in particular. As a result, the conventional and nuclear aspects will have to be addressed in 
turn. 
 The classic example of a conventional naval arms race is still the Anglo-German naval 
race. It has retained this archetypal status for good reason. In fact, it confirms much of what 
has been argued above, in that it clearly represents a case of unit-level pathologies that worked 
their way through the international system to produce a situation that is extremely difficult to 
explain in structuralist terms. As Kennedy found in his study 35 years ago, Tirpitz’s determi-
nation to pursue a vigorous naval build-up owed little to prudent strategic calculations and 
instead “fits in with the non-strategic aspects of the admiral’s naval policy: with his Social 
Darwinism […]; with his belief that Germany should rely less on the landowners and the army 
as the future bases of economic power […]; with his internal political calculations […]; and 
with the natural feelings of a patriot and a serving officer that having only a ‘second best’ navy 
was not good enough.”221 Far from being a result of a security-seeking Eigendynamik, the tit-
for-tat arms build-up that resulted flowed from this expansive vision. While the competition 
with Britain cannot be reduced to these factors, it thus appears that the accelerators of the 
Anglo-German naval competition were to be found primarily at the unit level. Seligmann‘s 
summary of this widely accepted interpretation is particularly incisive: “[T]his was an arms 
race that should not have taken place, where the challenger had no prospect of overtaking the 
leader, and where the only possible outcome was a humiliating defeat. Nothing has been writ-
ten to date that would seriously undermine these conclusions.”222 Far from being a runaway 
train that neither side could stop, then, the Dreadnought race was fueled by a series of deliber-
ate, domestically motivated policy decisions. Because Germany was trying to catch up in a 
highly symmetrical competition, and coming from a position far behind the leading power, 
the effort had to be intense and the window for success, if any, was short. The race eventually 
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wound down because its economic burden and strategic opportunity costs had become un-
sustainable in a worsening continental climate.  
If we accept this as the paradigmatic case of naval arms racing, the U.S.-Soviet naval 
competition does not qualify in any of the measures that have been proposed. It was neither 
extremely intense, nor marked by particularly rapid competitive cycles, nor were the respec-
tive efforts divorced from the actual threat environment, nor did the clearly inferior side de-
lude itself about its chances of getting ahead against the odds, or overinvest in naval forces in 
particular. Overall, Stevenson’s comparison between the Cold War at sea and the Anglo-French 
competition during the second half of the 19th century seems far more reasonable. The fact that 
a leading historian would explicitly describe this later case as a “naval competition”223 rather 
than an arms race is revealing. There are, in fact, few accounts of the U.S.-Soviet naval dynamic 
that disagree with its characterization of the case as something less than an arms race. The fact 
that the most visible exceptions are publications that specially emphasize the fact that they 
approach the case from an arms control perspective, can serve as further confirmation of the 
rule.224 This study will therefore adopt the position that the U.S.-Soviet conventional competi-
tion at sea does not qualify as an arms race, although the cycles of competitive posture change 
that we will be examining in detail could be seen as an example of the broader phenomenon 
of the arms dynamic in action.  
Turning to the nuclear element, there is little doubt that the U.S.-Soviet competition in 
nuclear weapons qualified as an intense arms competition. There are few other cases that have 
more frequently or more consistently been discussed as examples of an arms race. While some 
accounts, including Hammond’s rather meticulous study, have attempted to challenge this 
conventional wisdom head-on, it is much easier to make the case that the nuclear build-up 
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was ‘abnormally intense’ than it is for the conventional naval aspect.225 The historical and po-
litical science accounts that have described the outcomes of the strategic nuclear build-up as 
‘excessive’ or ‘irrational’ probably number in the hundreds – and that might still be conserva-
tive estimate. As a matter of fact, even one of the sharpest critics of the concept continues to 
occasionally refer to the Cold War nuclear competition as an arms race.226 And while Ham-
mond’s critical intervention is well-taken, he is himself hard-pressed to discount the descrip-
tion, ultimately arriving at another ‘yes and no’ answer.227  
That said, the competitive elements that are of primary interest to us only partially 
reflect the general pattern. To establish this, a brief discussion of both non-strategic and stra-
tegic nuclear weapons at sea is in order. Exact numbers are difficult to come by, but it is clear 
that, of the roughly 120,000 nuclear warheads built by the superpowers throughout the Cold 
War, a relatively small number were deployed as tactical nuclear weapons at sea.228 For the 
U.S. Navy, Ball mentions 850 nuclear depth bombs and 310 air defense warheads, as well as 
350 more modern warheads slated for procurement, in the mid-1980s.229 American carriers are 
reported to have deployed with a complement of about 100 nuclear weapons for aerial deliv-
ery.230 The Soviet total was probably substantially higher.231 The main point, however, is that 
this was not one of the elements of the nuclear arms competition that were marked by a pattern 
of excessive actions and reactions leading to obviously ‘hypertrophic’ arsenals. If we add in 
the very different philosophies with which the superpowers approached nuclear warfare at 
sea and the fact that there seems to have been limited interaction between their postures, it is 
difficult to frame this as a ‘race’ at all. While the possibility of tactical nuclear war at sea should 
 
225   Hammond, Plowshares into Swords, 232-35.  
226   Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (London: Routledge, 
2007), 216-17. 
227   Hammond, Plowshares into Swords, xx. 
228   Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013,” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 69, no. 5 (2015), doi:10.1177/0096340213501363, 75.  
229   Ball, “Nuclear War at Sea,” 11-12. 
230   Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Declassified: US Nuclear Weapons at Sea during the Cold War,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, no. 1 (2016), doi:10.1080/00963402.2016.1124664, 60.  
231  Donald C. F. Daniel, “The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at Sea,” Survival 29, no. 4 (1987), 
doi:10.1080/00396338708442367, 318-20.  
 
 The dynamics of military competition  
 
    
 [96] 
 
not be dismissed an insignificant fact of the naval competition, it was a small component of 
the nuclear arms dynamic overall. 
 The same cannot be said about the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons aboard 
submarines, which was a much more central aspect of the competition, although there were 
once again large asymmetries between the two sides in how they approached the contribution 
of ballistic missile submarines to their postures.232 In the United States, the Fleet Ballistic Mis-
sile program became a co-equal element of the country’s strategic nuclear posture relatively 
early on. On the Soviet side, this was not true until much later in the competition. A real effort 
was made to catch up in this area and by 1975, the Soviet Navy operated a similar number of 
modern SSBNs as its U.S. counterpart – although under much worse conditions from the 
standpoint of strategic and operational geography.233 Up to that point, one can also describe 
the postures of the two sides as somewhat convergent. From 1975 onwards, this changed again 
and the superpowers’ strategic nuclear postures at sea entered a phase of fundamental diver-
gence in both operational approach and deployment patterns.  
While all of this was part of an intense arms competition, the arms race framing adds 
little to our understanding and suggests a false symmetry between the U.S. and Soviet efforts 
in this area. It is undoubtedly true that ballistic missile submarines became a key element of 
the competition in naval postures. That said, even though there were important linkages, it 
would be a gross oversimplification to describe the Cold War naval competition as a mere 
appendage of a nuclear arms race in which both sides were engaged in a mad dash to outdo 
the other at every turn. The following chapters will present a much more complex and multi-
faceted picture that one would struggle to convey in the simple metaphors that dominate the 
literature on arms races. The expectation that our modular framework will better capture the 
intricate dynamics at play is broadly consistent with Gray’s findings from five decades of re-
search into these issues: 
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“The Soviet-American nuclear arms race certainly featured much interdependence of ri-
val programmes. However, the internal dynamics of the competition had powerful, in 
some respects superordinate, influence on the arming behavior directed abroad as latent 
menace. One can argue that in the political, strategic, and technical-tactical interdepend-
encies that characterized the arms competitive systems, each superpower competitor de-
served to be regarded in good part as a variable independent of influence by its foreign 
rival. Each country competed in its own ways and for its own reasons of strategy. Inter-
dependence was a defining reality of the competition, but the American assumptions and 
assertions about allegedly lock-stepped mechanistic action-reaction in rival weaponry, 
were over-simple and unsafe in a scholarly sense.”234  
 
Ultimately, to view the U.S.-Soviet competition in general, or its naval component in particu-
lar, in terms of a presumed take-over of the structural logic of the arms race would not do it 
justice. Having found that our hybrid framework is, if anything, likely to provide a superior 
and more nuanced understanding than an ‘arms race’ frame of reference can, we will now turn 
to one additional strand of the literature on military competition that is worthy of some atten-
tion. Based on the idea that the competitive behavior of the opponent can be proactively 
shaped with relative precision, this approach presents itself as the key to competitive success. 
In the next step, we will try to establish whether it can live up to its promise.  
 
2.3.4 The competitive strategies approach 
Having reviewed a range of different perspectives on the problem of peacetime military com-
petition, one of the most intriguing questions about the subject still remains unanswered: is 
there an intelligible approach or set of guidelines that allows one side to outsmart the other in 
a long-term, peacetime military competition? Looking back on the United States’ Cold War 
experience, some – predominantly American – analysts think there is.235 In short, they believe 
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that the United States found a way of leveraging its understanding of the specific weaknesses 
of the Soviet system to lure the Soviet government into wasting precious resources on ineffi-
cient counter steps. Rosen defines these so-called competitive strategies as initiatives designed 
to “try to get competitors to play our game, a game that we are likely to win. This done by 
getting them to make the kind of mistakes that they are inclined to make, by getting them to 
do that which is in their nature, despite the fact that they should not do so, given their re-
sources.”236 In other words, the competitive strategies approach aims to trip the opponent up 
by exploiting identifiable cognitive, political and organizational limitations.  
 As a frame of reference for thinking about military competitions and how to shape 
them in one’s favor, the competitive strategies approach has much to recommend. It is also 
very compatible with the theoretical and analytical choices made in the present study. For 
example, it “focuses on peacetime interaction among and between defense establishments,”237 
particularly as it unfolds over the long term. It also agrees that “states interact through the 
prism of their own strategic cultures and preferences, domestic institutions, and bureaucratic 
politics.”238 The products could just as well be described as posture changes in search of com-
petitive advantage. In many respects, then, the competitive strategies literature describes a 
kindred way of thinking about peacetime military interactions between strategic rivals. That 
said, it is also of rather limited utility in the context of our investigation.  
  For the purposes of this study, the dominant consideration is that the competitive strat-
egies approach was largely derived ex post from the Cold War example. Thus, to apply it or 
build it into our modular approach would lead to more obviously self-confirming results than 
is the case with the other theories we can draw on. At the same time, we must also be aware 
that the history of the competitive strategies ‘paradigm’ is a history written in large part by its 
participants after the fact. We find little evidence of an explicit competitive strategies frame-
work being applied by the U.S. defense establishment during the Cold War itself and to the 
 
236   Stephen P. Rosen, “Competitive Strategies: Theoretical Foundations, Limits, and Extensions,” in Mahnken, 
Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century, 12.  
237   Thomas G. Mahnken, “Thinking about Competitive Strategies,” in Mahnken, Competitive Strategies for the 21st 
Century, 7. 
238   Ibid., 8.  
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extent that one was applied, the boundaries between intuitive strategizing and the calculated 
application of a well thought-out, bureaucratically established approach remain unclear. The 
otherwise excellent chapters in Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century do little to dispel this 
impression.239 Hence, the exact relevance of competitive strategies thinking as a conscious in-
tellectual framework is never really established. Battilega’s chapter is symptomatic in that it 
points to the problem, and quickly moves on: “Although these initiatives [including the 1980s 
Maritime Strategy] may appear to be a collection of general U.S. force posture upgrades, in fact each 
also directly targeted key aspects of the Soviet approach to warfare; they were similar in spirit 
to Competitive Strategies.”240 What we can take away for our investigation is that, from the 
1970s onwards, elements of the U.S. defense policy community may have thought about the 
competition in ways that reflected – or are reflected in – the debate about competitive strate-
gies. Given that both superpowers had competent military thinkers aplenty, we could also 
conceivably find evidence of a similar train of thought on the Soviet side. 
 
2.4 Summary 
After reviewing the most pertinent strands of the literature on military competition and pos-
ture change, we are not only in a better position to admire the diversity of applicable theories 
that the field of security and strategic studies has spawned, but also to conclude that there is 
sufficient compatibility and complementarity between them to make a modular approach 
worthwhile. It is true that each of the theories examined above provides valuable insights and 
some come close to furnishing a convincing explanation for variety and variations in naval 
 
239  Gouré makes a convincing case for a formalization from 1986 onwards, but not for the critical phases of the 
competition. David Gouré, “Overview of the Competitive Strategies Initiative,” in Mahnken, Competitive Strategies 
for the 21st Century, 94-101. He also traces the intellectual roots of the approach to Porter’s landmark book, which 
appeared in the early 1980s (ibid., 94 n. 17). Presumably, it would have taken – at the very least – a few years for 
this thinking to establish itself in the defense bureaucracy. See Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for 
Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New York, NY: Free Press, 1980).  
240   John A. Battilega, “Soviet Military Thought and the U.S. Competitive Strategies Initiative,” in Mahnken, Com-
petitive Strategies for the 21st Century, 118. Emphasis added. 
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postures. However, it is only by combining compatible elements from several of them into a 
tailored framework that we can hope to both reduce the empirical complexity of the case to a 
manageable level and still do analytical justice to it at the same time. 
 In this chapter, we have identified several central pillars of such a framework. First, we 
have noted that strategic rivalries tend to revolve around competitions for military advantage 
and that such advantages are not determined by the state of technology in the international 
system, but rather created by the actors themselves. Secondly, we have concluded that struc-
tural theories cannot, by themselves, explain how military competitions develop over time. 
While threat perceptions are the main driver of competitive adaptation, they do not tell us 
much about the responses that will be selected at the unit level, which are heavily influenced 
by decisions made by military organizations at levels below the foreign policy executive. 
Thirdly, we have found that a hybrid framework that embraces insights provided by organi-
zation theories can fill in many of the gaps that a systemic perspective would leave us with.  
Fourth, we have examined in some detail the role of structural accelerators that are thought to 
be beyond the actors’ control and have concluded that these dynamics are heavily shaped by 
the actors and do not have the kind of independent explanatory power that has sometimes been 
suggested. Finally, we have taken note of the fact that that an opponent’s competitive reactions 
can be deliberately manipulated and misdirected for advantage, although it has not been con-
clusively established that political and bureaucratic actors are capable of the exquisitely calcu-
lated planning that is necessary to goad an intelligent adversary and pursue such a course of 
action over extended periods of time.  
With these preliminary findings in mind, it is time both further specify and solidify the 
approach that has been outlined over the course of this chapter and, at the same time, to dis-
card those insights that – while fascinating and informative in their own right – do not provide 
the kind of analytical guidance or leverage that would justify their inclusion. At the same time, 
we also need to develop a methodology for applying the hybrid framework in practice. We 
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[3] 
Researching naval posture change 
    THE MODULAR FRAMEWORK CONCRETIZED 
 
 
3.1  The competitive adaptation of naval postures 
Based on an extensive review of the security and strategic studies literature, we have come to 
the conclusion that change in naval postures comes about because outward looking military 
bureaucracies react to external threats, both to maintain their ability to perform their accepted 
roles and missions in war – and, by implication, to be seen as capable of doing so – and to 
uphold, or possibly expand, their claim to a significant share of the nation’s resources. The 
research question that we are seeking to address is why the U.S. Navy managed to maintain a 
meaningful advantage in anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense in the face of a resolute 
Soviet challenge, even though such advantages are thought to be difficult to successfully de-
fend in the long term and most often fleeting. How is it that the U.S. advantage persisted through 
successive adaptation cycles and remained unbroken 35 years into a competition that was pursued with 
considerable ingenuity and at no small cost in national resources by its Soviet adversary?  
In the following sections we will explicitly restate the five basic assumptions underly-
ing this investigation, provide a succinct rendering of the causal process we will be trying to 
retrace based on the available historical evidence, detail the overall approach we will adopt in 
reconstructing it, and specify which limitations and blind spots remain in our tailored, modu-
lar research framework. It is hoped that this will provide a framework for thinking about the 
 





evidence that is explicit, comprehensible, and open to scrutiny – and that will therefore pro-
vide a solid footing for the investigation that follows.  
This chapter will set out the research framework in some detail and further discuss the 
concepts and approaches that are at the heart of the investigation. The first part of the chapter 
will specify the core assumptions that underpin the study, explicate the causal model we have 
already implicitly developed in the course of the last chapter, introduce the main method of 
process tracing, and lay out some of the limitations of this approach to causal analysis. The 
second part will further concretize a way of thinking about naval postures and outline an array 
of supporting methods that have been developed to analyze naval forces, operational con-
cepts, and operations. Together, these various elements will provide the wherewithal to ad-
dress the research problem set out above.  
 
3.2 Five basic assumptions 
The following five assumptions stake out the author’s view of the subject and of the research 
problem, as it is summarized above. The framework that is developed here applies within 
these constraints. Thus, an analyst who fundamentally disagrees with some or all of these 
propositions is unlikely to arrive at the same conclusions, although it is certainly not impossi-
ble to arrive at similar conclusions based on a different set of assumptions.  
 
 
ASSUMPTION #1: ENDOGENOUS MILITARY ADVANTAGES 
Strategic studies researchers do not necessarily agree on where national advantages with re-
gard to the use of force come from. In the previous chapter, we contrasted two very different 
ways of thinking about military advantages. The present study rejects the widespread view 
that advantages apply across the international system in the form of an offense-defense bal-
ance of military technology. Instead, it follows in the footsteps of Shimshoni and Biddle in 
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characterizing advantages as endogenous to the units in the international system – that is, cre-
ated by the armed forces of the states in question as part of their search for a competitive edge 
over their notional or actual opponents.1  
 
ASSUMPTION #2: SPHERES OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY 
The second assumption we will make is that, while the foreign policy executive will lay down 
some general defense planning guidelines, military organizations have a sphere of primary 
responsibility within which they have considerable autonomy to shape their postures in line 
with perceived threats and their organizational essence.2 They may not always get their way 
where the implementation of operational approaches, force structure goals and general de-
ployment priorities is concerned, but they usually do unless civilian interventions are partic-
ularly vigorous and persistent. In a General Staff system like that of the Soviet Union, the 
service level plays a more muted role in formulating postures, although interservice conflicts 
certainly remain present.3 The U.S. case, on the other hand, was marked by much greater ser-
vice independence to begin with and saw increasing centralization, but not to the extent that 
it would have converged with the Soviet system.4 The post-Goldwater-Nichols system of joint-
ness has further shifted primary responsibility away from the individual services.5 However, 
since the time frame of this investigation largely predates Goldwater-Nichols, which came into 
its own only in the 1990s, this shift is of no particular relevance here. 
 
 
1  See Chapter 2, fn. 62.  
2  Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, with the assistance of Ar-
nold Kanter (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 27. 
3 Marten Kimberley Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 31-37. For a much more detailed review of the dynamics of 
the General Staff system, see Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command, 1967-1989: Personalities and Politics, 
Princeton legacy library (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014[1990]).  
4  For a Navy-focused view, see Thomas C. Hone, Power and Change: The Administrative History of the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946-1986 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy/Navy Historical Center, 
1989), 57-84. 
5  On the impact of Goldwater-Nichols on naval strategy, see Steven Wills, “The Effect of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987–1994,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 2 (2016), 21-41. 
 





ASSUMPTION #3: THREAT-BASED POSTURE PLANNING  
The third assumption we will make is that the actions of military organizations are motivated 
by their responsibility to fulfil core missions in relation to some external threat. They are bu-
reaucratic entities that pursue narrowly self-interested agendas, but their self-interest is per-
ceived through a lens of professional concern with the aspects of national defense that falls in 
their purview.6 Navies will propose reactions to external threats that benefit them over the 
other services and may seek to portray threats in ways that support their bureaucratic inter-
ests, but their actions are nonetheless driven by the ingrained responsibility to be in a position 
to win wars if necessary. Whether military services, let alone individual military officers, con-
sistently act in this manner is another question, but we will assume that they generally do so as 
long as a clearly identified threat is present. 
 
ASSUMPTION #4: ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSE 
We will assume that military organizations will react to these external threats in a self-inter-
ested and largely conservative manner. When evolutionary adaptation becomes necessary, 
they will implement significant changes without breaking the bureaucratic mold or rethinking 
the structure and purposes of the organization as a whole. When threatened from within the 
domestic environment, they will prioritize those interservice or political threats, which could 
directly affect their resources base, where as a failure to adjust to external threats would do so 
only indirectly and over time.  
We will also assume that, while military services are not unitary actors, they are suffi-
ciently hierarchical to ensure that actions that require a sustained implementation effort – in-
cluding decisions about operational doctrine, acquisition, and deployment patterns – are 
expressions of an organizational logic that the relevant constituencies within the organization 
 
6 Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 11-21. 
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by and large have to abide by.7 While a full buy-in of these constituencies is clearly preferable, 
the hierarchical structure allows the central leadership to suppress dissent, unless that dissent 
is either extremely widespread or supported by particularly powerful actors within the organ-
ization. 8 Conversely, it is difficult – although perhaps not unheard of – for small factions to 
force their will upon the organization as a whole, in which case those initiatives themselves 
become an organizational undertaking. All of this applies even to an organization that, as Da-
vis has found of the U.S. Navy, values “pluralistic decentralization”9 both at sea and on shore. 
All other things being equal, we will assume that significant posture changes are generally 
undertaken with sufficient unity of purpose to treat them as an organizational product, rather than 
an isolated initiative of some faction within the organization. 
 
ASSUMPTION #5: THE IMPORTANCE OF DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS 
While military organizations are given considerable latitude by the foreign policy executive  
as far as the development of postures and in the implementation of posture change is con-
cerned, they depend on resources extracted from the domestic environment to function.10 We 
will assume that, in any system of government that features overall civilian control over 
spending priorities, military organizations will face significant domestic constraints in imple-
menting adaptations, especially where force structure planning and procurement are con-
cerned. These processes may feature challenges to the organization’s threat perceptions and 
priorities that may lead to a redirection of resources. Perhaps counterintuitively, we will as-
 
7  A comprehensive study of hierarchy and the role of obedience in military organizations is Nico Keijzer, 
Military Obedience (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978).  
8 The latter case is central to Rosen’s theory of fundamental military innovation. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning 
the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 19-21. 
9  Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 40-41. 
10 They essentially face a task that is functionally similar to the process neoclassical realism describes at the 
level of state-society relations as a whole. See Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and Resource Ex-
traction: State Building for Future War,” in Lobell; Ripsman; Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and 
Foreign Policy, 194-226.  
 





sume that the probability of such outside adjustments will not necessarily be higher in a demo-
cratic system of government, although any interventions will be more visible. Overall, the au-
tonomy of military organization in designing their own postures will not be absolute, but a 
matter of degree and military initiatives will be subject to outside corrections. While radical 
corrections will be rare, smaller corrections will occur much more frequently and some will be 
sufficient to kill specific military initiatives, although this fate will not usually befall attempted 
posture changes as a whole. 
 
3.3 Causal model and overall method 
To get to the bottom of the research problem stated above, this investigation will have to re-
trace complex historical processes of posture change that shaped the Cold War at sea. To be 
able to make informed judgements in our weighing of the available evidence, we need to know 
what to look for. Specifically, we need to establish the notional causal chain that leads from 
changes in the external environment to specific responses in terms of operational doctrine, 
force structure, and patterns of deployment. The case study method is particularly well-suited 
to investigate the operation of such a series of causal mechanisms in great detail.11 Without an 
outline of an uninterrupted causal sequence, we cannot employ the process tracing methodol-
ogy that is at the heart of this undertaking with any success.12 Therefore, we need to organize 
the modular explanation developed above into a causal model that can be readily applied to 
the historical evidence. The basic model, which can be applied to both the U.S. and the Soviet 
side is presented in Figure 4 below. This depicts the competitive adaptation process from a 
national perspective.  
 
11 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 21. See also Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” in Re-
thinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 207-19. For the contrasting perspective of a historian on the question of 
causation, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2002), 91-109. 
12  George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 218.  
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Fig. 4: The posture adaptation process 
 
 
The differences between the two systems are discussed in some detail in Chapter 4. As we will 
see, the main impediment to a full application of the model to the Soviet system is the heavy 
imbalance of the available historical evidence, which means that the U.S. experience remains 
much better understood. This situation has improved somewhat over the last three decades, 
but the Russian polity today is fundamentally opposed to transparency, including about its 
Soviet past. Although the U.S. government is also making access to primary source materials 
more difficult than it used to, the difference is nonetheless stark. Figure 4 once again presents 
the main components of the modular framework, as they have been laid out above. 
To summarize, we have specified an independent variable (IV, external military 
threat), a dependent variable (DV, posture change) and an intervening variable (INTV, unit-
level threat perceptions). All of this is in keeping with the basic structure a neoclassical realist 
approach that is shifted downwards to the level of military organizations interacting with one 
another, within a set of guidelines laid down at the political-strategic level of the FPE. There 
are a total of five modifying variables that act upon the causal process: (1) political-strategic 
guidelines, (2) bureaucratic threats in the domestic environment, (3) entrenched organizational 
biases that are reflective of the organization’s bureaucratic essence, (4) the level and quality of 
internal debate, and (5) the level of resources that can be extracted from the fiscal-political 
environment. While the first four of these variables are active primarily during the conceptual 
 





stage of a posture change, the last impacts the implementation phase and may necessitate 
changes that are not in keeping with the original concept. The importance of the modifying (or 
condition) variables is in moderating or intensifying the impact of the independent variable 
on the dependent variable.13 It should also, once again, be mentioned that we have delimited 
the scope of the model, as it is developed here, to apply to competitive posture change in the 
peacetime setting of an active, long-term strategic rivalry. In the next step, we will take a closer 
look at the overall methodological approach that we will apply to trace the outline of the causal 
process in the historical evidence that is available to us.  
 
PROCESS TRACING 
Like many key concepts, methods and approaches in the social sciences, process tracing is 
somewhat contested. Highly intuitive in its basic form, it has become the subject of a special-
ized methodological literature of its own, which appears to be at least partly designed to im-
munize it against the charge – leveled by the disciples of hard scientific inference in the social 
sciences – that it does not quite live up to the standards of ‘proper’ (i.e. quantitative or quasi-
quantitative) methodologies.14 While practitioners of strategic studies will be unimpressed by 
such attempts to impose a monistic vision of scientific enquiry, and the same will apply to 
 
13  See Stephen van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), 11. 
14  See e.g. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 86-87. This literature includes Andrew 
Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2015); Ingo Rohlfing, Case Studies and Causal Inference: An Integrative Framework, Research Meth-
ods Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing 
Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2016), 150-67; Nina 
Tannenwald, “Process Tracing and Security Studies,” Security Studies 24, no. 2 (2015), 
doi:10.1080/09636412.2015.1036614; Marianne S. Ulriksen and Nina Dadalauri, “Single Case Studies and The-
ory-Testing: The Knots and Dots of the Process-Tracing Method,” International Journal of Social Research Meth-
odology 19, no. 2 (2015), doi:10.1080/13645579.2014.979718; David Waldner, “Process Tracing and Qualitative 
Causal Inference,” Security Studies 24, no. 2 (2015), doi:10.1080/09636412.2015.1036624; Bernhard Kittel and 
David Kuehn, “Introduction: Reassessing the Methodology of Process Tracing,” European Political Science 12, 
no. 1 (2013), doi:10.1057/eps.2012.4,1-9; Peter A. Hall, “Tracing the Progress of Process Tracing,” European 
Political Science 12, no. 1 (2013), doi:10.1057/eps.2012.6, 20-30; Ingo Rohlfing, “Varieties of Process Tracing and 
Ways to Answer Why-Questions,” European Political Science 12, no. 1 (2013), doi:10.1057/eps.2012.7, 31-39.  
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neoclassical realist scholars in security studies,15 it is nevertheless worth distilling from the 
now extensive literature on process tracing some basic characteristics and guidelines that may 
prove useful in organizing the investigation. 
 First of all, George and Bennett offer a useful definition of process tracing as “a proce-
dure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent 
variable of a particular case in a particular historical context.”16 This is what we will attempt 
in the following chapters. The variant of process tracing that we will employ is a theoretically 
informed narrative.17 This narrative will be geared towards analytical clarity rather than “thick 
description”18 of historical processes. Thus, we will not attempt to break the causal process 
down to the maximum level of detail or provide a detailed chronological account, except 
where it is absolutely necessary with a view to solving the research problem. The main effort 
will be geared towards tracing the causal factors we have identified above, while also looking 
out for possible alternative explanations. While King, Keohane and Verba see a danger of ex-
panding the scope of a process tracing effort to the point of “infinite regress,”19 Vennesson 
makes it clear that pragmatic self-limitation is baked into the approach from the outset:  
“First, process tracing is focused. It deals selectively with only certain aspects of the phe-
nomenon. Hence, the investigator is aware that some information is lost along with some 
of the unique characteristics of the phenomenon. Second, process tracing is structured in 
the sense that the investigator is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoret-
ical framework identified in the research design. […] Third, the goal of process tracing is 
 
15  In their Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell explicitly endorse 
process tracing as “[t]he most appropriate strategy for investigating causal chains in specific cases.” Norrin 
M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 132.  
16  George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 176. In fact, as Kittel and 
Kuehn show, it was only as a result of George and Bennett’s attempt at formalization that the term “process 
tracing” became widely established. Kittel and Kuehn, “Introduction,” 1-2. 
17  For a discussion of some common variants, see George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences, 210-12. See also Rohlfing, “Varieties of Process Tracing and Ways to Answer Why-Ques-
tions,” 32-38.  
18  Pascal Vennesson and Ina Wiesner, “Process Tracing in Case Studies,” in Soeters; Shields; Rietjens, 
Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies, 96. 
19 King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 86. See also Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Infer-
ence,” 209; Milja Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 102 n. 52. 
 





ultimately to provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that leads to a specific out-
come.”20  
 
None of this suggests an unrestrained and potentially ‘escalatory’ research process in which 
the study of any important causal link leads to the inclusion of several more links, and so forth. 
On the contrary, the fact that process tracing is informed by theory prevents such an outcome 
by design, where a historical enquiry would largely have to rely on the good judgement and 
self-restraint of the investigator. 
There are several important reasons for selecting an approach that has procedural dis-
cipline built into it: First, we are attempting an analysis of a macro-process of military compe-
tition, which spanned more than four decades and was marked by a very high degree of 
complexity. Under these circumstances only a structured approach is likely to keep the ana-
lytical effort sufficiently focused on the research problem. Secondly, the amount of historical 
evidence is such that an attempt to break down the processes to the full extent that we can 
would produce an entirely unwieldy and unreadable study, probably running to several thou-
sand pages. Thirdly, and perhaps counterintuitively, the evidence that is available is neverthe-
less too sketchy and incomplete to attempt a ‘thick’, let alone exhaustive narrative. Thus, we 
would be left with an extremely unbalanced account and an equally clumsy explanation, in 
which some causal factors and aspects of the process would be grossly overrepresented and 
others would remain almost totally opaque. 
It is for similar reasons that the study does not adopt David Rosenberg’s admittedly 
excellent framework for researching the process dimension of modern naval strategies: its enu-
meration of a total of seventeen clusters of variables paints a picture so comprehensive and 
perfectionist that the resultant account would be worthy of a masterful historian, but much 
 
20  Pascal Vennesson, “Case Studies and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices,” in Approaches and Method-
ologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 235.  
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too inclusive, and at the same time much too detailed, to serve the purposes of this study.21 By 
implication, it would require a gargantuan data collection effort that would undoubtedly take 
an individual researcher many years to compile, analyze and process – if the necessary evi-
dence is even available. Hence, this investigation has to contend itself with the limited findings 
that an effort of significantly lesser scope and depth can provide. Having said that, Rosen-
berg’s framework is extremely useful as a guide to possible research areas of interest and his 
many incisive insights will be incorporated where possible. 
While a primarily historical framework might lead us to open the aperture of the in-
vestigation beyond what is warranted or necessary, the approach that is pursued here has an 
important interpretivist element, nonetheless. It not only seeks “to establish and evaluate the 
link (or the absence of a link) between different factors”22 as Vennesson would expect of a 
positivist study, but also “to look for the ways in which this link manifests itself and the context 
 
21  David A. Rosenberg, “Process: The Realities of Formulating Modern Naval Strategy,” in Mahan is Not 
Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference of the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, ed. 
James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), 141-75. The seventeen 
factors Rosenberg enumerates are worth quoting in detail: (#1) “the nature of training and education programs, 
career patterns and professional specialization of officers in the naval service” (150), (#2) “the career patterns and oper-
ational, technical, and staff backgrounds of individual naval officers in significant (national or fleet) positions of leader-
ship” (151), (#3) “the procurement costs, capabilities, operating patterns, and sustainment requirements of naval 
weapons systems” (155), (#4) “changes in tactical doctrine and/or operational art” (156), (#5) “the administrative struc-
ture, operational doctrine, strategic plans and command and control organization of tactical units” (157), (#6) “the 
sources of intelligence information, including their nature, their quality, and their frequency” (ibid.), (#7) “the process 
of intelligence production, analysis, and dissemination” (ibid.), (#8) “the structure, organization, and procedures of 
naval service-wide strategic planning” (159), (#9) “the structure, organization, and procedures of naval service-wide 
program and procurement planning” (162), (#10) “the state of research and development progress of a nation’s naval 
warfare technology” (166), (#11) “the state of the national scientific and industrial infrastructure for research, develop-
ment, and production of naval warfare technology” (ibid.), (#12) “character and personalities of naval service national 
leadership” (167), (#13) “the structure, organization and procedures of national strategic military planning” (168), 
(#14) “the structure, organizations, and procedures of national program and procurement planning” (ibid.), (#15) “the 
character and personalities of national defense leadership” (ibid.), (#16) “the character of the national political system 
as it relates to defense issues” (171), and (#17) “the character, structure, and status of the financial and economic 
systems as they relate to national defense.” (ibid.) Emphases in the original. To an extent, one can find many 
elements of this comprehensive framework reflected in the much more modest approach outlined in this 
chapter. But, overall, Rosenberg’s take on the problem is far more demanding. As he accurately remarks, 
“[t]he seventeen factors identified here could, individually or in combination, be the basis of a monograph on 
the U.S. Navy in the postwar period, or on other navies, or other military organizations in other periods of 
history” (172). Emphasis added. 
22 Vennesson, “Case Studies and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices,” 232 
 





in which it happens.”23 In practice, we will attempt to map out the causal links that were con-
firmed to be present for each chapter using a full-page graphical representation, while devot-
ing the bulk of the narrative to a more detailed exploration of those links that seem most 
relevant in solving the research problem. In doing so, we will rely on a number of more specific 
supporting methods and approaches that are discussed below in the final part of the chapter. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
The approach outlined in this chapter has important limitations that should, once again, be 
stated explicitly. First, the present study is emphatically not an international history of the 
Cold War at sea. Such a history would have to be much broader in outlook, much more com-
prehensive in its mandate, and based first and foremost on a large volume of primary source 
materials from both sides of the Iron Curtain.24 This effort ticks none of the essential boxes, nor 
does it even attempt to do so. While the final product may at times resemble a highly synthetic 
and analytical history of the U.S.-Soviet naval competition, with a relatively narrow focus on 
the question of operational access in general war, it remains a work of political science that 
relies on historical data to solve a fairly specific puzzle.  
Addressing a related matter, it should also be emphasized that any military competition, 
whether it crosses the threshold into large-scale organized violence or not, is embedded in a 
grand strategic context, which encompasses not just military and geostrategic factors, but is 
shaped by economic, ideological and cultural elements as well.25 How a military competition 
 
23  Ibid., 233. 
24  On the core characteristics of international histories, see Patrick Finney, “Introduction: What Is Interna-
tional History?,” in Palgrave Advances in International History, ed. Patrick Finney (Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2005), 1-35; Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 30-50; Andrew J. Williams, Amelia Hadfield and J. Simon Rofe, International 
History and International Relations (London: Routledge, 2012), 7-32; Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman, eds., 
Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations, BSCIA studies in 
international security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), especially chapters 1-4 and 14-16. 
25  See William C. Martel, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy 
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eventually unfolds depends on the initial situation and on the long-term dynamics of posture 
change, but also on the impact of such apparently extraneous factors. While all of them are 
important in understanding the broader context of the competition, and while they may at 
times create significant countervailing pressures and incentives, they cannot be fully captured 
by an approach that is geared towards analyzing competitive change at the military level. 
Hence, it would not be unexpected if we were to find that such an approach would tend to 
overemphasize those factors that it is particularly well-suited to capture and likely underesti-
mate the relevance – even as far as changes at the military level are concerned – of others. 
Therefore, it will be most accurate in capturing the dynamics of competition where pro-
nounced military insecurity vis-à-vis a well-defined ‘other’ looms large in the actors’ calcula-
tions and these concerns are not overridden by other considerations of a non-military nature.  
Conversely, the framework proposed here is unlikely to produce satisfactory analytical 
results when looking at situations in which military security is a secondary concern and threats 
are ill-defined, fleeting, or subject to extreme fluctuation over time. As is the case with neo-
classical realist works, and realism more generally, one would expect it to be ill-suited for sit-
uations of “threatlessness”26 in which concrete planning goals and scenarios are enveloped by 
a “fog of peace”27 and thinking about future conflicts is possible only in the abstract. While this 
 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 7-55; Williamson Murray, “Thoughts on Grand Strat-
egy,” in The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, Richard H. 
Sinnreich and James Lacey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1-32; Richard Rosecrance and 
Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), espe-
cially chapters 1-3 and 7; Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of “Grand Strategy,"  
Security Studies 27, no. 1 (2017), doi:10.1080/09636412.2017.1360073, 27-57. 
26  John Mueller, “Embracing Threatlessness: Reassessing U.S. Military Spending,” in American Grand Strategy 
and Seapower, ed. Michael Gerson and Alison L. Russel (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2011), 47.  
27 The most sophisticated treatment of the concept and of how states cope with such uncertainty is: Emily O. 
Goldman, Power in Uncertain Times: Strategy in the Fog of Peace (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 
12-35. See also Talbot C. Imlay and Monica D. Toft, eds., The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and Stra-
tegic Planning under Uncertainty (London: Routledge, 2006), especially chapter 1, 11, and 13. As discussed 
above, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell emphasize that the applicability of neoclassical realism, or the lack of 
its applicability, depends primarily on whether there is clear threat information or not. In situations in which 
 
 





is not a problem for the present investigation, the scope conditions should nonetheless be kept 
in mind. 
It follows from this last point that we are emphatically not in the business of formulat-
ing a grand theory of naval competition in all places and at all times. The purpose of this study 
is to better understand the interactive element of the U.S.-Soviet naval confrontation by apply-
ing to it an analytical framework that is both systematic and explicit. If this undertaking 
should, by extension, provide useful heuristic strategies for thinking about current and future 
competitions at sea, this should be considered a welcome side effect. Any such inferences be-
yond the specific purview of the research problem outline above are not be mistaken for reli-
able generalizations of even the “contingent”28 kind. The number of variables at play and the 
fact that there are very few comparable cases – none of which involved missile-age conditions 
– imply that the potential for generalization is necessarily limited. In the next step, we will 
address the important question of how to make reliable inferences about the evidence at hand, 
which is a rather delicate matter in and of itself. 
 
3.4 Competitive adaptation: evidence and inference  
3.4.1 The death (and timely resurrection) of naval analysis 
During the Cold War era, the examination of Soviet naval developments was a well-developed 
art practiced by a small, but tight-knit group of civilian and military analysts. Their project, 
however, was geared towards a specific opponent and inevitably lost its drive as soon as the 
Soviet threat began to ebb away. To those who continued to pursue it, the 1990s opened up 
the unprecedented opportunity to enter into conversation with former Soviet naval officers 
 
such information is unavailable, other explanations will produce better analytical results. Norrin M. Ripsman, 
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, “Conclusion: The State of Neoclassical Realism,” in Lobell; 
Ripsman; Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, 282-87. 
28  George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 216. 
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and shipbuilding experts. The work that was done during this winding-down phase provides 
some crucial building blocks for this present study. But with no fully-fledged challenger of 
U.S. naval supremacy on the horizon, the 1990s strategic “interregnum”29 saw a predictable 
shift away from the kind of detailed, often technical analyses that are necessary to form a solid 
understanding of a competitor’s future capabilities and intentions. 
With the Soviet Union gone, the conceptual and theoretical strands of the literature 
almost inevitably gained in stature. To what extent did established ideas about seapower re-
main viable? What had really changed and what had not? How could navies re-conceptualize 
their mission spectrum to ensure their continued utility? How should ‘old’ and ‘new’ priorities 
be balanced in the face of uncertainty? In response to these and similar questions, Western 
experts produced a series of important works on how to think about seapower in the new era.30 
Some of the conceptual tools that this literature proposed remain valuable. Grove’s ranking of 
navies according to their potential for power projection is one example.31 His modified version 
of Ken Booth’s trinity of naval roles (see Fig. 5) is another.32  
At the same time, the quality of the seapower literature could not prevent the illusions 
of the age from taking hold. The subtle but important point that Grove’s version of the trinity 
still stood firmly on its military base, and could not simply be ‘turned over on its sides’ as de-
sired, appears to have been lost on some of the more enthusiastic proponents of post-Cold War 
Zeitgeist. In time, this fallacy took material form in the emergence of what Till has described 
as “postmodern naval policies,” which were built upon the expectation that war at sea had be-
come an implausibility and that navies would be tasked primarily with policing the fault lines 
 
29  Michael Cox, Ken Booth, and Tim Dunn, “Introduction,” in The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics, 
1989-1999, ed. Ken Booth, Michael Cox and Timothy Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
4.  
30 Some of the best examples include Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1990); Colin S. Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Geoffrey Till, ed., Seapower at the Millennium 
(Stroud: Sutton Publishers, 2001); Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Cass, 
2004); Sam J. Tangredi, ed., Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, DC, 2009). 
31 Grove, The Future of Sea Power, 236-41.  
32 Ibid., 234. 
 





of an ever more globalized world.33 While political scientists may have been at greater risk 
than naval historians, none of the scholarly or professional communities dealing with naval 
matters proved completely immune to the temptation of presentism.  
In Europe in particular, seapower was increasingly reduced to its naval diplomacy and 
policing “modes of action,”34 to the extent that these were sometimes seen as the ‘true’ raison 
d'être of navies. Thus, Booth’s key comment on his original version of the trinity faded from 
view: “It is appropriate that the military role forms the base of the trinity, for the essence of 
navies is their military character. It is a navy’s ability to threaten and use force which gives 
meaning to its other modes of action.”35 
Even where combat was still a real possibility, most navies were orienting themselves 
successively further away from the sea and towards the land. For the U.S. Navy, efficient 
power projection in relatively unopposed settings became the defining priority, and its sea 
control capabilities atrophied accordingly.36 The likelihood that this order of priorities would 
 
33  Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2009), 6-14. Much to his 
credit, Till’s embrace of this supposed “transformation” always felt tentative and it is not surprising that the 
framing of the entire chapter had changed significantly by the 2018 edition. See Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A 
Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2018), 36-59. 
34  Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 15. Emphasis in the original. 
35  Ibid., 16. The idea that navies can be used directly in support of a nation’s foreign policy has a long pedigree, 
of course. To suggest that this function can somehow be separated from their ability and willingness to fight 
at sea and/or to project force against the ‘opposite coast’ – in short, from their capacity to inflict violence – 
would, however, amount to a distinctly postmodern view. Breemer’s judgement on this matter remains rele-
vant: “There is no question that the demonstrative use of warships (so-called ‘naval diplomacy’) can serve 
important national political ends. But naval combatants are not designed and built for ‘showing-the-flag’; 
their primary purpose is to fight, while ‘presence’ can be no more than a peacetime ‘bonus’ function.” Jan S. 
Breemer, “Estimating the Soviet Strategic Submarine Missile Threat: A Critical Examination of the Soviet 
Navy's SSBN Bastion Strategy” (Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, 1987), 192. Empha-
sis in the original. On the political-military functions of navies short of war see also Edward Luttwak, The 
Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); James Cable, Navies in Vio-
lent Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989); James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991: Political Appli-
cations of Limited Naval Force (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994); James Cable, The Political Influence of 
Naval Force in History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Christian Le Mière, Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Cen-
tury (London: Routledge, 2014); Kevin Rowlands, Naval Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Model for the Post-
Cold War Global Order (London: Routledge, 2018).  
36 See e.g. Peter D. Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), especially 118-19.  
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be sustainable in the longer term was bound to be low – in fact, it carried within it the seeds of 








Fig. 5: Adapted ‘Booth trinity’ of naval modes of action (Grove, Modern Seapower, 234) 
 
While many insights from the post-Cold War period remain relevant, the reality that the de-
bates and ideas of the 1990s and 2000s were just as limited and context-dependent as the work 
of the Cold War naval analysts – possibly even more so – now appears to have by and large 
sunk in. As it became clear that U.S. naval supremacy would once again be challenged, notably 
by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), many of the categories of more tradi-
tional naval thinking were quickly reinstated. One of the key results of this development is the 
emergence of a literature that, at its best, can hold its own against the products of Cold War 
naval analysis.37 In effect, we are witnessing the rebirth of a school of naval thinkers that are 
 
37  Some high-quality examples of detailed naval analyses of the PLAN’s competitive trajectory are Lyle Gold-
stein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28, 
no. 4 (2004), doi:10.1162/0162288041588304, 161-96; Andrew S. Erickson et al., eds., China's Future Nuclear 
Submarine Force (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007); Gabriel B. Collins and Michael C. Grubb, A 
Comprehensive Survey of China's Dynamic Shipbuilding Industry: Commercial Development and Strategic Implica-
tions (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College/China Maritime Studies Institute, 2008); Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle 
Goldstein and William S. Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy "Assassin's Mace" Capability (Newport, 
RI: U.S. Naval War College/China Maritime Studies Institute, 2009); Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Gold-
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unafraid to dive deep into the technical and operational aspects of the subject to derive valua-
ble insights for policy and strategy. 
As far as research into Cold War navies is concerned, however, this new literature adds 
only modestly to the toolset that was developed decades ago by participants. In fact, even 
though there are clear exceptions to this rule, one could argue that 21st century naval analyses 
for the most part still fall short of Cold War standards of sophistication. As a result, we can 
scarcely avoid standing on the shoulders of the Cold War masters of the trade in our attempt 
to derive meaning from the evidence that has since come to light. The set of supporting meth-
ods that is described here reflects this reality: it is based on the Cold War-era literature, with 
the addition of 21st century concepts and ideas where appropriate. The next sections will es-
tablish what exactly we will be dealing with as we retrace the competitive adaptation of naval 
postures, and how to use a supporting cast of methods to make meaningful inferences from 
historical phenomena and artifacts as we move along. 
 
3.4.2 Thinking about naval postures 
In their attempts to affect posture change, decision-makers and military planners manipulate 
three main variables: theories and concepts for the operational employment of their forces, 
overall force structure, and patterns of force deployment. Together, these elements shape the 
 
stein, eds., Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011); Phil-
lip C. Saunders et al., eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, DC, 2011); 
Owen R. Cote, “Assessing the Undersea Balance between the United States and China,” in Competitive Strat-
egies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2012); Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan Martinson, eds., China's Near Seas Combat 
Capabilities (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College/China Maritime Studies Institute, 2014); Sarah Kirchberger, 
Assessing China's Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications (Heidel-
berg: Springer, 2015); Andrew S. Erickson, ed., Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016); Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the West-
ern Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” 
International Security 41, no. 1 (2016), doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00249, 7-48; Peter Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson, 
eds., China's Evolving Surface Fleet (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College/China Maritime Studies Institute, 
2017); Ryan D. Martinson, Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy (Newport, 
RI: U.S. Naval War College/China Maritime Studies Institute, 2018).  
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range of strategic options that are available in a crisis or conflict, which in turn shapes peace-
time interactions between potential enemies. But what exactly are we looking for when tracing 
posture change? What is the substance of a naval posture? And how can we analyze it? To 
provide working knowledge of these matters, this section will examine in greater detail each 
of the three main elements of naval postures: operational paradigm and doctrine, force structure, 
and deployment patterns. It will also outline the range of the functions that a broadly adequate 
posture must fulfil in the context of a long-term strategic competition. 
 
OPERATIONAL PARADIGM AND DOCTRINE 
An operational paradigm embodies a military organization’s general theory of how to fight 
the next war: the notional missions to focus on, the types of operations to prepare for, and the 
guiding principles of force employment.38 It is not a strategy, although it cannot avoid making 
some assumptions as to the type of adversary that will be fought and the kind of environment 
in which the fighting will take place.39 Ideally, it would be tightly coupled with a conception 
of how to relate military action to overall political success, in which case it could be appropri-
ately described as an “applied theory of victory.”40 Doctrine is a ‘crystalized’, organizationally 
 
38 The term is introduced in Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory 
(London: Frank Cass, 1997), xix. The U.S. terms operational approach and concept of operations (CONOPS) are 
both considerably narrower. According to the U.S. Department of Defense definition, an operational ap-
proach is “[a] broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accom-
plish the mission.” United States Department of Defense, “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” 
(Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2019), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doc-
trine/pubs/dictionary.pdf, 161. A CONOPS is even more specific and closer to an operational design. 
39 A strategy is necessarily specific to a given conflict (or, at the very least, a specified dyad). A strategy that 
is not tailored to the adversary and the environment that characterize that particular conflict is categorically 
unsound and likely to fail. See Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 38-41. 
40  Jonathan Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepre-
neurship,” International Security 15, no. 3 (1990), doi:10.2307/2538911, 187 n.1. On theories of victory more 
generally see William C. Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
 





accepted expression of the incumbent operational paradigm that allows it to be transported, 
taught, empirically tested, and refined.  
A military organization may subscribe to several operational theories and approaches 
at any one time. For example, land forces may have one set of operational principles for con-
ventional warfare against a symmetrically configured opponent and a different one for coun-
ter-insurgency warfare. However, since an organization will find it difficult – for reasons of 
internal coherence and external justification – to pursue disparate priorities with equal vigor, 
or to maintain equal levels of competence and capability across the entire spectrum of plausi-
ble scenarios, one set of approaches will usually be dominant. 41 This organizationally domi-
nant set of theories and concepts is the operational paradigm. In modern military 
organizations, attempts are often made to codify preferred operational approaches in the form 
of written doctrine with ex cathedra approval at the highest levels of the hierarchy. Force em-
ployment at lower levels of warfare may be even more closely specified by a formalized system 
of tactics, techniques and procedures. However, it would be a misunderstanding of doctrine 
to insist that it must be written down to count as such. Corum explains the interrelationship 
between theory and doctrine particularly well, when he states that  
“warfare is also a clash of ideas. Military theory provides a guide for military leaders in 
organizing their forces for war, theory forms the basis for officer education about war, 
and it plays a central role in determining which weapons will be built to fight a future 
war. Operational doctrine comes from theory and is constantly evolving. Doctrine is the 
practical expression of theory in that it is the stated manner in which the military leadership 
expects the large and small units of the military to conduct movement, logistics, and com-
bat so as to successfully win a campaign or war.”42 
 
Doctrine must be stated in one form or another to have any organizational impact, but if it is 
also constantly evolving, written documents may not be the most effective way of transporting 
 
41  The U.S. Army’s doctrinal history since the early 1970s is an excellent example of the struggle to reconcile 
disparate operational paradigms. See e.g. Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 193-232. 
42  James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940 (Lawrence, KS: University Press 
of Kansas, 1997), 3.  
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it in practice – and it is certainly not the only one. Therefore, incomplete codification or even 
a complete lack of written doctrine cannot be equated with an absence of doctrinal precepts as 
such. Moreover, Jensen’s distinction between formal doctrine, on the one hand, and informal 
doctrine that “reflects a broader professional discourse in articles, field orders, personal letters, 
and so on,”43 on the other, is also an important one. Irrespective of the exact form that doctrinal 
constructs might take, the reliance on an operational paradigm that is widely understood and deeply 
ingrained in the organization is a precondition for purposeful, coordinated action in war. Hence, the 
reliance on some form of doctrine is inescapable – even if it is called something else. 
The Soviet armed forces certainly were no exception in this regard, even if the body of 
thought that was known as military doctrine was actually an intensely politicized, high-level 
expression of the Communist Party’s views on future war. Within this peculiar system of 
thought, the development of operational principles and approaches was a more appropriate 
subject for military science and would have been codified as tenets of operational art.44 Perhaps 
more controversially, the U.S. Navy is also not an exception in this regard. In this case as in 
others, the absence of explicit doctrinal documents is not a good indicator for the absence of 
generally accepted and widely understood operational methods and principles. For example, 
we now know beyond reasonable doubt that the German Wehrmacht never had a codified doc-
trine of Blitzkrieg, yet the principles of operational thought that it had instilled in its officers 
produced wars that made it look like it did – until its opponents caught on and turned the 
 
43  Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2016), 4.  
44  For a solid discussion of the Soviet terminology see Joseph D. Douglass, Soviet Military Strategy in Europe 
(Elmsford, NY: Pergamon, 1980), 8-19. Fast Scott and Scott’s study is also valuable, in that it lets an array of 
primary sources speak for themselves. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, eds., The Soviet Art of War: 
Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982). For a discussion of the basic operational 
concepts of the Soviet armed forces, many of which were adapted to the naval sphere, see William Thomas 
Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Military Policy since World War II (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 
1986), 41-60. The application of formal operational art to the naval sphere is discussed in Russel H. S. Stolfi, 
“Soviet Naval Operational Art: The Soviet Approach to Naval Warfighting” (NPS Report 56-88-033, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1988); David J. Kern, “Soviet Naval Operational Art” (M.A. dissertation, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 1988).  
 





same set of guiding principles to their advantage.45 The U.S. Navy is an even more clear-cut 
instance of the same phenomenon. It is true that Navy doctrinal publications have been few 
and far between.46 The service’s most prominent expert on fleet tactics has even said that “what 
little doctrine the Navy has, it ignores in favor of operational flexibility.”47 But should we take 
this to mean that the world’s leading navy since the early 1940s, which prides itself on its 
ability to conduct persistent and often complex forward operations, has failed to develop an 
overarching concept for how to employ its forces productively? Does it not defy belief to claim 
that every Cold War-era naval planner, fleet commander, or commander of a multi-carrier 
battle group would make up the methods and principles according to which these vastly com-
plex instruments of seapower operate as he goes along – and that this process would be re-
peated after every change of command? 
In fact, quite the opposite is the case. It is certainly true that the USN has inculcated in 
its officers a highly pragmatic command philosophy that prizes adaptability and a facility for 
independent action, and which is entirely in line with the requirements of effective command 
at sea.48 As John Hattendorf has written, 
“The U.S. Navy has typically regarded doctrine as general guidance to be implemented 
or ignored as the on-scene operational commander judges appropriate to the situation of 
the moment. The attitude is not unlike how naval commanders in the Age of Sail regarded 
 
45 The authoritative account of German operational thinking in the lead-up to the Western campaign in 1940 
is Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940 (München: Oldenbourg, 2005). An English 
translation is available by Karl-Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, with the 
assistance of John T. Greenwood (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012). 
46  The most prominent attempt to establish written doctrine in the early post-Cold War era was “Naval Doc-
trine Publication 1: Naval Warfare” (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC, 1994). Accord-
ing to Swartz, this saw “continued used as reference through 2010 (largely outside USN),” which speaks 
volumes as to its organizational relevance. Peter M. Swartz, “U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts 
(1991-2000): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents” (CNA, Alexandria, VA, 2012), 57.  
47 Wayne P. Hughes, quoted in Peter M. Swartz, “U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction, 
Background and Analyses” (MISC D0026421.A1/Final, CNA, Alexandria, VA, 2011), 
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/D0026421.A1.pdf, 29. Hughes is also a staunch defender of the importance 
of naval doctrine, however. For a more detailed discussion of his views, see Wayne P. Hughes and Robert 
Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 20-23. 
48  On the important distinction between doctrinal precepts and command philosophy, see Geoffrey Sloan, 
“Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis and Theory,” In-
ternational Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012), doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01069.x, 246-50. 
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orders from their home governments; the decentralized regime of that era emphasized a 
commander’s judgment as to how prudent it was to apply those orders in the light of the 
situation at the scene of action.”49  
 
However, this preference for flexibility and command initiative – which, one might say, 
amounts to an unwritten doctrinal preference in and of itself – partially obscures an even more 
important reality: to allow for such far-reaching flexibility, the basic principles of force employment 
have to be extraordinarily stable and ingrained. Where this is the case, a written statement of op-
erational principles may not be required, at least in the absence of serious organizational crises. 
In that respect, U.S. naval doctrine can perhaps be said to resemble the British constitution. It 
is, to borrow Lord Hennessy’s magnificent expression, “the hidden wiring”50 of U.S. naval 
operations – largely unwritten, but clearly understood by those who shoulder the responsibil-
ity of command. 
The basic components of the U.S. Navy’s operational paradigm have been in place since 
World War II. They have remained stable throughout the Cold War and, to a large extent, 
beyond. They can be summarized here in an abridged form, although perhaps not without 
inflicting some violence upon them: in wartime, the U.S. Navy would project military power 
into the Eurasian rimlands by pushing carrier-centric strike forces far forward, to maintain 
operational access and engage the enemy both at sea and on land. Initially, this carrier-centric 
strategy had a strategic nuclear component, which was taken over by fleet ballistic missile 
submarines in the early 1960s. The second ‘prong’ of the Navy’s offensive strategy would con-
sist of attack submarines conducting simultaneous offensive operations up to the enemy’s 
coastline. A fraction of the surface Navy would be detailed to protect sea lines of communica-
tion. The subordinate principles and methods of U.S. naval operations have largely been de-
rived from these missions and the requirements they create. In limited war, a subset of the 
main wartime missions would be executed with an adjusted mix of surge forces as was 
deemed appropriate to the situation, while the remainder of the fleet continued to maintain a 
 
49  John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 27 (Newport, 
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combat-credible presence in other regional “hubs.”51 In peacetime, U.S. naval forces have been 
doing much the same thing, without crossing the threshold of actual violence. The basic logic 
behind this approach is captured by the concept of “combat-credible forward presence.”52 Any 
additional missions were either directly derived from the focus on offensive power projection 
at and from the sea, or clearly subordinate to it.53 This operational core of what Huntington 
famously called the “transoceanic Navy”54 is described in greater detail in the next chapter. 
What is important to note here is that, while it is true that the U.S. Navy has been less 
enthusiastic than its sister services in codifying its long-standing operational paradigm and 
calling the product ‘doctrine’, the operational paradigm itself is no less real – and no less stable 
– than those of the other services. It is embedded in officer education practices, fleet exercises 
and war plans (despite the progressive diminution of service responsibility for the latter). Like 
the more explicit doctrinal frameworks of the other services, it is supported by elaborate tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for carrier group operations, the employment of naval 
airpower, undersea warfare, and so forth. How the Navy’s prioritization of far-forward, offen-
sive power projection first came about is also explored in the next chapter. How it has evolved 
over time will become evident in Chapter 5. 
 
FORCE STRUCTURE 
The second variable that shapes naval postures is the availability of an appropriate combina-
tion of platforms and weapons to implement the specified operational priorities. The capital- 
 
51 Peter M. Swartz, “Sea Changes: Transforming U.S. Navy Deployment Strategy, 1775-2002” (CRM 
D0006679.A1, CNA/Center for Strategic Studies, Alexandria, VA, 2002), 50-51. 
52  Ibid., 48-55, 102-03; Peter M. Swartz, “A Short History of the U.S. Navy in the Cold War (1945-1990): Strat-
egy and Operations” (unpublished working paper, 2014). 
53  Power projection and sea control are often framed as two separate missions, with the former directed at 
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and technology-intensive nature of naval warfare means that this has often been an overriding 
concern. As Lautenschläger has put it, “[w]hereas armies have historically armed and sup-
ported the man, navies have essentially manned and supported the arm.”55 Hence, the material 
artifacts of naval warfare tell us more about actual capabilities than they do on land. In an as 
yet unpublished article, Biddle makes the case that this is also clearly reflected in battle out-
comes over the longue durée.56 
The relationship between operational approaches and available forces is complex. Op-
erational thinking that is not based on an estimate of the forces that can be generated for its 
implementation is out of touch with reality. At the same time, a version of the operational 
paradigm will at least implicitly guide force planners in their definition of requirements. Con-
sequently, the articulation of operational priorities can play an important role in shaping fu-
ture acquisition efforts. Given the expenditures and time horizons involved in bringing new 
platforms into the fleet in significant numbers, the lag time between the adaptation of opera-
tional principles and commensurate shifts in the force structure may be a decade or more. 
Considering that ships and submarines have realistic service lives of forty to fifty years and 
even an individual naval aircraft may last twenty years or more, the operational assumptions 
that are made in acquiring them become deeply embedded in the fleet for decades.57 In the 
long run, then, force structure choices have a far more pervasive impact on the service-level 
operational alternatives that are available than either of the other two elements. While this 
effect is mitigated by the flexibility that is built into any multi-mission naval platform, it is 
nonetheless likely to be significant. Thus, the adaptation of the operational approach in line 
with changing threat perceptions and requirements is both enabled and, potentially, con-
stricted by the force structure element.  
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Easily the most flexible element of a naval force posture is the preferred pattern of deployment, 
which is itself a combination of two variables: the geographic distribution of forces and the 
mode of deployment, which can be permanent, rotational, or reactive, to give just a few exam-
ples. Naval forces configured for long and far-flung deployments can be shifted from one the-
ater to another with relative ease and sustained there as necessary, provided that an adequate 
logistical infrastructure is in place. As a result, this element of a naval posture can – at least in 
theory – be reconfigured within just a few weeks. The U.S. Navy in the postwar decades has 
come quite close to this ideal. The ability to quickly establish a new center of gravity for naval 
operations was demonstrated on numerous occasions during the Cold War era, from the many 
instances of short-term augmented presence due to regional tensions to the massive five-car-
rier concentrations that were not unusual during the more intense phases of the air war against 
North Vietnam. In practice, the main hubs for U.S. naval operations – the North Atlantic with 
its marginal seas and the Western Pacific – have remained in place from the early 1950s on-
ward, with several marked changes in emphasis occurring between and within them.58 The 
fact that naval patterns of deployment can be adapted at fairly short notice and with limited 
political consequences may be able to partially compensate for force structure adaptations that 
are slow to materialize. It can, thus, be an important enabler of posture change, especially in 
the short- to medium-term.  
 
FUNCTIONS OF POSTURE PLANNING     
A military organization’s force posture is the face it shows to its potential opponents and, as 
such, it will have a significant impact on the course of strategic interaction, whether it is in 
peacetime, in a crisis or in a war. As far as this external face is concerned, we will differentiate 
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five functions, which are analytically distinct, even if they partially overlap in practice. The 
generic external functions of a given posture are deterrence, assurance, military stability, warf-
ighting, and war termination.59 (As we have seen, a posture also has important domestic and 
internal functions, in that it provides direction and serves as a justification for budgetary re-
quirements.) To understand how the various requirements may shape the options that are 
available for competitive adaptation, we will briefly discuss each of these five functions in 
turn. 
The deterrent function is to ensure that the opponent will consider the initiation of a con-
flict too costly or unlikely to produce sufficient gains to justify a military roll of the dice. Two 
approaches are often differentiated in the deterrence literature: deterrence by denial and deter-
rence by punishment.60 While the former seeks to instill in a potential attacker the belief that he 
will be unable to attain his war aims with acceptable losses and within an acceptable time 
frame, the latter relies on the threat of unacceptable damage to the attacker’s society, economy 
or system of government.61 Depending on the exact circumstances, naval forces can pose 
threats of denial at sea – primarily by means of effective undersea, anti-air and anti-surface 
warfare – or on land, by means of strike warfare, close air support of friendly ground forces, 
and theater nuclear attack. They can also threaten punishment by means of close or (especially 
since the late 19th century) distant blockade, commerce raiding, and – most importantly – stra-
tegic nuclear attack.62 The ability to have recourse to some or all these approaches is commu-
nicated through forward presence, exercises and demonstrations, and declaratory strategy. In 
 
59 To the planners’ credit, these functions were explicitly addressed in the design of the 1980s Maritime Strat-
egy. See e.g. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, 
Newport Paper 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008), 162-91. As we will see, the Maritime Strat-
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ments created by the five functions.  
60 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 37.  
61 Ibid. On conventional forces and deterrence by denial, see also John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 23-65. 
62 The whole range of employment options for naval forces that can ultimately also provide building blocks 
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don: Routledge, 2019), 115-68. 
 





the nuclear era, more than ever, the deterrent function has come to take center stage in posture 
planning. 
The assurance function represents a naval posture’s contribution to alliance politics. It is 
distinct from the deterrent function in that it serves the positive purpose of convincing allies 
and partners of the earnestness of declared security commitments and the military ability to 
follow through on them. While effective deterrence manipulates fear to maintain stability, ef-
fective assurance takes into account the strategic and domestic-political needs of one’s 
friends.63 The means by which this is accomplished partially resemble those necessary for the 
deterrent function, but they can go well beyond the minimum requirements for deterrence 
alone: presence arrangements, regular combined exercises, political and military-to-military 
exchanges, provisions for interoperability, and responsive declaratory policies can all make an 
important contribution to assurance. 
The military stability function of posture planning existed before the nuclear revolution, 
but its importance has increased considerably as a result of it. In a crisis, some types of postures 
are believed to create incentives for the opponent to strike or otherwise move first. 64 In the 
naval realm, surging forces out to sea as early as possible may offer important advantages in 
terms of survivability, as well as during the early phases of conflict. On the other hand, any 
indications of mobilization can lead to a strong military reaction on the other side and the crisis 
might be deepened as a result. At sea, ‘getting in the first blow’ may also offer greater ad-
vantages than in other operational spheres. Hughes counts it among his “great constants” of 
 
63 See Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Varieties of Assurance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 3 (2012), 
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naval warfare that “[a]t sea the essence of tactical success has been the first application of ef-
fective offensive force.”65 A posture that is configured for conflict prevention first and warf-
ighting second should be based on an awareness of these dynamics, even where potentially 
destabilizing effects cannot be entirely avoided. 
The warfighting function is perhaps the most straightforward one in theory, though not 
necessarily so in practice. Forces that are primarily configured for deterrence and assurance 
will have an inherent warfighting potential, as neither of the other functions can be effectively 
supported if they do not.66 Whether they have sufficient training, munitions and logistics sup-
port, whether their systems work as intended in a combat situation, and whether commanders 
who excel at managing their forces in a peacetime forward presence scenario will be effective 
in a wartime environment are very different questions, however. Posture planning can address 
them only partially. What an adequate warfighting posture can ensure is that the right types 
of forces will be available early enough and close enough to the prospective area of conflict to 
make a difference, and that those forces will understand how to fight and sell their lives dearly 
in the initial phases of combat. Wartime adjustments of some magnitude will probably be un-
avoidable, but peacetime posture planning can nonetheless create the preconditions for suc-
cess in war – or fail to create them, even with a posture that adequately fulfils the three 
previous functions. 
Finally, the war termination function points to the requirement of fighting a war in such 
a way as to allow for its conclusion once the most important objectives have been attained, and 
before it reaches levels of intensity that will preclude a negotiated peace of some kind.67 If a 
posture prefigures an operational approach that is highly escalatory or forces the opponent to 
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commit to total victory, it can be both military effective and self-defeating at the same time. 
Between nuclear-armed opponents, the possibility that a given posture might be so effective 
during the conventional phase that it forces the enemy to employ nuclear weapons deserves 
particular consideration. While the possibility that war termination might be the result of mu-
tual societal exhaustion after a nuclear exchange may serve the purposes of pre-war deterrence 
extremely well, a deterrence failure is always possible and a posture that is more prone to loss 
of control during the initial phases of a conflict has distinct disadvantages once war termina-
tion short of nuclear near-extinction scenarios becomes a realistic concern. 
This observation points to perhaps the most important dilemma military leaders face in 
devising an adequate force posture. Ideally, all five external functions would be well-inte-
grated, and the approaches selected on serving one of them would be fully compatible with 
all the others.68 In practice, this is unlikely to be the case. Thus, forces that are fully adequate 
for deterrence might be left with a set of unacceptable military alternatives if deterrence fails. 
Forces that may strike the perfect balance between warfighting potential and restraint to sat-
isfy the assurance function may not deter a risk-prone adversary. Forces that are configured 
to win as quickly and a cheaply as possible may be confronted with a choice of striking first or 
losing their main advantage. And a posture that greatly improves the level of crisis stability 
may not have sufficient offensive potential to win quickly, if the opponent initiates war for 
reasons that have little to do with the fear of being struck first. A posture that fails to ade-
quately cover one or more of the five external functions is unbalanced – perhaps dangerously 
so. Yet fully covering all of them at the same time may not be possible, or prohibitively expen-
sive. The extent to which the inevitable tensions between the different functions are taken into 
account and managed is the best measurement of the functional adequacy of a posture. No pos-
ture can serve all five functions equally well, but a posture that is based on an awareness of all 
of them and seeks a balance that does not casually neglect any of them is perhaps less likely to 
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lead to negative outcomes in a peacetime, crisis or wartime situation than one that is com-
pletely geared towards some dimensions of functionality to the exclusion of others. 
Now that we know what to look for in the course of the process tracing effort, the most 
important question that remains to be answered concerns the need for supporting methods: 
given that the available evidence on the operational approaches, force structures and deploy-
ment patterns of both competitors – and of the Soviet side in particular – is bound to be incom-
plete and often contradictory, how can we make sense of it all? The remainder of this chapter is 
an attempt to specify ways of deriving inferences of sufficient quality from our uneven evi-
dentiary base, as well as the limits that this effort inevitably faces.  
 
3.4.3 Hardware analysis  
The first and, at least in some respects, least problematic of the supporting methods that we 
will be relying on is hardware analysis. The basic idea behind this method is simple: if it is true 
that “navies have essentially manned and supported the arm,”69 as Lautenschläger found, 
there should be a considerable amount of useful information embedded in platforms and 
weapons, as well as in the processes by which they were developed, procured, built and up-
graded over time. Far from belonging into the much-maligned category of “bean counting”70 
exercises, hardware analysis is about making substantial inferences from observed choices concern-
ing naval systems. To arrive at such inferences, however, we need to go well beyond the simple 
description of the opponent’s force structures, or how they developed over time. As Epstein 
has emphasized “a mere enumeration of peacetime inventories […] does not constitute an anal-
ysis of military capabilities.”71 Rather, it is the organizational assumptions and preferences that go 
into weapons development that an analysis of naval platforms and weapon systems should try to 
unearth. The ambition is to arrive at a better understanding of the other dimensions of a naval 
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posture, especially operational doctrine and likely force employment, and perhaps also of the 
threat perceptions and policies driving them. 
There have been many attempts at good hardware analysis, but Michael MccGwire’s 
writings come closest to presenting a coherent system for analyzing Soviet naval force structure 
developments and deriving meaning from them. MccGwire is widely recognized as one of the 
most accomplished naval analysts of the Cold War period and, along with Robert Herrick and 
James McConnell, has been called a “seminal practitioner of the art of understanding the So-
viet Navy.”72 His contributions are spread out among a substantial body of work that will be 
cited throughout this study. It is possible, however, to introduce the main concepts and basic 
tools here, both to demonstrate the considerable utility of this approach and to lay bare its 
limitations. The section will also discuss possible alternatives to the approach proposed by 
MccGwire and look into some of the criticisms that have been made both of this approach, and 
of hardware analyses more generally. 
 
THE MCCGWIRE APPROACH 
The central idea of MccGwire’s approach to hardware analysis is that warships and shipbuild-
ing are the concrete expression of organizational perceptions, decisions and preferences, 
which in turn are the key to understanding Soviet naval policy.73 In his own words, “[t]he 
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number and characteristics of different types or classes of ships reflect the mix of operational 
requirements that was accepted at the time the production-design of each was finalized or 
subsequently modified.”74 He believed that, by relating the overall patterns of shipbuilding 
and the characteristics of successive classes of warships to information about force employ-
ment and operational activities, the core content of naval policy could be reconstructed with 
relative precision. His detailed assessment of Soviet naval developments, based in large part 
on this approach, remains as impressive today as it was forty-five years ago. Just as im-
portantly, MccGwire provided a rather substantial collection of rules-of-thumb, which are all 
the more credible as a result of his experience as head of the Soviet Naval Intelligence Section 
in the British Defence Intelligence Staff from 1965-67.75 While some of his findings are open to 
debate, the analytical tools that he provided have lost none of their utility – especially as far as 
the unresolved challenge of understanding Soviet moves based on imperfect information is 
concerned.  
How, then, can hardware analysis help us understand U.S.-Soviet competitive adapta-
tion cycles today? The first challenge – then as now – is to trace observed trends backwards to 
decisions about posture. While deployment patterns can be adapted relatively quickly, opera-
tional paradigms take, at the very least, several years to change, and force structures are much 
more stable yet. The implication is that “[a] shift in the pattern of operational employment of 
ships already deployed cannot of itself be taken as evidence of a fundamental change in naval 
policy rather than a desire to maximize the return on existing policy investments.”76 Therefore, 
the evidence for a major posture change is much stronger once it begins to manifests itself in 
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the force structure. This makes hardware analysis a method of choice in ascertaining such 
shifts – but not one that is without its downsides and challenges. 
 The first challenge is that shipbuilding is subject to significant “lead times,”77 which 
need to be quantified in order to relate observations to decisions. MccGwire’s rule-of-thumb 
was that a new ship design would take eight to twelve years to come to fruition, from the 
specifications of requirements to the delivery of the first vessel.78 Based on this rule, we can 
expect that it will take up to fifteen years for the initial decision to implement a major change 
to unmistakably manifest itself in the fleet, with purposely designed fighting units becoming 
available in numbers. We can extend the same principle to aircraft and technically complex 
weapons systems as well, although the lead times will differ to an extent. A rule-of-thumb, 
however, is just that. To arrive at a reliable understanding of the underlying naval planning 
processes, we will at times have to go into considerable detail in the following chapters. 
To complicate matters further, a decision to embark on new building programs or sig-
nificantly change already existing programs will bump up against ongoing production pro-
cesses. Because major subsystems and components are themselves subject to substantial lead 
times as well, programs may not immediately be brought to a halt, even if operational require-
ments have changed radically, because it would be both difficult and uneconomical to do so. 
MccGwire calls this “pipeline inertia.”79 His estimate was that platforms would continue to be 
produced for another two years after a decision to cancel – possibly longer, depending on the 
exact nature of the program. Also, the cancellation of a program less than four years before 
production start-up could be expected to have significant ramifications for the military ship-
building sector.80 All of these considerations would clearly limit the degree of freedom that a 
navy has in reshaping its force structures, even after a decision has been made. The Soviet 
system may have been even more sluggish than Western systems in dealing with large-scale 
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readjustments. The basic realities of lead times and pipeline inertia are not primarily a conse-
quence of a nation’s organization of its political economy, however, but instead a function of 
the sheer complexity of building modern warships, submarines, aircraft, and guided muni-
tions with any efficiency. 
 Additional limitations result from the minimum economical size of a building program 
and the number of units a single production line can put out in a given timeframe. For the 
VMF during the 1960s, MccGwire estimates that production runs of less than four to six for 
large surfaces ships, twelve to sixteen for destroyers and similarly sized vessels, twenty-five 
to thirty for nuclear submarines, and forty to fifty for diesel submarines should be considered 
irregular.81 While such irregularities need not indicate a major shift, they warrant particular 
attention.82 As we will see, a significant number of building programs veered radically off their 
expected paths and each of these instances acts as an important marker in our reconstruction 
of the dynamics of U.S.-Soviet naval competition.  
MccGwire’s account also tells us that each active production line for the VMF could be 
expected to churn out a nuclear submarine or destroyer-sized surface vessel every two years.83 
Of course, smaller or simpler vessels could be produced faster, but even diesel-electric subma-
rines still took about a year to complete during the 1960s.84 This allows us to arrive at the pre-
liminary deduction that the main alternatives available to decision-makers were either the 
economical option of a relatively slow and steady production run resulting in a gentle upward 
curve in capability, or a crash program utilizing a much larger number of parallel production 
lines, with accumulating costs for tooling, skilled personnel, and so forth. The latter would 
probably be justifiable if war was expected within a five- to ten-year period, and rather waste-
ful if it was not. Even in the case of a diesel submarine program, a manifold expansion of 
production capacities would have been required to accomplish a steep increase in numbers 
within a decade or less. As we shall see, the Soviet shipbuilding sector showed itself capable 
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of such an expansion during the 1950s, but the observed pattern was generally along the lines 
of the first option thereafter.  
Perhaps because a succession of such essentially ‘normal’ production runs would not 
have increased the operational capability of the VMF fast enough, MccGwire found that the 
Soviets had developed a specific design philosophy. Instead of fully developing successive 
‘generations’ of platforms, they would rush new designs into production as quickly as possible 
and then successively increase their capabilities during the production run by applying im-
proved subsystems as they became available.85 As a result, the new platforms would not ini-
tially realize their full potential. MccGwire’s verdict that “the Russians are great bluffers, and 
know that their opponents must credit them with the capability inherent in a weapon’s external design 
even if it turns out to be of limited operational value in practice”86 should always be kept in 
mind.  
 Finally, there is one further technical limitation that MccGwire put particular emphasis 
on in his later assessments of Soviet shipbuilding. Moving away from his more holistic assess-
ments of Soviet shipbuilding during the early to mid-1970s, he found the VMF’s apportion-
ment of a particularly scarce resource – namely, nuclear reactors – to be useful in 
reconstructing Soviet naval policy.87 Based on the allocation of 20 reactors per year, which was 
a known parameter derived from Western intelligence assessments he judged reliable, he was 
able to account for many of the twists and turns of the VMF’s submarine building program 
from 1957 to 1982.88 While this was a rather sparse account that has been partially overtaken 
by the sources that have since come to light, it provided an internally consistent explanation 
and projection of Soviet submarine building, at a time when neither was easily available. As 
is the case with MccGwire’s earlier assessments, the underlying logic has largely stood the test 
of time.  
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 Moving beyond the pattern of naval acquisitions itself, how did a leading analyst be-
lieve they could be related to naval policy choices? For this next step, MccGwire outlined what 
he called “minimum-requirements testing.”89 The basic assumptions that underpin this ap-
proach are extremely well compatible with the causal model that guides our investigation. He 
takes as his starting point the observation that 
“[t]he security of the homeland is the irreducible core of any national strategy and has 
first call on the allocation of resources to military procurement and to the shaping of de-
fense policy. Assessments of naval policy can start from this general rule and then look to 
see what other reasons there may be besides. In the case of the Soviet Navy, there is the 
additional constraint of Western maritime preponderance, which was overwhelming in 
1945 and has persisted in varying degrees ever since. […] Any Soviet naval staff that did not 
work out its contemporary operational concepts and future force requirements with this threat in 
mind would be negligent in its duty.”90  
 
As a result, MccGwire finds that the first step in relating hardware to policy should be to ex-
amine the fit between the reasonable requirements for homeland defense and the actual build-
ing programs. This entails four steps, which can be summarized as follows:  
(1)  to see whether the threat and the reactions to it are reasonable in line with one 
another;  
(2)  to ascertain whether the capabilities that are being acquired exceed the plau-
sible requirements for defense; 
(3) to establish to what extent the capability profile is specialized for defense or 
geared towards a more flexible employment concept; and 
(4) to see how the forces in question are actually being used and whether their 
operational employment lines up with their original design.91 
 
 
89  Michael MccGwire, “The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy,” in Michael MccGwire, Soviet Naval De-
velopments, 195-98. 
90  Ibid., 195. Emphasis added. 
91  Ibid., 196. 
 





MccGwire is explicit about the fact that such a ‘requirements test’ may not, by itself, yield an 
unambiguous assessment and should thus be correlated with other types of evidence.92 As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, the ambiguities that are associated with an increasingly ca-
pable defensive posture was, in many ways, at the heart of the Cold War competition at sea.  
 A final, recurring element of MccGwire’s assessments is the idea of “decision peri-
ods,”93 which provide the main interface between the political and naval spheres. While it is 
tempting to frame these as the central decision points for competitive posture change as well, 
the empirics are unfortunately more complex than that. We will come back to this matter in 
the following chapters. For the time being, however, it should be stated unambiguously that 
the present study does not share MccGwire’s ambition of leveraging hardware analysis to re-
construct the evolution of the Soviet Union’s overall naval policy. Although there is some over-
lap, our focus on the interactions between U.S. and Soviet naval postures is both more 
circumscribed and geared towards a different aim – namely, to retrospectively uncover why 
and how the U.S. Navy managed to stay ahead of its challenger in the competition for opera-
tional access to the European continent. Hence, Soviet policy decisions at the central govern-
mental level are of interest primarily due to of their knock-on effects at the level of naval 
posture, which are transmitted through some of the modifying variables in particular. These 
decisions are not, however, a main subject of our investigation. As a result, rather than consid-
ering it in depth here, we will rely on MccGwire’s identification of Soviet political ‘decision 





92  Ibid., 207. 
93 MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, esp. 22-29, 381-447; Michael MccGwire, “Contingency 
Plans for World War,” in George, The Soviet and Other Communist Navies, 61-81; Michael MccGwire, “The 
Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy: 1960-74,” in MccGwire; Booth; McDonnell, Soviet Naval Policy; Michael 
MccGwire, “The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy,” in Michael MccGwire, Soviet Naval Developments, 
198-204. 
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ALTERNATIVE TAKES ON HARDWARE ANALYSIS 
Besides the tools and perspective introduced by Michael MccGwire, there are several other 
avenues for hardware analysis that are open to us. The first and most technically developed of 
these is the detailed application of naval engineering techniques. This is an approach that was 
well-developed during the Cold War, and that has also continued to evolve. Based on an es-
tablished, scientific methodology and extensive engineering knowledge, this literature pro-
vides far and away the best assessments of what is technologically possible and sensible, and 
how shipbuilding could be expected to evolve on the ground. In some cases, valuable compar-
ative assessments were done, as were detailed analyses of individual platforms from an engi-
neering perspective.94 The main edge of this literature over MccGwire’s approach is its acute 
awareness of how design limitations may lead to choices that are not of a strictly military-
organizational nature at all. The analysis of nationally specific design philosophies can also 
yield interesting results. At the same time, a preoccupation with the details of design trade-
offs and a strong reliance on established technical indicators also leads to a uniquely narrow 
and specific outlook, with few exceptions. These analyses are best adduced as evidence, rather 
than adopting the methodology as such. 
 A more recent example of a contribution that does manage to combine social science 
with an awareness of naval engineering concepts and shipbuilding indicators, and to do so 
harmonically, is Kirchberger’s study of Chinese naval development.95 Her study also intro-
duces an alternative perspective on the overall pattern of shipbuilding activity, in the form of 
 
94 See, e.g. Nigel Brodeur, “Comparative Capabilities of Soviet and Western Weapon Systems,” in MccGwire; 
Booth; McDonnell, Soviet Naval Policy, 452-70; James W. Kehoe, “Warship Design: Ours and Theirs,” in 
MccGwire; McDonnell, Soviet Naval Influence, 364-86. For a more detailed study on a single platform, see 
Herbert A. Meier, “Methodology for Analyzing Foreign Warships,” in MccGwire; McDonnell, Soviet Naval 
Influence, 394-98; Reuven Leopold, “U.S. Naval Ship Design: One Viewpoint,” in The Other Arms Race: New 
Technologies and Non-Nuclear Conflict, ed. Geoffrey Kemp, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Uri Ra'anan (Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books, 1975), 57-75; James W. Kehoe and Kenneth S. Brower, “Warship Design in the Future,” 
in The U.S. Navy: The View from the Mid-1980s, ed. James L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 141-63. 
Relevant periodicals include Maritime Defence International and the Naval Engineers Journal,  
95  Kirchberger, Assessing China's Naval Power. 
 





force structure analysis.96 To accomplish this, Kirchberger groups PLAN vessels “according to 
vessel types and classes, age structure, and technological standards,”97 which provides a val-
uable backdrop of more detailed discussions of combat capability. While the capability analy-
sis she builds on top of this foundation is of a high standard throughout, the main technical 
indicator itself – fleet age structure – raises a concern that also applies to other such indicators: 
unless it is very carefully contextualized, it is prone to misrepresentation in what MccGwire 
would call a “colonel’s fallacy.”98 By this, he means the widespread tendency of senior military 
officers and bureaucrats to remain stuck in a mid-level planner’s frame of mind, where “the 
concern is properly for an opponent’s capabilities, with hostile intentions taken for granted. 
But while worst-case analysis is appropriate to contingency planning, it is wholly inappropri-
ate at the politico-strategic or ‘ministerial’ level of analysis.”99 Because the fleet age structure 
of any fast-modernizing navy will show an improving profile over time, its cooptation as part 
of a ‘colonel’s fallacy’ would result in any such force appearing aggressive, even if the behavior 
of an opposing party is actually wholly consistent with a defensive posture. Because the ‘colo-
nel’s fallacy’ is a common error of reasoning in military analysis, MccGwire would argue that 
requirements testing should not be left to others, but instead be performed by the analyst ‘at 
the source’. In this frame of mind, “[a]n opponent’s military capabilities are not ignored, but 
they are measured against his security requirements to discover whether there is any surplus 
that would indicate an aggressive plan of action.”100 An integrated approach to capability anal-
ysis and requirements testing makes it much less likely that a good indicator will end up as 
key evidence for the bad analyses of third parties. 
This brings us to the second alternative approach to hardware analysis, which has 
spawned a wealth of platform- or weapon-centric accounts of technological developments during the 
Cold War at sea. The best of these works also exhibit a deep understanding of operational 
 
96  Ibid., 182-233. 
97  Ibid., 182. 
98  MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, 367. 
99  Ibid. 
100  Ibid. 
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concepts and activities. As such, they combine some elements of MccGwire’s high-level anal-
yses with a greater affinity for the engineering mindset of shipbuilding practitioners. Most of 
the accounts in question are quite specific, although some have attempted to provide an over-
view of the entire period (or large segments of it).101 While their analyses of the U.S.-Soviet 
competition as a whole tend to be fragmentary, they point to the importance of factors that 
MccGwire was undoubtedly aware of, but which he does not examine in the same detail as 
other hardware analyses do. Many of these factors will be repeatedly referred to in the follow-
ing chapters, including: 
▪ propulsion choices and their impact on range and speed, as they relate to capa-
bility profile; 
▪ the capabilities of weapons and munitions carried and the implications of maga-
zine size; 
▪ the quality of sensors and other electronics, and the prickly question of targeting 
modalities; 
▪ considerations of survivability, as they relate to platform size and other design 
choices; 
▪ mutual dependencies and networking of platforms, be it as a force multiplier or a 
liability. 
 
Together, these design features provide substantial insights into force employment principles 
and operational patterns, which can only add to our understanding of posture developments 
overall. In addition to the major works of this subgenre of hardware analysis, which are re-
ferred to repeatedly throughout the empirical chapters of this study, there are countless exam-
ples of more ad hoc hardware analyses to be found, for the most part, in professional periodicals 
like USNI Proceedings. These often provide valuable insights on much more specific matters 
and which will be selectively referred to where suitable. On the whole, this category provides 
 
101  Some excellent examples include Norman Friedman, Modern Warship: Design and Development (Greenwich: 
Conway Maritime, 1979); Norman Friedman, Submarine Design and Development (Annapolis, MD: Naval In-
stitute Press, 1984); Norman Friedman, The Postwar Naval Revolution (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1986); Robert Gardiner and Norman Friedman, eds., Navies in the Nuclear Age: Warships since 1945 (London: 
Conway Maritime, 1993); Terzibaschitsch, Stefan. Kampfsysteme der US Navy: Waffen und Elektronik auf ameri-
kanischen Kriegsschiffen. Hamburg: Koehler, 2001. 
 





a treasure trove of quality evidence but, for the most part, these contributions lack MccGwire’s 
acute sense for the bigger picture.  
The third, and potentially most interesting, avenue that should be mentioned here is 
wargaming. This is fundamentally unlike any of the traditional, paper-based approaches out-
lined here, but potentially compatible with all of them. Wargames simulate “an intellectual 
battle which approximates the experience of command in times of war, where players control 
game elements that represent forces in combat.”102 Starting out in the 18th century as vastly 
expanded versions of boardgames like chess, wargames have been an established and institu-
tionalized method for military training and experimentation since the late 19th century.103 At 
the U.S. Naval War College, wargaming dates back to the times of Mahan. In the run-up to the 
Pacific War, the U.S. Navy gamed out successive versions of War Plan Orange against Japan, 
experimenting extensively with different options.104 The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) did not 
permit its commanders the same degree of intellectual freedom in toying with alternative op-
tions, but wargaming nonetheless played a prominent role – including in the operational de-
sign phase for the Pearl Harbor raid.105 The reliance on naval wargaming continued during the 
Cold War years.106 
What makes wargaming an interesting approach for posture analysis, however, is not 
so much its use in a military context, which is widely known and accepted. It is the widespread 
availability of sophisticated game designs in the unclassified sphere, and the increasing ac-
ceptance of wargaming as a method that can be used productively in an academic context.107 
 
102  Jon Peterson, “A Game Out of All Proportions: How a Hobby Miniaturized War,” in Harrigan; Kirschen-
baum; Dunnigan, Zones of Control, 3.  
103 For a solid history, see ibid., 3-31; Philipp von Hilgers, War Games: A History of War on Paper (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2012). On the basic approach of U.S. naval wargaming see Francis J. McHugh, U.S. Navy 
Fundamentals of War Gaming (New York, NY: Skyhorse, 2013).  
104  See Norman Friedman, Winning a Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Naval 
History and Heritage Command, 2019). 
105  Alan D. Zimm, The Attack on Pearl Harbour: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 
2013), 71-82.  
106 See e.g. Hal M. Friedman, Blue versus Purple: The U.S. Naval War College, the Soviet Union, and the New Enemy 
in the Pacific (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2017).  
107 This achievement is at least in part down to Sabin’s contributions including Philip Sabin, “Wargames as 
an Academic Instrument,” in Harrigan; Kirschenbaum; Dunnigan, Zones of Control, 421-37; Philip Sabin, Sim-
ulating War: Studying Conflict through Simulation Games (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).  
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The naval game system that remains the most capable – certainly as far as relating Cold War-
era hardware to defense requirements, or testing the effects of alternative platforms, weapons 
and force structure concepts in concrete scenarios is concerned – is the Harpoon family of 
games.108 Developed by Larry Bond and first published in 1981, Harpoon has gone through 
several major updates and is still being developed further, with its version 4.2 expected in the 
near future. Originally a tabletop game, it has also been fully digitized since. As far as the 
tabletop version is concerned, the Harpoon system provides an extremely detailed simulation 
of modern naval combat, with a 120-page rulebook that is open to all manner of additional 
adaptations. In short, it makes one of the best cases in point for Sabin’s claim that  
“simulation modelling is a far more ambitious process than mere narrative description of 
the events concerned. Wargames bestow in miniature the almost God-like ability to re-
wind time over and over again and to experiment with all kinds of random variations and 
alternative decisions, thereby creating the ultimate counterfactual sandbox.”109 
 
The only real downside of wargaming as a supporting research method is the massive invest-
ment of time and intellectual resources that it requires, which makes it a difficult path to tread 
for an individual researcher. The best evidence of what is involved in making wargaming ‘de-
liver’ as a method comes from a case in which it was arguably used to good effect: in the writ-
ing of Tom Clancy’s now-classic World War III novel Red Storm Rising. The players in this case 
were a mixed group of professional military analysts and seasoned Harpoon players, a full 
dozen strong, who played a single scenario – a saturation Tu-22M Backfire raid on a U.S./UK 
carrier battle group – three times. This included performing a good portion of the staff work 
that would have gone in developing the concept for such an attack in real life.110 For validation 
purposes, in particular, such a sustained group effort is difficult to avoid. Having said that, 
 
108  For an overview, see Don R. Gilman, “Harpoon: An Original Serious Game,” in Harrigan; Kirschenbaum; 
Dunnigan, Zones of Control, 209-19. Currently the most interesting version to work with in a Cold War setting 
is High Tide: The Cold War, 1980-1989 – A Decade of Naval Confrontation (Clash of Arms Games, 2003), which 
includes an excellent collection of technical data as well.  
109  Sabin, Simulating War, 55. Emphasis added. 
110  Larry Bond, Dance of the Vampires: A 1985 Cold War Harpoon Scenario (The Admiralty Trilogy Group, 2013), 
2-3; For the Clancy narrative, see Tom Clancy, Red Storm Rising (New York, NY: Berkley Books, 1987), chapter 
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recent advances in ‘civilianized’ computer wargaming, such as WarfareSims’ Command: Mod-
ern Air/Naval Operations follow-on to the Harpoon series may render the use of wargaming in 
Cold War naval research a more manageable proposition in the future.111  
All things considered, there is much to be learned from each of the additional catego-
ries of hardware-centric analytical approaches and tools discussed in this section. The ap-
proach that is ultimately used throughout this study will emphasize three elements in 
particular that may not have received the full attention they deserve in MccGwire’s frame-
work: 
(1)  We should realize that design trade-offs are pervasive in naval (and aerospace) 
engineering and that the features of naval platforms are subject not only to opera-
tional requirements but also to stringent physical limitations that may be impossi-
ble to overcome within the constraints of a given set of parameters. Not every 
prominent characteristic of a system is necessarily or primarily going to be tracea-
ble to military or political-strategic considerations.  
(2) The relevance of a systematic examination of the main technical characteristics of 
individual platforms, in addition to the overall pattern of construction, should also 
be underlined. Having said that, the nature and format of the study do impose 
certain limits on this ambition. At the end of the day, it is the competitive dynamics 
of posture change that we are interested in, not the evolving applications of mili-
tary technology per se.  
(3) Wargaming approaches would underscore the interactive nature of naval opera-
tions and the contingency of battle outcomes, which makes it difficult to arrive at 
firm conclusions as to the best, most plausible, or most likely courses of action in 
any given situation. The fact that the most likely outcome, if he could re-fight a battle 
fifty or one hundred times, would be a narrow victory does not ease a com-
mander’s real-world burden of responsibility. Given that a paper study can only 
consider a limited number of scenarios in any detail and will convey a picture that 
is necessarily selective, even in a long-form account, some humility is in order 
when making assessments about plausible alternative realities that ultimately did 
not come to pass. 
 
 
111  WarfareSims.com, “C:MANO Professional, Academic & Student Edition,” http://www.war-
faresims.com/?page_id=3822.  
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In the next section, we will have to address some of the most prominent criticisms that have 
been made of hardware-based analyses in general, and of MccGwire’s requirements testing 
approach in particular. 
 
CRITICISMS AND CAVEATS 
Several criticisms have been made of MccGwire’s work on shipbuilding and force structure 
analysis, and of hardware analysis more broadly – some of them valid, others not. Perhaps the 
most common criticism concerns the comparative reliability of findings derived from different 
types of evidence. In one such passage, Ranft and Till write that “[t]he main problem is that 
the evidence is intrinsically ambiguous, whether it is derived from what the Russians have got 
or from what they say and do.”112 That is undoubtedly true. Hardware and acquisition patterns 
leave considerable room for interpretation. It is difficult to overlook, however, that all different 
types of evidence are not actually created equal. While they are all ambiguous to some extent, 
analyses of shipbuilding patterns and capabilities can draw on a substantial accumulation of 
‘hard’ evidence that is difficult to dismiss out of hand: “[Hardware analysis] is not a panacea. 
But because it rests on a firm foundation of physical data, it does provide a relatively concrete 
form of reference against which to evaluate and interpret other types of evidence.”113As a re-
sult, it is reasonable to insist it can lay a solid foundation for inferences from other sources – 
especially those that are derived from partial literary evidence that is often much more ambig-
uous. As Booth puts it, “[n]obody, including MccGwire, claims that hardware analysis is a full 
indicator [of prospective employment], only the most reliable one at hand.”114 In practice, no 
method should be relied on to the exclusion of others. But it is difficult to argue that one should 
start from the kind of evidence that leaves more rather than less room for interpretation as to 
what the opponent’s main priorities are. 
 
112 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 2. 
113  Michael MccGwire, “The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy,” in Michael MccGwire, Soviet Naval De-
velopments. 207.  
114  Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, 184.  
 





The key point that speaks in favor of hardware analysis is that, while they are ambig-
uous to some extent, capabilities reflect choices about matters of naval posture that are settled enough 
to warrant a concrete commitment of scarce public sector resources over a period of ten to fifteen years. 
As long as the written record remains fragmentary, there is no better indication of priorities 
than that. MccGwire strongly believed that “[we] cannot avoid speculation, but we can control 
its quality.”115 In our attempts to control the quality of our speculations, an analysis of how 
material resources were actually put to use – how the limited capacity to reshape a naval posture 
for the long run was allocated to specific projects – remains the best starting point. Having said 
that, and while the order of precedence does matter, there is no doubt that the application of 
several methods with their distinct advantages and blind spots will generally produce better 
results than the reliance on any individual method can. MccGwire may have been one of the 
main practitioners of systematic hardware analysis, but that does not mean that he relied on 
this method to the exclusion of others. In fact, he would be the first to insist that hardware 
analysis should not be seen as a stand-alone approach. His specific claim was that “the capa-
bility that these ships comprise provides a concrete frame of reference against which to assess 
the implications of operational activity and public pronouncements.”116 While it is true that 
establishing such a frame of reference involves interpretations of an ambiguous evidentiary 
base – how, in a field of human activity that remains cloaked in secrecy, could it not? – the 
central claim itself stands undiminished.  
 Another criticism that deserves to be restated is that MccGwire relied on a view of the 
VMF as “a unitary, value-maximizing fleet-as-actor that deliberately and systematically trans-
lates its requirements into a set of ‘capabilities’.”117 This is a potentially serious critique that 
deserves to be taken seriously. That said, the author of this study has found limited evidence 
to this effect. It is true that MccGwire proposed as a reasonable assumption the view that a 
military organization would be focused on averting threats to the homeland first and that we 
 
115 Michael MccGwire, “The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy,” in Michael MccGwire, Soviet Naval De-
velopments, 207. 
116  Ibid., 177.  
117 Breemer, “Estimating the Soviet Strategic Submarine Missile Threat,” 229.  
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should use this as our starting point, rather than the ‘colonel’s fallacy’ of assuming that all 
rivals’ intentions are aggressive as a matter of course. However, he is quite explicit in stating 
that naval policies need not be related to ‘minimum requirements’ at all.118 How well his view 
of the Soviet Navy in particular – the so-called MccGwire thesis, according to which “Soviet 
naval development was best understood as a counter to the weapons and doctrines of superior 
Western naval power”119 – stands up to a 21st century review of the available evidence remains 
to be seen. As we embark on this review, it is worth remembering Wheeler and Booth’s state-
ment that “[i]n practice, there is always much more going on in the development of a country’s 
military policy than a logical convergence of external interests and weapons acquisition.”120 
Having said that, there is little reason to second-guess MccGwire’s adoption of a baseline view 
of competitors’ behaviors that ascribes to them motives that are not fundamentally different 
from our own. 
A fourth criticism, also levelled by Jan Breemer, concerns a practical limitation that 
applies not just to MccGwire’s approach, but to hardware analyses of all types, and that is 
potentially difficult to overcome: they “[presume] accurate intelligence about capabilities.”121 
Although it is not at all surprising that incidents like the misattribution of certain capabilities 
to a new class of vessels occurred throughout the Cold War, and expert disagreements about 
novel capabilities are also to be expected, this is clearly not a trivial matter.122 As Mahnken 
found in his study of interwar military intelligence, U.S. and other intelligence organizations 
have repeatedly missed foreign innovations, in both hardware and doctrine.123 Although the 
 
118 Michael MccGwire, “The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy,” in Michael MccGwire, Soviet Naval De-
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overall record was not catastrophically bad, only four out of the nine innovations examined 
were fully uncovered in a timely manner. Three were missed completely.124 Clearly, this is a 
major limitation when dealing with a ‘moving target’, although it is not one that applies to 
hardware analyses only. Two factors serve to mitigate the challenge. The first is that MccGwire 
essentially proposed a backward-looking approach – he does not claim to be in a position to 
keep track of Soviet naval developments in anything close to real-time.125 While prediction is 
a necessity in the context of an entrenched strategic rivalry and deficiencies in methodology 
sometimes have to be accepted for what they are, this is also a topic MccGwire approached 
with some restraint.126 The second factor applies to the present study in particular, and to his-
torical accounts in general. Once the ‘target’ has stopped moving, additional information may 
start to come to light in significant quantities, as was indeed the case after the end of the Cold 
War. While the research problem at this stage is primarily of academic and historical, rather 
than immediate political-military nature, interest in Breemer’s criticism grows progressively 
less pertinent as hindsight begins to kick in. Hence, the challenge it poses for our reliance on 
hardware analysis after the fact is a manageable one. 
A final criticism that can be made of MccGwire’s approach is that, at times, he may 
have been too ambitious in his attempt to not only make sense of the VMF’s naval posture, but 
to arrive at second-order inferences about Soviet security and defense policy more generally. 
While he assiduously avoided the ‘colonel’s fallacy’, his inferences concerning Soviet motives 
may sometimes stretch the evidentiary base in different, altogether more subtle ways. Alt-
hough this is more evident where detailed hardware analyses are absent from his texts, and 
there certainly were worse offenders in this regard – even among the elite analysts of the Soviet 
Navy – the present study nevertheless takes a more circumscribed approach. The bottom line, 
however, remains unchanged: in a review of the long-term dynamics of the Cold War at sea, 
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particular weight should be given to the analysis of observable naval capabilities and of the 
organizational choices they reflect. 
 
3.4.4 Literary analysis 
The main ‘competitor’ for hardware analysis during the Cold War was an approach that fo-
cused on Soviet public pronouncements and internal debates to establish the content of naval 
policies. The basic idea in this case was to start from what the Soviets said they would do and 
derive insights about roles and missions, force employment, and future developments primar-
ily through exegesis of written materials. As was the case with hardware analysis, there were 
classified counterparts to the public debates. Some of those documents have since been declas-
sified and can add to our evidentiary base.127 However, many of the achievements of literary 
analysts, practitioners of “literary intelligence”128 as some of them styled themselves, were 
based on their systematic reviews of the open source literature. As one would expect, the pre-
sent study relies heavily on hermeneutics throughout, and for the empirical chapters in par-
ticular, but it should be stated at the outset that it will not engage in the kind of detailed literary 
intelligence collection and analysis that Cold War practitioners relied on. Rather than trying 
to reprise the lost art of prowling through scraps of bureaucratic declarations and debates in 
the original Russian language and applying to them a deep understanding of the rigid termi-
nology of the Soviet official mind, it approaches the wealth of existing literary analyses from 
the perspective of the critical consumer. Hence, the actual application of this supporting 
method – narrowly defined as the engagement with the subtle meanings of Soviet primary 
source materials – has been left to others and the fruits of their considerable labor will add to 
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the overall picture we will paint as evidence. Having said that, it is nonetheless important to 
understand some notable differences in how literary analysis was applied during the Cold 
War. To bring out those variances, it is helpful to contrast and compare the approaches of the 
two most accomplished practitioners of literary analysis, Robert Herrick and James 
McConnell. In an additional step, we can then also ask how their methods differ from 
MccGwire’s take on the problem.  
Herrick was the first analyst, in 1968, to publicly broach the idea that the VMF’s posture 
was preponderantly defensive in nature and geared towards homeland defense. His Soviet 
Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice was considered a serious challenge to the U.S. 
Navy’s institutional outlook – so serious, in fact, that it famously warranted the addition of a 
Publisher’s Preface to justify the U.S. Naval Institute’s decision to publish it at all.129 Herrick 
was difficult to ignore for three reasons. Like MccGwire, he had been a naval intelligence of-
ficer before leaving the service. Secondly, and again like MccGwire, he read Russian and had 
lived in the Soviet Union. And third, he clearly was a serious historian of Soviet naval debates 
and understood where the VMF was coming from. He may have developed his style of densely 
sourced and historically contextualized literary analysis in part because he understood that 
his take on the subject would be controversial. Admiral (ADM) Arleigh Burke had encouraged 
him to proceed with his study and also contributed the foreword,130 but while Burke was a 
towering figure, he had retired in 1961. That the expanding Soviet Navy essentially still re-
mained wedded to the outlook of a coastal defense force, and that its more ambitious posture 
was not least of all a reaction to the threat of U.S. carrier strikes on the homeland, was not what 
the official Navy wanted to hear. Hence, Herrick had to make his case ironclad, and he chose 
to make it about history first, and only then about the present. At the same time, it is also true 
that there were few viable alternatives available to him. As he put it himself, “[a]lmost no 
useful and reliable information could be obtained from the few books in Western languages 
 
129  Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1968), xi-xii.  
130 Ibid., vii-ix, xvii. 
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that purport to treat of the Soviet Navy.”131 Since the Soviets did their best to wrap their naval 
development in a cloak of secrecy, doing his own literary analyses based on those Russian 
language materials available to him was Herrick’s best chance of stating his case publicly.  
In time, this developed into a powerful method for explaining Soviet naval develop-
ments largely in terms of the VMF’s own statements and historiography of itself. While he was 
open to incorporating aspects of hardware analysis, this was the approach Herrick relied on 
for the rest of his career, including a number of chapters and articles as well as his 1989 volume 
on Soviet Naval Theory and Policy.132 By this time, the potential troublemaker of the 1960s was 
widely recognized as “the master of Soviet naval history.”133 While it is an overstatement on 
Booth’s part to claim that, by the mid-1970s, Herrick’s and MccGwire’s explanation of Soviet 
naval initiatives, which had earlier “attracted substantial disapproval from Western naval es-
tablishments […] had become a generally accepted one,”134 they did have much of the highest-
quality evidence on their side. Ironically, Herrick’s most ambitious application of his method 
– a comprehensive three-volume set on Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy, 1956-1986 – was pub-
lished long after the Cold War had ended.135 It has only served to strengthen his case further, 
and even though Herrick’s ‘grand œuvre’ has been cited sporadically before, this study is one 
of the first to make extensive use of it. Herrick’s approach is particularly appealing because he 
often manages to contextualize his fairly esoteric evidence well-enough to let it speak for itself 
and make his case for him. While he frequently reads between the lines, he seldom does so in 
 
131  Ibid., xviii.  
132  Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Inheritance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1989). His articles and chapters notably include Robert W. Herrick, “The Gorshkov Interpretation of 
Russian Naval History,” in Michael MccGwire, Soviet Naval Developments, 206-21; Robert W. Herrick, “The 
USSR's 'Blue Belt of Defense' Concept: A Unified Military Plan for Defense Against Seaborne Nuclear Attack 
by Strike Carriers and Polaris/Poseidon SSBNs,” in Naval Power in Soviet Policy, ed. Paul J. Murphy (Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office/Department of the Air Force, 1978), 169-78; Robert W. Herrick, 
“Roles and Missions of the Soviet Navy: Historical Evolution, Current Priorities, and Future Prospects,” in 
George, The Soviet and Other Communist Navies, 9-36. 
133  Bradford Dismukes, “Introduction,” in George, The Soviet and Other Communist Navies, 5.  
134  Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, 192 n. 30.  
135  Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy, 1956-1986, 3 vols. (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 2003). 
 





ways that an informed reader cannot fathom. In other words, he makes it relatively easy for 
skeptical minds to follow his argument and develop a level of trust in his assessments. 
James McConnell stands out as the most purist exponent of literary intelligence analy-
sis, and arguably also as the most fastidious in his interpretations. As an analyst in the Strategic 
Studies Department of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) during the 1970s and 1980s, he 
wrote a series of detailed and highly regarded interpretations of Soviet doctrinal writings and 
is credited – along with his CNA colleagues – with providing a key impulse for the U.S. Navy’s 
admission that the VMF was, in fact, pursuing a defensive strategy centered on SSBN protec-
tion.136 He clashed repeatedly with Michael MccGwire over the meaning of the so-called 
Gorshkov series of articles that appeared in Morskoy sbornik during 1972-73, as well as over 
Gorshkov’s The Seapower of the State, which was published in 1976. Whereas MccGwire was 
convinced that the series was “an exercise in advocacy,”137 and remained at least partially un-
converted into the 1980s, McConnell believed that Gorshkov was “formulating a ‘concrete ex-
pression of doctrine’”138 and that “what has been interpreted as a modest amount of authority 
is really modesty in displaying authority.”139 He may well have been correct in these assertions, 
 
136  This story is told extremely well in John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy 
1977-1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), 23-36. McConnell’s notable 
works include James M. McConnell, “The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean” (Professional Paper No. 77, Cen-
ter for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 1971); James M. McConnell, “The Gorshkov Articles, the New 
Gorshkov Book, and Their Relation to Policy” (Professional Paper No. 159, Center for Naval Analyses, Ar-
lington, VA, 1976); James M. McConnell, “Military-Political Tasks of the Soviet Navy in War and Peace” (Pro-
fessional Paper No. 148, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA, 1976); James M. McConnell, “Strategy 
and Missions of the Soviet Navy in the Year 2000” (Professional Paper No. 206, Center for Naval Analyses, 
Arlington, VA, 1977); James M. McConnell, “Doctrine and Capabilities,” in Soviet Naval Diplomacy, ed. Brad-
ford Dismukes and James M. McConnell (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1979); James M. McConnell, “The 
Interacting Evolution of Soviet and American Military Doctrines” (Professional Paper No. 412, Center for 
Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 1980); James M. McConnell, “The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to 
Conventional: The Long-Term Perspective” (CRC 490-Vol. I, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 
1983); James M. McConnell, “The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional: The Mid-Term 
Perspective” (CRC 490-Vol. II, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 1983); James M. McConnell, 
“Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development,” World Politics 37, no. 3 (1985), 
doi:10.2307/2010246, 317-43; James M. McConnell, “Analyzing Soviet Intentions: A Short Guide to Soviet Mil-
itary Literature” (CRC 593, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 1989).  
137  MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, 448-76. 
138  McConnell, “The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book, and Their Relation to Policy,” 3. 
139  Ibid., 80. 
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although his interpretations of what it was that Gorshkov was expressing were much more 
tenuous at times. Steven Walt eventually provided an external assessment of the spat in a re-
port for the CNA, in which he sided with McConnell in a number of respects but concluded 
that “many of the specific disagreements […] are probably indeterminate.”140  
The fact remains that McConnell’s interpretations hinge on two critical assumptions: 
(1) that the Glavkom – the Commander-in-Chief or Glavnokomanduyushchiy of the VMF –  and 
Soviet military writers more generally, meant what they said and would act accordingly, and 
(2) that the real meaning of Soviet writings often was to be found in “latent content,”141 such 
as statements about history that were assumed to contain doctrinal precepts for present-day 
use. To provide one particularly central example, McConnell believed that Gorshkov’s shift of 
the Soviet interpretation of the Battle of Jutland in favor of Admiral Jellicoe’s caution, ‘fleet-in-
being’ strategy amounted to a doctrinal endorsement of a defensive posture centered on keep-
ing Soviet SSBNs in home waters and withholding them from any initial nuclear exchanges.142 
Much of his confidence in such assessment rested on a very close analysis of Soviet jargon, and 
its usage in official and semi-official writings. Usage of Soviet concepts like oborona strany (na-
tional defense) and zashchita strany (military-strategic tasks) was particularly central to 
McConnell’s case.143 It is hardly surprising, then, that Douglas Hart repeatedly referred to 
McConnell’s work as an illustration for his claim that “[d]iscussions of Soviet doctrine in the 
 
140 Stephen M. Walt, “Analysts in War and Peace: MccGwire, McConnell, and Admiral Gorshkov” (Profes-
sional Paper No. 458, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 1987), 51.  
141 Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy 1977-1986, 27. 
142  This debate is extremely well summarized in Breemer, “Estimating the Soviet Strategic Submarine Missile 
Threat”, 178-86. Breemer’s own reading of the same passages is damning: “Clearly, the Soviet admiral is 
reminding his audience that though capital ships, be they battleships at Jutland or SSBNs today, may have 
pride of place in a navy, they cannot be the sole measure of a fleet. The message is straightforward; the same 
cannot be said for the one McConnell claims to have deciphered.” Ibid., 186. See also McConnell, “The 
Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book, and Their Relation to Policy,” 40-41; Walt, “Analysts in War and 
Peace,” 27-30.  
143  Walt (Analysts in War and Peace, passim) provides an excellent accounting of McConnell’s positions in this 
regard.  
 





Western analytical community have come to resemble arguments over scriptural interpreta-
tion”144 and chose him as the key example for what he pointedly describes as a “Talmudic”145 
school of thought in doctrine analysis. Overall, McConnell’s style in literary analysis was that 
of a virtuoso: when he was at his best, he played the game at an entirely different level than 
most of his colleagues, but at times he also appears to struggle to explain how exactly he ‘got 
there’. His judgements were clearly based on extremely thorough and systematic study of So-
viet writings, down to a level of detail that is largely unmatched elsewhere in the literature, 
but they also strike the reader as intuitive in ways that are not fully transparent. Even Walt’s 
sympathetic assessment eventually arrives at the conclusion that  
“McConnell's entire method consists of relating particular external events (which one can 
always interpret a number of ways) with a variety of specialized esoteric definitions based 
on extensive research into Soviet military conventions regarding language use. This has 
the practical effect of making his interpretations by definition idiosyncratic, because one 
cannot fully understand the logic of his arguments unless one is privy to the background 
definitions [deduced by McConnell himself; MH] upon which the interpretations are 
based.”146  
 
Dismukes reminds us of the potential practical consequences of leaving it to consumers to 
separate hard evidence from what might amount to inspired leaps of faith when he observes 
that  
“it is not uncommon today to encounter the loose observation that Soviet writings show 
(or perhaps ‘Gorshkov himself has written’) that the Soviets plan to put their SSBNs in 
bastions if war should come. Such observations are, in fact, correct only if one accepts that 
the Soviets engage in esoteric communication. The Soviets themselves have never pub-
licly said anything explicit about their wartime SSBN employment plans.”147 
 
 
144  Douglas M. Hart, “The Hermeneutics of Soviet Military Doctrine,” The Washington Quarterly 7, no. 2 (1984), 
doi:10.1080/01636608409550030, 81. 
145  Ibid., 82. 
146  Walt, “Analysts in War and Peace”, 53.  
147  Bradford Dismukes, “Introduction,” in George, The Soviet and Other Communist Navies, 7. Emphasis in the 
original.  
 
                                                 Researching naval posture change  
 
    
  [155] 
 
The level of discourse that McConnell supported with his interpretations was extremely high 
by today’s standards, as well as by those of his own time, and his contributions remain among 
the best and most important to come out of the forty-year project to understand the Soviet 
Navy. However, his conclusions do not necessarily flow from the evidence he presents in ways 
that a critical reader can easily ascertain. To fully buy into the McConnell paradigm, one has 
to be willing to trust the master’s firm grasp of his subject – sometimes without having a way 
of knowing exactly why. 
 
CRITICISMS AND CAVEATS 
Several criticisms have been made of the literary intelligence genre and, while the evidentiary 
value of its best products is beyond doubt, some of them will be amplified here. The first issue 
that has been raised and that should be mentioned here is the extent to which literary analysis 
is subject to deliberate disinformation.148 Given that this is a question that remains partially 
intractable even today, it is difficult to ignore the possibility. McConnell’s take on the problem 
remains instructive: 
“Moscow is, of course, aware of alien eavesdropping; hence much of the rigid propaganda 
conventions, the misleading statements, the guarded language that borders on the 
opaque. The substance of the message is not affected, however; the Kremlin cannot afford 
to deceive its own cadres. If disinformation be defined as a communication that the Soviet 
elite, skilled in reading the literature of its specialty, would declare to be untruth, then 
there is very little disinformation in the Soviet press.”149 
 
Based on what we know, this statement may well be entirely accurate. However, in framing 
the issue in this manner, McConnell also raises the specter of rampant omission: if a system as 
paranoid about security issues as that of the USSR elects to avoid disinformation in the public 
discourse about highly sensitive questions of military planning, that discourse is instead likely 
 
148  Swartz, “Understanding an Adversary's Strategic and Operational Calculus,” 40-41.  
149  McConnell, “Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development,” 319.  
 





to be very heavily sanitized indeed. The limitations that this imposes on an outside analysts’ 
ability to conduct detailed analyses of military matters may not be catastrophic, but the poten-
tial for serious inaccuracies due to the reliance on severely abridged source material cannot be 
dismissed out of hand either. 
The second issue that literary analysts have struggled with is the extent to which even 
Soviet doctrinal writings that have not been subject to disinformation or debilitating censor-
ship can serve as an accurate guide to the content of Soviet naval posture. McConnell’s insist-
ence that Gorshkov’s articles were an expression of doctrine that enjoyed “the force of a state 
law,”150 while other contributions ‘only’ belonged in the less apodictic category of military sci-
ence in some ways accentuates the tension between theory and practice. If it was publicly 
stated grand theory that determined operational employment, rather than professional de-
bates among officers in the classified fora of the Soviet armed forces, what remained of the 
vaunted mainstay of Soviet military thought – of operational art? As Moltke the Elder fa-
mously remarked, strategy amounts to “a system of expedients.”151 In war, and even in the 
preparation for war, lawlike tenets must be either vague enough to allow for the expression of 
the professional judgement of military planners – and in this case they may not tell us very 
much about actual force employment – or they are inflexible enough to warrant their circum-
vention in practice, even if they are authoritative in theory. Literary analysis cannot, by itself, 
tell us which of the two we are dealing with. By insisting that the high-level political-military 
is determinative with regard to the operational paradigms of the armed forces, based on their 
reading of that self-same discourse, literary analysts created a logic that was internally consistent 
but completely unsubstantiated as far as its external validity was concerned.  
This leads us straight to a third issue – namely, the need to complement any literary 
analysis with other types of evidence and the reticence in this regard of leading literature an-
alysts, above all James McConnell. While we have focused on the core content of the hardware 
analysis method above, MccGwire’s take on researching the Soviet Navy is ultimately best 
 
150 Quoted in McConnell, “The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book, and Their Relation to Policy,” 77.  
151  See e.g. Arden Bucholz, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001), 56-57.  
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described as “eclectic,”152 which was (and still is) one of its strengths. While one of the main 
selling points of his approach was that it provided an excellent grasp on what missions the 
VMF was actually structuring its forces for, he was also comfortable debating the definitional 
minutiae of the Gorshkov series with McConnell and putting “persistent and insightful pres-
sure”153 on the latter to argue his case more convincingly. The same did not necessarily apply 
to his counterparts. As was the case with other niche contributions to the field of Sovietology, 
theirs was a highly specialized pursuit, and it only became more so over time. McConnell’s 
commitment to literary analysis was such that he largely saw it as a stand-alone approach – 
certainly as far as his own contributions to the debate were concerned. As Breemer recapitu-
lated after exhaustive study of McConnell’s opus, “this writer knows of only two instances in 
which McConnell has sought to match Soviet doctrinal ‘evidence’ with estimated hardware 
capabilities. In both cases, material evidence was picked-and-chosen to shore up selected lit-
erary-based conclusions.”154 It is probably fair to say that none of McConnell’s colleagues who 
opted for more balanced approaches – MccGwire, Herrick, Robert Weinland and Bradford 
Dismukes and others besides would qualify on those grounds – attained quite the same level 
of penetration of the Soviet official mind, as it expressed itself on the page. The warning label 
that comes with the purist approach is that many of the most impactful literary analyses have 
been just that. The present study takes the position that, in a 21st century reexamination of the 
U.S.-Soviet competition for naval advantage, such one-sidedness should be avoided, and mul-
tiple types of evidence should be brought to bear whenever possible. 
 
3.4.5 Operational patterns and exercises 
As a tool for civilian analysts, systematic reviews of exercises and peacetime operational pat-
terns are neither as well-established nor as widely practiced as the two approaches outlined 
above. This, of course, is all the more reason to ask what additional evidence exercises and 
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operations can provide. The amount of systematic research that has been done in this area is 
actually quite limited. The academic interest in exercises has picked up somewhat in recent 
years, with several publications coming out of a project at the University of Glasgow.155 As far 
as the Cold War context is concerned, John Lehman’s recent contribution is an interesting hy-
brid between personal memoir and detailed narratives of a succession of key exercises in the 
1981-86 timeframe.156 Lehman leaves little doubt that exercises were a critical element both in 
the formulation and implementation phases of the 1980s Maritime Strategy. Grove had made 
this point convincingly in his excellent Battle for the Fiørds, published in 1991, but the additional 
details and personal assessments Lehman provides are most valuable.157 As far as patterns of 
operational activity in peacetime and limited wars are concerned, there are some good analyt-
ical assessments as well as a wealth of historical evidence to deal with. The relevance of these 
accounts to the question of posture change can amount from negligible to absolutely critical – 
in short, to a resounding ‘it depends’. We will briefly address each of these two additional 
research areas in turn.  
 In Western attempts to make sense of Soviet naval developments, large exercises – no-
tably the OKEAN series – have figured prominently at times, but the attention accorded to 
them has fluctuated wildly. Although exercises are most often mentioned in passing, usually 
as evidence of whatever point the author is trying to make about the global expansion of Soviet 
naval ambitions in the 1970s, some subject matter experts have attempted serious reviews.158 
 
155  Beatrice Heuser and Harold Simpson, “The Missing Political Dimension of Military Exercises,” The RUSI 
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don: Ian Allan, 1991).  
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Naturally, U.S. intelligence took a major interest as well, and some useful insights are available 
from declassified documents. For example, the CIA documented the anti-carrier nature of the 
VOLNA exercise in 1970, known as OKEAN 70 in Western sources, which was elsewhere 
framed as an example of Soviet global ambitions (see Fig. 6 below). The analytical synopsis is 
worth quoting to provide an impression of how such matters were treated in finished intelli-
gence products:  
“An example of high-level interfleet coordination for anticarrier strikes was demonstrated 
during Exercise Ocean in April 1970. This exercise included nearly simultaneous strikes 
against six widely separated simulated carriers. In this operation, naval TU-16s carried 
out ASM attacks in the Norwegian Sea, Sea of Japan, and North Pacific, while TU-95s of 
the strategic bomber forces attacked targets in the North Atlantic and Philippine Sea (see 
map below). [EXCISED] At the same time a cruise missile submarine made a mock attack 
in the Mediterranean.”159 
 
To account for more routine operations, Western analysts developed a methodology based on 
an indicator known as the “out-of-area sea day,”160 which allowed them to trace the magnitude 
of Soviet activities with relative precision. Watson’s study, Red Navy at Sea, remains the most 
comprehensive application of the concept. It is important to note that his definition of ‘out-of-
area’ is quite expansive and “encompasses all the world’s ocean areas except the Soviet inland 
waterways, coastal waters, and local exercise areas.”161 Hence, most observed operational ac-
tivities that were not completely routine are classed as ‘out-of-area’, even if they were strictly 
related to homeland defense tasks. Other contributions have focused more narrowly on Soviet 
activities in particular areas, or on the motivations behind Soviet deployments.162  
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text (New York, NY: Praeger, 1973), chapters 28-32; Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell, eds., Soviet Naval 
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Fig. 6: CIA illustration of anti-carrier operations during OKEAN 70. ((Central Intelligence 
Agency/Directorate of Intelligence 1972)25) 
 
 
A great deal can also be learnt from observing the employment of navies in crisis operations 
and limited wars. For example, although a general war against the Soviet Union would have 
been a different matter entirely, wartime operations in both Korea and Vietnam involved ex-
tensive applications of carrier airpower that tell us quite a lot about the capabilities and limi-
tations of U.S. naval aviation at the time.163 Conflicts that did not directly involve either of the 
main Cold War competitors can provide extremely valuable evidence. The sinking of the INS 
Eilat (1967) and the Battle of Latakia (1973) in the Mediterranean theater, as well as the British 
experience in the South Atlantic (1982) all held important cues as to the nature of naval warfare 
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in the Missile Age.164 In fact, even accidents like the 1967 fire aboard the USS Forrestal and the 
1969 USS Enterprise fire, hold important clues concerning such critical questions as damage 
control and ship survivability.165 Meanwhile, incidents at sea can provide important insights 
about the psychology of a potential wartime opponent.166  
Unfortunately, there is also a tendency in Western naval thinking to mistake what na-
vies also do in peacetime and limited war, both to further national objectives and to maximize 
their perceived utility, for their ‘real’ operational paradigms. The adherents of the “Cable 
school”167 of naval diplomacy are the usual suspects in this regard. While the disagreement is 
ultimately irresoluble, there is reason to believe that this view is misguided. It is true, of course, 
that governments have long called upon their navies to engage in various forms of gunboat 
diplomacy and limited interventionism. The Soviet government was no exception in this re-
gard. But to claim that this is the ‘true’ purpose of navies is a stretch even where Western 
navies are concerned, and all the more inaccurate with respect to the VMF.  
The most controversial case in point is the ‘global Soviet Navy’ scarce of the 1960s and 
1970s. An understandable overreaction to a growing but limited Soviet naval presence outside 
home waters, the fear of a Soviet shift to a truly globalized naval posture never materialized 
to the extent that many Western observers had so energetically predicted. Ultimately, we are 
left to debate the extent to which any of the capability that Soviet vessels flaunted in oppor-
tunistic peacetime displays of increasing naval modernity was designed for operations far 
from home. “The core of Moscow’s Third World diplomacy of force lies in its capabilities for 
 
164 On the Israeli experience, see Abraham Rabinovich, The Boats of Cherbourg (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1997). On the naval war over the Falklands, see e.g. Geoffrey Till, Understanding Victory: Naval Opera-
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countering U.S. carrier task groups,”168 McConnell found in his contribution to perhaps the 
most thorough examination of the out-of-area phenomenon. The anti-carrier mission, of 
course, was the essence of zone defense – of what we have called the red perimeter. In other 
words, there was no such thing as Soviet naval forces designed specifically for Third World 
missions. Many Western analysts of the Cold War at sea will undoubtedly stick to their guns 
and insist that the global expansion of Soviet naval power was very real indeed – if only to ebb 
away again roughly in parallel with the shift in Western perceptions of Soviet naval strategy. 
As far as peacetime operational activity is concerned, there is good evidence to support this 
view. It is when observations of what the Soviet Navy also did are mistaken for evidence of 
what it was all about that the established narrative starts to go off the rails. The final word in the 
matter will, of course, have to be based on a comprehensive review of Soviet documents, if 
and when this becomes possible. But as far as the available evidence is concerned, there is little 
about the increase in out-of-area days during the 1960s and 1970s that cannot be explained by 
a combination of peacetime opportunism and domestic considerations on the part of VMF 
leadership cadres.  
In the context of this study, the examination of operational activities and exercises 
should be properly framed as a supporting line of effort. Evidence on operations and exercises 
will help us firm up or otherwise correct the overall picture that emerges from a review of 
hardware and literary evidence. Interpretations that rely primarily on such evidence are more 
dubious and should be avoided in the context of posture analysis. Having said that, the sys-
tematic study of exercises and peacetime operations still has considerable untapped potential 
and, provided that it is combined with other evidence as appropriate, could be a promising 
avenue for historical as well as policy-relevant research in the coming decade. 
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3.4.6 Semi-structured interviews and oral histories 
On both sides of the East-West divide, the Cold War competition at sea was a project pursued 
by large bureaucratic organizations and shaped by forces that often strike us as impersonal. 
The types of evidence that we have considered so far are largely an expression of those forces. 
Ships and aircraft, doctrines, finely tuned operational plans, complex exercises, and coordi-
nated global deployments of thousands of men are all products of naval bureaucracies collec-
tively going about their business, egged on by their conception of duty and by the relentless 
pressure of events. Inescapably, however, there is also a much more personal side to all of this: 
for more than forty years, hundreds of thousands of men and of women lived the Cold War at 
sea – or, to be more precise, some aspect of it. The best way to unlock this wealth of individual 
experience is to talk to them about it while we have the chance to do so.169 It is true that there 
are well-understood limitations that should warn us against an overreliance on personal ac-
counts of events that are now anywhere between thirty and seventy years in the past but, as 
we have already determined, the same is also true of other kinds of evidence as well. Like the 
other supporting methods, interviewing and oral history are best seen as contributing one im-
portant aspect in the search for a well-rounded picture. 
 What kind of insights can personal accounts provide that add to our understanding of the overall 
picture in ways that the other supporting methods cannot? As far as the present study is concerned, 
the main focal point in this regard has been the collection of participants’ subjective percep-
tions of how the U.S.-Soviet competition developed over time and of the threat posed by Soviet 
seapower to U.S. naval supremacy. To get a better sense of how U.S. naval officers and analysts 
thought and felt about the Soviet challenge then, and how they think about it now, a total of 
 
169 On interview techniques in general, see Rosalind Edwards and Janet Holland, What is Qualitative Interview-
ing? (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013); Karin Olson, Essentials of Qualitative Interviewing (London: 
Routledge, 2016); Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012). On oral history in particular, see Patricia Leavy, Oral History: Understanding 
Qualitative Research (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.ac-
tion?docID=10443140; Valerie Raleigh Yow, Recording Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and Social Sci-
ences (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2005); Donald A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History: A Practical Guide (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
 





twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2016 – all but one of them in person in 
the United States.170 This turned out to be most enlightening and helpful. At the same time, it 
is difficult to overlook that the number of interviews of one kind or another that have been 
done with former participants in the U.S.-Soviet naval competition is now probably in the 
thousands. Only a tiny percentage of them is publicly available and repeating the effort is often 
not an option. For one, the researcher may lack the resources to embark on an extensive cross-
country campaign of the United States or of the former Soviet Union. Even where this is not a 
problem, an increasing number of individuals who were in senior positions at the time will be 
unavailable or struggling with the unavoidable infirmities of very old age. Most of the senior 
decision-makers during the early phases of the confrontation have now regrettably passed on.  
There are some notable exceptions to the deplorable fragmentation of interview-based 
evidence. Institutionalized oral history programs provide perhaps the best way of conserving 
living memories in such a way as to render them accessible for the long term. On the U.S. side, 
there are several such programs that have captured aspects of the Cold War at sea. The U.S. 
Naval Institute is understandably proud of its Oral History Program, which has been running 
since 1969.171 While the Institute is independent, these can be considered the semi-official oral 
history record of the U.S. Navy. The Naval Historical Foundation’s effort is younger, but just 
as expansive and also excellent in quality.172 Together, they comprised more than 370 volumes 
at the time of writing, the majority of which are related to World War II or to the conflicts in 
Korea and Vietnam. There is plenty of evidence on the peacetime naval competition with the 
Soviet Union as well, and several volumes have been consulted extensively for this study.  
 
170  The interviews that were conducted as part of the data collection effort for this study are listed in the 
bibliophraphy. While most of the interviews were with former participants in the events, there are some 
exceptions of particularly knowledgeable individuals that were tapped primarily for their expertise, rather 
than their personal experience of countering the Soviet Navy. On semi-structured interviews, see Brenda L. 
Moore, “In-Depth Interviewing,” in Soeters; Shields; Rietjens, Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Mili-
tary Studies, 117-18.  
171  U.S. Naval Institute, “The U.S. Naval Institute Oral History Program,” https://www.usni.org/press/oral-
histories/about.  
172  Naval Historical Foundation, “Oral History Program,” http://www.navyhistory.org/programs/oral-histo-
ries/.  
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As far as the limitations of personal accounts are concerned, they would seem to apply 
both to interviews that are tailored towards a specific research agenda and to the large oral 
history collections, which usually feature wide-ranging conversations about all aspects of a 
naval officer’s career. The main caveat in both cases is that perceptions of an individual nature 
are often extremely valuable, as long as they are not mistaken for ‘hard’ evidence.173 It is an 
inescapable peculiarity of the human mind that it does not store memories in their ‘pristine’ 
form but keeps processing important experiences as new information becomes available. 
While the effects may be very subtle, they are also pervasive. It is not given to us to control 
them, nor can an outsider reverse them through insistent prodding. Hence, rather than mining 
for what the interviewee originally felt, thought, or perceived, the researcher should respect a 
participant’s memories for what they are. Contrastingly, it should also be noted that there can 
be important exceptions to the rule that interview material should not be considered ‘hard’ 
evidence of detailed chains of events, decision-making processes, and so forth. Interviews can 
certainly contribute to the unearthing of historical facts, provided that there are sufficient means 
of corroboration. In the first instance, these should be primary documents of some kind. 
Another limitation is that, especially where peacetime military competitions are con-
cerned, the group of individuals that is interviewed tends to consist almost exclusively of high-
level decision-makers or particularly ‘remarkable’ individuals. While this is in some ways 
proper and unavoidable, the possibility that the perceptions of this group of individuals will 
be systematically different from those of other groups cannot be excluded. Given that setting 
up a ‘control group’ is often not a viable solution nor a viable option, this is primarily some-
thing to be aware of. Finally, it should be noted that individuals who have retired from military 
organizations or from positions of officialdom will still be affected by strict classification rules 
and, since they cannot be expected to have a comprehensive understanding of which infor-
mation has since been released into the public domain, will often have to err on the side of 
caution. Having noted these limitations, interview-based research is nonetheless a vital means 
 
173  On questions of human memories as evidence, see Yow, Recording Oral History, esp. 35-45.  
 





of learning about the past and it has been one of the principal supporting methods in the course 
of conducting this study. 
 
3.4.7 The unknown and the unknowable 
Having reviewed the specialized supporting methods that are available to us in the course of 
our process tracing of the U.S.-Soviet competition for military advantage at sea, we must ulti-
mately come to the conclusion that there are some aspects of the subject that will remain diffi-
cult to capture reliably. To be more precise, there are two types of limitations that have 
remained intractable throughout the research effort: (1) there are some things we could know, 
but do not; and (2) there are things we cannot know and never will. We will address these 
problems in turn, and also break them down into several more specific challenges. 
 In the first category, the main limitation is one of access to authoritative materials. Re-
quirements for naval systems, the exact content of operational plans, and the rationales of de-
ployment patterns are all set out in official documents that are subject to extensive 
classification and may not become publicly available for decades – if at all. While a very sub-
stantial amount of formerly classified materials from U.S. archives is now in the public do-
main, and a good number of those documents have been incorporated into this study, there is 
much that we still do not know. What is true of the United States applies to the former Soviet 
Union in much greater measure. As a result, we may have to rely on sanitized, second-hand, 
or otherwise non-authoritative materials.  
Secondly, there is a difficulty of interpretation. We cannot allow ourselves to overlook that 
even the most authoritative and/or most highly classified documents are no more than a snap-
shot of where a bureaucracy – or, to be more exact, some organizational unit or department of 
it – stood at a given point in time. Postures are developed and implemented within a specific 
organizational setting and themselves subject to interpretation by various bureaucratic con-
stituencies. As a result, even where classification is not a problem, the exact meaning of oper-
ational precepts may not be immediately obvious. Official documents “may […] not tell the 
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whole story or paper over serious differences of purpose.”174 Interviews can help provide im-
portant context for what we do find in primary and secondary source materials, but the caveats 
noted above apply. Because there may be important conceptual factors that we are completely 
unaware of, and because we are interpreting what is itself already likely to be a convenient 
interpretation of what was decided or discussed, we can never be completely certain that we 
have captured all the important aspects of the picture and we are likely to miss some of them 
completely.  
Finally, we know that there may well be a discrepancy between the declaratory and practi-
cal significance of the various elements of a naval posture. As discussed, decisions about pos-
ture serve a number of practical functions. Their impact, however, varies significantly. They 
may reshape an organization completely within just a few years, or they may be taken and 
communicated as declaratory policy or propaganda. As a result, it is often difficult to establish 
whether opposing military organizations ‘say what they mean and mean what they say’ or 
whether “whatever [they] may superficially say […] should not be taken at face value.”175 
Feeding into this, there is also an ambiguity of observable evidence: because official statements 
may be of limited utility or completely unavailable, much of what we know about postures is 
“derived by inference”176 from empirically observable artifacts and behavior. As preferences 
of operational doctrine are usually “strongly reflected in the forces that are acquired by the 
military organization,”177 procurement preferences and deployments provide important clues 
as to the contents of a naval posture. However, because the same forces could potentially be 
employed in other ways, and the same posture can support widely diverging strategies, this 
evidence may be quite ambiguous. 
This reference to strategy brings us to the second category of limitations: those that con-
cern the unknowable. As H. R. McMaster has written, “[w]ar is the final auditor of military 
 
174  Fritz W. Ermarth, “Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought,” International Security 3, no. 2 
(1978), doi:10.2307/2626687, 142. 
175  Lambeth, “How to Think About Soviet Military Doctrine,” 3. 
176  Ermarth, “Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought,” 141. 
177  Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 14. 
 





organizations.”178 How the opposing forces in the Cold War at sea would have performed 
against each other in the crucible of a missile-age war at sea, we do not know and never will. 
There are two types of effects, in particular, that we can speculate about, but that we cannot 
gauge with any certainty. The first type is interaction effects: the practical consequences of de-
cisions about posture cannot be judged in isolation from the doctrine and operational ap-
proaches adopted by the adversary. In fact, some of the most critical effects of postures result 
from the contingent interactions between the opponents’ military-conceptual frameworks and 
deployments which may be difficult – even impossible – to foresee.  
The second type is incomplete execution effects. While postures shape actual military be-
havior in ways that are at least partially predictable, they do not, in any defensible sense, de-
termine it. How political and military leaders decide to employ the forces at their disposal will 
only become fully apparent once war is upon them. Actual military operations may follow 
accepted operational principles and expected patterns of deployment closely, or not at all, de-
pending on the exact circumstances of the situation.179 There is, and has to be, a creative role 
for strategy in war, as well as in crisis situations. The extent to which preplanned options will 
be implemented is not in any way preordained. Posture provides options for strategy that 
reflect military-organizational preferences and some level of peacetime political-military guid-
ance. By prioritizing certain types and lines of effort over others, posture narrows the range of 
plausible strategic options. But it does not determine how a war will be fought. As a result of 
these limitations, the practical task of posture analysis should be approached with considera-
ble humility, especially as far as it concerns the probable real-world effects of what is being 
discussed or decided.  
The closest we could come to understanding the dynamics of a Cold War era conflict 
at sea is through systematic wargaming or simulation modelling. A serious effort along those 
lines would have to include not just the application of a suitable framework, but an entire 
 
178 Jensen, Forging the Sword, vii.  
179 Karl-Peter Stratmann, NATO-Strategie in der Krise? Militärische Optionen von NATO und Warschauer Pakt in 
Mitteleuropa, Internationale Politik und Sicherheit 5 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1981), 143. 
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campaign of games using sensitivity analyses and/or Monte Carlo modelling of probabili-
ties.180 While such an effort is no longer as far out of reach for a single researcher, or a small 
research group, as they once used to be, it is still true that copious amounts of experience, 
highly specialized knowledge and especially time are required – all to reduce the level of un-
certainty for a small range of plausible scenarios. Ultimately, the limitations discussed here are 
all at least partially irresolvable. Some will remain altogether insurmountable. All of them add, 
to borrow Donald Rumsfeld’s now notorious terminology, to a set of “known unknowns”181 
that we have to contend with and finally accept in order to be able to engage in the kind of 
strategic studies and security studies research that this study represents. 
 
3.5 Summary: finding a balance 
In this chapter, we have set out a way of researching the dynamics of U.S.-Soviet competitive 
naval adaptation efforts, based on the earlier, step-by-step exploration of extant theories of 
military competition in Chapter 2. The overall approach of posture analysis that we have put 
together for this research project is, in many ways, about striking a balance – between the de-
sire to put theoretical insights to use and the need to retain sufficient empirical depth, between 
different ways of thinking about the causal path that leads to posture change, between the 
various supporting methods outlined above, and also between confidence in our findings and 
humility in the face of persistent limitations.  
The challenges of analyzing peacetime rivalries are considerable, and the peculiarities 
of researching a military competition in the absence of any conclusive evidence about how a 
conflict would have played out only adds to the challenge. In addressing our specific research 
problem, the decision to aim for empirical accuracy rather than for the greatest generalizability 
is both methodologically appropriate and consistent with the best traditions of the strategic 
 
180  Alan Washburn and Moshe Kress, Combat Modeling (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), esp. 263-66. 
181  Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, 12 February, 2002,” 
https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.  
 





studies field. As Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell have noted for the ‘neighboring’ field of se-
curity studies research, an approach like the one developed here may be viewed as “compar-
atively inefficient”182 by scholars who fully embrace the standards of ‘scientific’ research into 
complex social phenomena. What appears more relevant, from the perspective of an investi-
gation like this one, is that the approach that is selected is appropriate and well-adapted to the 
subject at hand. 
The approach and the specific methods that will be used to make sense of the array of 
historical evidence that is available to us in the following chapters meet this criterion. The 
supporting methods, in particular, were developed by military and policy analysts to grapple 
with the real-world problems of their time. In many cases, they still provide the best way of 
looking at the evidence that has since come to light and to reassess central aspects of the U.S.-
Soviet naval competition from a 21st century perspective. If the modular framework that we 
have put together defies this expectation and performs poorly, the errors in conceptualization 
or application are the author’s to bear. Having said that, we are now ready to step into the 
menacing, grey-in-grey world of the Cold War at sea. 
 
182 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, 178.  
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[4] 
The interdiction threat that never was 




4.1  U.S. naval posture and the weight of the past 
On the shortlist of clichés that the strategic studies tradition must contend with, military plan-
ners who earnestly and diligently prepare their forces to “fight the last war”1 are not a surprise 
entry. Not every tired cliché is, however, necessarily inaccurate – and not in every case does 
the behavior in question lead to an undesirable outcome. For the first fifteen years of the Cold 
War confrontation, the United States Navy prepared to re-fight the Battle of the Atlantic 
against yet another continentally-minded challenger, equipped with more advanced subma-
rines derived from late-war German technology and, towards the end of this first period, with 
a first generation of missile-armed naval strike aircraft. And it would do so in ways that were 
taken directly from the pages of the carrier admirals’ Pacific playbook. The challenger, of 
course, was the USSR, primarily in the guise of its Military-Maritime Fleet (Voyenno-morskoy 
flot SSR, VMF) and its fledgling naval aviation component, the Aviatsiya voyenno-morskogo flota 
(AVMF). 
 
1 Geoffrey Sloan, “Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis 
and Theory,” International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012), doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01069.x, 252. 
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The submarine that was supposed to be at the center of the first part of this story was 
a Soviet version of the Type XXI – the final long-range “convoy killer”2 that the Third Reich 
had brought to the production stage. Throughout the first stage of the Cold War competition 
at sea, this was the proximate threat that drove U.S. technology development and the main 
challenge to sea control that the U.S. Navy planned to defeat in case it should find itself 
fighting World War III. Over time, the expectation that hundreds of advanced diesel subma-
rines would prey on Western shipping in the North Atlantic and the Western Pacific was 
etched into the minds of Western naval planners to the extent that alternative explanations of 
“the sources of Soviet naval conduct”3 were no longer seriously entertained by most. Nor were 
they conjuring up monsters from thin air. The perception that the VMF submarine force was 
planning to follow in the footsteps of the German U-Bootwaffe was plausible enough and – as 
seen from the perspective of a maritime alliance, the very survival of which depended on the 
integrity of its sea lines of communication – even likely. If we follow the established view that 
any military threat is the product of an opponent’s capabilities and intentions, rather than a 
mirror image of one’s own worst fears, it nonetheless proved seriously inaccurate. 
While it is now widely accepted that the interdiction of Western SLOCs in the North 
Atlantic and elsewhere was not the Soviet Navy’s main priority during the latter stages of the 
Cold War, the idea that this came about only as a result of the VMF’s creation of heavily de-
fended Northern bastions for its ballistic missile submarines remains widespread.4 The case 
made in this chapter is that, far from shifting to a defensive strategy only in the late 1970s, the 
USSR never actually intended to fight a Third Battle of the Atlantic – certainly not in terms of 
the implied meaning, as an interdiction battle to cut Western sea lines of communication. The 
essentially defensive orientation of the VMF had a fundamental impact on the techno-doctrinal 
 
2 The term is used by to describe the unrealized Type XXVI ‘Walter-Boot,’ of which the Type XXI was a 
conventionally-powered derivative, in: William P. Gruner, “The German Type XXVI Convoy Killer Subma-
rine,” The Submarine Review, (1993). 
3 William H. J. Manthorpe, “A Background for Understanding Soviet Strategy,” in The Sources of Soviet Naval 
Conduct, ed. Philip S. Gillette and Willard C. Frank (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 17.  
4 On the emergence of a consensus on the existence of Soviet defensive bastions, see Jan S. Breemer, “Esti-
mating the Soviet Strategic Submarine Missile Threat: A Critical Examination of the Soviet Navy's SSBN Bas-
tion Strategy” (Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, 1987), 163-262; Peter M. Swartz, “Un-
derstanding an Adversary's Strategic and Operational Calculus: A Late Cold War Case Study with 21st 
Century Applicability – U.S. Views on Soviet Navy Strategy and Operations” (COP-2013-U-005622-Final, 
CNA, Washington, DC, 2013), 17-26. 
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trajectory of its submarine force, the pattern of which repeatedly defied Western analysts’ ex-
pectations. At the same time, the U.S. Navy’s competitive adjustment to an anticipated threat 
that failed to materialize, similarly set the pattern for the development of its submarine and 
ASW forces for decades to come. By 1960, both sides were locked into path dependencies that 
would continue to shape their interactions into the 1980s. The same was true in another main 
area of competition, between Soviet land-based strike aircraft and U.S. carrier groups at sea. 
In this second case, which we will discuss towards the end of the chapter, Soviet initiatives 
caused less alarm initially, but this began to change over time.   
Perhaps ironically, the misperceptions of U.S. (and allied) naval analysts generally 
served them well during this first phase of the competition, whereas accurate Soviet percep-
tions of the offensive nature of Western naval strategy did not result in the development of 
fully adequate defenses against U.S. power projection forces. Ultimately, this first phase of the 
Cold War at Sea demonstrates that the interactions between threats and the “influence of form-
ative experiences,”5 as they were captured in the U.S. Navy’s organizational essence, were the 
critical shaping force of competitive adaptations. In the following, we will in turn examine the 
submarine and naval air threats, as they developed during the first phase, and attempt to ar-
rive at some preliminary conclusions concerning the dynamics of the competition. 
 
4.2 The Type XXI and U.S. threat perceptions  
4.2.1 The anticipated threat 
The U.S. Navy’s initial take on the Soviet submarine problem unavoidably bore the imprint of 
recent wartime experience. In the Pacific, unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan had 
graphically demonstrated how the failure to raise effective ASW defenses and make up for 
shipping losses with sufficient wartime construction could wreak havoc on a major power’s 
war effort. According to the Joint Army-Navy assessment of 1947, U.S. submarines had sunk 
 
5  Sloan, “Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy and the Generation of Fighting Power,” 252.  
 
 The interdiction threat that never was 
 
   
 [176] 
 
1,113 Japanese merchant vessels, amounting to nearly 4.8 million gross tons of shipping.6 As a 
result, Imperial Japan’s defense of its maritime perimeter and, indeed, the home islands itself 
had become logistically untenable by late 1944 – long before the American fire bombing cam-
paign of spring 1945, the atomic bombings, or the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.7 
In the Atlantic, German interdiction efforts never came close to succeeding in the face 
of the extensive ASW system implemented by British, Canadian, and U.S. naval forces from 
early 1941 onwards. As Marc Milner states with refreshing clarity, “the Atlantic war was not 
within Germany’s power to win – unless the Allies committed such colossal errors as to defeat 
themselves.”8 He concludes that “[t]he German attack on shipping complicated effective man-
agement of the Allied war effort, but for all its drama it had no appreciable influence on the 
outcome of the war.”9 And yet, with its ‘submersible torpedo boats’ all but purged from the 
seas, the Kriegsmarine had achieved a remarkable success: It had developed and operationally 
 
6 See Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, “Summaries of Japanese Shipping Losses,” https://www.ibib-
lio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/JANAC-Losses-2.html. Carrier and land-based tactical air power 
contributed significantly to the U.S. interdiction effort late in the war, accounting for another 687 merchants, 
amounting to 2.2 million gross tons. U.S. fears of an effective Soviet anti-shipping campaign from the air may 
be partially traceable to this experience, as well as to early German successes employing the land-based Fw 
200 maritime patrol/strike aircraft against North Atlantic shipping routes in 1940-41. On Fw 200 operations, 
see Sönke Neitzel, Der Einsatz der deutschen Luftwaffe über dem Atlantik und der Nordsee 1939-1945 (Bonn: Ber-
nard & Graefe, 1995). 
7 As Pape argues, “over 75 percent of the tonnage destroyed was sunk prior to 1 January 1945. Thus, sub-
marines had essentially won the tonnage war before air power could intervene to help. […] By late 1944 – 
prior to the initiation of strategic air attacks – the raw material base of Japan’s war economy had been under-
mined and its industry was in steep decline.” See Robert Anthony Pape, Bombing To Win: Air Power and Coer-
cion In War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 100. Blair agrees, arguing that “the third year of the 
submarine war against Japan was devastatingly effective,” and succeeded in breaking the back of Japan’s 
industries. He notes that “the postwar records credited 603 ships for about 2.7 million tons [being sunk by 
the commands]. This was more shipping and tonnage than in 1941, 1942, and 1943 combined (515 ships for 
2.2 million tons). […] Including tankers and merchant ships, the net loss in 1944 was over 2 million tons.” 
Blair further notes that the low levels of oil supplies even led the Japanese to launch “experiments in making 
oil from potatoes.” Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2001), 816-17. 
8  Marc Milner, Battle of the Atlantic (Stroud Gloucestershire: History Press, 2011), 255. 
9  Ibid., 256. The U-boat campaign did, of course, impose considerable opportunity costs on the allies. O’Brian 
argues that, in terms of its diversion of allied resources from more efficient uses, the U-boat war “can be 
considered a partial success.” See Phillips Payson O'Brien, How The War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied 
Victory in World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 243. It should not be forgotten, how-
ever, that there were opportunity costs on the German side as well. Jones estimates that production of the 
Type XXI – which ultimately did not result in a single allied ship being sunk – consumed high-grade steel 
equivalent to perhaps 5,000 tanks and may have expedited the collapse of the Eastern front. See Marcus O. 
Jones, “Innovation for Its Own Sake: The Type XXI Uboat,” Naval War College Review 67, no. 2 (2014), 10.  
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deployed the first ‘actual’ submarines, the Elektroboote of the long-range Type XXI and the 
coastal Type XXIII.10 As the victors of the Second Battle of the Atlantic soon came to under-
stand, the Type XXI in particular would have largely obviated the progress that had been made 
in ASW techniques during the war.11 The new boat could fire a dozen pattern-running torpe-
does in as many minutes, and another salvo of six within less than half an hour – all based on 
sonar data rather than visual target acquisition.12 It could outrun most surface ASW vessels 
with a submerged speed of up to 17 knots, and operate at ‘silent’ speeds for up to seventy-two 
hours without snorkeling.13 Once it had slipped away, it could recharge its massive batteries 
in less than three hours.14 The allied navies would have been hard-pressed to bring this new 
boat to heel.15 Of the few Elektroboote that became operational before the war ended, a few were 
attacked on the surface, but there is no indication that any were sunk while operating sub-
merged, which was what they were primarily designed for.16 In defeat, the German navy had 
 
10 While the retrofitting of basic snorkels into Type VIIC and Type IXC boats from 1943 onwards allowed for 
greater underwater endurance, the first submarine that had been consciously designed to operate submerged 
for most of its deployment was the Type XVII, which was based on Helmuth Walter’s hydrogen-peroxide 
propulsion scheme. After the complex and technologically immature closed-cycle design proved impractical 
to produce in any quantities, the long-range Type XXI and coastal XXIII were designed as more conventional, 
diesel-electric alternatives to the Walter-Boote. For a detailed treatment of the evolution of German submarine 
designs during the war, the standard reference work remains: Eberhard Rössler, Geschichte des deutschen 
Ubootbaus (Munich: Lehmanns, 1975).  
11 See Owen R. Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Subma-
rines, Naval War College Newport Papers 16 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2012), 13-14. 
12  Eberhard Rössler, U-Boottyp XXI (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 2002), 145-46. 
13  Norman Friedman, Submarine Design and Development (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 57; 
Norman Polmar and Kenneth J. Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet 
Submarines (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004), 9.  
14 With only one electric motor charging the batteries, a normal charge could take up to six and a half hours. 
See Rössler, U-Boottyp XXI, 112. It was this combination of advanced capabilities that made the Type XXI 
unique. In fact, the IJN had designed a submarine that was superior to the XXIs in submerged speed. The I-
201-class, of which only three were built, could make 19 knots but lacked the endurance, diving depth, state-
of-the-art electronics and heavy armament of its German ‘counterpart’. See Hangerer Lengerer, “The High-
Speed Submarines of the I 201 Class,” in Warship 2006, ed. Antony Preston, John Jordan and Stephen Dent 
(London: Conway Maritime Press, 2006), 59-77. 
15 The Type XXI also had some notable weaknesses. Its snorkel, in particular, required a major redesign. The 
perception that the boat could snorkel at 10 knots (cited, e.g. in Friedman, Submarine Design and Development, 
56) was not borne out in an operational setting. The design speed proved unattainable due to vibration prob-
lems affecting both the snorkel and periscope and the maximum practical speed was limited to 6 knots. See 
Rössler, U-Boottyp XXI, 100.  
16 The known attacks are summarized in: Blair, The Hunted, 676-77. 
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Fig. 7: U-2513 was one of two Type XXIs operated by the U.S. Navy after World War II. There are 
relatively few photographs of these submarines in their original combat configuration. If any exist of 
Type XXIs in VMF livery, they remain buried in Russian archives. (U.S. Navy) 
 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the first phase of the undersea competition between the U.S. 
and Soviet navies was principally shaped by the legacy of World War II. As will be argued in 
the following, this was true not just in a technological sense. The reverberations of the great 
interdiction campaigns in the Atlantic and the Pacific considerably distorted the U.S. Navy’s 
assumptions about the new challenge it was facing. The path-dependent results of these early 
misperceptions concerning likely Soviet building programs and operational concepts require 
a nuanced assessment: they had both a long-lasting negative impact on the quality of U.S. 
estimates concerning the Soviet submarine threat, and a largely positive impact on the Navy’s 
postwar ASW efforts. 
As part of the Potsdam Agreement of early August 1945, the surviving samples of the 
Kriegsmarine’s main U-boat types – thirty boats in total; the remainder was to be scuttled – 
were parceled out to the three major Allied powers. The U.S. and Britain received two Type 
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XXIs each and the Soviet Union received four of these 1,820 ton, long-range subs.17 The UK 
also received two Type XXIIIs and the USSR received a single one of these 260 ton, coastal-
type vessels.18 In addition to its diplomatically sanctioned share of the spoils, the Red Army 
had captured a considerable number of individual hull segments, as well as blue-prints and 
machine tools related to the Type XXI program.19 Like the Western allies, the Soviets also made 
a considerable effort to absorb as much as possible of the German knowledge base by appre-
hending, debriefing, and pressing into service key personnel involved in cutting-edge arma-
ments programs, including those working on the Elektroboote.20 As relations between the West-
ern powers and their erstwhile Soviet ally began to deteriorate in late 1945 and continued to 
go south in 1946, the bottom line from an intelligence perspective was thus quite clear: the 
 
17 Unless otherwise stated, all submarine displacement figures refer to submerged displacement in tons, 
rounded to full tens. There are some unfortunate inconsistencies in the literature as to the appropriate base-
line unit, and both the imperial (long) ton and the metric ton are often used. A metric ton is 0.9842 long tons – 
conversely, a long ton is 1,016 kg. Unless an author is explicit in his usage of one or the other, I have made no 
attempt to reconstruct which of the two was used in a source. Within a strategic studies (as opposed to an 
engineering) framework, the differences are of no particular consequence.  
18 Ballantyne’s description of the Type XXIII as “a pretty pointless craft” (Iain Ballanytne, Deadly Trade: The 
Complete History of Submarine Warfare from Archimedes to the Present (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2019), 
475) would seem harsh, but given its limited endurance and extremely modest armament of two torpedo 
tubes with no reloads carried, it would have been of little use in high-seas interdiction operations. As a result, 
it did not figure prominently in postwar U.S. and allied threat perceptions. The design did serve as an im-
portant starting point for postwar German submarine construction, from the ill-fated Klasse 201 of the early 
1960s onwards. The 201s and the much more successful 205s and 206s were small for their time, but still 
substantially larger than the Type XXIII at 450-500 tons and much more heavily armed with eight torpedo 
tubes. On German postwar designs, see Eberhard Rössler, Die neuen deutschen U-Boote: die U-Boote der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland Entstehung, Bedeutung, Einsatz (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 2004). 
19 In an attempt to revolutionize not just the capabilities, but also the production process of German subma-
rines, the Type XXI was constructed in a modular fashion from eight hull sections that were to be built and 
fitted out at one of 11 yards located all over Germany and transported to the lead shipyards only for final 
assembly. The stated aim was to cut down construction time from 460,000 man-hours to 260,000. See Fried-
man, Submarine Design and Development, 57. As a result of shoddy workmanship and a general decline in the 
quality of the materials available towards the end of the war, the build quality of the first several boats was 
extremely poor and they were restricted to training missions only. See Rössler, U-Boottyp XXI, 41-42. Many 
of the prefabricated segments were ultimately captured before assembly, as allied troops advanced into Ger-
many.  
20 As its share of war spoils, and under the auspices of the Potsdam agreement, the Soviets received a range 
of German submarine technical documentation as well as a number of completed former Axis submarines. 
The Soviets also captured thousands of German technicians and scientists from their occupation zone; while 
the exact figure is unknown, common estimates suggest that 4,000 German submarine design and construc-
tion personnel ended up in the Soviet Union. See Jan S. Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design, Development and 
Tactics (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1989), 78.  
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Soviet Union had in its possession all the necessary components to build the Type XXI, or a submarine 
based on its design, in large quantities. 
Within the overall scheme of preparations for the eventuality of another global war, 
the possibility of a large-scale campaign against Western shipping was, of course, but one of 
the disquieting scenarios U.S. planners had to contend with.21 The dominant strategic debates 
of the day concerned the proper integration of atomic weapons into national military strategy, 
as well as their employment and likely effectiveness in case of war.22 Intimately related to this 
latter concern was the question of whether an air campaign alone could be sufficient to repel 
Soviet aggression and perhaps force a viable settlement, or whether a rather protracted war 
would be inevitable. With regard to the so-called “air-atomic strategy,”23 opinions tended to 
quickly diverge along service lines: The United States Army Air Force (USAAF) – which, in 
September 1947, became the independent Air Force – was quite convinced of its war-winning 
potential. The Army and Navy expected something more closely resembling a replay of World 
War II, with the addition of atomic weapons.24 It was the prospect of another drawn-out con-
flict, in which the European continent might be fully or partially lost to Soviet forces in the 
initial phase and would later have to be reconquered, that led to a renewed focus on sea lines 
of communication and, thus, on the submarine problem.25  
The Navy, of course, had strong incentives to bring the ASW issue to the fore. Its bu-
reaucratic survival depended on the existence of a credible threat at sea, a reality that was 
further accentuated by the brewing debate on defense unification.26 In the foreseeable future, 
a much-expanded Soviet submarine fleet was the only challenge to Western sea control that 
 
21  On the origins of U.S. war planning against the Soviet Union, see Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next 
War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 159-90.  
22  David A. Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” In-
ternational Security 7, no. 4 (1983), doi:10.2307/2626731, 3-71; Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1945-50 (Lon-
don: Frank Cass, 1996). 
23  See Edward Kaplan, To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured 
Destruction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2015); Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and 
Containment before Korea (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982). 
24 See Richard Hegmann, “Reconsidering the Evolution of the US Maritime Strategy 1955–1965,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 14, no. 3 (1991), doi:10.1080/01402399108437454, 303-04; Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 
1945-50 (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 18-19. 
25  Ibid., 28-32. 
26  Paolo E. Coletta, The United States Navy and Defense Unification 1947-1953 (Newark, NJ: University of Dela-
ware Press, 1981), 26-53. 
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fit the bill in terms of both magnitude and plausibility.27 As early as June 1946, Fleet Admiral 
Nimitz had raised the issue at the highest level, reporting to President Truman that the number 
of Type XXI equivalents in Soviet service could reach “several hundred in operation by 1951.”28 
This was backed up by an Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) assessment presented at the first 
of a series of ASW Conferences, which offered a “conservative estimate”29 of up to 300 Type 
XXIs in 1950.30 When Vice Admiral Sherman briefed Truman in January 1947, he struck a more 
moderate tone, but estimated “a 1947 building capacity of 50 fleet [i.e. long-range] subma-
rines.”31 He also restated the Navy’s belief that “the Soviets are devoting great effort to the 
building of the German Type XXI submarine.”32 Sherman’s figure of up to fifty long-range 
boats in 1947 actually went beyond the earlier ONI assessment, which expected no more than 
twenty operational boats in 1948, and no more than fifty in 1949, with a steep increase there-
after. Not long after, ONI assessed that Soviet yards could increase their capacity to an impres-
sive thirty boats per month – or more than a thousand boats inside a three-year period – and 
that it would take them no more than five years to do so.33 In 1950, naval intelligence thought 
200 boats per year realistic and even as late as 1954, actual build rates of 140-160 boats per year 
were still expected for the near future.34  
Other than an unnamed Soviet admiral, who in 1948 was quoted as advertising a long-
term building program of 1,200 new submarines, there was little specific evidence to back up 
 
27 There was some debate within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) as to whether the 
submarine threat or the air threat should take precedence. Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy: 
The Development of American Naval Strategy, 1945-1955 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 4, 10-14, 
30; David A. Rosenberg, “American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization: The Navy Experience,” in Mahan 
is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference of the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 
ed. James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), 257-59, 265.  
28 Quoted in: Jeffrey G. Barlow, From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945-1955 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 164. 
29 CAPT George R. Phelan, quoted in: Ibid., 165.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy, 96. 
32 Ibid., 96. 
33 Friedman, Submarine Design and Development, 101. The German yards had achieved a completion rate of 28 
Type XXIs in December 1944. See Norman Polmar and Jurrien Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Na-
vies, 1718-1990 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 142. 
34 Friedman, Submarine Design and Development, 101. Breemer, for one, believes that the Soviet shipyards were 
quite incapable of putting out such numbers. See Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design, Development and Tactics, 
80.  
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those estimates.35 But the potential threat of the Type XXI (or a close analogue) being let loose 
on Western shipping made the prospect of such a program difficult to ignore. Additionally, 
there was still the possibility that the Soviets would master Dr. Walter’s intricate hydrogen-
peroxide fuel cycle and manage to put it into industrial-scale production.36 The resultant sub-
marines would have been capable of even higher submerged speeds: the experimental V-80 
had sprinted at an unprecedented 26 knots, and the pre-production Type XVIIA had managed 
a sustained run of more than five hours at 20 knots.37 At the tactical level, Western ASW forces 
would be completely outmatched by such a submarine.  
Conversely, at the operational and strategic levels, the ability to strangle U.S. and allied 
forces fighting in Europe still very much depended on the availability of the new submarines 
– be they of the Elektro- or closed-cycle type – in numbers. The German experience remains 
highly instructive in this regard: Deploying from ports on the Bay of Biscay, close as could be 
to its Atlantic hunting grounds, the U-Bootwaffe managed to keep scarcely more than 25 per-
cent of its rugged and fairly basic boats operationally available at any one time.38 Effective wolf 
packs could be formed only occasionally, and during some months there was scarcely a hand-
ful of boats at sea at all.39 The upshot for a Soviet anti-SLOC campaign is clear: due to the much 
greater distances Soviet boats would have to travel to get to their hunting grounds and back 
to base, there either had to be many more of them, or the same number of boats would have to 
 
35 See John Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present (London: Arms and Armour, 1989), 23. Meanwhile, 
Breemer’s tracing of the remark to Admiral of the Fleet Kusnezov (in Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design, 
Development and Tactics, 81, 83) could not be verified by the author, and raises questions. Kusnezov had fallen 
from grace in 1947 and was facing a court martial in 1948. He got off relatively lightly and was demoted – not 
for the last time, as it turned out. The unnamed admiral’s statement plays well with MccGwire’s estimate of 
the postwar building program, which is reproduced in Polmar and Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet 
Navies, 1718-1990, 140. 
36 The Soviets had not captured a complete Walter-boat but they succeeded in gaining access to the Walter 
design office at Blankenberg. Walter himself and his design staff were captured by the British. See Jordan, 
Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 22. 
37 See Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 2. 
38 Breemer, “Estimating the Soviet Strategic Submarine Missile Threat,” 85; See also: British Admiralty, “His-
tory of U-Boat Policy, 1939-1945: C.B. 4501” (British Admiralty, London, 1946), http://www.uboatar-
chive.net/British%20Reports/U-boatPolicy.htm. 
39 For a detailed breakdown by month, see Gudmundur Helgason, “U-Boat Force Combat Strength,” 
Uboat.net, https://uboat.net/about/contact.htm. 
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cruise at much higher speeds to allow for meaningful concentrations in time and space.40 Since 
very high sustained transit speeds of 20 knots or more are achievable only with nuclear pro-
pulsion, only a very large number of long-range boats would do.41 Even accounting for the 
increased lethality of Type XXI-style armament, the plausibility of a 1950s SLOC interdiction 
scenario remained very sensitive to this assumption. 
It is important to note that the problem of numbers would be alleviated if forward 
operating bases could be quickly made available.42 That said, anti-SLOC operations would 
have been most critical in a prolonged war that may not have resulted in such early successes. 
The impact of shipping losses to submarines is, after all, cumulative and thus becomes severely 
felt only over time. If the Soviet Union wanted to conduct a serious interdiction campaign from 
the outset, or in a scenario that might not result in an immediate collapse of Western defenses, 
the VMF had to be equipped with many hundreds of the Type XXI- or Walter-derived subma-
rines.43 In the absence of specific evidence, which was often difficult to come by until satellite 
 
40 The Type XXI could – in theory – make a little more than 17 knots submerged, but would have drained its 
battery far too quickly when travelling at more than 8-10 knots. Polmar gives a range of 25 nmi at 16 knots, 
which is tactically useful but negligible from an operational mobility perspective. See Polmar and Moore, 
Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 4. As a result Type XXI transit 
speeds may have been roughly comparable to those achieved during the first phase of the WWII campaign, 
when surfaced transits with sustained speeds of 10-12 knots were still possible. 
41 Long endurance at high speeds was, in fact, not one of the strong suits of closed-cycle propulsion. In prac-
tice, the user had to choose one or the other: the Walter scheme resulted in high speeds, while the alternative 
closed-cycle diesel resulted in longer endurance. See Ibid., 35. A ‘slow’ Walter submarine was also envisioned 
by the Royal Navy in the early 1950s, but the point remains the same. See Norman Friedman, The Postwar 
Naval Revolution (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 196. The limitations of classic diesel-electric 
propulsion in this regard are, of course, well-established. 
42 According to Blair’s landmark account, the first of the German forward bases at Lorient had little impact 
on the U-boat campaign in the first three months after the French surrender. By the end of the war, some 
1,500 patrols had been launched from French ports, some 750 from Norwegian bases, and some 700 from Kiel 
and Wilhelmshaven. But, despite exceptional military successes and the best efforts of U-boat headquarters, 
the shift to forward operations took quite some time to unfold. See Clay Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunted, 
1942-1945 (New York: Random House, 1998), 184; Gudmundur Helgason, “The U-Boat Bases,” Uboat.net, 
https://uboat.net/flotillas/bases/. 
43 As the documentation for warplan Bushwacker noted, the Walter-type would be “exceedingly expensive to 
operate.” See Joint Strategic Plans Group, JSPG 500/2, 8 March 1948, "Bushwacker" in America's Plans for War 
Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1950: Vol. 8, Plan Bushwacker, ed. Steven T. Ross and David A. Rosenberg (New 
York, NY: Garland, 1990), 164. While the German experience is only partially relevant in this regard and 
economies of scale were probably quite possible, a closed-cycle fleet would have remained a much more 
expensive proposition than either a ‘high-low mix’ of Walter- and diesel boats, or an exclusive reliance on 
diesel-electric types. In the event, nuclear propulsion – which was itself ‘exceedingly expensive to operate,’ 
by any reasonable standard – largely obviated the debate about the relative merits of Walter-based air-inde-
pendent propulsion (AIP).  
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reconnaissance came into its own during the 1960s, U.S. intelligence assessments simply as-
sumed that what was operationally necessary was also possible and, indeed, likely. 
 
4.2.2 The anti-SLOC scenario and U.S. military planning 
While intelligence assessments touted a major Soviet construction effort and the Navy was 
clear in its insistence that a long war was what potentially lay ahead, OPNAV’s success in 
pushing the threat to allied SLOCs as a major concern in the joint planning process waxed and 
waned. As far as the declassified record is concerned, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) war plans of 
the early Cold War era did project a growing threat and expected a Soviet interdiction effort 
of some magnitude.44 Plan Crankshaft of May 1948 expected a major anti-SLOC effort even in 
the very near term. The planners’ line of argument can only be described as a sterling case of 
“mirror imaging:”45  
 
“The Soviet strategists must realize the vital importance of the sea lines of communication 
and of certain sea areas to the Allies. Therefore, they will exert every feasible means at 
their disposal to deny to the Allies these sea areas and lines of communication in order to 
protect the USSR against the Allied offensives, to starve the United Kingdom into sub-
mission, and to seriously weaken the war-making capacity of the United States.”46 
 
 
44 Those joint U.S. war planning documents that are publicly available cover the period up until early 1951, 
when draft plan Dropshot was withdrawn from consideration. The projections contained in Dropshot covered 
the period up until 1957. 
45 On mirror imaging in this particular context, see Mats Berdal, Forging a Maritime Alliance: Norway and the 
Evolution of American Maritime Strategy 1945-1960, Forsvarsstudier 4/1993 (Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 
1993), 47-50. See also John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy 1977-1986, Newport 
Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), 23. The best systematic study of the phenomenon in 
a Cold War context is Robert B. Bathurst, Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy (Oslo, London: 
Sage/PRIO, 1993). The idea of the mirror image as a basic reality in U.S.-Soviet relations can probably be 
traced to: Urie Bronfenbrenner, “The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Re-
port,” Journal of Social Issues 17, no. 3 (1961), doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1961.tb01682.x, 45-56. See also Christo-
pher Jones, “Reflections on Mirror Images: Politics and Technology in the Arsenals of the Warsaw Pact,” in 
Goldman; Eliason, The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, 117-45. William Eckhardt and Ralph K. White, 
“A Test of the Mirror-Image Hypothesis: Kennedy and Khrushchev,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 11, no. 3 
(2016), doi:10.1177/002200276701100306, 325-32. 
46 Joint Strategic Plans Group, JSPG 496/10, 11 May 1948, "Crankshaft" in America's Plans for War Against the 
Soviet Union, 1945-1950: Vol. 7, From Crankshaft to Halfmoon, ed. Steven T. Ross and David A. Rosenberg (New 
York, NY: Garland, 1989), TOP SECRET (declassified 19 August 1977), 49. Emphasis added. 
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Nevertheless, SLOC protection remained a secondary concern in most short-term war plans, 
which relied on the air offensive to an even greater extent than medium- and long-range plans, 
which reflected an acute lack of forces, as well as funds to generate them.47 As a result, the 
latter tended to me more responsive to the Navy’s concerns. In a substantial annex on the naval 
operational concept, Plan Bushwacker of March 1948 made it clear that a modernized VMF sub-
marine force “will present a very serious threat to our sea lines of communication by 1952.”48 
It further explained that “it may be assumed that in the light of past experience [...] the use of 
submarines in unrestricted attacks against shipping would offer the most fruitful field of im-
mediate employment for enemy submarine efforts.”49 Bushwacker estimated a total of “200 in-
terim high submerged-speed submarines”50 in the 1952 scenario. The number of ex-German 
Type XXIs that could be made available was estimated at sixty units.51 Plan Dropshot of 1949 
expected “[a]n intensive air and sea offensive against the British Isles, with the initial objective 
of neutralizing Great Britain as a serious military factor and of preventing the use of the British 
Isles as a base by United States forces”52 in 1957. It accentuated this as “essential in achieving 
the ultimate objective”53 from the Soviet side. Dropshot also expected more generalized subma-
rine and air attacks against allied SLOCs, including “intensive antishipping submarine raids, 
involving as many as fifty long-range, high submerged-speed submarines and approximately 
sixty long-range conventional submarines”54 in the Pacific. 
As will be further detailed below, there was significant debate about the relative prior-
ity of submarine and air threats inside OPNAV as well. In 1949, the Air Warfare Division (Op-
55) asserted that the submarine threat, as it stood, could be “effectively throttled early in the 
war”55 and suggested an “aggressive anti-submarine campaign employing carrier air strikes, 
 
47 Ross, American War Plans, 1945-50, 108-10. 
48 Joint Strategic Plans Group, JSPG 500/2, 8 March 1948, "Bushwacker" in America's Plans for War Against the 
Soviet Union, 1945-1950, 202. 
49 Ibid., 203. 
50 Ibid., 164. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1920/5, Vol. II, 19 December 1949, "Dropshot" in America's Plans for War Against 
the Soviet Union, 1945-1950: Vol. 14, Long Range Planning: Dropshot, ed. Steven T. Ross and David A. Rosenberg 
(New York, NY: Garland, 1989), TOP SECRET (declassified 7 October 1973), 400. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid., 417, 411.  
55 Rosenberg, “American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization: The Navy Experience,” 262. 
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aerial minelaying, and antisubmarine subs as the spearheads.”56 The fact remained, however, 
that the Navy had no effective technological counter to a future threat based on state-of-the-
art German – as opposed to prewar Soviet – technology.57 It was this very realization that had 
motivated ADM Sherman’s initial statement, at the 1946 ASW Conference, that “the strategic 
counter to this sort of thing is high emphasis on attack at the source of the trouble.”58 As Navy 
ASW experts had found, any other course of action would leave the convoy escorts and hunter-
killer groups with a major problem on their hands: statistically, close to a hundred attack runs 
would be required for a surface ship to sink a single Type XXI.59 Detection rates and sinkings 
from the air would also be reduced by up to 94 percent, from World War II levels.60 The unfa-
vorable balance of resources required to deal with Type XXIs at sea made an approach based 
on killing them in port, on the slipways, and in the factories look distinctly more attractive.  
As it began to find broad acceptance both within and beyond OPNAV, the ‘attack at 
source’ paradigm did not remain confined to submarine-related targets. The reliance on 
forward offensive operations to attrite an expanded and modernized Soviet submarine fleet 
was, however, prominently reflected in several war plans of the late 1940s. Thus, Plan Reaper 
listed “[a]ttack on enemy at the source”61 as the highest priority in controlling allied lines of 
communication in case of war in 1954:  
“Principal operations, conducted by carrier task forces, submarines and land-based air, 
would be against targets in the Barents-Norwegian-North Baltic Sea areas; in the Medi-
terranean-Black Sea areas; and in the China-Kamchatka areas. One of the principal oper-




57 Both the limited nature of the short-term threat and the absence of effective response measures to the Type 
XXI threat were confirmed by Vice Admiral Low’s special study of April 1950, known as the Low Report. See 
Joel J. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO, 1949-80 (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1991), 10. 
58 Quoted in: Barlow, From Hot War to Cold, 165.  
59 Ibid., 164. 
60 Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman, Hunters and Killers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), 
Vol. 2, 78. 
61 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 2143/6, 29 November 1950, JOWP "Reaper", Joint Outline War Plan for a War 
Beginning 1 July 1954, "Groundwork" in America's Plans for War Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1950: Vol. 15, 
Blueprint for Rearmament: "Reaper", ed. Steven T. Ross and David A. Rosenberg (New York, NY: Garland, 
1990), 31, TOP SECRET (declassified 4 August 1980). 
62 Ibid., 49. 
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The final draft for Plan Dropshot, which was eventually obviated by the budgetary bonanza 
that followed the surprise attack in Korea, listed “offensive operations to destroy enemy naval 
forces, shipping, naval bases, and supporting facilities”63 third among its PHASE I priorities 
in case of war in 1957. This made it a key priority right after ‘Secure the Western Hemisphere’ 
and ‘Conduct an Air Offensive against the Soviet Powers’.64 After establishing that “[t]he prin-
cipal threat from Soviet naval forces would lie in their submarine capabilities”65 and briefly 
discussing other naval capabilities, Dropshot asserts that: 
“Offensive operations against the source of these threats are considered the most effective 
and least expensive means of neutralizing them. These operations would have as their 
primary objectives the destruction of naval and merchant shipping, submarine assembly 
and repair facilities, naval bases, and the air defenses of such supporting facilities. […] 
Operations against those targets constituting the source of Soviet naval strength would 
be conducted primarily by fast carrier task forces, hunter-killer groups and submarines, 
assisted by land based air.”66 
 
Based on what limited intelligence was available, the JCS assumed that a reconstituted U.S. 
Navy – employing the aggressive approach outlined inter alia by Op-55 – would be able to 
contain a Soviet interdiction effort in the initial phase of a conflict. In Phase II, allied forces 
would “move to increase our measure of control of essential lines of communications [sic]”67 






63 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1920/5, Vol. II, 19 December 1949, "Dropshot" in America's Plans for War Against 
the Soviet Union, 1945-1950, TOP SECRET (declassified 7 October 1973), 254. 
64 Ibid., 253a-54. 
65 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1920/5, Vol. III, 19 December 1949, "Dropshot" in America's Plans for War Against 
the Soviet Union, 1945-1950: Vol. 14, Long Range Planning: Dropshot, ed. Steven T. Ross and David A. Rosenberg 
(New York, NY: Garland, 1989), TOP SECRET (declassified 7 October 1973), 537. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 598 
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4.3 The early Soviet submarine threat in retrospect 
4.3.1 Soviet postwar submarine designs: a closer look 
While the outcome of a conjectural conflict in the late 1950s will never be known, the expecta-
tion that the potential anti-SLOC threat could be contained by Western naval forces was most 
likely justified. The more dramatic Western projections of future Soviet submarine construc-
tion may have been technically conceivable, but we now know that none of them were re-
motely accurate.68 The actual build rates during the first fifteen years of the Cold War, exclud-
ing the last offshoots of wartime programs that predated the Type XXI by years, are 
summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Soviet construction of early-Cold War submarine designs69 
Year Completed Soviet designation NATO designation Range category 
1946 0 -- -- -- 
1947 0 -- -- -- 
1948 0 -- -- -- 
1949 0 -- -- -- 
1950 0 -- -- -- 
1951 1 Project 613 Whiskey MR 









1954 44 Project 613 Whiskey MR 
 
68 Friedman provides an alternative, more positive framing: “ONI erred by assuming that Stalin would be 
wise enough to emphasize the weapon the West feared most.” See Friedman, Submarine Design and Develop-
ment, 101. Of course, Stalin did emphasize that weapon, and his successor went even further than he had. They 
just didn’t emphasize it to the extent ONI expected based on its preferred assumptions, as opposed to ob-
servable facts at the time. 
69 Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail S. Monakov, Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding 
Programmes, 1935-1953 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 223-24; Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Doctrine and 
Policy, 1956-1986 Vol. 1 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003), 74-78. See also: Gorshkov, Sea Power of the 
State, 209; Polmar and Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990, 281-87.  
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MR = medium range; LR= long-range 
 *    18 or 19 units re-equipped as low-end SSGs          
 †    5 units converted to SSB version 
 
The picture that emerges is quite clear: the number of long-range submarines launched for the 
VMF remained low throughout the entire period. Meanwhile, the number of medium-range 
units built did eventually increase very substantially. (The design features of these boats – 
which were also not Type XXI derivatives, by any reasonable standard – will be discussed in 
the next section.) As far as raw numbers are concerned, 1955-56 would remain the Cold War’s 
busiest years for Soviet shipyards. Production of the early postwar designs went into steep 
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decline soon after, as the advantages of nuclear propulsion became apparent and Khrush-
chev’s “modernists”70 began to question the utility of conventional forces in the nuclear era. 
Ultimately, the perception of the VMF’s submarines as a major threat to Western SLOCs had a 
more lasting impact on the Cold War competition than the 1950s building program itself. As 
Jordan notes, early estimates that suggested that the USSR might be gearing up for a major 
anti-shipping campaign left an imprint on the Western debate “for at least the next twenty 
years.”71 His assertion that this “result[ed] in a series of errors regarding the capabilities, pro-
jected missions, and building rates of the various submarine types which subsequently entered 
service”72 is entirely credible, and is also borne out by this study.  
OPNAV’s concern with the possibility of a massive construction effort putting out Type 
XXIs in the hundreds was, of course, not at all unjustified. The Navy and, to the extent that 
they assimilated Navy thinking, the JCS were planning against capabilities that the USSR was 
known to possess: the technological base to develop Type XXI- and perhaps Walter-deriva-
tives, and the industrial base to produce them in worrisome quantities. Within that specific 
frame of reference, the numbers and Soviet lines of operation that were projected in war plans 
like Bushwacker and Dropshot reflected fairly balanced assessments of what was possible. More 
alarmist estimates – like Nimitz’s “several hundred […] by 1951”73 or ONI’s expected build 
rate of 200 boats a year in the early 1950s – assumed that Soviet submarine construction might 
be designed to fuel a massive Third Battle of the Atlantic in the near future. In fact, an all-out 
construction effort of Type XXI-derived submarines at any point in time was plausible only if 
the VMF’s main concern was assumed to be with SLOC interdiction.74 However, while the 
expectation that such a program would materialize was not unreasonable in the late 1940s, by 
 
70  George E. Hudson, “Soviet Naval Doctrine and Soviet Politics, 1953–1975,” World Politics 29, no. 1 (1976), 
doi:10.2307/2010048. 
71  Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 23. 
72  Ibid..  
73  See n. 28. 
74 There were voices inside OPNAV who argued, correctly as it turned out, that it was not. See Palmer, Ori-
gins of the Maritime Strategy, 68. Rear Admiral (RADM) Fawkes, the British Flag Officer Submarines (FOSM) 
during the early 1950s, expressed similar views and warned against exaggerating the threat. See Peter Hen-
nessy and James Jinks, The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2015), 
82-83.  
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far the most significant finding concerning the Soviet approach to Cold War submarine war-
fare is that it never did. In the next step, we will examine the actual capabilities the VMF devel-
oped during 1946-1960 and why the threat they posed fell far short of Western expectations.  
The USSR was, of course, no newcomer to submarine construction. In line with Young 
School thinking, submarines had been an integral part of its prewar approach to naval strat-
egy.75 In fact, at the outbreak of World War II, no other navy was operating nearly as many of 
them as the Red Fleet.76 Not all of the Soviet prewar designs were of high quality, and the focus 
was plainly on coastal defense. Some of the larger types were, however, perfectly suitable for 
high-seas missions. The K-class, in particular, proved its value during the war, with Polmar 
and Noot describing them as a “highly capable craft and well-liked by the Soviet Navy.”77 But 
like the rest of the VMF submarine force, the K-class ‘cruiser’ was of conventional design – a 
“submersible torpedo boat”78 with limited submerged endurance and speed – and posed no 
particular ASW challenge. In an open-ocean scenario, most Soviet subs of this era were mark-
edly inferior to the Kriegsmarine’s mainstay Type VII and Type IX designs.79 The leading West-
ern navies had become highly proficient at countering this sort of threat, and while the steep 
draw-down of forces during 1945-47 would have made a reconstitution of the wartime ASW 
system a major organizational challenge, the knowledge and capabilities were both still avail-
able. If the USSR was going to challenge the Western sea powers in their preferred domain 
and pose a credible threat in the North Atlantic, German technology was its best bet by far. 
In light of this fact, the production choices made in the late 1940s and early 1950s are 
quite instructive as to the motivations of the VMF’s postwar submarine program. As will be-
come evident, the USSR did not fully come around to the paradigm that the Type XXI had 
instated until about 1955, and switched the bulk of its efforts to nuclear propulsion soon 
 
75 See Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Inheritance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1989), 65-66; Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968), 19-27. 
76 Polmar and Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990, 95. 
77 Ibid., 88 
78 Karl Lautenschläger, “The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001,” International Security 11, no. 3 (1986), 
doi:10.2307/2538886, 102. 
79 To mention just a few of the relevant factors, none of the Soviet boats were snorkel-equipped, they had 
much inferior diving depths, and even worse habitability. While many sources fail to highlight this issue, 
German boats also suffered from uneven build quality in the later stages of the war. But Soviet boats had this 
problem from the outset, resulting in lower survivability.  
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thereafter. In addition to the non-adoption of the available German design, observable con-
struction of Soviet designs up until the late 1950s does not point to a strong focus on SLOC 
interdiction either. As a result, we can state not only that the USSR never built any copies of 
the Type XXI, but that it followed a different path of development as a matter of preference.   
The first of the postwar submarine classes was Project 613, known to NATO as the 
Whiskey-class. The initial design work for these boats was completed during the Great Patriotic 
War, at some point between 1942 and 1944. After the Soviet designers had gotten a first-hand 
look at the Type XXI, some adjustments were made – which specific adjustments is less clear. 
In any case, Project 613 was not designed from the ground up. It was – and remained – a 
development of the prewar S-class that sought to balance the new requirement for better 
submerged speed with very conservative Soviet design features.80  
The vessel that resulted was nothing like the German ‘convoy killer’. Its hull form was 
based on the S-class and retained the classic prewar saddle tanks. It was 25 percent smaller in 
submerged displacement and considerably less streamlined than the more modern German 
subs. Its electric motors were only about half as powerful as the Type XXIs, resulting in a ser-
viceable – but not particularly impressive – submerged speed of 13 knots.81 It sought to retain 
good seakeeping on the surface and initially kept the deck guns as well.82 German designers 
had found that the retention of deck artillery increased water resistance by a significant 20-25 
percent.83 It stuck with the prewar concept of splitting the torpedo armament into forward and 
aft tubes, and carried only six reloads to the Type XXIs fourteen.84 There is no mention in any 
 
80 Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 25-26. 
81 Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 31. 
82 This gun is a bit of a mystery but appears to have been the rather unsuccessful SM-24 twin 57mm gun 
mount. A single 100mm is also reported as having been fitted on some units, which MccGwire believes would 
have been useful to counter amphibious forces. While Polmar and Moore are undoubtedly correct in describ-
ing it as an anti-aircraft gun, the 57 mm was another compromise, with reasonable effectiveness against many 
light-skinned surface targets as well. See ibid., 26; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign 
Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), 361 n. 12; Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 
30; NavWeapons, “Russia: 57 mm/78.7 (2.24") SM-24-ZIF, 57 mm/78.7 (2.24") ZIF-31,” NavWeapons, 
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNRussian_57mm-78_zif-31.php.  
83 Rössler, U-Boottyp XXI, 18. 
84 To be fair, stern tubes were also retained in some postwar Western designs. However, in both cases this 
was largely a symptom of excessive conservatism, and of planning submarines around less advanced torpe-
does. The German Lageunabhängiger Torpedo (LUT) could hit targets in the rear, as well as the frontal aspect. 
According to Rössler, this weapon “largely obviated” the additional stern tubes. See ibid., 146. 
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source of an advanced fire control system based on acoustic sensor data. Finally, and quite 
astonishingly, Project 613s were not equipped with even a basic snorkel during the postwar 
redesign effort, which left them tremendously vulnerable to tried and tested Western ASW 
methods. When a snorkel was eventually added, it performed even worse than the problem-
atic German models. According to a former crew member, “a design flaw […] allowed exhaust 
gas to be sucked back into the submarine.”85 When a Whiskey was ordered to conduct a thirty-
day patrol without surfacing, “the crew was so poisoned that their legs and hands were swol-
len to nearly twice their normal size. The Soviet Union chalked up the voyage as proof of the 
superiority of Soviet manhood.”86 To make a long story short, “German technology was not 
deployed to any significant extent”87 in the Whiskey. As a result, in their original configuration, 
the 613s were more of the past than of the future – a step forward for the VMF, but by no 
means a major innovation.  
None of this is to say that the submarine itself was necessarily a bad design. In fact, the 
Whiskey was a serviceable instrument for its assigned missions, which are discussed in detail 
below. Indeed, with at least 215 units built, Project 613 has remained the largest submarine 
program ever completed by any country in peacetime. But it became an adequate Cold War-
era sub only as a result of later modifications: the addition of a snorkel (first observed in 1955, 
and presumably upgraded at some point thereafter), the removal of the deck guns for better 
streamlining, an improved sonar suite (first seen in 1957-58) and an electronic support 
measures (ESM) mast (after 1957), as well as further upgrades throughout its service life. What 
none of these improvements could change was the fact that the 613 had not been designed for 
long-range operations in the Atlantic.  
 
85 See Sherry Sontag, Christopher Drew and Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of 
Cold War Submarine Espionage (London: Hutchinson, 1999), 153. 
86 Ibid. 
87 W. J. R. Gardner, Anti-Submarine Warfare (London: Brassey's, 1996), 13. 
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In fact, it had almost exactly the same range as the Type VIIC – but, if it was to operate against 
Atlantic convoys, it had to do so over twice the distance the German Atlantikboote typically had 
to cover.88 As both ONI and the CIA eventually realized, the Whiskey 
“could not be effective against US sea lines of communication to Europe—which are some 
1,800 to 2,400 nm distant. The W class, under optimum conditions, can remain on a patrol 
station located about 1,800 nm from its base for about 10 days. It is better able to defend 
the sea approaches to the USSR and interdict naval vessels in the Norwegian Sea.”89  
 
 
Since these were the missions the 613 had been designed for from the outset, this assessment 
was eminently sensible. Soviet engineers did, however, develop a long-range type in parallel 
to the Whiskey-class, which sheds further light on Soviet preferences during this first phase of 
the confrontation. 
Project 611, known to Western analysts as the Zulu-class, was the largest submarine 
that the USSR had ever built at that point in time. At 2,600 tons, its submerged displacement 
was nearly twice that of the Whiskey, and 40 percent larger than the Type XXI’s. It was more 
streamlined than the former and also had a better submerged speed of about 15 knots. At the 
same time, it appears that deck guns were still part of its initial configuration – an odd choice 
in a design otherwise optimized for good underwater performance, and one which was 
ultimately corrected.90 Project 611 also had an unusual propulsion layout with three shafts, 
which led to suspicions that closed-cycle power units had been (or would be) fitted on the 
outer shafts. It appears that this was the designers’ original intention, which was abandoned 
when problems in bringing the closed-cycle scheme into operational service proved to be more 
persistent than expected.91 The Zulu’s lack of a snorkel – or, for that matter, the creep motors 
introduced on the Whiskey – might be explained as a result of the switch to an all-diesel power 
 
88 From the Northern Fleet bases in the Murmansk area to a useful position somewhere in the eastern North 
Atlantic (e.g. 53° N, 22° W – roughly on the same latitude as Dublin and on the same longitude as Reykjavik), 
a Soviet boat would have to cover at least 1,900 nmi each way, even on an unrealistically straight course. 
From Lorient, the distance is less than half that. Approximate distances at sea are best calculated using a 
specialized tool like the one available at www.searoutes.com. 
89 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Soviet Attack Submarine Force Evolution and Operations” (Intelligence 
Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 1971), SECRET (declassified 14 September 
2017), 8. 
90 Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 30. 
91 Ibid., 28-29. 
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plant late in the design phase. But even so, these design features made little sense for a sub-
marine that would have faced even greater exposure to Western ASW forces than its smaller 
sister. After the failed integration of closed-cycle propulsion on the Zulu, the VMF limited its 
only other attempt at series production to a coastal design.  
Unlike their medium-range counterparts, the Zulus were quite capable of operating in 
the mid-Atlantic or even off the Eastern Seaboard. If they could make all or part of the transit 
on the surface, their range was better than 15,000 nmi. Once they had been retrofitted with 
snorkels, Western estimates were lowered to 9,500 nmi on a completely submerged patrol.92 A 
main armament of twenty-two anti-shipping torpedoes for their six bow and four aft tubes 
was also appropriate for more extended patrol durations. While they were still subject to some 
of the same compromises that marked the Whiskey-class, the refitted Zulus came a good deal 
closer to matching the Type XXI’s performance at extended ranges. That said, Project 611 was 
still no Type XXI equivalent, at a time when U.S. submarines were already beginning to move 
on from the German example. It was slower, undoubtedly noisier with its three-shaft layout 
and lack of effective quieting measures, and it had only a very basic sensor and electronics 
suite.93 Again, later upgrades took care of several of these deficiencies, but the state of the art 
had clearly overtaken the Zulu before it ever left the drawing board. 
 
 
92 Polmar and Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990, 283; Breemer, Soviet Submarines: 
Design, Development and Tactics, 286. 
93 Just as the first Zulus were being delivered, the Royal Navy demonstrated that much more quiet diesel 
submarines were possible – even compared to the fairly silent Type XXI. Importantly, HMS Porpoise achieved 
a major reduction in radiated noise even when snorkeling. See Hennessy and Jinks, The Silent Deep, 130. The 
Zulu attempted nothing of the kind – nor did its successor, the Foxtrot. Had the VMF decided to go down this 
path early on, the competition might have played out very differently. 
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Fig. 8: A Whiskey-class submarine underway, with the British ASW frigate HMS Rothesay in trail. The 
relatively small size of the 613s is evident in this late-Cold War image. (U.S. National Archives)  
 
Even more importantly, only twenty-one Zulus were ever deployed in the general-purpose 
configuration, while five others were redesigned to carry early ballistic missiles and several 
more were canceled. To put this number into perspective, the Kriegsmarine had built a ‘long-
range’ Type IX for every three ‘medium-range’ Type VIIs. Given the increased ranges at which 
it would have to operate, a VMF submarine force optimized for combat in the North Atlantic 
should have aimed for a much higher proportion of long-range boats. The actual ratio of fin-
ished Z- and W-class hulls, however, was roughly 1:10. Had SLOC interdiction been the name 
of the game, this allocation of resources would have been shockingly inefficient, even by the 
standards of a planned defense economy. 
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In addition to the W- and Z-class boats, Soviet yards built thirty units of the much 
smaller Project 615 or Quebec-class, which U.S. naval intelligence initially endowed with an 
estimated range of up to 7,000 nmi.94 Designed as general-purpose coastal boats or perhaps as 
close-in “interceptors,”95 their actual range was less than half that.96 While a closed-cycle sys-
tem was to be fitted on this class, this was once again changed to a conventional propulsion 
layout after the first few units experienced serious incidents resulting from liquid oxygen leaks 
in the propulsion plant.97 Dubbed the zazhigalka (“cigarette lighter”98) by its crews, with officers 
allegedly “receiv[ing] a 20-percent bonus – known as ‘death pay’”99 for serving on them, these 
early Quebecs were an extremely dubious showcase for the first AIP system ever installed on 
an operational submarine. While the VMF did not give up on closed-cycle propulsion alto-
gether, none of the other designs that were considered left the drawing board – the technology 
was impressive, but under realistic conditions it never lived up to its promise.     
As a result, when the next generation of more mature postwar designs came around, 
they were conventional diesel-electric types as well, and not much faster or more quiet than 
their predecessors. The medium-range Project 633 (Romeo-class) and long-range Project 641 
(Foxtrot-class) were, however, superior in other respects. Notably, they had increased ranges 
of 9,000 and 17,000 nmi on snorkel, introduced better sensors, and could dive to 1,000 ft. The 
Foxtrot could apparently keep moving at creeping speeds for more than a week without snor-
keling, which was a major improvement over previous classes.100 Neither of the two programs 
was pursued to the extent that was originally envisioned, and they ultimately resulted in sixty-
two Foxtrots and only twenty Romeos being commissioned.101 It was with the delivery of the 
 
94   Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design, Development and Tactics, 87.  
95   Ibid. 
96   Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 47.  
97   Ibid., 44.  
98   Central Intelligence Agency, “Problems in the Soviet Submarine Service” (Special Report, Central Intelli-
gence Agency, Washington, DC, 1965), SECRET (declassified 28 September 2006). 
99   Ibid. 
100  Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 202. 
That said, Compton-Hall (Submarine vs. Submarine, 23) gives the endurance at maximum speed as one hour, 
which would not have made the Foxtrot a capable hunter over longer distances. For example, catching up 
with a convoy while submerged would have been well-nigh impossible. 641s were also not equipped as 
hunter-killers, although there apparently was a Western expectation that they would be. See Breemer, Soviet 
Submarines: Design, Development and Tactics, 99.  
101   The Foxtrot production run for the VMF continued into the early 1970s and, for export purposes, beyond. 
 
 The interdiction threat that never was 
 
   
 [198] 
 
first of these improved units in 1958 that the Soviet submarine force began to live up to 
Western fears of a decade earlier. The VMF now had advanced diesel boats designed from the 
outset to survive in the kind of ASW environment that had broken the back of the German U-
Bootwaffe, and with sufficient reach to cause some havoc on the main Atlantic shipping routes. 
Perhaps, in some very general sense, one could call them Type XXI derivatives with Soviet 
characteristics. Yet, by the time they entered service, that paradigm had itself been superseded.  
 
 
Fig. 9: The Foxtrot was the first Soviet submarine to transcend the performance of the Type XXI. By the 
time the first of these vessels went to sea, the USN and VMF were both shifting to nuclear power. They 
nonetheless posed a credible threat into the 1970s. (U.S. National Archives) 
 
In the expectation of the massive Type XXI-based submarine threat that never came, the US 
Navy had begun to devise a new ASW system designed specifically to hunt down high-sub-
merged-speed diesel subs. And on 17 January 1955, the first nuclear-powered submarine – the 
USS Nautilus – had set out on its shakedown cruise, proving that completely air-independent 
propulsion with unlimited operational range and sustained speeds of more than 20 knots had 
now become a reality. Barely a year and a half later, the U.S. Navy decided that it would stop 
building diesel boat altogether.102 Before the VMF could rush into service a nuclear submarine 
of its own, the U.S. had completed five and laid down eleven more. Among them were six 
Skipjack-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) that would do a jaw-dropping 33 
 
102   Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 133. 
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knots and remain in service into the late 1980s.103 Another revolution had come, and the U.S. 
Navy had engineered it. The Red Fleet, meanwhile, was once again behind the curve. 
 
4.3.2  The reasons why: zone defense and the distant patrol mission 
Before we move on to examine how the U.S. Navy developed an ASW posture that provided 
a suitable counter to the anticipated threat, however, we have one critical question yet to an-
swer: if the VMF of the 1950s was not postured for a Third Battle of the Atlantic, to what end 
did Soviet shipyards churn out more than 250 modern diesel-electric submarines, before the 
available resources were eventually rebalanced in favor of nuclear construction? To take this 
line of inquiry even further, we have to ask ourselves why the VMF did not at least build 
intermediate-range boats that could operate against the Atlantic shipping lanes if so required, 
instead of medium-range units that could not. How come the Soviet submarine force was not 
even structured for the possibility of a more forward-leaning posture in case of war, when the 
dependence on trans-oceanic SLOCs was clearly an important Western vulnerability?104 
The answer to these questions would seem to lie not so much in the inability of Soviet 
engineers and shipyards to build longer-range ‘convoy killers’ en masse, as in a clear set of 
priorities derived for the VMF from broader Soviet defense objectives.105 While the point was 
 
103   The USS Scorpion was lost with all hands in May 1968 – the second and last loss of a U.S. nuclear-powered 
submarine. The last unit was decommissioned in 1990. 
104   Using the same amount of resources that went into separate classes of long-range and medium-range 
boats during the first decade of the Cold War, the VMF could have been equipped with perhaps 200 interme-
diate vessels that would have offered much better on-station times in the eastern portion of the North Atlantic 
or, for that matter, the North Pacific as well.  
105   Some have advanced the theory that the USSR was simply incapable of copying the Type XXI. See, e.g. 
Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design, Development and Tactics, 80. Gilli also explicitly makes the case that the 
USN and the Royal Navy experienced difficulties copying the Type XXI. See Mauro Gilli, “The Struggle for 
Military-Technological Superiority: Complexity, Systems Integration and the Technological Challenges of 
Imitation” (Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, 2015). However, as far as the Soviet case is con-
cerned, the evidence points in a different direction. According to a prominent Soviet engineer, the TsKB-18 
design bureau began drawing up plans for a straightforward copy of the Type XXI, designated Project 614. 
But the design, which reflected German wartime priorities, was found to be insufficiently durable for a long 
service life and almost immediately discarded. See Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and 
Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 24. However, even if Soviet decision-makers did face important 
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almost certainly debated behind closed doors, operating in numbers against convoys west of 
the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap was simply not envisioned as a principal mission focus 
for the VMF submarine force in a war with NATO. That is why, even at the planning stage, a 
long-range component of a single Zulu for every nine Whiskeys was considered perfectly ade-
quate. This is where different national strategic needs and preferences led to a very different 
techno-doctrinal outcome. The Type XXI had been the Kriegsmarine’s final and potentially most 
successful attempt at creating the ultimate weapon system to accomplish one thing, and one 
thing only: “[T]o destroy Allied merchant shipping.”106 This is what the German theory of vic-
tory during both Battles of the Atlantic wholly depended on. The Soviet submarines of the 
early Cold War, however, were designed with a very different mission in mind: to shield the 
homeland from seaborne attack.  
To come to grips with the VMFs preference of using submarines for missions other than 
SLOC interdiction it is important to once again remind ourselves of how Soviet Cold War na-
val strategy was a continuation of traditions predating the Great Patriotic War, and even the 
Soviet Union itself. The repeated failures Tsarist Russia had experienced in its attempts at 
building a Western-style battle fleet eventuated in the pragmatic ‘active defense’ paradigm of 
1925-32 and the ideas of the Young School.107 As we have seen, the latter was convinced that 
“the utility of the battleship had ended”108 and that “[a] balanced naval force should consist of 
light units. […] Only submarines, PT boats, high-speed destroyers, and naval aircraft were es-
sential.”109 It is true that the VMF continued to flirt with the idea of a much-expanded surface 
fleet and secured Stalin’s approval for a fairly large-scale construction effort during 1936-40 
and again during 1946-50. But in terms of the operational paradigm that was envisioned, it 
seems that the basic formula of later decades had begun to emerge even before Stalin passed 
from the scene. 
 
technological limitations, this would still not provide a compelling explanation for why they preferred next-
generation replacements for their own S-class (the Whiskey) and K-class (the Zulu) over an intermediate-range 
boat patterned more closely on the Type XXI. Surely, an industrial base that was capable of building subma-
rines of both longer and shorter ranges than required for such a boat was not technologically incapable of 
covering the middle ground as well. 
106 Ibid., 5. 
107 On active defense, see Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, 9-27. 
108 Ibid., 22.  
109 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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Stated in the simplest terms, the postwar Soviet system was one of deeply echeloned zones 
of defense – a scheme that became much more expansive over time, but that was essentially 
retained even after the shift to defensive bastions as the main focal point of Soviet naval pos-
ture.110 Described simply as ‘zone defense’ by other Cold War sources, but perhaps more ac-
curately classified as an ‘oceanic perimeter defense-in-depth,’ this was a more ambitious take 
on sea denial than Russia’s littoral strategies of the past. After all “her most likely opponents 
were now the traditional maritime powers, who had just demonstrated their capability to pro-
ject and support continental-scale armies across vast distances of sea.”111 At the same time, 
despite its increased reach and a growing level of ambition over the following decades, zone 
defense was also categorically different from how the great sea powers of the West thought 
about naval warfare. In its earliest and most basic form, the zone defense system saw the VMF  
“prepare a defensive perimeter up to about 500 miles from the Soviet coast within which 
invading forces would come under increasingly severe attack as they headed for Russia. 
Beyond and at the outer limits of this perimeter, defending forces would be restricted to 
land-based bombers, long-range submarines (Zulus) and a few heavy ships […] whose 
exact function was not very clear. Closer in, the stress would be on huge numbers of me-
dium-range and coastal submarines (Whiskeys and Quebecs respectively), more and more 
aircraft, a swarm of minor combatants, especially torpedo boats, dense minefields and 
last but not least, powerful batteries of coastal artillery.”112 
 
 
Herrick traces the theory behind this scheme to ADM Alafuzov’s writings in the immediate 
postwar period, but Alafuzov was himself drawing on ideas developed several decades ear-
lier.113 Later on, the outermost or ‘open-ocean’ zone would increase in importance and the 
depth of the outer defense zone would reach out to at least 1,000 nmi from the Soviet coast.114 
As far as the submarine force is concerned, Moore, Flanigan and Helsen describe a “three-
 
110 Herrick, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy, 274-76. 
111 Michael MccGwire, “Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy,” in Naval Strategy and National Security: An 
"International Security" Reader, ed. Stephen van Evera and Steven E. Miller, Princeton Legacy Library (Balti-
more, Maryland, [Princeton, New Jersey]: Project Muse; [Princeton University Press], 2014), 145. 
112 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 173.  
113 Herrick, Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy, 1956-1986, 17-18; MccGwire, “Naval Power and Soviet Global 
Strategy,” 145. 
114 Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Research and Reports, Soviet Naval Strategy and Its Effects on the De-
velopment of Naval Forces, 1953-63, October 22, 1963, CIA/RR ER SC 63-3, CIA Historical Collection, TOP SE-
CRET (declassified 21 May 2012), 15.  
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tiered defense radiating from the Soviet homeland,”115 which they also trace back to the imme-
diate postwar period:  
“In essence […] the Zs could be seen as an early-warning platform, whose primary mis-
sion was to alert the Soviets to approaching hostile naval forces and to furnish some initial 
defense against them. The Ws, on the other hand, provided the main force and thrust of 
Soviet naval defense, while the Qs offered coastal patrol and final defense.”116 
 
If we factor in the succession of problems encountered with the infelicitous Quebec program, 
this mission structure fully aligns with observed submarine construction during 1946-1960, 
while a focus on SLOC interdiction far out in the Atlantic – once again – does not. According 
to First Secretary Khrushchev, the decision to largely abandon the heavy surface units in favor 
of an even stronger focus on submarines was made at the Party level, soon after Stalin’s 
death.117 At this stage, the planned construction of several hundred more diesel-electrics was 
already being thrown into disarray by the far-reaching implications of nuclear propulsion. 
With his savaging of the VMF’s budget in 1956-57, Khrushchev came down decisively in favor 
of nuclear-powered – and nuclear-armed – submarines.118 However, we can still see the off-
shoots of the original zone defense concept in the follow-on programs that were cut short. The 
Foxtrot was designed to take over the Zulu’s mission in the first line of defense. It was, in 
Breemer’s judgment, still 
“a traditional ocean patrol type, intended to operate on a patrol line or barrier astride the 
expected line of advance of enemy surface forces. Its range, endurance and armament 
were adequate for the requirements of an oceanic tonnage war, but the weight of the evi-
dence nevertheless suggests that coastal defence, albeit a [sic] greater distances, was the 
‘Foxtrot’s’ principal intended mission.”119  
 
 
115 K. J. Moore, Mark Flanigan, and Robert D. Helsel, “Developments in Submarine Systems, 1956-76,” in 
Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, ed. Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell (New 
York, NY: Praeger, 1977), 152. 
116 Ibid. 
117 See Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, 75.  
118 While it may have been an overreaction to the technological trends of the day, Khrushchev’s intervention 
seems broadly justified in retrospect. The construction of the planned surface vessels, in particular, would 
not have left the VMF better off in the long run. Whether a continuation of diesel-electric construction at a 
higher rate would have been beneficial is a more difficult question to answer.  
119 Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design, Development and Tactics, 99.  
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The massive Romeo program – according to one source, the initial plan was for 576 units – was 
brutally curtailed as resources were shifted, and the overall defense effort was re-centered on 
missiles and nuclear weapons.120 Had it been allowed to run its course, this massive construc-
tion effort would have pushed out the main perimeter to an extent that would have lent sub-
stance to the fears of Western intelligence services and allowed the VMF to operate in much 
greater density in areas that were previously limited to Zulus operating in handfuls. As it 
turned out, this task would fall to more capable nuclear-propelled vessels instead, with the 
corresponding disadvantage of production runs in the dozens rather than the hundreds. 
 
4.4 Submarine hunters for a new era  
4.4.1 From the SSK concept to the ‘fast attack’       
The U.S. Navy’s adjustment to the anticipated threat from high-submerged-speed diesel sub-
marines unfolded over a roughly ten-year period and can be divided into two stages. The first 
stage involved the promulgation and elaboration of the ‘attack at source’ concept, which has 
already been referred to, and which is also discussed in more detail in section 4.5. Treatises on 
anti-submarine warfare tend to disregard this part of the equation – perhaps because the ASW 
paradigm itself is so strongly associated with defensive sea control during both world wars.121 
In addition, direct attacks on supporting infrastructure and submarines in port were seen as 
largely unsuccessful in World War II.122 The Navy was, however, perfectly serious about mak-
ing the ‘attack at source’ approach a main focus of its ASW effort during the first decade of the 
 
120 Ibid., 101. 
121 Two exceptions to this rule are: Jan S. Breemer, “Anti-Submarine Warfare: A Primer” (Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 1988); Gardner, Anti-Submarine Warfare. 
122 Brian McCue, U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay: An Essay in Operations Analysis (Washington, DC: National De-
fense University Press, 1990). 
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Cold War, and possibly beyond.123 The second stage sought to recover the advantage the West-
ern allies had built in dealing with the ASW problem at sea. The system that resulted from this 
line of effort had three main components: (1) submarines designed to hunt and kill other sub-
marines, (2) long-range oceanic surveillance, and (3) an updated version of the air-surface team 
that had decided the Second Battle of the Atlantic.124 The key to all three elements was passive 
acoustics. As the advances in this area began to show promising operational results, the need 
to kill submarines in port and erode their supporting infrastructure began to lose some of its 
urgency. What is perhaps most remarkable about this second stage is the systematic explora-
tion of unproven concepts and the reliance on largely experimental approaches. This ulti-
mately left the Navy prepared to deal not only with the expected diesel threat, but also with 
the even more difficult challenge posed by nuclear submarines. 
The first key element of the postwar ASW system was the hunter-killer submarine. 
Ironically, the Type XXI itself pointed the U.S. Navy in this direction in the postwar search for 
a means of containing the threat that it posed. As postwar evaluations of its capabilities 
showed, the German design was extremely quiet for its time when operating on battery, but 
still produced copious amounts of detectable noise whenever it snorkeled.125 This made it vul-
nerable to passive acoustic detection. Very conveniently, German submarines had also been 
equipped with a relatively advanced listening apparatus, the Gruppenhorchgerät, which could 
sometimes capture single vessels at distances of up to 10 nmi.126 The hunter-killer concept was 
based on submarines carrying a more powerful version of this sensor and deploying across 
likely enemy transit routes, in areas that were suitable for setting up an ambush. Running on 
batteries, the hunter-killer would listen for noisy snorkelers, maneuver into position, and fire 
 
123 There are some notable disagreements on when ‘attack at source’ was abandoned as a key ASW method. 
Palmer (Origins of the Maritime Strategy, 161-67) argues that the offensive focus was lost during the 1950s. 
Hegmann (Richard Hegmann, “In Search of Strategy: The Navy and the Depths of the Maritime Strategy” 
(Doctoral dissertation, Brandeis University, September 1990), passim) makes the case that ‘attack at source’ 
lines of operation were still part of U.S. war plans in the 1960s. 
124 By far the best treatment of these developments and an indispensable take on the subject is: Cote, The Third 
Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, 13-40. On the early organ-
izational history of SOSUS, see also: Gary E. Weir, “The American Sound Surveillance System: Using the 
Ocean to Hunt Soviet Submarines, 1950-1961,” International Journal of Naval History 5, no. 2 (2006). 
125 Ibid., 14-15. 
126 The GHG was not unique to the Type XXI among German submarines, and the detection range was usually 
quite a bit below the maximum. But it was a capable sensor for its time. See Rössler, U-Boottyp XXI, 134-35.  
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acoustic-homing torpedoes at any hostile submarine trying to break out into the open ocean.127 
The immediate results of the Navy’s efforts to bring this concept to fruition were the BQR-4 
passive sonar, which was essentially an enlarged and improved Gruppenhorchgerät, and the K-
1-class submarine. These original hunter-killer submarines (SSKs) were designed to be easily 
mass-produced in case of mobilization – plans called for as many as 970 to combat an expected 
threat of up to 2,000 Soviet Type XXIs, or 250 to go up against a more moderate force of 356 
enemy submarines.128 Like all other postwar diesel submarines in the U.S. Navy, they were 
actually built in small numbers, with an emphasis on testing and evaluation. Three K-1-class 
units were commissioned during 1951-52, and quickly established the validity of the ASW 
submarine concept. While initially designed for this specialized role, advanced passive sonar 
arrays eventually became the primary sensor on all U.S. Navy submarines. As a stopgap and 
additional test case for possible mobilization, seven World War II fleet boats were also con-
verted to carry the BQR-4, starting in 1950.129  
 
127 Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, 14-15. 
Straight-runners like the Mark 16 were also initially used, but success rates would have been very low indeed. 
128 Norman Friedman, U.S. Submarines since 1945: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1995), 75. 
129 Ibid., 80-82. These boats were actually more capable in some respects than the smaller, more simple K-1s. 
See Polmar and Whitman, Hunters and Killers, 91. However, Friedman (U.S. Submarines since 1945, 83) notes 
operational restrictions in severe weather, which forced one of the conversions to operate on the surface dur-
ing a storm. This was due to the increased air intake of the larger power plant, which the snorkel could not 
meet in high sea states.  
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Fig. 10: The original hunter-killer submarine, USS Barracuda (SSK-1), with her unwieldy sonar dome 
containing the BQR-4 array. (U.S. National Archives)  
 
The main disadvantage of these early SSKs was their slow speed, which was a result of their 
smaller, noise-optimized power plants. While a submerged speed of 8-9 knots was acceptable 
for forward ‘barrier’ operations against snorkeling diesel submarines, the VMF’s turn towards 
nuclear propulsion after 1958 largely negated the combat value of the original SSKs. The small 
K-1s – later re-designated the Barracuda-class – also suffered from limited endurance. While 
nuclear power provided a solution to both of these problems, the thoroughbred hunter-killer 
was not meant to compromise its main traits of maximum sonar performance and quietness 
by balancing them against other desirable qualities. In the event, only a single SSKN – the USS 
Tullibee – was built before the concept of specialized hunter-killers was abandoned alto-
gether.130 As Friedman put it, the SSKs “were victims of their own success. The special SSK 
designation was dropped in 1959. From that time, all U.S. attack submarines have had the SSK 
role.”131 
With other nuclear boats as the main threat, the Navy decided that its best option was 
to combine the high speed of the Skipjacks with better quieting and sensors to create the ‘fast 
 
130 She was never actually designated an SSKN, but this was her intended role. See Polmar and Moore, Cold 
War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 153.  
131 Friedman, U.S. Submarines since 1945, 85. Emphasis in the original.  
 
                                              The interdiction threat that never was 
 
    
  [207] 
 
attack’ submarine as we know it. From the Thresher/Permit-class onwards, high operational 
and tactical mobility, much-reduced levels of radiated noise at slow speeds, and excellent sen-
sors were all packed into a single, high-end platform. With at least four times the displacement 
of a Barracuda and a much more complex technological base, these state-of-the-art SSNs were 
large and expensive, and could not be built in very large numbers. That said, as an ASW plat-
form for hunting their nuclear counterparts, they were in a class of their own. The VMF did 
not begin to field similarly well-balanced or lethal designs until the mid-1970s. In the mean-
time, the few ‘fast attacks’ that the Navy could send into battle would have been very unpleas-
ant opponents to deal with. The techno-doctrinal evolution of the SSN force is covered in 
greater detail in the following chapters. 
 
4.4.2 Networked surveillance on an oceanic scale 
The second major element of the postwar ASW complex was long-range, wide-area oceanic 
surveillance, which was again based on rapid advances in passive acoustics. As government-
sponsored research had discovered during 1943-44, the properties of deep water are such that 
sounds – specifically, those in the lower frequency spectrum – will often travel over thousands 
of miles and still remain distinguishable.132 This also implied that the sound source would 
potentially be amenable to categorization and localization. Provided the necessary technical 
capabilities were in place, submarines would be liable to detection over much greater distances 
than any on-board sensor could ever achieve. The Navy’s original intention in funding such a 
system was to do for allied convoys in a Third Battle of the Atlantic what communications 
intelligence produced by Ultra had done during World War II: to identify submarines, and 
gathering wolf packs in particular, early enough to route a convoy around them.133 When it 
became apparent that the Soviets might soon begin using their subs as nuclear delivery vehi-
cles, the need to establish an early warning capability against submarines approaching the 
 
132 Edward C. Whitman, “SOSUS: The "Secret Weapon" of Undersea Surveillance,” Undersea Warfare 7, no. 2 
(2005), https://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/underseawarfaremagazine/Issues/Archives/issue_25/sosus.htm.  
133 Norman Friedman, Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter Through Three World Wars 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 243.  
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North American continent emerged as an even more pressing imperative.134 Fortunately for 
the Navy, scientists had already achieved the necessary breakthroughs by the time this second 
threat began to materialize.  
While the physics of sound propagation in water are highly complex, the key concern 
in filtering out a sound source of interest over long distances is whether a sufficient signal-to-
noise ratio can be attained.135 A combination of very large arrays – about 1000 ft in length – 
with a series of narrowband filters proved very effective in this regard.136 The captured sounds 
would then be converted into visual form for interpretation, using a newly developed tech-
nique known as low-frequency analysis and recording (LOFAR).137 This could be accomplished in 
near-real time. Given the amount of real estate that would be required, static emplacement of 
the arrays on the seabed and of the processing facilities on land was the only viable option, 
with armored cables running between them.138  
The first full-scale hydrophone arrays of what would become the Sound Surveillance 
System (SOSUS) were emplaced off the Bahamas in 1952. A program to cover all of the Eastern 
Seaboard with a series of similar installations began the year after and was expanded to in-
clude the West Coast and Hawaii in 1954. The first of the Atlantic stations was declared oper-
ational in 1954. By the mid-1970s, installations in Iceland and off northern Norway, in the 
Aleutians and – possibly under Japanese control – off Hokkaido, expanded the system’s cov-
erage deep into to the VMF’s main defensive perimeter.139 Each set of arrays had to be paired 
 
134 Whitman, “SOSUS”. 
135 Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, 22. 
136 Ibid. 
137 See Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 177. The 
acronym is also sometimes spelled out as ‘long-frequency analysis and ranging’. Actually, approximate rang-
ing and localization of a contact is often possible through triangulation, whereas a single sensor array will at 
best provide a line of bearing. See Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle 
with Soviet Submarines, 25. LOFAR was also used aboard U.S. attack submarines for classification of contacts, 
but tracking relied on the opponent’s broadband signature. 
138 The cables alone apparently cost 50,000 US$ per nautical mile in the mid-1950s. See U.S. Navy At Cape 
Henlopen, “Terminal Equipment Building of the Navy, Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), Naval Facility 
(NavFac) Lewes,” A Century of Service: The U.S. Navy on Cape Henlopen, http://www.navyatcapehenlo-
pen.info/navfacterminalbuilding.html. 
139 Polmar and Whitman, Hunters and Killers, 126-27. The Japanese had an entirely separate system of hydro-
phones as well. For details on both of these systems, See Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owa-
tatsumi: Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (Acton: ANU Press, 2015), 
doi:10.22459/TO.01.2015, 15-18. 
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with a shore installation, also known as a naval facility (NAVFAC), of which at least twenty-
two were built.140 At those facilities, the captured sound would be processed and recorded 
onto paper charts that displayed frequency content over time. In the case of a submarine con-
tact, noise emitted by the propeller blades and certain types of on-board machinery would 
result in a fairly unique sound signature. Based on recordings of the characteristic narrowband 
sound sources – or ‘tonals’ – emitted by each Soviet and friendly class of submarines, contacts 
could be classified and sometimes tracked for extended periods of time. In time, these skills 
were honed to perfection. As one high-ranking participant remembers: 
“[W]e were able to determine frequency spacing, numbers of shafts on a contact, numbers 
of blades on each of those propeller shafts. If there was a turbine and a blade rate we could 
tell if there was a reduction ratio. If we knew what the ratio was we could pinpoint it to a 
particular submarine class or particular submarine perhaps. We got so good at it from 
1965 up until 1985 that we were able to name the submarines. We had pet names for them. 
Even though they were […] built the same way and had the same reduction ratios and 
the same propulsion systems […] each one had their own unique operating characteristics 
or sources that we were able to detect.”141 
 
If the signature was received by several arrays, which would ideally be spaced far apart, the 
approximate location of the contact could be established by means of triangulation.142 In those 
circumstances, SOSUS could not only provide early warning, but act as a wide-area opera-
tional sensor. In the best case, it would generate engagements by cueing tactical ASW forces 
towards so-called SOSUS probability areas (SPAs), in which an enemy submarine was ex-
pected to lurk. These areas were often quite large – up to 3,000 square nautical miles – but they 
 
140 In his unclassified presentation, Jim Donovan (“Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS),” Unclas-
sified Brief at ASW Seminar hosted by the Submarine League and Naval Historical Foundation IUSS Caesar 
Alumni Association, http://www.iusscaa.org/history.htm, slide 10) gives 22 for the mid-1970s. Polmar and 
Whitman (Hunters and Killers, 127) give a total of 26 known facilities, of which one was lost to a hurricane. 
Several more U.S. installations may have been erected in Japan, but presumably these have not been declas-
sified or were formally under Japanese control. 
141 Naval Historical Foundation, “Ocean Surveillance during the Cold War: Sensing, Fusion, Exploitation” 
(Transcript of the 2010 Submarine Force Birthday History Seminar, Naval Historical Foundation, 2010), 12.  
142 Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, 25; Whit-
man, “SOSUS”; Polmar and Whitman, Hunters and Killers; Naval Historical Foundation, “Ocean Surveillance 
during the Cold War”.  
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nonetheless simplified the search problem to a significant extent.143 Tracking first-generation 
nuclear submarines, in particular, proved to be well within the system’s capabilities. In one 
rather famous instance in 1961, SOSUS maintained a track on the first Polaris-equipped sub-
marine, USS George Washington, on its second patrol – all the way from Norfolk, Virginia to the 
SSBN forward base at Holy Loch on the Firth of Clyde.144 Similar results were attained against 
Soviet ´nukes’ soon thereafter, while diesel submarines – which had been the design basis, but 
which were only intermittently noisy while using their diesels – remained rather more difficult 
to track over long distances.145 
 
4.4.3 Evolutionary change, persistent problems 
This brings us to the final element of the postwar ASW complex. While SOSUS was clearly an 
impressive addition to the ASW toolkit, providing an initial cue was far from sufficient to suc-
cessfully track and potentially sink an enemy submarine. In fact, the hand-off to tactical ASW 
forces at sea proved to be one of the weakest links in the new ASW ‘kill chain’. If contacts could 
not be investigated within a few short hours, the track might well go cold. And even if the 
response was timely, the submarine might never be re-acquired. This put a premium on rapid 
response and, if at all possible, the availability of multiple types of sensors. Attack submarines 
were not particularly suitable for this task: they might not get into an SPA on time and if they 
did, all other forces would have to be held back to avoid friendly fire incidents. In addition, 
SSNs would give away their main advantage of stealth if they had to use their active sensors. 
Surface units similarly lacked the speed to act on intelligence provided by SOSUS in a timely 
manner, but could bring powerful active sonars and a substantial weapons suite to the fight. 
 
143 The role of operational intelligence from other sources in further improving detection and tracking capa-
bilities is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
144 Whether the track was continuous is not evident from any of the known sources, but ‘actionable’ intelligence 
can be gleaned even from intermittent contacts.  
145 Whitman, “SOSUS”. See also: VADM Gerald E. Miller, quoted in: John R. Benedict, “Taking a Long-Term 
Perspective on U.S. Navy ASW Objectives, Capabilities & Trends: Historical Survey & Projections, 1940-2020” 
(Presentation, Monterey, CA, July 23, 2009), slide 116. While the noise from a snorkeler does reach the deep 
sound channel, it may be attenuated by the properties of the water column. And, in any case, it is present 
only at certain intervals that may be separated by many hours, or even days, of silent running on batteries. 
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Aircraft, meanwhile, would be perfectly suitable for the initial search, but might not have suf-
ficient persistence over the search area to carry a prolonged engagement through to the end.  
The solution to this dilemma was of a more evolutionary nature, essentially reprising 
the combined air and surface action that had broken the back of the U-Bootwaffe during 1942-
45. Interestingly enough, the Navy encountered major difficulties in making this work at the 
tactical level. However, before the service could even get to that stage, several technical prob-
lems also had to be solved. The maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), in particular, was in need of a 
new sensor. Radar – which had played a role in many submarine kills from the air during 
World War II – would be much less effective against a diesel submarine that exposed only its 
snorkel, rather than its entire sail and deck, and then only periodically. It would be almost 
completely useless against nuclear-powered opponents. What was required was a sensor, or a 
set of sensors, that could be effective against a submerged opponent from the air. Sonobuoys 
– air-dropped hydrophones with a radio data link – had already seen limited use during 1942-
45.146 The initial postwar attempts to build on that technology had not been particularly suc-
cessful, but this changed once low-frequency processing began to find its way onto patrol air-
craft. With this new capability, detection ranges increased dramatically.147 The method of using 
sonobuoys as a source for narrowband analysis became known as Jezebel. Once the presence 
of a submarine had been confirmed, its approximate bearing could be established with the 
‘time difference of arrival’ method also employed by SOSUS.148 This second method – which 
was effective only as long as the submarine kept snorkeling long enough to drop a precisely 
spaced sonobuoy pattern of four – was known as Correlation, Detection and Ranging (CO-
DAR).149 Finally, a method of using practice depth charges in the manner of an active pinger – 
to bounce an echo off the submarine’s hull – was developed to further narrow down the search 
area. This third technique was known as Julie.150 According to one experienced officer of a 
 
146 They were actually pioneered by the British, but the U.S. Navy was close on their heels. See Roger A. 
Holler, “The Evolution of the Sonobuoy from World War II to the Cold War,” U.S. Navy Journal of Underwater 
Accoustics, 2014, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a597432.pdf, 325-26. 
147 Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, 32. 
148 Owen R. Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarine, 
Newport Papers 16 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003), 32.  
149 This required that two pairs of sonobuoys be dropped in a very precise pattern. See Holler, “The Evolution 
of the Sonobuoy from World War II to the Cold War,” 332-33. 
150 Ibid., 333-34. 
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maritime patrol squadron (VP) officer, “Julie never worked.”151 The complexity of the locali-
zation schema was later reduced as better sonobuoys with directional listening and active 
search capabilities were developed, and helicopter-borne dipping sonars became widely avail-
able.   
Aboard MPAs like the land-based P2V Neptune and the carrier-based S2F Tracker, so-
nobuoys were usually combined with two additional short-range sensors. The more lasting of 
these was the magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), which would register any large metallic ob-
jects blocking out the earth’s natural magnetic field.152 The second, which was dispensed with 
due to atrocious false alarm rates, was an exhaust sniffer designed to trace residual diesel 
fumes.153 In both cases, the aircraft would have to fly a very narrow search pattern to have a 
good chance of detecting a submarine, which made these methods unsuitable for the initial re-
establishment of a SOSUS contact.154 Because sonobuoys could only be carried in limited num-
bers and going through a series of patterns could take quite some time, the cue on which the 
MPA was acting had to be fairly solid already, or there was a good chance that the submarine 
would escape. No such system was in place by 1960, but this would change during the second 
phase of the competition.  
Finally, to increase the chances of holding and effectively prosecuting a contact, the 
idea was to bring surface ASW vessels into the fray as early as possible. The surface Navy’s 
main tools would be quite similar to those already in service – active scanning sonars and 
rocket-propelled ASW weapons. However, it was soon recognized that significant evolution-
ary improvements were required in both areas. Wartime active sonars had been designed for 
use against slow targets and often could not keep the high-submerged-speed diesels fixed in 
their beams. They were as good as useless against Nautilus and her Soviet counterparts. The 
last of the forward-firing depth bomb launchers, Weapon Alpha, had already been designed 
 
151 Naval Historical Foundation, “Ocean Surveillance during the Cold War,” 18.  
152 Louis Gerken, ASW versus Submarine Technology Battle (Chula Vista, CA: American Scientific Corp., 1986), 
604-09. 
153 Ibid., 609. 
154 Naval Historical Foundation, “Ocean Surveillance during the Cold War,” 18-19. 
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with the Type XXI in mind and remained moderately useful.155 That said, the Navy realized 
early on that longer ranges were required for both active sonar and surface-launched weapons. 
The most impressive results were achieved by pairing the SQS-23 active sonar with the Anti-
Submarine Rocket (ASROC) system, which both became operational towards the very end of 
this phase. The engagement range of up to five nautical miles that was achieved by this com-
bination was a twelve-fold increase over Weapon Alpha.156 Its payload of either a Mark 46 light-
weight homing torpedo or nuclear depth bomb also made ASROC considerably more lethal, 
and it remained the surface Navy’s standard ASW weapon for the remainder of the Cold 
War.157 Unfortunately, it did not become widely available until the mid-1960s and took some 
time to make its impact felt in the fleet.  
 
Fig. 11: A Pacific Fleet hunter-killer group centered on the Essex-class anti-submarine warfare carrier 
USS Kearsarge (CVS-33) at anchor in San Diego, 1961. (U.S. Navy)   
 
 
155 Norman Friedman, Modern Warship: Design and Development (Greenwich: Conway Maritime, 1979), 125-
126. However, only a small number of destroyer leaders and destroyers were equipped with this weapon. 
The classic Mk 10/11 Hedgehog of World War II also remained in service into the 1960s.  
156 ASROC had a range about twice that, but the 10,000 yard range of the SQS-23 was the best that any surface 
ship could manage with onboard sensors until the late 1960s. See Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide 
to World Naval Weapons Systems (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 381. 
157 The nuclear-armed ASROC was a controversial system within the Navy but was retained as a backstop 
against the most agile VMF submarines, which it was feared would be able to outmaneuver the Mark 46 
conventional payload. See Linton Brooks, interview with author, 9 May 2016, Arlington, VA. 
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Moreover, even with better sensors and more potent weaponry, the main challenge for the air-
surface team was organizational in nature: coordination was not its strong suit. Exercises in 
the late 1950s cast a dim light on the combined arms performance of the hunter-killer groups, 
which were still the most prominent feature of the Navy’s at-sea ASW effort. As Hegmann 
notes, “[i]n ASW exercise after exercise Navy defensive, tactical ASW proved ineffective in 
stopping submarine simulated attacks on friendly forces. […] Indeed in 1958 it took a HUK 
[hunter-killer group] two and a half days to find one diesel submarine, and that only when the 
submarine finally exposed itself to replenish its air.”158 In other words, even if SOSUS worked 
perfectly and SSKs had exacted their toll on transiting Soviet subs, successfully engaging those 
that did make it to the open ocean remained a challenge. As exercises against Nautilus had 
showed early on, the situation would deteriorate further once the VMF started operating nu-
clear boats of its own.159 Technological progress by itself would not solve the problem: “ASW, 
to be effective, also had to be an integrated art, not only of machines and weapons but of men 
as well.”160 While the Navy understood this well, making the combined arms approach work 
at sea was no easy task.  
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), ADM Arleigh ’31-knots’ Burke at the height of 
his tenure (1955-1961), kept prodding. After he had delivered a famously “unfortunate 
speech”161 on the subject, Burke put RADM John Thach – a famed naval aviator – in charge of 
developing appropriate doctrine and tactical protocols. For two years, Thach’s Task Group 
ALFA hunted friendly subs at sea and came closer to mastering the art than any other postwar 
hunter-killer group had – only to realize that the balance of resources needed to finish off a 
well-handled diesel sub remained unfavorable.162 The expectation that SOSUS contacts could 
 
158 Hegmann, “In Search of Strategy: The Navy and the Depths of the Maritime Strategy,” 287. While this was 
clearly not an impressive performance, it should be noted that a HUK still succeeds in its mission if can hold 
down a diesel for days and eventually force it to reveal itself, at which point it would be attacked and prob-
ably sunk. Hence, this episode serves to demonstrate the limitations of the HUK approach, but not a dramatic 
failure. 
159 Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, 21. 
160 Michael T. Isenberg, Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, 
1945-1962 (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1993), 742. Emphasis added. 
161 Friedman, U.S. Submarines since 1945, 109. 
162 Isenberg, Shield of the Republic, 747. On Task Group ALFA, see also: Thomas D. McGrath, “Antisubmarine 
Defense Group Alfa,” USNI Proceedings 85, no. 8 (1959), 49-55.  
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be finished off quickly and reliably, and surface task forces consistently shielded from subma-
rine attack, could not be met with existing means. Piecemeal attrition would almost certainly 
have defeated the VMF submarine force over time, but hunting submarines in the open sea 
would still be a painful process going into the next phase of the competition. 
 
4.4.4 A threat mitigated, but not defeated 
While it was combined arms ASW that left the Navy most exasperated, it should be empha-
sized that tactical coordination on the surface was not the only limitation of the new ASW 
system. SSKs and SSNs were an extremely scarce asset during 1955-1965, and there were ar-
guably too few of them even thereafter. Moreover, their torpedoes up to and including the 
Mark 37 were essentially designed against the Type XXI threat and far too slow to catch early 
Soviet nuclear subs in most circumstances. Despite modifications, which otherwise improved 
the weapon’s performance, this problem would persist into the early 1970s. Thus, a ‘torpedo 
crisis’ not unlike those experienced by both the U.S. and German navies during World War II, 
in which scores of excellent approaches were foiled by faulty or ineffectual weapons, was a 
genuine possibility.163 Nuclear alternatives – the Mark 45 Anti-Submarine Torpedo (or AS-
TOR) the Submarine-launched Rocket system (SUBROC) – were under development by the 
time this phase of the competition ended, but a satisfactory solution for the torpedo problem 
remained in the distant future.  
SOSUS, for its part, did not provide tactically useful information with any consistency, 
certainly during the first decade of its existence. In the late 1950s, the evaluation centers had 
not even begun building their later library of Soviet submarine signatures, which seriously 
called into question the system’s operational utility at that point in time.164 In fact, the first 
 
163 On U.S. torpedoes during the first phase of the competition, see Thomas Wildenberg and Norman Polmar, 
Ship Killer: A History of the American Torpedo (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 151-54. On the U.S. 
torpedo crisis in World War II, see ibid., 102-114; Robert Gannon, Hellions of the Deep: The Development of 
American Torpedoes in World War II (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 73-94. 
On German torpedo problems, see Eberhard Rössler, Die Torpedos der Deutschen U-Boote: Entwicklung, Herstel-
lung und Eigenschaften der deutschen Marine-Torpedos (Hamburg: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 2005), 83-90. 
164 Polmar and Whitman, Hunters and Killers, 126. 
 
 The interdiction threat that never was 
 
   
 [216] 
 
actual detection of a Soviet submarine did not occur until 1962.165 During the run-up to the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in early October 1962, none of the four Soviet Foxtrots making their way 
towards Cuba were tracked before they had reached the Western Atlantic.166 False contacts 
were produced with mind-numbing regularity even in the 1970s.167 Finally, SOSUS was also 
quite vulnerable to sabotage, and cables were regularly damaged even in peacetime.168 In a 
crisis or the early stages of a conflict, NAVFACs outside U.S. territory – such as those on Jan 
Mayen and off Andenes in Norway, or at Keflavik and Höfn in Iceland – were also attractive 
targets for Soviet air strikes or special operations forces. As a result, important parts of the 
system might have been disabled before the war had even started.169 In a high-intensity sce-
nario, a number of key arrays and installations would probably have been destroyed immedi-
ately to deprive NATO of the continued use of an important force multiplier – be it by con-
ventional or nuclear means. This left early warning of approaching SSBs and SSBNs in a 
prewar setting, and tactical cueing in a strictly limited war as the most plausible missions.   
Despite these valid objections to the ‘big picture’ of a largely successful adjustment 
effort, Cote’s assertion that the Navy “ended up nearly preempting the ASW challenge”170 
posed by the Soviet submarine force remains broadly accurate. This is particularly true in the 
context of actual, as opposed to projected, VMF capabilities at the time. Not only had the Navy 
formulated a comprehensive technological and operational response to the Type XXI threat. It 
was also well on its way to dealing with the even more daunting challenge posed by the first 
generation of Soviet nuclear submarines – all of which were armed with nuclear weapons of 
one type or another – from the late 1950s onwards. While U.S. analysts were almost totally 
wrong about Soviet intentions, the Navy’s competitive adjustments resulted in an ASW com-
plex that would have put the VMF’s long-range submarines squarely on the defensive. There 
is little doubt that they would have been worn down eventually, especially if attempted to 
 
165 “IUSS History,” IUSS Caesar Alumni Association, http://www.iusscaa.org/history.htm. 
166 Benedict, “Taking a Long-Term Perspective on U.S. Navy ASW Objectives, Capabilities & Trends,” slides 
71-72. 
167 According to one source, there were close to 470,000 SOSUS detections in 1968, of which 4,755 were classi-
fied as submarine contacts. The great majority of those were friendlies. The 600 confirmed Soviet contacts 
were split about evenly between diesel and nuclear boats. See Friedman, Network-Centric Warfare, 322, n1. 
168 Polmar and Whitman, Hunters and Killers, 132. 
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operate west of the GUIK gap or in the northeastern Pacific. Whether or not that advantage 
was sufficient to survive in the long run against a succession of increasingly more capable 
Soviet submarines was, of course, another matter. In the next section, we will consider the 
early development of the second key element of U.S.-Soviet competitive adaptation: the use of 
land-based strike aircraft against the U.S. Navy’s mighty carrier force. 
 
4.5 Opening a second front: naval strike aviation  
4.5.1 The deep roots of the carrier-centric offensive posture 
The organizational essence of the Cold War U.S. Navy was the projection of carrier-centric sea 
power in support of U.S. forward security commitments, against a potential adversary situated 
on the Eurasian landmass. Its key advantage, as it was perceived both by the Navy itself and 
by its opponent, lay in the ability to establish and retain access to the European rimlands, and 
utilize them as a staging area for offensive operations against relevant elements and sources 
of Soviet military power. As early as the summer of 1946, “[t]he Navy determined to meet that 
challenge as far forward as possible—in the European and Pacific maritime approaches to the 
Soviet Union.”171 In practice, that meant not just supporting U.S. allies, but also holding Soviet 
territory itself at risk. This “orientation toward the land”172 was at the heart of the transoceanic 
naval posture, as it was described by Huntington. While it was not without alternatives, the 
transoceanic preference reflected the geopolitical realities of the confrontation, as well as the 
grand strategic objectives formulated by U.S. political leaders and civilian bureaucrats.173 How 
the Navy chose to interpret these external demands and the ways in which it would ultimately 
discharge its missions was not at all unrelated, however, to its preexisting priorities and incli-
nations. 
 
171 Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy: The Development of American Naval Strategy, 1945-955 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 30.  
172  Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” USNI Proceedings 80, no. 5 (1954), 
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1954/may/national-policy-and-transoceanic-navy. 
173  See e.g. Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold 
War, 1945-48,” The American Historical Review 89, no. 2 (1984), doi:10.2307/1862556, 346-81. 
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In fact, the basic operational elements of the transoceanic posture were largely in place 
in 1946 – the emergence of the attack submarine as the central ASW platform and the domi-
nance of the nuclear mission by tactical aircraft and submarines being notable exceptions. Yet, 
even these later posture changes were grounded in the well-established missions of a service 
preoccupied with gaining, maintaining and exploiting operational access to the maritime en-
virons of its adversaries’ homelands. The main instrument for both sea control and power 
projection would be the same as during the final years of World War II: the fleet aircraft carrier.  
In fact, we can date the origins of this paradigm even earlier. The U.S. Navy’s offen-
sively-oriented principles for carrier employment were established first in theory and then 
during a long series operational experiments and tests. The basic ideas can be traced back to 
the thinking of CAPT Henry C. Mustin on sea-launched strike operations during 1915-1917.174 
They were expanded, tested, and refined in the major maneuvers known as the Fleet Problems, 
which were conducted on an annual basis from 1923 to 1940. 175 A more systematic, if nonethe-
less very preliminary, approach was developed at the Naval War College during the first half 
of the 1920s. Pierce summarizes some of the most important findings: First, not unlike their 
Japanese colleagues, staff at the college realized that carrier air power would best be employed 
to deliver concentrated “pulses”176 of firepower. Secondly, it followed that the total number of 
sorties that could be launched at any one time would be the decisive factor in inflicting the 
greatest possible damage on the opponent. Thirdly, it was found that the potential of carrier 
airpower would be severely hampered by the short-legged aircraft available at the time – a 
deficiency that was difficult to overcome until the technology had matured considerably.177 
 
174  Jan van Tol, “Military Innovation and Carrier Aviation: An Analysis,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Win-
ter 1997-98, 101-103. Mustin was patriarch to a dynasty of naval officers that continues to this day. It is oddly 
fitting that his grandson, the late VADM Hank Mustin, should have played such a central role in shaping the 
offensive Air-Navy of the 1980s. Admiral Mustin passed away weeks before the author was to interview him 
for this study in the spring of 2016. 
175  Craig C. Felker, Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923-1940, Texas A & M Univer-
sity military history series 107 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2007); Albert A. Nofi, To 
Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2010). 
176 Wayne P. Hughes and Robert Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2018), 84.  
177 Terry C. Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 
125.  
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At the same time, critics contended that carriers would be excessively vulnerable to both aerial 
bombardment and to the big guns of the battle fleet. In a passage that could be lifted straight 
from a policy article written in the 1970s – or, for that matter, the 2010s – British analyst James 
Bates observed a “growing preference”178 for small carriers. This, he argued, was due to the 
fact that “[t]he huge Lexington and Saratoga (33,000 tons), the Kaga and Akagi (26,900 tons) 
and even our Eagle (22,600 tons) Furious, Courageous and Glorious (22,500 tons) are recog-
nized as being unduly large and vulnerable baskets with an overconcentration of eggs.”179 The themes 
of carrier size and vulnerability, concentration of striking power, and the range and composi-
tion of the air wing have dominated doctrinal and force structure debates ever since.  
 
 
Fig. 12: USS Saratoga (CV-3), a supercarrier by the standards of her time, in May 1934. She was torpe-
doed on two separate occasions, struck by five bombs, and hit by three Kamikaze aircraft during 
WWII. As a target during Operation Crossroads, she survived the Navy’s first nuclear test with little 
structural damage and was finally sunk by the second. (U.S. National Archives) 
 
While these debates continued into the late 1920s, the Fleet Problems turned out to be ex-
tremely useful, allowing the Navy to explore the actual potential of naval air power in a num-
ber of operational scenarios. Hence, Fleet Problem I (1923) established a base level of credibility 
for naval aviation as an offensive instrument.180 Fleet Problem V (1925), validated the progress 
the experimental carrier Langley was making and motivated carrier advocates to press for the 
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swift completion of the Lexington-class carriers.181 Fleet Problem IX (1929) saw ADM Joseph A. 
Reeves detach the newly completed Saratoga from the main body of the fleet and launch a 
major independent strike against the Panama Canal, in what is often seen as a signature mo-
ment in the early history of U.S. naval aviation.182 As a result, the carrier-launched strike 
against a key land target was transformed from a theoretical possibility into a demonstrated 
capability less than a decade into the development of the carrier fleet. 
The Navy’s actual carrier doctrine could be considered “relatively advanced”183 by 
1939. While the idea of “employing multiple carriers as the core of a fast-striking force”184 had 
captured carrier advocates’ attention years before Saratoga’s dash to the Canal, few concrete 
steps were taken towards an operational paradigm centered on independent multi-carrier op-
erations. The battleship had lost much of its erstwhile glamour, but its dominance was still 
very much intact at the time. In fact, as the interwar naval arms control regime fell by the 
wayside and the prospect of another world war began to loom, the significant sea powers – 
Britain, Japan, the U.S., Italy, France and Germany – all embarked on another round of com-
petitive dreadnought-building. In the U.S., conceptual work, bureaucratic advocacy, and fleet 
experimentation had already created the possibility of a very different Navy, built around the 
carrier as its new capital ship.185 But it would take the major strategic shock of Pearl Harbor 
 
181 Ibid., 73-82. 
182 Ibid., 109-19. Hughes reminds us that the aftermath was not particularly triumphant: “After launching the 
strike, the Saratoga was found and ‘sunk’ three times – by surface ships, by a submarine, and by aircraft from 
Lexington.” Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 80.  
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Review 66, no. 1 (2013), 57. 
184 Jan van Tol, “Military Innovation and Carrier Aviation: The Relevant History,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Sum-
mer 1997, 85. 
185 The best comparative reviews of U.S. carrier development are Geoffrey Till, “Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: 
The British, American, and Japanese Case Studies,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson 
R. Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 191-226; Thomas C. Hone, 
Norman Friedman and Mark David Mandeles, American and British Aircraft Carrier Development: 1919-1941 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999); Emily O. Goldman, “International Competition and Military 
Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919-1945,” in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. 
Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 158-84; Emily O. 
Goldman, “Receptivity to Revolution: Carrier Air Power in Peace and War,” in Goldman; Eliason, The Diffu-
sion of Military Technology and Ideas; Michael Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences 
for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 65-97. 
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and three long years of all-out naval warfare in the Pacific for this possibility to be fully real-
ized and implemented. The end result was the “institutional apotheosis”186 of the U.S. Navy – 
and with it the offensively-employed fleet carrier.  
 
 
Fig. 13: “Murderer’s Row”: A line-up of fleet carriers – USS Wasp, USS Yorktown, USS Hornet, USS 
Hancock, and USS Ticonderoga – at Ulithi in the Caroline Islands, 8 December 1944. (U.S. National Ar-
chives) 
 
During the final phase of the war, fast carrier task groups of three to five carriers each were 
roaming the Pacific with almost unlimited freedom of action, often as part of much larger task 
forces. Operational concentrations of fifteen to twenty carriers were not uncommon towards 
the end of the war.187 So powerful had the fast carriers become that they could be employed to 
systematically counter Japan’s land-based air power at acceptable cost to themselves.188 
 
186  Peter D. Haynes, Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era (Annap-
olis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 15. 
187 Clark Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy (New York, NY: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 
320-79. 
188 See e.g. Thomas Hone, Norman Friedman and Mark David Mandeles, Innovation in Carrier Aviation, New-
port Paper 37 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2011), 70.  
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Against an enemy who could muster such vastly superior forces, as well as an effective radar-
based defensive system and superior operational intelligence, Hughes and Girrier find that 
“[t]he Japanese might as well have massed their forces and taken their chances, especially in 
1942, when they had numerical superiority and qualitative equality. By 1944 nothing they 
could do mattered.”189 Militarily speaking, the fleet carriers and the vastly complex, tightly 
integrated organizations that had been built around them had become quite literally unstop-
pable. Politically and bureaucratically speaking, they were in danger of bombing themselves 
out of existence. 
 
4.5.2 ‘Attack at source’ implemented 
The threat to the carrier during the late 1940s was much more severe than anything the Japa-
nese or, indeed, the Soviets could muster – but it was not of a military nature at all. Rather, the 
early Cold War history of the U.S. carrier fleet and of the entire concept of the transoceanic 
Air-Navy itself was shaped by cut-throat bureaucratic competition. The Navy found that 
weaponizing the projected Soviet submarine threat in the intense interservice competition of 
1946-1949 was its best hope of securing the future of naval aviation and eking out a meaningful 
nuclear role for itself.190 To make its case, it conflated its undisputed responsibility for keeping 
the sea lanes open with the land-attack capabilities of its carriers, via VADM Sherman’s ‘attack 
at source’ concept.191 Henceforth, carrier air power would be the first line of ASW defense by 
striking submarines in port, their supporting infrastructures, the defensive installations that 
went with them, and the shipyards and industrial plants that built them.192 Because submarine-
related targets were spread across the four fleet areas of the Soviet Union, ‘attack at source’ 
 
189 Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 98. 
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Rosenberg, “American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization: The Navy Experience,” in Mahan is Not 
Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference of the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, ed. 
James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), 245-78.  
191 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1998), 287-89.  
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against the VMF’s submarine arm would involve operations by multi-carrier task forces from 
multiple vectors, with possible concentrations anywhere in the Mediterranean and the North-
ern Fleet area, as well as the Northwest Pacific. To be effective, ‘attack at source’ strikes had to 
begin as early as possible in a conflict, before the Soviet submarine force was flushed out to 
sea. In other words, large parts of the Soviet periphery would come under sea-borne attack 
almost immediately. For the U.S. Navy, the adoption of this concept meant nothing less than 
the survival of its carrier fleet and, hence, the ability to sustain its organizational essence in the 
face of a severe bureaucratic threat from the newly independent Air Force. As seen through 
Soviet eyes, it was a homeland defense nightmare: fifteen or more mobile airfields, each launch-
ing dozens of nuclear strike sorties a day from anywhere within 1,000 nmi of a Soviet coast, 
well-protected, and moving faster than any submarine in the Soviet Navy.193 
Far from being a mere bureaucratic crowbar, ‘attack at source’ was the Navy’s main 
operational paradigm for the use of its carrier forces at least into the mid-1950s.194 Neither the 
limitations of the available systems, nor the practical difficulties of the task would stop a new 
generation of carrier admirals from making naval air power work against the Soviet Union. 
As early as March 1946, USS Midway (CVB-41) was sent into Arctic waters in the aptly named 
Operation Frostbite, to establish that carrier operations were possible in the high north and 
what the limiting factors were.195 Conditions were found to be difficult and the experiment did 
not result in regular deployments north of the Arctic circle but, as a young lieutenant aboard 
Midway observed with undaunted optimism in Proceedings, the temperatures would be even 
lower and the wartime conditions even worse for an enemy who had to operate his aircraft 
from bases on land.196 By November 1948, the basic outlines of the new paradigm had become 
quite distinct. According to a memorandum that was circulated by the Air Warfare section 
under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) (Air): 
“The [carrier] task groups will be used offensively to keep our sea lines of communication 
open. The air groups will destroy enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air, bottle up 
 
193  Even the first vessel of the nuclear-powered November-class that was commissioned in July 1958 was still 
several knots slower than an attack carrier at high speed. See section 5.2.2.   
194 Hegmann, “Reconsidering the Evolution of the US Maritime Strategy 1955–1965,” 310-12. 
195 Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy, 32. 
196  E. B. Salsig, “Operation Frostbite: A Strategic Success,” USNI Proceedings 72, no. 9 (1946), 1199-1204.  
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enemy submarines and shipping by mining, attack enemy submarines and other naval 
forces at sea, disrupt enemy lines of communication, [and] destroy enemy air installa-
tions.”197 
 
The year after, this approach was formalized in a study on “The Future Development of Car-
rier Aviation” – known as the OP-55 study – which we will discuss in greater detail in section 
4.5.4 below.198 As had been hinted at the year before, naval planers were no longer just thinking 
about the presumptive Type XXI threat, but extending the same principles to Soviet land-
based air forces as well. In 1951, the JCS gave the Navy official responsibility for naval-related 
strikes against Soviet land targets out to a radius of 600 nmi from its carrier task forces, as well 
as for the support of U.S. allied ground forces, and prepared a list of ninety-eight Soviet naval 
bases and 287 air bases to target in an air offensive.199 Also in 1951, ONI was circulating a list 
of prospective targets for an air campaign against the Northern Fleet basing areas on the Kola 
Peninsula. The submarine bases at Rosta, Pechenga, Polyarnyy, Iokanga, and Varyenga (later 
Severomorsk) were all described as probable targets, as was the Sevmorput shipyard.200 It is 
likely that the list continued to grow as the Kola was successively turned into a main hub of 
Soviet military strength.201 
It does not come as a surprise, then, that the ‘attack at source’ concept found its way 
into joint war plans, including Plan Dropshot, quoted earlier. The map depicting ‘Naval Air 
Target Coverage’ in the finalized version of Dropshot is reproduced on the next page. Com-
menting on this map, Rose notes “the enormous depth of operations, in which only Outer 
Mongolia and western Siberia would lie beyond the range of naval air power.”202 Although 
the map only shows potential target coverage, not operations, it does demonstrate how much 
progress the advocates of U.S. carrier aviation – seen in its death throes by not a few observers 
only years before – had made at the dawn of the new decade. The Navy had succeeded in 
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making itself and its organizational essence about the Soviet Union, and it was offering a ca-
pability that the Air Force was not. If World War III turned out to be a long war – essentially 
a replay of World War II with the addition of nuclear weapons, as most of the war plans at the 
time still expected it would be – the Navy had an essential job to do and carrier task forces 
would be doing it.203 From an organizational perspective, this was a case of highly successful, 
organic adaptation. In combining outward-looking and bureaucratic imperatives and translat-
ing them into a plan for significant, but evolutionary posture change, is also very much along 
the lines of the organizational behavior that our analytical model would lead us to expect. It is 
also important to note that parallel debates unfolded in Britain and in the NATO context and 
that essentially the same methods were proposed, but the level of actual buy-in on the part of 
the allies remained unclear.204 Thus, for all practical purposes, we should consider ‘attack at 
source’ primarily a U.S. Navy concept.  
To Rose, the Dropshot map also suggests that the Navy’s conception of its role was al-
ready beginning to grow well beyond the original target set in the early 1950s.205 His conclu-
sions are worth quoting at length:  
“Since the heaviest and longest-range aircraft operating from the three Midway battle car-
riers would soon carry nuclear weapons, and an even larger and more capable ‘supercar-
rier’ [the Forrestal-class; MH] was being talked about in the wake of the North Korean 
invasion, the navy might even serve as a complement or supplement to the air force’s 
Strategic Air Command (SAC). Indeed, the navy’s forward-positioned carriers might well 
be better placed to deliver the first heavy nuclear or conventional blows of World War III 
than the air force. 
By 1952, […] most fleet carriers went on global deployments with atomic weapons in their 
bellies and were positioned, if not precisely where Dropshot proposed, then at least close 
enough so that twelve to thirty-six hours’ hard steaming could place them there. The car-
rier was now on the periphery of the strategic-warfare game. Within just a few years, 
Dwight Eisenhower, pursuing his New Look strategy, would formally ratify the carrier’s 
critical role.”206 
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By this time, the institutional and operational importance of the ‘attack at source’ doc-
trine was on the wane, as the at-sea components of the new ASW complex began to fall into 
place and the Soviet submarine threat proved less severe than anticipated. Without access to 
the war planning documents themselves, we do not know whether the forward, offensive el-
ement of U.S. Navy fleet-on-fleet operations was really “lost”207 during this period, as Palmer 
believes it was. Richard Hegmann, for one, disagrees quite vehemently and finds considerable 
evidence of ‘attack at source’ thinking well into the 1960s.208 Given that it eventually reap-
peared with some twists (and a vengeance) in the late 1970s, one might wonder if it had ever 
been truly gone.209 What can be stated unequivocally is that the relative importance of the car-
rier’s strategic nuclear missions increased as the 1950s wore on and that “targets of naval in-
terest”210 might have been less central to the carriers’ operational employment in a general war. 
At the same time, their continued utility was now no longer in any doubt. Ironically, given the 
growing concerns over surface ship survivability in the nuclear age, it was the Navy’s stake in 
the nuclear undertaking that had given the large-deck carrier a new lease on life.211 In political 
terms, the Navy’s responsiveness in Korea probably came a close second, although the idea 
that the limited war mission alone could have sustained a fifteen-carrier Navy in the 1950s 
political-strategic environment is problematic.212  
At the high point of carrier-based strategic deterrence – roughly six months before the 
first Polaris submarine, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598), went to sea in the final days of 
1959 – there were 1,124 nuclear weapons afloat in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the 
 
207 Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy, 82-94. 
208 Hegmann, “In Search of Strategy: The Navy and the Depths of the Maritime Strategy,” 290-331, 460-85. 
209  Palmer was the first one to explicitly make the connection through historical research. See Palmer, Origins 
of the Maritime Strategy, 93-94.  
210 Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals, 115. 
211 See Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, esp. 28-39.  
212 To an extent, this changed in the 1960s and the Navy could not be faulted for emphasizing this aspect, as 
Arleigh Burke and others did at many occasions, even in an environment in which strategic nuclear planning 
reigned supreme. See e.g. Ken Jones and Hubert Kelly, Admiral Arleigh (31-Knot) Burke: The Story of a Fighting 
Sailor (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 185. The fact remains, however, that even in the 1960s the 
limited war rationale could only support a stagnant force structure – and U.S. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 
McNamara was not at all unsympathetic to limited war thinking. As part of a justification for the large carrier 
force the Navy wished to maintain indefinitely, limited wars were an important – but apparently not a suffi-
cient – element in the long term. 
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Pacific.213 In fact, we now know that there were more nuclear weapons aboard U.S. Navy ships 
in 1959 than there were in the entire Soviet armed forces.214 There was also an entirely new type 
of attack carrier under construction: the 90,000 ton, nuclear-powered USS Enterprise (CVAN-
65). In operations off the coast of Vietnam in 1965, she would launch 165 strike sorties in a 
single day.215 At the same time, according to Hendrix’ recent study, the average unrefueled 
range of the carrier air group had increased by roughly 60 percent since 1943.216 Evidently, as 
the U.S. Navy’s attack aircraft turned into capable nuclear delivery vehicles and as the new 
carrier fleet itself was being modernized, the urgency of countering U.S. naval air was taken 
to a different level in the eyes of the Soviet political and military leadership. Something had to 
be done about the carriers – and the best way to quickly counter-concentrate (nuclear) fire-
power against them was with naval aircraft. 
 
4.5.3 Soviet naval aviation: pioneering missile combat 
The instrument that would have to deliver these counter-concentrations of air power was the 
AVMF, with some level of support by Long-Range Aviation forces of the Soviet Air Force 
(Voenno-vozdushnye sily, VVS), if and when they were available for the task. At the time when 
the anti-carrier mission first emerged, in the mid-1950s, Soviet naval aviation was very much 
in a state of flux and not yet in any shape to effectively counter carrier-borne strikes. With 
relatively limited combat experience in World War II, the AVMF had to draw extensively on 
 
213 Department of Defense, “Nuclear Weapons Afloat: End of Fiscal Years 1953-1991,” https://open.de-
fense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/frddwg/weapons_afloat_unclass.pdf, 1. 
214  We get this rather significant insight by cross-referencing Department of Defense, “Nuclear Weapons 
Afloat: End of Fiscal Years 1953-1991” with Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weap-
ons Inventories, 1945–2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 5 (2011), doi:10.1177/0096340213501363, 78. 
215  U.S. Navy, “USS Enterprise (CVN 65),” https://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/histories/cv65-en-
terprise/cv65-enterprise.html.  
216  Jerry Hendrix, “Retreat from Range: The Rise and Fall of Carrier Aviation” (Center for a New American 
Security, Washington, DC, 2015), 19, 27.  
 
                                              The interdiction threat that never was 
 
    
  [229] 
 
foreign experience to find its way in the postwar period.217 Fittingly enough, this meant stud-
ying the U.S. and Japanese performance in the Pacific War above all.218 As this element of the 
Soviet naval posture began to result in a credible, land-based anti-carrier capability, it opened 
up a second front of competitive adaptation that would remain highly active into the 1980s.  
In the late 1940s, the naval strike component of the AVMF was still a force of basic 
torpedo bombers like the Ilyushin Il-4, Tupolev Tu-2, and the lend-lease Douglas A-20 Havoc 
(known as the Boston in the UK and USSR). All of them had originally been meant for the VVS 
and were modified for naval use, as would largely be true of AVMF aircraft throughout the 
Cold War era.219 In the early 1950s, these ageing types were complemented by the first jet-
powered types, the relatively successful Il-28 Beagle and the more problematic Tu-14T Bosun.220 
The weapons of choice for anti-surface warfare at this time were conventional, 450 mmi torpe-
does as well as the rocket-propelled RAT-52 torpedo, which offered a significantly better range 
of 10 kilometers.221 While the concept of the anti-surface torpedo aircraft as such was in its 
twilight days, the aircraft themselves were certainly more capable than World War II-era 
types, with much higher speed and a search radar that would detect a carrier up to 50 kilome-
ters away.222 The well-known limitations remained, however: the aircraft still had to get rela-
tively close and attrition would be high as a result. (The last ever operational use of torpedo 
aircraft took place in 1951 – not against a ship, but against the Hwacheon hydroelectric dam 
in Korea.223) From 1954 onwards, some specialized Il-28 squadrons were nuclear-capable and 
equipped with the 30-kt RDS-40, which is considered the Soviet Union’s first tactical nuclear 
 
217  On Soviet naval air operations during World War II, see Yefim Gordon, Soviet Air Power in World War 2 
(Hinckley: Midland, 2008), passim.  
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(2014), 1-24.  
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weapon.224 In addition, there were a number of mine-layer regiments, which might also have 
had some utility in an anti-carrier scenario. 
 What the AVMF really needed, however, was a weapon that could be fired from out-
side the combat air patrol (CAP) radius of American naval task forces, which would radically 
reduce the level of attrition that the attacking aircraft would suffer and allow regiments to be 
turned around for more attacks. Using high-level torpedo attacks – rather than the low-level, 
close-in attacks that had sometimes resulted in entire squadrons being wiped out during the 
Pacific War – was a start.225 But the attackers would still have to run the gauntlet of an enemy 
task group’s radar-directed defense-in-depth, which was far from perfect in the 1950s, but still 
one of the world’s most dense and most tightly coordinated air defense environments.226 One 
rather promising way to avoid the worst of this potential meatgrinder had been pioneered by 
the German Luftwaffe in the shape of the Hs 293, a rocket-powered, radio-guided glide bomb.227 
Provided that the range of such weapons could be increased substantially, and the guidance 
improved, the attacking aircraft would be able to hit distant targets from outside the range of 
U.S. fleet air defenses. A number of experiments in the late 1940s convinced Soviet engineers 
that this was the direction to go in and eventually produced the first practical, long-range anti-
ship missile (ASM), the KS-1 Kometa (NATO designation: AS-1 Kennel).228 
The Kometa was essentially a ‘miniaturized’ Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 fighter jet that 
had been equipped with a radio command guidance system and a 800-kilogram warhead. 
With an effective range of 90 kilometers and a speed of slightly over 1,000 km/h, it still left the 
launching aircraft exposed to counter-attack while it guided the missile onto the target. 229 But 
 
224  Gordon and Komissarov, Soviet Naval Aviation, 1946-1991, 90. 
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with twenty-five times the range of a standard air-dropped torpedo and a flight time of 
roughly six minutes, where a torpedo attack would result in almost twice the exposure time 
(and to successive defensive layers), it was still a major improvement. The missile was first 
deployed in 1953 and the first aircraft to be armed with it was a modified Tu-4 bomber – a 
close copy of the American B-29.230 This Tu-4K first took off in 1951 and could carry a KS-1 
under each wing, as well as the radar and guidance system, with a combat radius of about 
2,000 km.231  
The Tu-4K served only for a few short years, with one regiment each in the Northern 
Fleet and Black Sea Fleet areas and were actually outlived by their torpedo-carrying predeces-
sors.232 According to a rather well-informed source, “the Soviet government seriously consid-
ered using these aircraft against US Navy aircraft carriers during the Korean War,”233 but this 
could not be conclusively verified. In truth, the Tu-4 was of dubious value as an anti-carrier 
platform even when it entered service. In Korea, the largely identical B-29 had proven so sus-
ceptible to Soviet-made jet fighters that all daylight missions had been discontinued by Octo-
ber 1951.234 While any bomber was bound to be vulnerable to some extent, even when escorted, 
the lumbering Tu-4s would have been easy prey for the new carrier-borne jet interceptors. The 
KS-1 missile itself was found more likely to retain some utility and was kept in service into the 
late 1960s. 
The need for a more capable platform was met by the Tu-16 Badger medium bomber. 
The Tu-16 was one of the most adaptable and successful Soviet bomber designs of the Cold 
War and the naval version remained in service into the 1990s.235 With the missile-carrying Tu-
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16KS entering service in numbers between 1954 and 1958, it quickly became apparent that the 
limiting factor would now be the missile. A new K-1M Kobalt search and targeting radar could 
detect maritime targets up to 180 km away.236 The combat radius of 1,800 kilometers was per-
fectly adequate for what was still an early generation jet aircraft. The cruising speed of 800 
km/h was also satisfactory, although its top speed of 990 km/h was not fast enough to run 
away from contemporary carrier-based fighters and would be vastly inferior to the next gen-
eration of U.S. Navy fleet defense fighters like the F8U Crusader.237 As a result, the Badger would 
also remain quite vulnerable unless its standoff range could be increased further. The fact that 
the KS-1 severely degraded the performance of the aircraft during its attack run, forcing it to 
reduce speed to about 420 km/h and descend to below 4,000 meters to launch the missile, and 
then slow down even further to guide it, only added to the problem.238 It was not lost on U.S. 
intelligence, either.239 Hence, a new weapon was needed for the Badger to realize its potential. 
None of the programs that were undertaken to fulfil that requirement resulted in any actual 
capability before the early 1960s, and we will examine the further development of the AVMF’s 
strike branch in Chapter 5. Finally, it should also be mentioned that the AVMF was still some-
what hedging its bets with regard to missile combat: there was also a more traditional Tu-16T 
version of the Badger, which was armed with up to six standard, 450 mmi torpedoes or assorted 
mines. Along with the AVMF’s own fighter regiments, the torpedo and mining components 
were also shut down during Khrushchev’s stringent defense rationalizations in 1960, leaving 
primarily missile carriers and land-based ASW aircraft.240   
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Ultimately, even the developments of the 1950s left the AVMF a very different organi-
zation – one that would be fighting according to a novel operational paradigm that had yet to 
reach its full potential. Nevertheless, the future implications for the U.S. Navy’s carrier-centric 
posture were clearly significant: “By about 1960 the U.S. Navy considered missile-armed 
‘Badgers’ the most serious threat to carrier battle groups, whose main wartime task was to hit 
Soviet land targets. The carriers could outrun diesel-powered submarines, but not bombers.”241 
Eventually, the submarine and airborne missile threats would begin to converge into a single 
paradigm of tightly orchestrated combined arms operations at sea. This possibility was al-
ready hinted at in a CIA analysis of the Soviet professional military literature from the 1950s 
and early 1960s: 
“The take-off lines for carrier strike aircraft must, under most circumstances, be within 
1,000 nm of the USSR for strikes, even against peripheral targets. Obviously the area 
within the take-off line of carrier strike aircraft is considered the most critical, but it also 
is the area in which the Soviet Navy has at least some current defensive capability. It is in 
this general area that Soviet preemptive strikes against carriers would be made and where 
forces may be continually deployed. Forces that can be employed now to some extent and 
forces that are planned for future employment in this area include reconnaissance aircraft; 
aircraft armed with ASM's; and reconnaissance, torpedo, and cruise missile submarines 
with either nuclear or diesel propulsion. It is principally in this area that joint operation 
of aircraft and submarines will be carried out.”242 
 
While this would clearly complicate carrier task forces’ defense problem, the practical 
challenges of implementing such a paradigm were more formidable than professional mil-
itary science would have us believe. The convergence between submarine and naval air 
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4.5.4 Darkening horizons: carriers versus land-based air 
How would the U.S. Navy’s carrier groups have fared against the first postwar generation of 
Soviet strike aircraft? While it is difficult to provide a conclusive answer, the story of U.S. fleet 
air defense during this first phase of the Cold War at sea is best described as one of consider-
able confidence in the main instrument of transoceanic power projection slowly turning into 
apprehension as 1950s progressed. The original optimism is repeatedly captured in key state-
ments of the ‘attack at source’ concept. The Naval Strategic Planning Study (NSPS) 3 of March 
1947 is fairly typical in that regard: 
“Carrier air power, operating from the highly mobile, self-defending, and self-sustaining 
sea bases embodied in the carrier attack force, is the only weapon in the possession of the 
U.S. which can deliver early and effective attacks against Russian air power and selective 
shore objectives in the initial stages of a Russo-American conflict.”243 
 
 
The background to statements like this is plainly discernible: The U.S. Navy had done it in the 
Pacific during 1944-1945 and would be able to reliably reproduce that success. NSPS 3 is re-
markable, among other things, for stating this logic explicitly. Palmer’s excellent summary is 
worth quoting in full:  
“Based on the Navy’s World War II experiences in the Pacific, [NSPS 3] concluded that 
carriers could operate effectively in the face of quantitatively superior Soviet air power. 
The Pacific war demonstrated that mobility, concentration, and surprise were the key to 
successful carrier operations. Naval air accounted for 68 percent of the Japanese planes 
destroyed during the Philippines campaign, most of them on the ground. Land-based 
aircraft were less effective. Carrier planes carried a lighter bomb load but delivered ord-
nance with greater precision than land-based bombers. In addition, lack of forward air 
bases would characterize a Soviet-American war, just as it had the Japanese-American 
struggle.”244 
 
The Navy’s assessment of the air threat tracks followed a similar pattern as those in the ASW 
area: the next war, it was assumed, would be fundamentally the same as the last one. In the 
Pacific, carrier task forces had become highly effective at wearing down the adversary’s land-
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based air power at acceptable cost to themselves. By concentrating the defensive strength of 
several carriers in close proximity, they had eliminated the offensive advantage the Japanese 
had enjoyed at the outset of the war.245 Ultimately, even Japan’s embrace of Kamikaze attacks 
– essentially saturation raids using “human missiles”246 – could not overcome carrier defenses 
with sufficiently high success rates to make a real difference. According to one postwar study, 
there were 2,550 Kamikaze sorties during the Philippines and Okinawa operations, of which 
CAP fighters downed 45-50 percent and anti-aircraft guns destroyed between half and two 
thirds of those that made it through the CAP screen. This still left 453 to inflict hits and near-
misses, but not a single fleet carrier was sunk by Kamikaze.247 
With this in mind, it is unsurprising that ADM Sherman felt the carriers could and, 
indeed, should be sent in “harm’s way”248 in a war against the Soviet Union, much like they 
had been against a capable opponent only a few years before. And it is difficult not to credit 
Sherman’s assessment. As was the case with many of his fellow naval officers in OPNAV and 
in the fleet, his was a view based not just on historical analyses, but also on his personal expe-
rience as a participant. The ability of a carrier task force to survive in the face of determined 
attacks against it lay not in any of its individual elements, but in the system of task group oper-
ations the U.S. Navy had developed – and, on balance, that system had performed extremely 
well. Sherman had seen it in action against the IJN – indeed, he had himself wielded it as Nimitz’ 
key operations planner. Now he and other veterans of fast carrier operations in the Pacific 
were confident that it could be successfully wielded against the Soviet Union as well. What is 
more, he was almost certainly right about that in 1947. Of course, the carrier would always be 
vulnerable to some extent. Sherman’s own command, the USS Wasp, had been torpedoed out 
from under him by the Japanese submarine I-19 in September 1942. But a carrier group was an 
instrument of war – it was meant to be sent into harm’s way. The risks could be minimized to 
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such an extent that they would be bearable, but they could never be eliminated. And they were 
bearable if experienced carrier admirals were willing to bear them. 
 
 
Fig. 15: USS Essex (CV-9) is struck by a Kamikaze during operations off the Philippines, 25 November 
1944. She lost 15 of her crew in the attack. A testament to the robustness of the 24-ship class she led, 
and of U.S. fleet carriers more generally, she was back in the fight three weeks later and continued to 
serve in the active force until 1969. No Essex-class carrier was lost to enemy action. (U.S. National Ar-
chives) 
 
At the same time, however, important aspects of warfare were changing rapidly, as the Navy 
well understood. What remains remarkable about the entire set-up proposed in NSPS 3, the 
OP-55 study and other documents of the time, is the implicit assumption that the VMF would 
let U.S. carrier groups steam into the Barents Sea to lay waste to its bases with nuclear weap-
ons, but would not itself use tactical nuclear weapons against a set of suitably isolated military 
targets at sea. There is an air of implausibility about this, given that the U.S. Navy of the late 
1940s and the 1950s had no compunction about using tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) exten-
sively and early in a conflict, but the idea remained strangely constant. In fact, the same as-
sumption still figured prominently in the Maritime Strategy debates of the 1980s. Although 
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we cannot know for certain what the Soviet threshold for the employment of TNW at sea was, 
this was almost certainly a misunderstanding of Soviet ideas about operational art and nuclear 
warfighting – and one that a new generation of carrier admirals might have paid dearly for.249  
The Navy’s argument was about more than recent history and carrier vulnerability, 
however. It was also an argument about the service’s carrier-centric organizational essence, 
about still being the right kind of Navy in a new era. The Op-55 study made this case very ex-
plicitly: 
“Carrier aviation must retain the bulk of its strength in offensive power if it is to support a 
truly offensive Navy rather than a defensive one. Our Navy must carry out numerous 
functions other than defensive antisubmarine warfare and must possess the self-con-
tained ability to move at will and wage offensive war against the enemy in the air, on the 
surface and below the surface.”250 
 
As if to confirm that a carrier offensive was not only the proper thing to do, but also urgently 
necessary, they made the case that land-based aircraft would actually be a more severe threat 
to NATO’s SLOCs than submarines and had to be dealt with immediately in case of war.251 To 
understand the bureaucratic and interservice dimensions of this story, it is worth considering 
how the Navy’s most forceful competitor, the Air Force, viewed carrier operations. Jeffrey Bar-
low provides a short synthesis of various Air Force criticisms of the effectiveness of carrier air 
power during this period: 
“1)  aircraft carriers are highly vulnerable to a variety of attacks by an enemy’s air force  
 and submarines; 
 2) carriers would be unable to operate in waters within range of a first-rate land- 
  based air force; 
 3) carrier aircraft are inherently inferior to land-based aircraft in range, speed, and  
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Ball, “Nuclear War at Sea,” International Security 10, no. 3 (1985), doi:10.2307/2538940, 8-10, 27-28. This was 
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  combat capability; 
 4) carrier aircraft lack the requisite range to hit significant targets in the interior of a  
  large land power; 
 5) the weight of a bombing effort that a carrier task force could employ against land  
  targets is relatively insignificant.”252 
 
Of course, evidence can be adduced to support or undermine any and all of these criticisms. 
The point here is not to evaluate them in detail, but to illustrate the divergence of informed 
perspectives on the issue – a valuable demonstration of Miles’ Law in public administration, 
according to which “where you stand depends on where you sit.”253   
Meanwhile, the Navy’s own studies and exercises were a source of increasing concern 
as the 1950s wore on. There were several new problems for fleet air defense in a world of jet 
aircraft, anti-ship missiles, and nuclear weapons that could not be reduced to the same old 
formulae that had served late-World War II carrier concentrations so well. To counter massed 
air attacks, the carriers still had to be concentrated. But if nuclear attack was a possibility, they 
had to be dispersed. CAP fighters were now faster, but also had lower endurance, there were 
fewer of them and “none of the possible solutions using fighters was leakproof.”254 The first 
air defense missiles – the medium-range Terrier and Tartar, and the long-range Talos, collec-
tively known as ‘3 T programs’ – would start coming into the U.S. fleet in greater numbers in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s.255 But, as yet, they were far from being an effective missile age 
equivalent to the countless anti-aircraft (AA) guns of a World War II fast carrier task force. 
Work had also begun on the much more advanced Typhon program – in some ways a precursor 
for the Aegis system – but it would take years to be fielded (and, as we will see, was eventually 
cancelled).256 
 
252  Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals, 121.  
253 Barton J. Bernstein, “Understanding Decisionmaking, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 
Review Essay,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000), doi:10.1162/016228800560417, 156; Rufus E. Miles, “The 
Origin and Meaning of Miles' Law,” Public Administration Review 38, no. 5 (1978), doi:10.2307/975497, 399-403.  
254 Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet, 310.  
255  See Norman Friedman, “The '3 T' Programme: Part 1 and 2,” in Warship: Vol. VI, ed. John Roberts (Lon-
don: Conway Maritime, 1982), 158–166, 181–185; Marion E. Oliver, “Terrier/Tartar: Pacing the Threat,” Johns 
Hopkins APL Technical Digest 2, no. 4 (1981), 256-60; William Garten and Frank Dean, “Evolution of the Talos 
Missile,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 3, no. 2 (1982), 117-22.  
256 Milton Gussow and Edward C. Prettyman, “Typhon – A Weapon System Ahead of Its Time,” Johns Hopkins 
APL Technical Digest 13, no. 1 (1992), 82-89.  
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In addition, the defender could now also rely on electronic warfare to counter guided 
weapons like the KS-1, which opened up new and – at this stage – largely unprecedented pos-
sibilities for the defense.257 But while this field would experience explosive growth over the 
next several decades, there is little mention in the literature of electronic countermeasures be-
ing implemented at this stage.258 Thus, even the rudimentary Kometa ASM still stood a good 
chance of doing serious damage. In one scenario of a Soviet attack involving KS-1 missiles, the 
Navy’s Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) estimated that surface-to-air missiles would 
shoot down only three out of fifty attacking planes, with CAP fighters accounting for ten oth-
ers, and fifteen out of a notional 100 missiles.259 The end result would be a devastating 29 mis-
sile hits on the task force, all by missiles that could best be described as basic.260 All was not 
well with the Navy’s new model air defenses – and the AVMF’s strike forces still had a number 
of unpleasant surprises up their sleeve. 
 
4.6 Summary   
At the end of the first period of the Cold War at sea, the Soviet challenge to Western sea control 
was slowly picking up steam. Clearly, here was a landpower that intended to balance against 
the naval capabilities of the Western alliance in earnest and with a significant investment of 
resources. Yet, if anything, the U.S. Navy was in a stronger position to counter the VMF’s main, 
submarine-centric effort than it had been when the challenge first took shape a decade earlier. 
Several factors explain this somewhat puzzling outcome. First, it is important to realize that 
the threat submarines posed to the SLOCs was readily understood on both sides of the Atlantic 
and that the response in this case did not depend on the outcome of any lengthy debates about 
the nature or potential gravity of the threat. While the U.S. Navy ended up adjusting to the 
 
257 Karl Lautenschläger, “Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare,” International Security 8, no. 2 
(1983), doi:10.2307/2538594, 39-40. 
258 In his excellent case study work, Solomon mentions EW “soft-kill” systems optimized against the Tu-16s 
radar guidance system but does not date this development, nor do any of the other sources that were con-
sulted. Jonathan Solomon, “Defending the Fleet from China's Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: Naval Deception's 
Role in Sea-based Missile Defense” (Master's thesis, Georgetown University, 15 April 2011), 45. 
259 Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet, 311. 
260  Ibid. 
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Soviet submarine program for the wrong reasons, this would seem to partially account for the 
fact that the adjustment process was relatively smooth during the early phase of the Cold War 
at sea. Secondly, the USN could also feed off its wartime ASW effort, which included a strong 
basic research component. The postwar development of a lasting advantage in passive acous-
tics rested on some of the preliminary findings drawn from that research. Thirdly, the overes-
timation of the VMF submarine fleet’s potential for offensive operations, based on inaccurate 
assumptions about its purpose, led to a stronger techno-doctrinal reaction than an accurate 
understanding of the problem would have supported. This also meant that avenues of devel-
opment that might otherwise have encountered greater bureaucratic resistance – such as the 
shift towards hunter-killer submarines as a leading element of the ASW program – were vig-
orously pursued early on. Finally, the idea that the VMF was dead-set on cutting NATO’s life-
line across the Atlantic also supported an early focus on ASW against nuclear-propelled sub-
marines, which promised to upset the existing equation of undersea warfare. As a result, the 
Navy was already planning against this even more serious threat before it ever materialized.  
Along with Soviet techno-doctrinal and force design choices that appear questionable 
with hindsight, this combination of factors set the U.S. Navy on a path towards long-lasting 
superiority in undersea warfare. While historical contingency undoubtedly played an im-
portant part in realizing the underlying advantages, the complex relationship between inac-
curate – but bureaucratically convenient – threat perceptions and reactions at the level of ASW 
posture goes a long way towards explaining the unequal footing on which the two navies 
entered the decisive second phase of the competition. At the same time, the U.S. reactions to 
the Soviet submarine threat were such that they were almost certain to exacerbate the security 
dilemma at sea, thus fueling further feedback loops over the following decades.  
This is particularly true with regard to the ‘attack at source’ concept, which was 
adopted not only because it was considered an effective response to the submarine threat, but 
for bureaucratic reasons, including its consistency with the organizational essence of the car-
rier-centric Navy that had been spawned by the exigencies of the Pacific War. Given the strong 
focus on striking Soviet territory from the sea early in a conflict, the security dilemma logic 
applied here with particular force. At the same time, however, the threat posed by the carriers 
to the Soviet homeland could still be countered using relatively conventional naval means. 
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While a specialized, submarine-based element of the anti-carrier effort only began to emerge 
during the 1960s, we can already see the outlines of that reaction in the development of Soviet 
naval air forces.  
Here, a different picture emerges – one that still very much allowed for a future in 
which carrier survivability would be reduced to such an extent that forward operations would 
become very difficult to justify. It is certainly fair to say that, by the end of this first phase, the 
U.S. side had not found a remedy that offered anything like the long-term, theater-wide po-
tential of SOSUS or the frightful level of ASW capability that the fast attack submarine pro-
vided at the platform level. Typhon might have come close, but its price tag was ultimately 
much more impressive than the capabilities it provided, and its cancellation meant that U.S. 
fleet air defenses continued to fall short of their requirements. Thus, it was not until Aegis made 
its appearance in the fleet in the mid-1980s that surface ships came as individually capable vis-
à-vis AAW threat they faced as SSNs were vis-à-vis their much less impressive Soviet coun-
terparts. However, as was the case in both battlegroup and wide-area ASW, the U.S. advantage 
in AAW ultimately lay in the system, rather than the platforms themselves. In 1960, the U.S. 
Navy’s AAW system for the missile age looked considerably more fragile than the slowly so-
lidifying ASW system. As we will see, that fragility eventually abated and the threat from 
missile-firing aircraft and submarines remained manageable. Why this was the case, and how 
the VMF’s submarine fleet developed from a zone defense force into the main element of a 
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5.1 Naval advantage and the search for security in the nuclear age  
Following the U.S. Navy’s head start into the nuclear age, the VMF did not lose a lot of time 
catching up. By 1958, it had launched its first nuclear-powered submarine, essentially still with 
the same four-year lag that had attended the Soviet Union’s military nuclear program since 
the mid-1940s.1 The breakneck speed inevitably came at a cost: the first generation of Soviet 
nuclear submarines was famously unreliable and accident-prone, killing scores of sailors over 
the decades.2 While human and material casualties both occurred far more frequently than in 
the U.S., this was clearly seen as an acceptable price to pay while the calculations of Soviet 
military planners continued to revolve around the imperative of homeland defense. Unavoid-
ably, this imperative took on even greater significance as Soviet decision-makers began to 
grapple with the implications of the nuclear revolution. The second phase of the competition 
thus resulted in a modulation of the original security dilemma at sea, in which an expectation 
of large-scale Soviet submarine construction had given rise to the ‘attack at source’ doctrine, 
 
1  Raymond P. Ojserkis, Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race: The Truman Administration and the U.S. Arms 
Build-Up (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 150. 
2  For a complete overview of Cold War naval nuclear accidents involving these (and other) Soviet subma-
rines, see P. L. Olgaard, “Accidents in Nuclear Ships” (NKS/RAK-2(96)TR-C3, NKS/Nordic Nuclear Safety 
Research, Roskilde, 1996). There is no comparable resource covering non-nuclear accidents, which tend to 
draw comparatively little attention, but it is understood that a number of such accidents also occurred. 
 





which in turn vindicated the VMF’s belief that a large submarine fleet was necessary to defend 
the homeland. During the 1960s, U.S. naval power projection very much remained at the center 
of Soviet force development, but the VMF now felt that it potentially could – and, indeed, had 
to – counter the U.S. Navy’s offensive edge by targeting nuclear-armed aircraft carriers long 
before they reached their launch points. As we will see, this might also have included attacks 
on U.S. naval bases with sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). When the first Soviet missile 
submarines went to sea, the VMFs mission structure began to reflect this additional, more of-
fensive approach to counter-projection operations. Meanwhile, the largest share of the VMF’s 
resources for submarine construction went towards direct anti-carrier defense rather than nu-
clear strike missions. Hence, even as the Soviet approach to naval warfare became more am-
bitious in the 1960s and early 1970s, it essentially remained what it had always been: territorial 
defense at sea. 
Concurrently, the U.S. Navy continued to prepare for a Third Battle of the Atlantic, 
with the unpleasant addition of potential nuclear strikes from submarines against its home 
territory. With the technological breakthroughs of the 1950s coming to full fruition, the service 
became more capable in wide-area ASW than ever before. SOSUS proved highly effective 
against early nuclear designs, which produced high noise levels constantly, where diesel-elec-
trics had been noisy only intermittently.3 Moreover, from the early 1970s onwards, the data 
the evaluation centers produced was fed into an all-source operational intelligence system that 
was not only more effective in tracking submarines, but less vulnerable under wartime condi-
tions. With better cueing, a growing number of ‘fast attacks’ operating off enemy submarine 
bases and a fleet of ever more capable MPAs cutting down on reaction times, attrition rates 
were set to go up considerably. This would not only have relieved the expected pressure on 
the SLOCs, but also on the organic anti-submarine defenses of the offensively-oriented carrier 
battle groups (CVBGs), which were often lacking. Carrier vulnerability to submarine attack 
remained a factor, but clearly not enough of a factor to deter the U.S. Navy from experimenting 
with – and eventually adopting – even more offensive employment options towards the end 
 
3  Owen R. Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarine, 
Newport Papers 16 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003), 21. 
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of this phase. As a result, we can conclude that the reliance on missile- and torpedo-armed 
submarines as part of the VMF’s approach to counter-projection warfare, did not ultimately 
succeed in altering its opponent’s operational preferences. 
The Soviet failure to change its opponent’s calculus is only partly attributable to the 
U.S. Navy’s success in maintaining and further developing an increasingly dense and capable 
system for wide-area ASW. The competition in AAW also played a critical part in the eventual 
outcome. If the VMF had managed to stay ahead of its opponent in this field by introducing 
supersonic anti-ship missiles and survivable strike aircraft early on, and integrating them into 
a robust ISR and targeting infrastructure, as indeed it planned to do, the utility of the U.S. 
surface fleet would have been called in question to a much greater extent than ultimately was 
the case. This was particularly true after the Typhon failed to materialize and the U.S. Navy’s 
ship-borne air defenses continued to rely on upgraded versions of the first-generation, ‘3 T’ 
type systems into the 1980s. However, because technology development in this area of the 
competition was marked by considerable difficulties on both sides, the missile threat to the U.S. 
fleet remained at manageable levels. This is not to say that those missile-carrying strike aircraft 
and submarines that the VMF did deploy could not have inflicted grievous losses – including 
in some conventional-only scenarios. However, short of nuclear use, the relative fragility of the 
VMF’s fledgling reconnaissance-strike complex meant that countermeasures could be de-
signed with relative ease and that the AAW competition remained more balanced than it might 
otherwise have been. As a result, the carrier battle group model remained viable    
An area in which the U.S. Navy soon found itself comfortably ahead, meanwhile, was 
the reliance on SSBNs for strategic deterrence. This brings us to the most important change in 
Soviet naval posture, which occurred towards the end of this second period – one that flowed 
from the VMF’s inability to replicate its modest success in countering the carrier as a nuclear 
delivery platform in the field of anti-SSBN defense. As a result of this failure, the only option 
that remained open to it was to counter the U.S. Navy’s sea-based nuclear weapons not with 
classical naval means but by making sure that its own SSBNs could strike the American home-
land even while they remained securely ensconced in Soviet-controlled near-seas areas. While 
 





the resulting ‘bastion’ concept has been discussed at length elsewhere, the origins of that sys-
tem and the context in which it emerged will be covered in some detail in this chapter. 
 
5.2 A new kind of rivalry 
5.2.1 Outlines of the future sea-based deterrent 
The advent of nuclear propulsion brought with it a radical change in the submarine’s combat 
potential. The most fundamental fact of life of diesel-electric submarine operations – the steep 
trade-off between speed and endurance imposed by limited battery capacity – no longer ap-
plied. The availability of unlimited energy, up to the fixed design output of the power plant, 
also meant that oxygen and freshwater could both be extracted directly from the undersea 
environment. As a result, the nuclear submarine did not depend on the surface for the entire 
duration of its patrol, with the important exceptions of communications and tactical recon-
naissance, which were voluntary to some extent. As a result, the turn towards nuclear energy 
was an all but inevitable step for any power that wanted to seriously challenge the United 
States Navy at sea. Given the myriad of challenges that had to be overcome to construct a 
nuclear submarine that would not kill its crew in short order, the Soviet industrial base com-
pleted this turn in the shortest possible time and, by Western standards, cut too many corners 
in the process. The breakneck speed with which the shift to nuclear propulsion was accom-
plished nonetheless had an important long-term effect: the VMF remained viable as an under-
sea competitor for the following decades, despite the lower technical standard of its first- and 
second-generation nuclear submarines. However, before this nuclear turn would fully mate-
rialize, the VMF had to contend with an even more consequential innovation: the prospect of 
delivering nuclear weapons from a submarine platform against targets in the enemy’s home-
land. Together, these two developments would eventually reshape the Soviet Navy’s way of 
doing business and fundamentally change the complexion of the Cold War competition at sea. 
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But, as yet, that change was still a long way off and the challenges that would have to be over-
come were formidable.  
In August 1949, the USSR became the second nation to successfully test an atomic 
weapon – in this case, the RDS-1 implosion bomb with a yield of 22 kilotons. This demon-
strated nuclear capability was to remain an “existential”4 deterrent vis-à-vis the United States 
for years to come. Despite speculations about one-way missions using the Tu-4A, the VVS did 
not have an intercontinental-range delivery system available until the mid-1950s.5 It also 
lacked the forward bases the U.S. Strategic Air Command could depend on. It was in this sit-
uation that the VMF first began to make inroads with regard to capturing a portion of the 
nuclear strike mission. Breemer believes that the development of early SLBMs was initiated 
more or less in parallel with the first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs.6 
Whether the submarine was actually seen as a practical intercontinental delivery system by 
Party leaders during this first phase is more difficult to establish.7 What we do know is that, in 
September 1955, the VMF became the first navy in the world to launch a ballistic missile from 
a submarine. The missile was an early Scud derivative designated the R-11FM, with a range 
of perhaps 80-100 nmi, and the submarine in question was a Zulu – one of six that ended up 
serving as in the PLRB (Povodnaya lodka raketnaya ballisticheskaya or submarine with ballistic 
missiles) role, instead of in their original anti-surface patrol capacity. By comparison, the U.S. 
Navy did not launch the first UGM-27A Polaris missile from the USS George Washington until 
June 1960, but Polaris established an immediate technological lead of about ten years once it 
came online. 
 
4  An existential deterrent is one which does not derive its effect from being operationally postured, but from 
its presence alone. See Marc Trachtenberg, “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 
International Security 10, no. 1 (1985), doi:10.2307/2538793, 139.  
5  Steve Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2014), 15-16. 
6 Jan S. Breemer, “Estimating the Soviet Strategic Submarine Missile Threat: A Critical Examination of the 
Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastion Strategy” (Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, 1987), 48.  
7 Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword, 54. 
 





Armed with only two of the short-range R-11FMs, which had to be launched from the 
surface, the modified Zulu Vs provided a very modest level of capability.8 Nonetheless, the 
VMF had been the first to put to sea a ballistic missile submarine that could theoretically 
launch against targets in the continental United States. To expand on this success, a dedicated 
SSB was derived from the Foxtrot design. The resulting Project 629 or Golf-class added one 
more missile tube and would carry a much larger, 350 nmi missile known as the R-13 (SS-N-4 
Sark). With twenty-two Golfs built between 1958 and 1962, this would be the second largest 
class of Soviet ballistic missile submarines.9 The ASW problem posed by these boats was in 
line with their patrol-type sisters, meaning that they were actually more difficult to detect than 
early nuclear submarines, but could be hunted to exhaustion once a good track had been es-
tablished. They did not, by any reasonable standard, provide a secure second-strike capability, 
nor were they intended to do so – a point that will be elaborated on below. That said, the U.S. 
Navy could not be completely confident to sink all of them before they could launch, which 
meant that they would still have weighed on U.S. decision-makers’ minds if deployed in a 
crisis.  
The VMF was also initially neck and neck with the U.S. Navy in cruise missile devel-
opment, but technical and bureaucratic setbacks resulted in repeated delays. The USN had 
initially adopted the German V-1 design and tested a reverse-engineered version of it – the 
KUW-1 or Loon – from submarines during 1947. The Navy’s desire to field a cruise missile that 
could carry a nuclear warhead as soon as possible resulted in the Regulus missile and its su-
personic follow-on, the Regulus II.10 The Navy eventually commissioned four conventional and 
 
8  Zulu II-IV were slight variations of the original patrol-type boats. See Norman Polmar and Jurrien Noot, 
Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 283-84. 
The R-11FM’s small 10-kiloton warhead in combination with its large circular error probable (CEP) also se-
verely limited its utility against military targets, although there may have been a 500-kiloton version as well. 
Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 309-12. As will be dis-
cussed below, this limitation was more relevant in the context of Soviet views concerning SLBMs, which were 
substantially different from those developed in the West.   
9  If the Delta I-IV are counted as subclasses of the, they relegate the Golfs to third place.  
10  David K. Stumpf, Regulus: The Forgotten Weapon – A Complete Guide to Chance Vought's Regulus I and II 
(Padacah, KY: Turner, 1996). A much more advanced ramjet design, known as Rigel, was also tested but dis-
carded.   
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one nuclear-powered Regulus submarines between 1953 and 1960, but the surface-launched 
cruise missile (SLCM) compared unfavorably with Polaris and did not last long in U.S. service.  
 
 
Fig. 16: Like its Hotel-class nuclear counterpart, the Golf-class carried three ballistic missiles in its elongated 
sail. After the switch to longer-range missiles and a much larger, Western-style missile battery in the Yankee, 
these early ballistic missile submarines were reassigned to the theater nuclear strike mission. (U.S. National 
Archives)  
 
Early cruise missile development for the Soviet Navy followed a broadly similar path that 
might have led to an operational missile several years earlier, had it not been littered with 
bureaucratic complications.11 After experimenting with several V-1 spinoffs that proved un-
satisfactory, Soviet engineers eventually ended up with a relatively simple turbojet design as 
well.12 Like Regulus, the weapon that eventually made it to sea was an unwieldy, inaccurate, 
 
11 Norman Polmar and Kenneth J. Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet 
Submarines (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004), 93-94. 
12 Polmar claims that the Soviets also worked on a ramjet missile program that failed, much like Rigel. Ibid., 
94. However, Lardier and Baretsky, in their history of Vladimir Chelomey’s missile designs, describe the 
10XN as nothing more than a land-based version of the 10X, which was the Soviet V-1 copy. See Christian 
Lardier and Stefan Barensky, Proton Launcher: History and Developments (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2018), 5-
12. According to this account, the twin-engine version Polmar refers to was the 16X, and all of these missiles 
were powered by technologically much less impressive pulse-jets, much like the V-1. The First Secretary’s 
younger son, Sergei Khrushchev, who worked for Chelomey, states as much in a fairly recent interview. See 
Slava Gerovitch, Voices of the Soviet Space Program: Cosmonauts, Soldiers, and Engineers who took the USSR into 
Space (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 67-76. 
 





surface-launched, nuclear-armed missile designed for use against land targets. Designated the 
P-5, or SS-N-3c Shaddock in NATO parlance, it exchanged the longer range of its American 
counterpart for (barely) supersonic speed and had a more streamlined launch procedure, but 
also an even more primitive guidance system.13 The launch platform was a Whiskey with a 
single deck-mounted launcher for testing, and later with two such launchers or four launch 
tubes integrated into the outer hull.14 A total of thirteen such conversions were undertaken. 
The missile itself was first tested in 1957 and introduced in 1959 – five years behind Regulus. 
Like Regulus, it served in a frontline role for only a few short years. By this time, however, the 
U.S. and Soviet ‘technology trees’ had diverged radically. Whereas Regulus spelled the end for 
the original Navy cruise missile program, the P-5 went on to serve as the basis for one of the 
pivotal weapon systems of the VMF: submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).   
 
5.2.2 HENs: the vulnerable first generation 
As far as sea-launched nuclear weapons were concerned, the VMF’s next step was to combine 
its two early missile systems – the R-13 and the P-5 – with the advantages of a nuclear-powered 
launch platform. In fact, all three of the first-generation nuclear boats were originally envi-
sioned as long-range nuclear delivery systems, which was reflective of the national defense 
priorities at the time. Designated the Hotel-, Echo-, and November-classes by NATO and sharing 
the same VM-A reactor, they are often collectively referred to as the ‘HENs’. Built in their basic 
configuration15 between 1958 and 1964 they remained the most capable opponents Western 
ASW forces had to face into the late 1960s. The November-class, known as Project 627 to its 
designers, was actually the earliest of these designs. Taking a fairly courageous approach to 
technology development, the first serial production of Project 627A was laid down before the 
prototype went to sea in June 1958. As Jordan observes, “all the technological eggs were placed 
 
13 Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 94-95. 
14 These variants were known as Single-Cylinder, Twin-Cylinder, and Long Bin, respectively.  
15 The modified Echo II-class remained in production until 1968.  
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into a single untried basket.”16 The result was an imperfect submarine with a troublesome pro-
pulsion plant, but one that was still superior to Nautilus and the subsequent Skate-class in most 
respects. With its twin reactors and novel hull form, the November was considerably faster – 
though not quite fast enough to keep pace with a Skipjack – and could also comfortably dive to 
1,000 ft.17 The retention of a double hull was not ideal in other respects but it did result in better 
survivability.18 The Soviet engineers had furthermore even made a serious attempt at noise 
reduction.19 All in all, the pre-series Leninsky Komsomol (K-3) and the twelve production boats 
that followed represented a remarkable achievement for the Soviet defense industry and the 
VMF.  
That the Novembers made decent patrol submarines is all the more noteworthy because 
they had not been designed as such. Their original mission was to carry a single thermonuclear 
torpedo – the gargantuan T-15 – which was designed for use against enemy naval bases.20 
Whether this made it an ‘attack at source’ weapon or an interdiction weapon is a matter of 
interpretation. In any case, the VMF rejected this as the main mission for its first class of nu-
clear submarines, with ADM Kuznetsov himself stating its case. As a result of his vehement 
intervention, Project 627 was redesigned to carry a standard torpedo armament for use against 
surface targets.21 While its original role was that of a ‘missile sub’ of sorts, it thus ended up as 
the nuclear-powered heir to the Zulu. As such, it had little in common with the new breed of 
 
16 John Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present (London: Arms and Armour, 1989), 49. While the obser-
vation as such is accurate, he is incorrect in suggesting that the prototype stage was skipped altogether and 
that the reactor was not tested before being installed. According to Polmar’s later research, a full-scale power 
plant was installed at the Obninsk nuclear facility, about 100 km southwest of Moscow. See Polmar and 
Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, p. 73. The Victor III-
class submarine K-138 was later named after the town.  
17 The much higher efficiency of U.S. submarine designs even at this early stage is evident from the fact that 
the November translated the 36,000 shp provided by its two reactors into a speed of perhaps 30 knots at full 
power, whereas the Skipjack got 33 knots out of single-reactor, 15,000 shp propulsion plant.  
18 Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 52-53. 
19 Polmar and Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990, 165; Polmar and Moore, Cold War 
Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 74-75. 
20 Ibid., 72. The concept of the Russian Status-6 nuclear-armed drone that is said to be under development 
makes for an interesting comparison here. See e.g. Matteo Natalucci, “Russia completes testing of ‘Poseidon’ 
thermonuclear torpedo,” February 20, 2019, https://www.janes.com/article/86583/russia-completes-testing-
of-poseidon-thermonuclear-torpedo. 
21 Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 76.  
 





U.S. Navy ‘fast attacks’ that were already being built during the same phase of the competition. 
Most notably, the Novembers did not have a well-established ASW role. Their passive sonar 
was half a decade or more behind the BQQ-2 installed in the contemporaneous Thresher-class.22 
The performance of the anti-submarine homing torpedoes they carried for self-defense was 
even less confidence-inspiring than that of their Western counterparts.23 Finally, despite their 
designers’ best efforts, they were still roughly 15 decibels – i.e. by a factor of 30 – louder than 
the Thresher/Permit-class when operating at tactical speeds of 6-8 knots.24 As a result, they were 
much more easily detectable in most circumstances, and would have been less likely to coun-
ter-detect a U.S. submarine – even with a passive sonar of roughly the same quality.25  
Because the November was for the most part required to operate against enemy surface 
task forces, whose noise levels were another order of magnitude higher and which would 
 
22 It may be noted that the Novembers were designed years before the 594 class, but in operational terms the 
objection is beside the point: both designs went to sea during roughly the same period. Concerning Soviet 
sonars, Friedman’s assessment that the MG-10/Trout Cheek set was still a direct development of the late-war 
German sets seems plausible. See Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to 
Net-Centric Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 362. Zelyakh’s statement in the History of 
Russian Underwater Acoustics that the Soviet hardware of this era was “in no way inferior in its tactical char-
acteristics to sonars of western countries” (465) is an interesting counterpoint. But as far as passive sonar is 
concerned, repeated encounters between U.S. and Soviet submarines tell a different story. V. E. Zelyakh, 
“Submarine Hydroacoustic Equipment: Hydroacoustic Systems for Submarines of the Pre-World War II and 
First Post-War Generations,” in Godin; Palmer, History of Russian Underwater Acoustics, 455-70. 
23 The SET-53, which was the only submarine-launched ASW weapon available between 1958 and 1964, could 
not catch up with any U.S. nuclear submarine, except perhaps from an extremely favorable ambush position. 
See Weaponsystems.net, “Type 53 Torpedo,” Weaponsystems.net, http://weaponsystems.net/weaponsys-
tem/HH14%20-%20Type%2053.html. The source’s criticism of its 100 kg warhead seems less justified, seeing 
that most light-weight ASW torpedoes have an explosive charge about half the size. Even if the damage in-
flicted amounts ‘only’ to a mission kill, this will still result in the loss of the submarine – though perhaps not 
its crew – in most wartime situations.  
24 See Tom Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 
1987). The reference here is to the broadband noise signature, which is most relevant for passive submarine 
detection, whereas LOFAR was used for classification. Polmar and Moore (Polmar and Moore, Cold War Sub-
marines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 75) state that the November “was considered 
to be” as quiet, or as noisy, as a Whiskey or Zulu using electric motors when running at “medium speeds.” 
Unless the latter had extremely loud electric motors or the reference is to a fully cavitating diesel-electric 
motor, this (presumably) Soviet perception may have been seriously inaccurate. Perhaps the noise level was 
about equal in some part of the frequency spectrum, but as a statement about Project 627’s broadband noise 
signature it is difficult to credit. The fact that Antonov, Marinin and Valuyev (Alexander Antonow, Walerie 
Marinin and Nikolai Walujew, Sowjetisch-russische Atom-U-Boote: Gefahr aus der Tiefe (Augsburg: 
Bechtermünz, 2000), 14-15) make the same claim almost verbatim may reflect a honest conviction to this effect, 
but its merits remain dubious. 
25 See Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy, 273-79. 
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mainly have used active sonar for detection, this was probably not seen as major handicap 
within the Soviet frame of reference at the time. From the American perspective, the Novembers 
were an obliging target for SOSUS and the submarine-mounted passive arrays that were com-
ing online just as the first of the Soviet nuclear boats were going to sea. The Navy leadership 
had not expected this to happen before the early 1960s, but the new threat had been anticipated 
and the capabilities necessary to deal with it were, for the most part, already being put in 
place.26 
The next design to reach operational status was Project 658, the Hotel-class, which was 
built around the November’s reactor plant and the Golf’s missile compartment. With a retro-
grade hull form to give it sufficient stability while surface-launching its missiles, this design 
was otherwise unremarkable.27 Its hull form slowed the Hotel down to 26 knots, but it could 
easily outrun any diesel-electric hunter-killer. This might well have been an essential skill in a 
wartime scenario: like all early Soviet nuclear submarines, the Hotels were about as noisy as a 
snorkeling diesel at slow speeds, and their noise level was at least an order of magnitude higher 
than that when they sprinted.28 In other words, being detected was only a matter of time – a 
disadvantage that would only become more lethal as Western passive sonar technology got 
better and better. Like Project 627As, they were able to operate at depths of up to 1,000 ft, 
which would at least have allowed them to reduce cavitation noise, if they did have to ‘run 
away’ at high speed.29 Whether the dubious build quality of these submarines would have 
allowed them to stand up to such abuse for very long is another matter. An interesting defen-
sive feature was the installation of additional 400 mmi tubes for ‘small-bore’ anti-surface and 
ASW torpedoes, with two each in the bow and stern. The main purpose of these ‘fire-and-
 
26  Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 79.   
27   Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 63.  
28 According to a Navy source, the HENs produced about 160 db of broadband noise at low speeds and in 
excess of 170 db at 13-15 knots, which is still only about half the Hotel’s flank speed. See Stefanick, p. 277 n30. 
For the audiophile reader, a very rough comparison with decibel values in the air is obtained by subtracting 
62 db from the values in water, which are calculated according to a different reference unit (1 micropascal @ 
1 yard).  
29 Jan S. Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design, Development and Tactics (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1989), 
104.  
 





forget’ weapons would probably have been to focus the mind of a pursuing vessel’s com-
mander, while the SSBN made its escape.30 
Besides its noisy and famously accident-prone machinery, the main operational limi-
tation of the Hotel was the missile it carried.31 While the 350 nmi range of the R-13 was an 
improvement over the even less impressive R-11FM, the boat’s chances of survival against a 
fully alerted ASW screen off the U.S. coast were still marginal. Weinland states flatly that, as 
of January 1963, the Soviets had to contend with the fact that their SSBN fleet “could be pre-
vented from striking the American continent by U.S. ASW forces.”32 The possibility of a capa-
ble skipper with steady nerves sneaking in an effective strike certainly could not be dismissed 
out of hand.33 But given that the missile itself was largely invulnerable in flight, using a vul-
nerable platform to carry it over more than 90 percent of its distance to target was clearly a 
solution that left much to be desired. To their credit, the Soviet planners began to correct this 
flaw during the production run, and seven of the eight Hotels were upgraded to carry the sub-
merged-launch R-21 (SS-N-5 Serb), which also doubled the range to 700 nmi. The same missile 
system was installed on fourteen Golf-class submarines during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
How exactly U.S. submarines and surface hunter-kill groups would have performed 
against the combined Hotel, Golf, and Zulu V threat is a scenario-dependent question we ulti-
mately do not know the answer to. Unless an attack was executed as a ‘bolt from the blue’ by 
a small number of boats that had slipped past multiple lines of SOSUS arrays, the U.S. ASW 
 
30 Friedman believes the emphasis was on anti-surface defense, while Jordan states the case for an ASW role. 
See Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, p. 54. Contrary to Jordan’s account it was later discovered 
that the 400 mm tubes had not been installed on the Novembers. SSBNs and nuclear-powered, guided cruise 
missile submarines (SSGNs) had a need for self-defense weapons against submarines as well as surface hunt-
ers, so it stands to reason that both would have been carried, according to mission requirements. 
31 While serious nuclear and non-nuclear accidents occurred on several Novembers and Echos as well, Project 
658’s first-of-class K-19 has had a unique impact on Western popular culture by having both a book written 
and a movie made about the tragic 1961 loss-of-coolant accident that was responsible for her nickname: Hi-
roshima. The movie was the 2002 Hollywood effort K-19: The Widowmaker, directed by Kathryn Bigelow. The 
book is: Peter A. Huchthausen, K-19: The Widowmaker (Washington, DC: National Geographic Society, 2002).   
32 Robert G. Weinland, “The Evolution of Sovet Requirements for Naval Forces: Solving the Problems of the 
Early 1960s” (AD-A123 655, Center for Naval Analyses, Center for Naval Analyses, 1982), 23. 
33 The reaction time of the missile system was apparently a very moderate six to eight minutes from a pre-
alerted state, which would have given ASW forces little time to catch the submarine on the surface. See Fed-
eration of American Scientists, “R-13 / SS-N-4 SARK,” Federation of American Scientists, 
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/slbm/r-13.htm.  
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complex that was in place by the mid-1960s could have inflicted significant levels of attrition 
before they reached their launch areas. Even more importantly, MPAs could have rendered 
boats equipped with the R-13 and R-11FM ineffective simply by flooding areas containing sus-
pected submarine contacts with their search radars to deny them the opportunity to launch 
from the surface. The submerged launch capability and better reach of the upgraded Hotel IIs 
and Golf IIs made the simultaneous defense against them a much more serious challenge. At 
the very least, the effective denial of launch opportunities could no longer be assumed and the 
strategic value of these early missile subs increased accordingly. As will be discussed below, 
Soviet operational doctrine reflected this increase in capability fairly accurately, with a few 
years of lag time. 
Lastly, there was the submarine that was designed around the P-5 cruise missile: the 
Echo-class PLARK (Povodnaya lodka atomnaya s raketami krylatymi; atomic submarine with 
winged missiles). A very distinctive design known to its creators as Project 659, it also retained 
the conservative hull form but had six canister-launched missiles stowed horizontally within 
its broadened deck casing, and deep notches serving as blast deflectors. Its submerged perfor-
mance was roughly comparable to the Hotel’s. The unusual design resulted in additional flow 
noise, but this was probably not a major concern given the high base level of machinery noise.34 
Like the other first generation ‘nukes’, the Echo was an excellent target for the passive acoustics 
ASW regime the U.S. Navy had developed in response to the Type XXI. As a missile platform, 
it suffered from the same limitations that plagued the Hotels, Golfs, and Zulu Vs: a surfaced 
launch procedure that exposed it to World War II-style ASW measures, and a missile with 
insufficient standoff range. However, while the deficiencies of the ballistic missile subs could 
be partially corrected by equipping them with a new weapon system, no such remedy was 
pursued for the Echo and the program was terminated after five units. Had the VMF not been 
an area defense navy to the bone, this might have closed the curtain on the Echo’s contribution 
to Cold War history. As will be explored in detail below, it was instead modified to become a 
mainstay of the anti-carrier concept – and by far the most numerous of the HENs. 
 
34 Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 96-97. 
 





5.2.3 Building a nuclear projection force – but to what end? 
Before we move on to explore the rise of anti-carrier warfare and the U.S. Navy’s reactions to 
it, the rebalancing of new submarine construction in favor of land-attack types during c. 1955-
1961 requires that we address a weighty question: if the Soviet Navy’s main missions were 
defensive in nature, how exactly does the nuclear strike mission fit into the picture? The an-
swer involves sorting through some controversial issues based on incomplete evidence, but it 
can basically be broken down into three main components: early-Cold War military require-
ments, mid-1950s political pressure, and doctrinal specialization along service lines. Once 
these dynamics had played out and the basic course for the development of the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear forces was locked in, the Navy had to settle for a very limited share of the nuclear 
strike mission, which was closely related to its defensive tasks. It had to wait for another dec-
ade before a new role for its SSBNs as a countervailing deterrent and secure reserve force 
started to gain acceptance, and even longer until it could deploy capabilities to match this 
burgeoning ambition.  
The first factor in the VMF’s early shift towards land-attack was the pressing need in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s to break the U.S. monopoly not just on atomic weapons, but also 
on long-range delivery – and to do so as quickly as possible. To this end, the submarine was 
seen as a viable nuclear weapons carrier along with strategic bombers and future land-based 
missiles.35 As is often the case in cutting-edge technology development, the earliest attempts 
at constructing a submarine with land-attack capability failed.36 As we have seen, the same 
was true of the T-15 nuclear torpedo program, which the VMF rejected towards the end of 
Kuznetsov’s tenure as Glavkom. Other programs inevitably took a number of years to come to 
fruition. For example, the basic concept for the short-range R-11FM missile was proposed 
shortly after Stalin’s death, and the missile became operational roughly five years later, in 1959. 
 
35 Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), 
94-95. 
36 See Lardier and Barensky, Proton Launcher, 11-12; Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and 
Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 94. The former source includes two interesting drawings of the 
early P-2 and re-equipped K-class SSGs, which the author has not seen elsewhere.  
 
                                              A shield and spear for the motherland 
 
  
  [257] 
 
Thus, the first set of land-attack capabilities that came online in the 1955-1961 timeframe was 
a result of the initial search for a suitable means of delivery to turn the products of the Soviet 
nuclear weapons complex into a credible warfighting capability.37 
A second factor in the VMF’s shift towards land-attack – and, indeed, the bureaucratic 
containment of its nuclear role soon thereafter – was the consolidation of political power in the 
hands of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CPSU), Nikita 
Khrushchev. As we have seen in Chapter 4, Khrushchev was fervently committed to the notion 
that any future military confrontation with the United States would take the form of a nuclear 
missile war and went to great lengths to foist his vision of war upon the Soviet armed forces. 
Given the inner workings of the Soviet system at the time – in which the formulation of mili-
tary doctrine could still be directly impacted by the top echelon of the CPSU, and the Party 
leader in particular – this had an almost immediate (if only temporary) skewing effect on the 
national military strategy.38 While we do not know that the VMF was literally fighting for its 
bureaucratic survival during this period, it was unquestionably under intense pressure to 
 
37 Soviet planners did not come around to the Western view of atomic weapons possessing deterrent capabil-
ities that are distinct from their warfighting properties until much later in the confrontation. Khrushchev is 
now generally credited with having moved the Soviet Union closer to the ‘assured destruction’ paradigm. 
What is often conveniently forgotten is that his views were rolled back again beginning in 1961. A recent look 
at Khrushchev’s effort to come to terms with the nuclear revolution is: Campbell Craig and Sergey Rad-
chenko, “MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the Nuclear Revolution,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, 1-2 (2018), 
doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1330683, 208-33. On the reversal in 1961, see Michael MccGwire, “Soviet Military 
Doctrine: Contingency Planning and the Reality of World War,” Survival 22, no. 3 (1980), 
doi:10.1080/00396338008441887, 110-11. 
38 See, e.g. Sergei Chernyavskii, “The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions,” Journal of Strategic Stud-
ies 28, no. 2 (2005), doi:10.1080/01402390500088346, 291. The notion – wide-spread in contemporaneous West-
ern publications – that the CPSU directly held sway over military doctrine throughout the Cold War period 
is inappropriately simplistic. Rice, in her excellent account of the rise of the General Staff in Soviet military 
decision-making, sees Khrushchev’s deep involvement in professional military matters as heralding the twi-
light of this system based on “personalistic intrusions” (64) by political leaders. She argues that his initiatives 
were met with considerable bureaucratic resistance even at the time – although he still got his way where 
major decisions like the establishment of the RVSN (Raketnyye voyska strategicheskogo naznacheniya, or Strategic 
Missile Forces) were concerned. See Condoleezza Rice, “The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in 
the Soviet Union,” World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987), doi:10.2307/2010194, 55-81. As Hudson shows, frictions be-
tween the Party, VMF, and Army views were ripe even at the time. See George E. Hudson, “Soviet Naval 
Doctrine and Soviet Politics, 1953–1975,” World Politics 29, no. 1 (1976), doi:10.2307/2010048, 91-94. 
 





demonstrate its relevance under Khrushchev’s scheme.39 The extremely rapid pace of techno-
logical change made the political pressure all the more difficult to deflect. That the nucleariza-
tion of the VMF was promoted only by a “small group of dissidents,”40 as Hudson claims, 
frankly defies belief under the circumstances of the late 1950s. 
In fact, it was eminently sensible for the Navy leadership to reframe the service’s 
techno-doctrinal trajectory in terms of the new strategic direction. We know that the Glavkom 
did not share Khrushchev’s vision of future war and considered it detrimental to the VMF’s 
interests.41 But even a less astute bureaucrat than Gorshkov might have realized that paying 
tribute to the First Secretary’s “mania for nuclear missiles”42 would help him shore up the 
VMF’s tenuous standing within the defense system. It was only from a position of relative 
strength in this field that he could make the pitch for a more balanced building program a few 
years later, in 1962:  
“Modern submarines and missile-carrying aircraft comprise the principal striking forces of 
the Navy and are the essence of its power. Yet, there must be other forces besides the long-
range strike forces both for active defense against any enemy within the limits of the defense 
zone of a maritime theater and for the comprehensive support of the combat and operational 
activities of the main striking forces of the Navy.”43 
 
 
39 There were influential advocates of abolishing the VMF, including Marshall of the Soviet Union and Min-
ister of Defense (during 1955-57) Georgy Zhukov, but how close they ever came to achieving this aim is less 
clear. See Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy, 1956-1986 Vol. 1 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 2003), 89-91.  
40 Hudson, “Soviet Naval Doctrine and Soviet Politics, 1953–1975,” 97. His insistence (on p. 95) that Gorshkov 
was not a Party man is equally dubious. The Glavkom’s opposition to the scrapping of the Sverdlov-class cruis-
ers, which Hudson adduces as evidence, was a simple act of bureaucratic politics that had little to do with 
his loyalty to the Party, or lack thereof.  
41 Even after Khrushchev’s death, Gorshkov never named the disgraced First Secretary and Chairman, who 
had hoisted him to his position. But in his magnum opus as a theorist, The Sea Power of the State, he makes short 
shrift of the ‘modernist’ strand in Soviet strategic thought, which sought to systematize the primacy of the 
‘nuclear missile war’: “[I]n our country, too, military research circles put forward extreme views, boiling 
down to a denial of the role of the separate branches of the armed forces and arms systems. The possibility 
of the fleet operating at sea was also denied and hence the country's need for it. […] Misunderstanding of the 
character of modern warfare and the influence on it of nuclear missile weapons and blind genuflexion to the 
‘omnipotence’ of the atomic and hydrogen bombs led to a tendency for the armed forces to develop in a one-
sided way.” See S. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979), 158. 
42 Herrick, Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy, 1956-1986, 79. 
43 Quoted in: Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1968), 74. 
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While this was an important realization, the Golf-, Hotel-, and Echo-class construction programs 
that were brought to the realization stage during this period, along with the R-13 and P-5 mis-
sile programs, only went so far.  It would be another decade before Gorshkov’s Navy could 
field a sea-based intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that was roughly on a par with 
Polaris in its original A1 version – and even then, the lack of forward bases and the U.S. Navy’s 
superior ASW system meant that it did not provide comparable capabilities.44 
Ironically, the same set of ideas that accelerated the shift toward nuclear-propelled and 
nuclear-armed submarines during 1955-1959 effectively stunted the VMF’s prospects of play-
ing a bigger role in the strategic nuclear mission soon thereafter. In 1959, Khrushchev founded 
a new branch of the Soviet armed forces with explicit responsibility for nuclear missile strikes: 
the Strategic Missile Forces (Raketnyye voyska strategicheskogo naznacheniya, or RVSN).45 The 
Navy’s inability to provide a sufficient level of intercontinental capability with its first gener-
ation systems probably contributed to the decision to vest this mission in the RVSN in its en-
tirety.46 Given that the ability to hold at risk targets deep inside U.S. territory was its raison 
d’être and its only bureaucratic selling point, the new service branch had every reason to jeal-
ously guard its roles-and-missions turf against any intrusion from the VMF and VVS. Whereas 
the Strategic Air Command (SAC) ultimately had to “co-opt”47 Polaris and sought to control it 
by way of its dominant influence in the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, the RVSN was 
more successful in staving off the bureaucratic threat posed by sea-launched missiles and man-
aged to repeatedly “repel the Navy’s assault on the [its] deep-strike citadel.”48 This began to 
 
44 On how the U.S. Navy engineered this major lead in sea-based nuclear strike, see Owen R. Cote, “The 
Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The U.S. Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles” (PhD thesis, MIT, 1996); 
Graham Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Pro-
grammatic Success in Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).  
45 On the early history of the RVSN, see Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 144-47. 
46 Michael MccGwire, “Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy,” International Security 3, no. 4 (1979), 
doi:10.2307/2626766, 165.  
47 Fred M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 263.  
48 Robert W. Herrick, “Soviet Naval Mission Assignments: Part 1. Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike” 
(ADB082797, Ketron Inc. for the Assistant Director for Net Assessment, Navy Program Planning Office, Ar-
lington, VA, 1979), vi. On Polaris integration, see David A. Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear 
Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” International Security 7, no. 4 (1983), doi:10.2307/2626731, 60-65. 
 





change only in the late 1960s, when the VMF’s next-generation SSBNs were increasingly seen 
as an important reserve force.49 In the meantime, the VMF’s assets appear to have been treated 
as a largely separate resource to attack targets of direct relevance to its accepted core missions. 
This brings us to the third factor of the shift towards offensive land-attack weaponry 
during 1955-1961. As had been the case with the Type XXI threat, Western analysts had a ten-
dency to mirror-image the functional profile of Soviet SSBNs, turning them into a “doctrinal 
replica”50 of the Polaris force. The U.S. Navy, and in time an increasing number of political 
players from President Eisenhower downward, thought of Polaris submarines as a ‘finite’ de-
terrent that should be deliberately withheld from an initial nuclear exchange.51 In this view, 
the SSBN force was nothing more and nothing less than a priceless insurance policy against a 
disarming first strike. At the same time, for bureaucratic reasons, Polaris submarines were part 
of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for general nuclear war and in the early 1960s 
would actually have been used alongside or even ahead of SAC bombers in the initial strike 
against the Soviet Union.52 Leaving aside the obvious incongruity between the theory of finite 
deterrence and the practice of tasking Polaris to blast Soviet air defenses in the first minutes of 
a nuclear war, Western analysts had an understandable propensity to think of the role of Soviet 
SLBMs as corresponding to either the one or the other.  
 
49 McConnell’s case for a withholding posture from the early 1970s onwards is convincing and a much better 
fit with the changing capability profile of the SSBN fleet than Herrick’s case for an essentially static posture 
even after 1974, when the Deltas began to join the fleet. See James M. McConnell, “Military-Political Tasks of 
the Soviet Navy in War and Peace” (Professional Paper No. 148, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA, 
1976), 2-3, 17-23. 
50 Breemer, “Estimating the Soviet Strategic Submarine Missile Threat,” 70. 
51 The best overview of the development of Navy views on ‘finite deterrence’ from primary sources is: William 
Burr, “"How Much is Enough?": The U.S. Navy and "Finite Deterrence",” Electronic Briefing Book No. 275 
National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb275/index.htm. 
52 On inflexibility in the SIOP with regard to Polaris targeting, see Kaplan, To Kill Nations, 160-61. We do not 
know for certain which targets Polaris was to be used against in the early SIOPs, but we know there were no 
withhold options for Polaris in the 1962 and 1963 iterations of the SIOP. Interestingly enough, there was a 
withhold option for naval air in SIOP-63. See William Burr, “"It Is Certain There Will be Many Firestorms": 
New Evidence on the Origins of Overkill,” Electronic Briefing Book No. 108 National Security Archive, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB108/index.htm. We also know that even SECDEF McNamara’s 
‘assured destruction’ scheme, which embraced Polaris as the primary countervalue weapon, 25 percent of 
Polaris missiles would still have been used against counterforce or counter-military targets. See Kaplan, The 
Wizards of Armageddon, 319.  
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In actual fact, the VMF’s early ballistic missile submarines may have been neither a sec-
ond-strike force nor a part of the main alert force designated to deliver an initial blow against 
‘strategic’ targets in the United States. While there is an array of evidence to support the theory 
that the SSBN force eventually developed into the Soviet version of an assured deterrent be-
ginning in the late 1960s, there is little to suggest that this shift occurred much before that.53 
And in his exhaustive study of SSBN-related Soviet sources for Op-96, Herrick also found “an 
overkill of flatly contradictory evidence to refute the view that Soviet SSBNs have [as of 1979], 
or ever had, a share in the initial deep strike against continental U.S. targets.”54 Rather, they 
were initially tasked with striking a naval target system that was seen as largely separate from 
the RVSN’s main strategic targets, and to provide some additional firepower for later strikes 
or re-strikes. To add insult to bureaucratic injury, duplications of effort appear to usually have 
involved the RVSN striking naval-related targets, rather than the VMF striking ‘deep’ strategic 
targets.55  
While there is limited evidence on this count, it appears that the target system assigned 
to the VMF until the late 1960s was largely made up of two categories: enemy naval forces in 
 
53 The chief advocate of the idea of a Soviet SSBN withholding strategy admits as much, although he was not 
100 percent consistent on this point. See James M. McConnell, “The Interacting Evolution of Soviet and Amer-
ican Military Doctrines” (Professional Paper No. 412, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 1980), 28-
29. This role was qualitatively different from the ‘nominal back-up’ role Herrick identifies from the mid-1960s 
onwards, in which the SSBNs would basically have served as a re-attack capability for the RVSN and long-
range air forces, or a numerical reserve if the main strike forces ran out of warheads to put on target. See 
Herrick, “Soviet Naval Mission Assignments,” 42-43, 141-42. Significantly, the Soviet Union never even 
claimed a secure second-strike capability until 1974, when the third generation of Soviet SSBNs armed with 
the intercontinental-range R-29 were beginning to come online. See Weinland, “The Evolution of Soviet Re-
quirements for Naval Forces,” 35. 
54 Ibid., v. I rely on this source quite extensively here, because it is by far the most thorough examination of 
the evidence bearing on pre-1970s Soviet SSBN targeting by a leading scholar, despite its imperfections. While 
Herrick worked from open sources, declassified contemporaneous assessments like NIE 11-15-74 are far less 
convincing in their exposition of the logic behind Soviet SSBN targeting and appear to largely mirror-image 
U.S. concepts. See Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Naval Policy and Programs, December 23, 1974, CIA His-
torical Collection, TOP SECRET (declassified 3 February 1996), 9-14. 
55 See Herrick, “Soviet Naval Mission Assignments,” 24-25, 98. Looking beyond the VMF-RVSN rivalry, even 
the missile artillery of the Ground Forces saw an opportunity to partake in the defense against Western naval 
assets and argued its case in Voennaya mysl in the late 1960s. See Central Intelligence Agency, Military Thought 
(USSR): The Rocket Troops of the Ground Forces in Combat with Naval Targets, May 7, 1974, CIA Historical Col-
lection, TOP SECRET (declassified 16 June 2017). 
 





port, and their supporting infrastructure of naval bases and facilities.56 The main focus of the 
PLARB force (Podvodnaya lodka atomnaya s raketami ballisticheskimi, or atomic submarine armed 
with ballistic missiles) appears to have been on carrier battle groups at anchor, which arguably 
would have made it first and foremost an anti-carrier asset during this period.57 As we will 
see, both carriers and Polaris SSBNs were considered highly important targets in terms of re-
ducing the nuclear threat to the homeland. Because strikes against CVAs and SSBNs in port 
could be framed in terms of both fleet-on-fleet combat and nuclear counterforce, it is unsur-
prising that the RVSN was also assigned the same mission.58 A third category of targets was 
more discretionary and included coastal targets, for which the RVSN had primary responsi-
bility but which could also be struck by SSBNs in some circumstances.59 There is some evidence 
to suggest that this subset of targets – which included terminals of shipborne commerce – was 
linked to the possibility of conducting a secondary anti-SLOC campaign, which we will exam-
ine later in the chapter.60 Even though a final assessment of SSBN targeting during this phase 
would have to be based on authoritative Soviet sources, Baer’s qualification that it “was not 
part of a sea-control challenge”61 appears difficult to uphold on closer examination. 
While the VMF’s partly involuntary emphasis on nuclear targets of unambiguous na-
val interest may seem surprising from a 21st century vantage point, it is worth noting that the 
U.S. Navy had once thought about both Regulus and Polaris in much the same way, before it 
went on to develop the finite deterrence concept.62 Had ADM Burke been less successful in 
 
56 Herrick, “Soviet Naval Mission Assignments,” 24-25, 96. 
57 Ibid., 98. 
58 The overlap is also implicit in the basic offensive/defensive mission structure, which MccGwire derives 
from Sokolovskii and other “evidence available.” MccGwire, “Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy,”, 142-
143. 
59 Herrick, “Soviet Naval Mission Assignments,” 26-28. The reality was that the VMF did not really have a 
capability to strike anything other than coastal targets until about 1967, when the Golf- and Hotel-classes had 
been converted to carry the SS-N-5, and the first Yankee-class vessels armed with the SS-N-6 missile began to 
join the fleet. 
60 Ibid., 45. 
61  George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 395.  
62  Spinardi traces the shift in Navy thinking to 1957. See Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 33-34. This is largely 
consistent with the collection of pertinent documents in: Burr, “"How Much is Enough?": The U.S. Navy and 
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pushing secure second strike as an eminently sensible strategic role for fleet ballistic missiles, 
an alternative future for Polaris might have looked not so different from the VMF’s operational 
concept for its ‘boomers’ up until the early 1970s. While the “meaning of the nuclear revolu-
tion”63 may be plain enough with hindsight and the submarine-based invulnerable deterrent 
may look like it was an inescapable development, the role of historical contingency in realizing 
it should not be underestimated.  
The bottom line concerning the role of Soviet sea-launched land-attack missiles from 
1955 up until late 1960s is that the operational doctrine for their use linked them to the VMF’s 
core mission of inflicting the greatest possible amount of damage to the enemy fleet before it 
could steam up to the Soviet coast and launch its nuclear-armed aircraft against the homeland. 
This began to change with the significant increase in range, numbers and survivability of the 
SSBN force during 1967-1974, but we don’t know for certain when – and if – the shift was 
completed.64 In the meantime, the development of a nuclear strike capability against naval and 
coastal targets clearly endowed the VMF’s basic area defense strategy with a much sharper 
offensive edge. At the same time, it did not yet represent a revolution in the service’s mission 
structure. Rather, it added a forward offensive instrument assigned to accomplish an existing 
 
"Finite Deterrence"”. Navy enthusiasm for the strategic role is known to have existed earlier, but remained 
muted – perhaps an ingrained lessons of the controversy surrounding Vice Admiral (VADM) Gallery’s 1948 
memorandum on a possible strategic nuclear role for the Navy. On this episode, see Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt 
of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950 (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of the 
Navy, 1994), 117-21; Jerry Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 33-36. 
63  See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 4. 
64 We simply do not know which targets were assigned to the VMF’s late-Cold War SSBN fleet and which 
employment options existed. However, in a translation of the SECRET-level 1983 Combat Regulations of the 
VMF, we find the following passage, which would seem to suggest that the SSBNs had become a generic 
strategic nuclear asset: “Naval strategic nuclear forces are a component part of the strategic nuclear forces. 
They include strategic missile submarines and are employed to carry out the tasks and operations of the strategic 
nuclear forces in accordance with the Supreme High Command’s plans to hit important targets both in military-
geographic regions and in continental (oceanic) theaters of military operations.” See Central Intelligence 
Agency, Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy - Chapter 1: The Navy and the Fundamentals of Combat Employment 
in Operations, August 18, 1986, CIA Historical Collection, TOP SECRET (declassified 6 June 2017), 7. Emphasis 
added.  
 





mission, especially in case the war started out as a nuclear missile war, which both sides 
thought plausible at the time.65 
Ultimately, its lopsided rivalry with the RVSN and early exclusion from the ghastly 
‘main event’ in a prospective missile war only served to spur the VMF on in its search for a 
strategic offensive mission. After realizing early on that it was his service’s best hope of cap-
turing a much larger share of the defense budget, Gorshkov spent the next twenty years laying 
siege to the RVSN’s preeminent role in strategic nuclear warfare that had been cemented in 
the late 1950s.66 His successes in the long attritional struggle to increase the VMF’s relative 
stature probably owed as much to external factors – the political leadership’s “desperate pur-
suit of parity,”67 the growing vulnerability of land-based missiles, and the diminishing returns 
of a further expansion of the RVSN – as to the Glavkom’s wily bureaucratic maneuvering. Until 
these structural pressures had worked their way through the Soviet system, the center of grav-
ity of the VMF’s contribution to the national defense would lie elsewhere: namely, in holding 
a perimeter at sea against the U.S. Navy’s nuclear-armed projection forces. 
 
5.3 The rise and fall of anti-carrier warfare 
5.3.1 The strategic defense imperative 
Much like the long-range submarine caused prolonged anxiety among Western naval plan-
ners, it was the attack aircraft carrier that struck fear into the hearts of their Soviet counterparts 
during the first two decades of the Cold War at sea and, indeed, beyond. From the mid-1950s 
onwards, carrier air power was seen as a nuclear menace on a par with strategic bombers and 
 
65  This was just one of the five scenarios Soviet planners envisioned, according to A. A. Kokoshin, Soviet 
Strategic Thought, 1917-91 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 128.  
66  Herrick, Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy, 1956-1986, 147.  
67  Pavel Podvig, “A Desperate Pursuit of Parity,” Science & Global Security 10, no. 3 (2002), 
doi:10.1080/08929880215325, 223-25. 
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land-based ballistic missiles. And while the latter certainly posed a severe threat to the survival 
of the homeland, the carrier was primarily – though not exclusively – the VMF’s problem.  
Although the roots of the zone defense scheme go back to a time when carrier air strikes 
were at most a futuristic feature of the international security environment, the threat from 
Western flattops became one of the central reasons to rely on such a system in the postwar 
period. U.S. fleet carriers had amply demonstrated their potential for power projection over 
great distances against Imperial Japan, replacing battleships as “the best way to transport fire-
power across the Pacific Ocean.”68 During the final phase of the Pacific War, the fast carrier 
task forces had been transformed into a formidable land-attack air force that could successfully 
conduct concentrated operations into the teeth of land-band defenses.69 During the final phase 
of the war, they showed that they were able, at some cost to themselves, to “destroy or neu-
tralize massive enemy land-based air power and continental bases.”70 Combined with the U.S. 
armed forces’ ability to launch large-scale, combined-arms amphibious assaults, this capability 
could not fail to catch the eye of Soviet military thinkers, as they began to settle into a Cold 
War mindset.71 By 1948, the U.S. Navy was flying nuclear-capable aircraft off its fleet carriers 
for experimental purposes – a development that raised the possibility that carrier-launched 
nuclear strikes reaching far into the Soviet Union would soon become part of its standard rep-
ertoire. Unlike Western fears of a flood of Soviet Type XXIs choking off the sea lanes, this 
expectation proved entirely accurate. 
Soviet defense planners saw the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed strike air-
craft on American fleet carriers as a dire threat to the Soviet homeland that could not go un-
answered. As Wegener accentuates, “[w]hen the United States assigned to its aircraft carriers 
an atomic role […] Soviet territory was exposed to a threat far more dangerous than any that had 
ever emanated from the possibility of enemy invasion. By necessity, Soviet naval defense centered 
 
68 Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 136. 
69 The classic history of this development is: Clark Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy (New 
York, NY: Naval Institute Press, 2015). The final shift towards land-attack is covered on pages 320-75.  
70 Ibid., 321.  
71 On Soviet threat perceptions concerning Western amphibious capabilities, see Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail 
S. Monakov, Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935-1953 (London: 
Frank Cass, 2001), 74-78. See also: Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 171.  
 





around arming against this nuclear peril.”72 In the late 1950s, countering the carrier threat be-
came the VMF’s highest priority tasking, and Soviet perceptions of the threat posed by U.S. 
naval air forces remained acute even after Polaris became the USN’s main nuclear strike 
weapon.  
As seen from a U.S. perspective, the Soviet Union’s major investments into anti-carrier 
warfare (ACW) was perhaps the most direct challenge to the USN’s ability to maintain mean-
ingful control of the seas on a global scale. While the VMF’s preferred approach to ACW al-
ways had a distinct combined-arms flavor, it was clear from the outset that the submarine 
force would have to carry much of the burden – and it continued to do so for the remainder of 
the Cold War. The combined-arms nature of the ACW challenge will become much clearer 
when approached from an air-centric perspective, as we will do in section 5.5. However, the 
anti-carrier program could not fail to impact the U.S. Navy’s ASW effort as well.  
Interestingly enough, by the time the ACW effort came into its own the role of the 
carrier was already changing. By the time Polaris went to sea in the early 1960s and superseded 
the attack squadrons of the carrier air wing as the Navy’s main nuclear power-projection tool, 
the new generation of 90,000 ton ‘supercarriers’ had proved their value and the future of naval 
aviation was assured for the foreseeable future. The strong focus on nuclear strike persisted 
into the 1960s and included the integration of carrier battle groups into SIOP-62. From SIOP-
63 onwards, SECDEF McNamara released the carriers from nuclear alert force duties, but they 
remained available as part of various SIOP force generation options until 1976, and part of the 
nuclear reserve force even thereafter.73 Hence, the VMF’s concern was hardly misplaced, even 
though it was lagging behind U.S. posture changes by a number of years. 
 
72 Edward Wegener, The Soviet Naval Offensive: An Examination of the Strategic Role of Soviet Naval Forces in the 
East-West Conflict (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 24. Emphasis added. 
73 Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers; Andrew Faltum, The Supercarriers: The Forrestal and Kitty Hawk 
Classes (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 27. The Navy considered SIOP integration a burden, 
because it severely constricted the carriers’ flexibility. In essence, they were tethered to their specified launch 
points for the duration of a forward deployment. While others have almost exclusively emphasized limited 
war as the main focus of the carrier force after 1963, the reality is that McNamara’s decision also freed up the 
CVBGs to go after naval-related targets – including those early linked to the ‘attack at source’ concept – again 
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As we have seen, the chief side-effect of the Air-Navy’s success in future-proofing its 
main weapon system for the nuclear age was to focus the mind of Soviet planners squarely on 
how to kill carriers before they could reach their launch points and deliver devastating coun-
ter-military strikes across the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. This required that the 
VMF’s reach be expanded in proportion to the increased combat radius of carrier-based strike 
aircraft. U.S. intelligence at the time correctly assessed that the Soviets would “shift from the 
long-held policy of defending the Soviet homeland in Eurasian (mainly Europe) littoral waters 
to a policy of attempting to counter the ‘aggressor’ in waters and bases farther from Soviet 
shores, even to the shores of the US.”74 After all, carriers with a strike range of approximately 
1,000 nmi could do tremendous damage without ever entering the modest 300-500 mile ‘outer’ 
defense zone of old. Unless they were handled with extraordinary impudence by their com-
manders, they would have to be attacked well out to sea – or, in a Soviet version of ‘attack at 
source’, even in port. 
The system that was developed to accomplish this, and eventually expanded to try and 
fend off the Polaris threat as well, later became known as the “Blue Belt of Defense.”75 This 
appears to have been an incarnation of the perimeter defense system that was designed spe-
cifically for multi-service, combined-arms operations against sea-borne nuclear threats.76 As 
such, it would have represented the General Staff-level a response to what was considered a 
problem of critical national importance. Little in the way of reliable information is available 
on the overall system, the division of labor that was envisioned, or the level of integration 
across service lines. Hence, reference to the overall construct is made only where specific evi-
dence allows us to link the Soviet Navy’s roles with those of the other services.  
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75 Robert W. Herrick, “The USSR’s “Blue Belt of Defense” Concept: A Unified Military Plan for Defense 
against Seaborne Nuclear Attack by Strike Carriers and Polaris/Poseidon SSBNs” (Professional Paper 111, 
Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA, 1973), 169-78. 
76 Ibid., 5-6.  
 





As far as the VMF’s major contribution was concerned, it was manifest that nuclear-
powered submarines would have to play a prominent role in the anti-carrier task. A stealthy, 
survivable platform that could keep up with – or at least successfully maneuver against – a 
carrier battle group and carry a considerable number of large stand-off weapons would be an 
ideal means of executing anti-carrier strikes.77 Given that defense against carriers was a task of 
national importance that involved weapons he saw as the wave of the future, Khrushchev 
provided the VMF with a new level of political backing. He made the point specifically, in 
considerable detail, and at a supremely important occasion in the Soviet political calendar – 
namely, in his report to the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961. The passage in question is 
worth quoting in full: 
“The Soviet Union is a continental power. Those who will want to start a war against us will 
have to overcome water barriers. That is why we are building up a powerful submarine fleet 
equipped also with target-seeking missiles so that we can sink in the ocean, hundreds of 
kilometers distant, vessels on their way to the borders of the socialist countries. 
 
The atom-powered Soviet submarine fleet, equipped with ballistic and target-seeking mis-
siles, stands vigilantly guard over our socialist gains. It will retaliate crushingly against an 
aggressor, and against his aircraft-carriers, which, in case of war, will make a nice target for 
our submarine-launched missiles. (Stormy applause.)”78 
 
 
Overall, the First Secretary’s scheme of making ‘nuclear missile war’ the be-all and end-all of 
Soviet defense planning could only be described as a major bureaucratic threat to the VMF. 
Yet, with the first generation of ballistic missile subs falling short of the leadership’s expecta-
tions, the strategic defense element became its saving grace. In the 1963-1968 timeframe, forty-
eight submarines designed specifically for anti-carrier warfare – thirty-two SSGNs and sixteen 
 
77 Forrestal- and Midway-class carriers had a top speed of 33 knots, and even at a transit speed of only 25-27 
knots, no diesel submarine could keep pace with a carrier group. 
 78 N. S. Khrushchov, “Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 
22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U.” The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1962), 64. Emphasis in the 
original. 
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SSGs – joined the fleet. During the same period, only three new SSNs and six SSBNs were 
completed.79 
While there is no universal agreement on this point, there is reason to believe that the 
VMF’s strong commitment to ACW remained very much intact even after carrier air had been 
largely displaced from the strategic nuclear role by Polaris.80 Two years after the carriers had 
been withdrawn from the SIOP and once again become a purely operational asset at the dis-
posal of theater commanders, Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov wrote that they were “[t]he main 
element of the general-purpose naval forces […] and a highly trained reserve of strategic strike 
forces in a global nuclear war.”81 Far from seeing a waning role for the carrier, Gorshkov be-
lieved that the rise of the missile as the primary delivery system for nuclear weapons “did not 
influence the role of aircraft-carriers in the system of Anglo-American naval forces. Today 
these ships form the basis of the sea power of the US fleet despite the ever-growing threat from 
sophisticated missile weapons.”82 The U.S. Navy would begin to reinforce this perception al-
most as soon as the carrier had been withdrawn from the ‘active’ strategic nuclear forces. 
As we will see, Gorshkov’s insistence on the central role of the carrier, re-stated in an 
era in which ballistic missiles reigned supreme, also contained a tacit admission that Soviet 
attempts at developing an anti-SSBN posture had failed. This led to the realization that, at the 
level of national strategy, the VMF could neutralize the enemy’s secure reserve force only by 
 
79 Polmar and Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990, 289, 294-300. 
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deploying a secure reserve force of its own.83 Countering American CVBGs may have re-
mained a priority in 1978 and beyond partly because the Soviet side felt they could be coun-
tered within a traditional war-fighting framework – certainly to a much greater extent than 
Polaris, Poseidon or Trident. To the extent that this assessment was accurate, it was the result of 
two decades of techno-doctrinal development that was surpassed in persistence and earnest-
ness only by the commitment to the secure SSBN force during the second half of the competi-
tion. At the heart of the anti-carrier undertaking were three generations of guided-missile sub-
marines, which would each pose a different challenge for U.S. ASW forces. 
 
 
5.3.2 Anti-carrier submarines:  a high-priority effort 
The history of the VMF’s submarine anti-carrier programs was largely characterized by mak-
ing do with suboptimal solutions, until all the most essential tactical characteristics could be 
brought together in a single, advanced system. MccGwire believes that a three-stage program 
was envisioned from the outset, with the first two generations as an ‘initial’ and ‘interim’ re-
action, respectively.84 As was the case with both its ballistic missile submarines and its SSNs, 
the Soviet Navy eventually managed to design and build a highly advanced system that met 
its operational requirements: the massive, nuclear-powered Oscar-class cruise missile subma-
rine. But getting there was not a straightforward process and success did not come cheap, or 
easily. The first one of these massive ‘carrier killers’ was built at the Sevmash yard at the end 
of our investigation period in 1976, but it would not be delivered to the VMF until 1980. The 
inadequacies of the first two generations of anti-carrier boats gave the U.S. Navy precious time 
to adjust to the threat and field techno-doctrinal countermeasures that further reduced the 
level of capability that the VMF could bring to bear. As we will see below, the same pattern 
applied to the air threat posed by the missiles these submarines carried. As far as ASW is con-
cerned, the SSGNs in particular suffered from faults that were at least partly self-imposed, and 
 
83 Whether this countervailing force had to be as large as the force it sought to neutralize is, of course, a dif-
ferent matter. 
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from the fact that some of the same deficits that marred the first generation were carried over 
into the second generation as well. Thus, ASW methods that had been developed for use 
against first generation vessels – essentially the results of the 1950s innovation process – by 
and large remained effective against the second generation as well.  
Until the early 1960s, the VMF’s most capable platform for countering the carrier threat 
were patrol submarines armed with nuclear torpedoes. The torpedo in question was the T-5 – 
a simple straight-runner with a 3-5 kiloton warhead.85 This was the weapon Foxtrot-subma-
rines famously carried during the Cuban Missile Crisis, although the risk of a desperate sub-
marine commander using them without further specific authorization has probably been over-
stated.86 In zone defense operations, the diesel-electrics of the 1950s had only the option of 
setting up an ambush and hoping that a battle group would pass right through their patrol 
area. In this case, an attacking submarine could either attempt to sink the carrier with conven-
tional anti-shipping torpedoes after the inner screen had passed over it, or fire a T-5 from 
longer range – provided the necessary authority had been pre-delegated.87 When the Novem-
ber-class came online, the ability to stalk a task force operating at transit speed improved mark-
edly. With a speed advantage of no more than 3-4 knots at best, the submarine commander 
still had to be quite skilled to keep up if the enemy force was zig-zagging at all, which under 
wartime conditions it should have.88 But combining the November and the T-5 clearly made for 
a much more effective damage-limitation capability against the carrier than the VMF had hith-
erto possessed.89 As Hill notes, despite the early nuclear submarine’s flaws “it certainly should 
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have given pause to carrier group commanders to know that one was about.”90 That said, a 
torpedo attack by itself was not an ideal means for ACW. Whereas Soviet submariners had 
limited operational experience going up against well-organized battle group defenses, West-
ern navies been shielding their high-value units from torpedo attack for decades. Their record 
was far from perfect, but of the twenty-three large fleet carriers of the U.S. Navy that saw 
combat in World War II, only one – USS Wasp (CV-7) – was lost to submarine torpedoes as the 
primary cause.91 (Incidentally, her commanding officer at the time was then-CAPT Forrest P. 
Sherman, the CNO-in-the-making and later architect of ‘attack at source’.)  
Even with the standard loadout of two nuclear torpedoes in its tubes, the Soviet at-
tacker still had to make it into the inner defense zone of the battle group and get away after 
leaving a ‘flaming datum’ of the most dramatic kind. With conventional torpedoes, the chances 
of getting close enough, sinking a carrier, and ideally staying alive to tell the tale were lower 
yet. What was required, then, was a real standoff capability that would allow a submarine to 
also attack from well outside the defensive ASW screen – something no torpedo could provide, 
but a missile weapon could.92 Ideally such a missile would be effective during the conventional 
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phase as well. Nuclear use at sea was certainly seen as acceptable, if the very concrete alterna-
tive was increased nuclear devastation of the homeland. Hence, the intimate link between anti-
carrier operations and tactical nuclear warfare that was established during the early phase 
proved very persistent, even as more capable conventional options became available: every 
dedicated ACW asset in the Soviet Navy could carry tactical nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, 
being stuck with tactical nuclear use as the only high-confidence option for countering the car-
rier was less than satisfactory. 
 
 
Fig. 17: The USS Wasp (CV-7) burns after falling victim to the IJN submarine I-19 off the Solomon Islands, 15 
September 1942. This was the only loss of a U.S. fleet carrier to a submarine torpedo attack alone. (U.S. 
Library of Congress) 
 
The near-term solution that the VMF pursued was highly pragmatic and reflected the urgency 
of fielding a viable anti-carrier defense: it was decided to adapt the existing Echo-class design 
to fire an anti-ship version of the P-5 land-attack missile, which had already been under sim-
ultaneous development. The P-6 missile – the SS-N-3a variant of the Shaddock to NATO – had 
 





a range of 250 nmi, which was unheard of for a submarine-launched anti-ship weapon at the 
time and put the submarine well outside any conceivable battle group ASW defense.93 To make 
the Echo more suitable for its new role, an additional pair of launchers was added, for a total 
of eight. Jordan believes that the standard loadout was a mix of conventionally and nuclear-
tipped missiles.94 Six and two would appear to have been a sensible compromise, but since 
there was no way of distinguishing conventional and nuclear missiles using photographic ma-
terials, we do not know with any certainty. According to Antonov, Marinin, and Valuyev, the 
P-6 could be launched in a moderate to rough sea state, and the boat could keep moving at up 
to 10 knots.95 Tracking and initial guidance of the missiles was performed by the dual Front 
Door/Front Piece antennae, which were stowed in the enlarged sail and rotated forward during 
the launch preparation stage. The chief limitation of the system was that there was no way the 
submarine itself could detect targets for its P-6s over the horizon, meaning that it would have 
to be part of what the Soviets later came to call a “reconnaissance-strike complex.”96 For sec-
ondary torpedo attack and self-defense, once the missiles were expended, Project 675s also 
carried four standard-caliber (533 mm) torpedoes and six of the smaller 400 mm weapons.97  
Apart from the increased armament, the liabilities of the modified first-generation de-
sign were even greater than those of the original Echo. The lengthened hull and increased dis-
placement cost the Echo II about 3 knots of speed compared to the land-attack version. This 
left it – at best – with a marginal capability for maneuver relative to its targets. Given the ex-
treme range of the missile system by the standards of its time, this was probably seen as a 
perfectly acceptable trade-off. That said, the Echo II not only had to launch on the surface but 
– unlike the Echo I, which could submerge upon firing its autopiloted missiles – also had to 
remain surfaced during part of the missile’s flight time, to designate a target based on the radar 
 
93 Ibid., 79. 
94 Ibid., 81. 
95 Antonow, Marinin and Walujew, Sowjetisch-russische Atom-U-Boote, 37. Firing the missiles in sea state 5 
presumably would not have been the crew’s favorite task, but it does not seem implausible either.  
96 Milan Vego, “Recce-Strike Complexes in Soviet Theory and Practice” (Soviet Army Studies Office/U.S. 
Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a231900.pdf, ii. 
97 Yuri V. Apalkov, Подводные лодки советского флота 1945-1991 [Submarines of the Soviet Fleet 1945-1991] 
(Moscow: МОРКНИГА [MORKNIGA], 2009), vol. 1, 75.; Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 81. 
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picture that was sent back to the submarine by an airborne source – the Tu-95RT maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft – via a video data link (VDL).98 A new air search radar was installed 
for early warning of incoming enemy aircraft.99 Obviously, if the submarine was detected on 
the surface, be it by radar or by direction finding, and sought out by a U.S. or allied air asset, 
its only recourse was to abort the missile launch and submerge as quickly as possible. As for 
passive detection, one can assume that the Echo II was at least as noisy as the earlier version, 
given that its power plant had to work harder to propel its lengthened hull at the same speed 
and the two additional blast deflectors would have further increased flow noise.100 Its crews 
apparently called it “a rattling can”101 – and that is according to a Russian source. Since the 
battle group’s organic ASW defenses did not reach 200 nmi (or more) ahead of the main body 
and still primarily relied on active sonar during the 1960s and early 1970s, this was a handicap 
mostly during transit and while trying to get into firing position. However, with SOSUS en-
tering its prime, vulnerability to passive detection long before the Echo II came within missile 
range played right into the U.S. Navy’s hands. While it was perfectly understandable that the 
first-generation boats were not optimized to survive in an environment marked by a signifi-
cant U.S. advantage in passive acoustics, a lack of improvement in this area threatened to make 
VMF submarines cooperative targets for decades to come. 
Meanwhile, the Echo II’s combination of long-range missiles and a torpedo armament 
with optional nuclear warheads complicated the CVBG defense problem to some extent. The 
Echo II was certainly very noisy, but a carrier battle group was considerably louder still and 
silent SSN escorts operating in direct support were still in the distant future.102 As a result, the 
SSGN also stood a chance of closing in with a battle group and doing serious damage from 
 
98 Yefim Gordon and Dmitriy Komissarov, Soviet Naval Aviation, 1946-1991 (Manchester: Hikoki Publications, 
2013), 332; Carlo Kopp, “Maritime Strike: The Soviet Perspective,” Australian Aviation, 1988, https://www.au-
sairpower.net/TE-Sov-ASuW.html. 
99  Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 82. 
100  Antonov, Marinin and Valuyev claim that several measures were put in place to reduce noise levels, but 
do not provide any specific information as to the nature of these measures or how successful they were. See 
Antonow, Marinin and Walujew, Sowjetisch-russische Atom-U-Boote, 38.  
101 B. Y. Golubchik, “The Sonar System Kerch: The History of Its Creation,” in Godin; Palmer, History of Russian 
Underwater Acoustics, 480. 
102 Regular ‘direct support’ for CVBGs became possible only as the construction of the Los Angeles-class, which 
was designed with this purpose in mind, began to swell the number of fast and quiet SSNs in the late 1970s.  
 





within the screen, where it could deliver its attack while submerged. What is less clear is 
whether Soviet doctrine and command philosophy permitted an Echo II-skipper to make use of 
his increased tactical options. In fact, since highly orchestrated standoff attacks were envi-
sioned, there is every reason to believe that it did not. Its reduced speed also limited the Echo 
II to approaches from the frontal quadrant, which would usually have seen the most intense 
ASW effort. Hence, its ability to double as a torpedo-attack submarine was modest – but cer-




Fig. 18: An Echo II-class guided missile submarine in transit. The four pairs of recessed missile launchers are 
clearly visible, as are the blast deflector notches to the rear of each launch canister. (U.S. National Archives)   
 
Overall, the shipyards at Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk put out twenty-nine units of Project 
675 – the first in 1963 and the last in 1968. The fact that the number of hulls surpassed the 
combined total of torpedo-attack Novembers and land-attack Hotels and Echo Is was testament to 
 
103 By the time the Echo Is had all been converted into 659T torpedo submarines, their usefulness was starting 
to look more look dubious. With ten to fifteen years of service life left in them, the last were written off in the 
late 1980s. Like the rest of the HENs, they suffered their share of serious accidents and fires, but none were 
lost at sea.  
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the strong commitment of the VMF and the political-military class more broadly to the ACW 
mission. Doubtless, the VMF’s first-generation anti-carrier platform had many serious flaws, 
but its significance should not be underestimated: if one had to date the shift from an extended 
coastal defense to an oceanic area defense, the 1963 introduction of the Echo II – a high-seas missile 
battery for long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) that was linked to a fledgling intelli-
gence, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (ISTAR) complex – would make an 
excellent contender. 
In a further demonstration of the importance that was attached to ACW at the service 
level and beyond, the inability to produce even larger numbers of nuclear propulsion units – 
a total of 110 (!) reactors went into the first-generation boats – led to the Echo IIs being supple-
mented by a class of diesel-electric anti-carrier boats.104 Project 651 (NATO designation: Juliett) 
was designed as a PLRK (Podvodnaya lodka s raketami krylatymi, or submarine armed with 
winged missiles) from the keel up and, at more than 4,200 tons, had a substantially larger 
submerged displacement than the previous generation of diesel boats. With their broad beam 
and blast deflectors, the 651s also “had all the hydrodynamic efficiency of a badly damaged 
brick.”105 Despite their bulk, they could carry only half as many missiles as its nuclear-pro-
pelled counterpart. With a top speed of 18 knots, the Juliett also had no chance of trailing, and 
little chance of closing in with, a CVBG. Hence, it had to rely on the very long range of its 
missiles to an even greater extent than the Echo II. The guidance and air search radars were 
identical with the nuclear boat, as was the launch procedure. 651s also had a secondary arma-
ment of six standard-caliber (533 mm) and four 400 mm torpedo tubes, apparently with no 
reloads for the former and eight reloads for the latter.106 According to two otherwise reliable 
 
104 See Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 100; 
Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 83. I do not count the single Project 645 submarine – an experi-
mental design based on the November’s hull but equipped with lead-bismuth cooled reactors – as a HEN, 
because the VM-A pressurized water reactor was the critical shared feature of the production boats of the 
first generation. 
105 This according to Bruce Rule, “O JULIETT, JULIETT, Wherefore art thou JULIETT?,” IUSS Caesar Alumni 
Association, http://www.iusscaa.org/articles/brucerule/o_juliett__juliett__wherefore__art_thou_juliett.htm.  
106 Providing a substantial number of defensive weapons and just enough offensive firepower to sink a target 
of opportunity, but not enough for a secondary attack role, would have been a sensible trade-off in a diesel-
 
 





sources, a large production run of seventy-two Julietts was planned, but there is reason to 
doubt this.107 Jordan, for one, suggests that the low build rate (for a diesel) of two per year was 
more consistent with a program that was deliberately limited in scope.108 Since the Juliett was 
designed as a supplement to the Echo II, which was itself only the first stage of the anti-carrier 
program, his is the more plausible account. In the event, sixteen were delivered during 1963-
1968 before the project was terminated and the lead shipyard – Krasnoye Sormovo in Gorky – 
was shifted to nuclear construction.  
 
 
Fig. 19: A Juliett-class PLRK resupplying at sea from a submarine tender. Her ‘main battery’ of four SS-N-3a 
anti-ship missiles could not be reloaded at sea. (U.S. National Archives) 
 
electric cruise missile boat. In addition, two of the new ASB-30 nuclear replacement warheads were probably 
carried to be fitted onto standard 533 mm weapons when necessary. See Polmar and Moore, Cold War Sub-
marines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 102, 28. Again, there is no agreement on the 
exact details concerning reloads, numbers and location of the 400 mm tubes, etc. While Polmar and Moore’s 
thorough post-Cold War look at the subject remains a standard reference, J.V. Apalkov’s more recent Russian-
language account is stronger on some of these technical minutiae. See Apalkov, Подводные лодки советского 
флота 1945-1991 [Submarines of the Soviet Fleet 1945-1991]; Yuri V. Apalkov, Подводные лодки советского флота 
1945-1991 [Submarines of the Soviet Fleet 1945-1991]: ВТОРОЕ ПОКОЛЕНИЕ АПЛ [Second Generation of the 
APL] (Moscow: МОРКНИГА [MORKNIGA], 2011), vol. 2; Yuri V. Apalkov, Подводные лодки советского 
флота 1945-1991 [Submarines of the Soviet Fleet 1945-1991]: ТРЕТЬЕ и ЧЕТВЕРТОЕ ПОКОЛЕНИЯ АПЛ [Third 
and Fourth Generation of the APL] (Moscow: МОРКНИГА [MORKNIGA], 2012), vol. 3. 
107  See MccGwire quoted in: Siegfried Breyer and Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy (Cambridge: Pat-
rick Stephens Ltd, 1977), 36; Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and 
Soviet Submarines, 100. 
108 Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 84-85. 
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The nuclear submarine that Gorky would build once this transition was completed was the 
‘interim’, second-generation anti-carrier boat. Known as Project 670 (NATO designation: Char-
lie), the platform itself had initially been designed as a cheaper, more numerous successor to 
the November. It was adapted to a dedicated anti-carrier configuration when a follow-on 
PLARK project was abandoned during the design stage.109 The result was an innovative sub-
marine, in several respects – and one that posed a more dangerous threat than it is sometimes 
given credit for. In terms of its basic design features, the Charlie was the first Soviet nuclear 
submarine that relied on a single reactor – the VM-4 – to drive a single shaft, as was generally 
the case in Western designs. It appears that this was primarily a way of reducing costs, and of 
enabling construction of a next-generation PLARBs and APLs (Atomnaya podvodnaya lodka or 
atomic submarine) during the same period.110 Secondly, and even more importantly from an 
operational perspective, the Charlie introduced both submerged launch and the world’s first 
sea-skimming anti-ship missile, the P-70 Ametist (SS-N-7 Starbright). Because of the missile’s 
much shorter range of approximately 35 nmi, the boat could – under some circumstances and 
to some extent – do its own targeting using passive sonar. However, the Kerch sonar that was 
initially used on the Charlie limited the realistic range for an engagement without external 
support to about half the effective missile range.111 While this was clearly a major flaw, it pre-
disposed the 670s to attack from very short range, in effect using the P-70 as a “flying tor-
pedo.”112 The extremely short warning times this entailed, the missile’s low flight profile, and 
the ability to deliver an additional torpedo attack in short order, made it an unpleasant oppo-
nent to deal with.113 With ten additional torpedo reloads for its four standard tubes, a 670 
 
109 Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 162. 
110 Ibid. 
111 See Defense Threat Informations Group, “Russian / Soviet Sea-Based Anti-Ship Missiles,” Special Report 
derived from JED's "Destroyers & Carrier Killers" Defense Threat Informations Group, 
https://de.scribd.com/document/50289372/Russian-Soviet-Naval-Missiles. This was eventually remedied by 
the adoption of the Rubin sonar used on the Papa (see below).  
112 Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 108. 
113 Author’s interview with RADM Michael McDevitt, Alexandria, VA, 11 May 2016. 
 





driven by an aggressive commander had a good chance of doing additional damage after its 
missiles were expended.  
Despite the very different and more severe threat posed by a well-handled Charlie, two 
major flaws of the first-generation Echo II remained largely unremedied: the top speed in-
creased very modestly to a still-insufficient 26 knots, and the noise level remained too high to 
evade detection under the conditions of a pervasive U.S. advantage in passive acoustics.114 To 
be fair, advances had been made in both areas. The much more streamlined hull form and 
smaller wetted surface resulted in higher speed, despite the switch to a single reactor and the 
retention of the double hull. Apparently, the noise reduction measures that were adopted were 
also quite extensive and included mounting some equipment on springs, as well as a newly 
designed propeller.115 We can conclude that there was an awareness of the inadequacies of the 
first-generation boats and that Soviet engineers were working to alleviate them. They were 
just not making progress at the same rate as their counterparts were, as a result of their ever 
more deeply ingrained obsession with passive sensors. As long as the Soviet deficiencies per-
sisted, the U.S. Navy could maintain a crucial lead in sensor technology without fundamen-
tally changing its preferred approach to the ASW problem.  
During 1967 and 1972, eleven Charlies were delivered in the basic configuration de-
scribed above. Six more units were built as improved 670Ms, or Charlie IIs, during 1973-1980. 
This second pattern carried a new and considerably more capable missile, the P-120 Malakhit 
(SS-N-9 Siren) with an increased range of up to 55 nmi, and much better resistance to counter-
measures. This came at the cost of a further reduction in speed to 24 knots, due to the addi-
tional drag produced by a lengthened bow section, to accommodate the new weapon. In other 
words, the definitive version of the Charlie still had to maneuver itself into a firing position 
much closer to the battle group than the Echo II before it. Whilst it had neither the speed nor 
 
114  Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present; Jordan, Soviet Submarines: 1945 to the Present, 81. 
115 Alexander Antonow, Walerie Marinin and Nikolai Walujew, Sowjetisch-russische Atom-U-Boote: Gefahr aus 
der Tiefe (Augsburg: Bechtermünz, 2000), 70. These measures appear to have been well behind the curve, as 
far as competition with the U.S. Navy was concerned. But it is important to note that there was a clear interest 
in more advanced quieting measures in the 1960s era designs.  
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the stealth to do so reliably in a broad range of circumstances, with the tactical situation in its 
favor, the presence of a 670M could potentially make for a very bad day. 
Despite these step-by-step advances, it took the VMF until the early 1980s to conclude 
the ‘interim’ stage and field a truly advanced anti-carrier submarine. To understand why this 
was so, we must briefly delve into the troubled history of the submarine that was originally 
meant to fill this role: the experimental Project 661, or Papa to NATO. One of the most ambi-
tious submarine designs of the Cold War era, on either side of the confrontation, the Papa was 
engineered for maximum advantage vis-à-vis a U.S. battle group. Its design speed was 38 
knots – fast enough to catch up with a carrier from even the least favorable starting position, 
an even overtake it if necessary. Like the Charlie I, the Papa was armed with the submerged-
launch P-70 Ametist. However, unlike the equipment on the smaller and less advanced ‘in-
terim’ boat, its Rubin sonar reflected the state of the art in Soviet underwater acoustics research, 
and was optimized to “provide long-range detection of surface ships, especially multi-screw 
aircraft carriers.”116 With its unheard-of speed and improved sensors, the Papa promised to 
raise the VMF’s anti-carrier capability to the next level.  
Alas, Project 661’s realization process was beset by debilitating problems and it never 
lived up to this promise, which ultimately led to its abandonment after a single vessel had 
been completed. Made almost entirely of titanium alloy, which no other nation had worked 
with in submarine construction (and none ever would), the Papa’s double hull began to de-
velop extensive welding cracks before it was even completed. An industrial maximum effort 
was required to turn the first-of-class into a seaworthy submarine. The results were impres-
sive, in some respects. Notably, the Papa far exceeded its makers’ expectations in the important 
category of forward motion: during testing, it set a submerged speed record of 44.7 knots that 
remains unbroken to this day.117 The tremendous amount of fluid resistance that acted upon 
the surface at such high speeds is said to have literally stripped the paint off its outer hull. The 
 
116 See Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 137. 
Unfortunately, Mikhailov’s article in the History of Russian Underwater Acoustics (484-94) does not yield much 
additional information on the system. See Yu. A. Mikhailov, “The Birth of Rubin,” in Godin; Palmer, History 
of Russian Underwater Acoustics. 
117 Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 139. 
 





combination of flow noise and machinery noise also resulted in deafening sound pressure lev-
els of around 100 db inside the submarine.118 With noise levels within the hull reaching levels 
that could lead to irreversible hearing damage, the level of radiated noise was almost certainly 
at the extreme upper end of the scale as well. At the end of the day, Soviet engineers found 
themselves with a remarkable achievement under their belts – but not one that translated into 
a useful tactical advantage. Seeing that the construction of a class of Papas was going to result 
in extravagant costs without commensurate benefits, Soviet decision-makers sensibly decided 
to abandon the program in 1970. 
 
 
Fig. 20: The K-186, named after the city of Omsk, was the last Oscar II-class submarine laid down before 
the Cold War ended. She was overhauled during the 2000s and remains in service with the Russian 
VMF’s Pacific Fleet. (US National Archives) 
 
Hence, the search for a truly capable ‘carrier killer’ continued and the U.S. Navy was given 
more time to adjust to the prospective threat. In fact, it was not until 1978 that the third-gen-
eration threat began to materialize, with the construction of the first vessel of Project 949, 
known to Western analysts as the Oscar-class. After only two vessels, the initial configuration 
 
118 Antonow, Marinin and Walujew, Sowjetisch-russische Atom-U-Boote, 73-74. 
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was changed to an improved 949A (Oscar II) standard. When the first of these 19,000-ton levi-
athans – the Krasnodar (K-148) – went to sea in 1986, she was the vindication of the VMF’s belief 
in the submarine as the backbone of its anti-carrier strategy. K-148 and her sisters were at once 
quiet enough to elude their hunters, fast enough to shadow a CVBG for days, and – if they 
were in capable hands – able to fire from a position of their choosing. While they still depended 
on a battle network to realize their full potential, they were so heavily armed that they could 
challenge a battlegroup’s defenses even on their own. In short, the Oscar IIs were everything 
the VMF had been looking for, crammed into a hull with the displacement of a World War II 
era heavy cruiser, at great cost to the failing Soviet economy. They were an impressive asset 
for the bastion defense concept in their time. Ultimately, the Red Navy’s most impressive 
achievement in challenging U.S. sea control from the deep came far too late in the game to 
make a real difference. 
 
5.3.3 SS-NX-13: The anti-ship ballistic missile saga    
Whilst the eventual perfection of the submarine as a cruise missile platform was by far the 
more operationally relevant outcome of the VMF’s investment in ACW over a thirty-year pe-
riod, it was not the only avenue that was explored. From the mid-1960s onwards, there was 
also a second track of techno-doctrinal developments that never led to an operational capabil-
ity: the pursuit of a submarine-launched anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). In fact, there is 
considerable evidence to indicate that the second-generation SSBNs of Project 667A – the Yan-
kee-class – were originally designed to carry such a missile. Given that the Yankee was the most 
numerous of all Soviet ballistic missile submarines, with thirty-four units completed during 
1967 and 1972, the strong possibility that it was envisioned as a dual-purpose boat with an 
anti-carrier capability has important implications for our analysis. 
Work on the VMF’s next ballistic missile submarine started in the late 1950s, but pro-
gressed slowly after the RVSN was assigned sole responsibility for long-range nuclear missile 
strikes. However, the VMF still intended to capture a significant share of that mission and, 
 





after several failed or unsatisfactory submarine and missile designs, gained approval for the 
construction of a new class of ‘nuclear submarine missile cruisers’. The 667A design that had 
ultimately made the cut was a major improvement over the Hotels, with a much more reliable 
reactor and a Polaris-like sixteen-tube missile battery fitted aft of the sail.119 Leaving aside the 
number of missiles that were carried and the fact that one of the two missile options was an 
IRBM, the Yankee was a distinctly Soviet design, with the customary double hull, twin reactors, 
and twin screws. This configuration allowed for a top speed of 28 knots – about 6 knots faster 
than its American contemporaries, which were designed for low noise and shorter patrols 
from forward bases. However, the inefficiency of the design is evident from the fact that it took 
the Yankee close to 350 percent of the installed power of a contemporary U.S. ballistic missile 
sub to attain this advantage, which was only partially useful.120 In fact, the 667As were notori-
ously noisy and easy to track, which was a highly undesirable trait in an SSBN, in particular.121 
The temptation to run at high speed during transit, which would usually take the Yankee 
through areas with excellent SOSUS coverage, made life even easier for Western ASW forces.   
Western analysts have generally seen the Yankees as a “matching force,”122 a Soviet copy 
of Polaris in the quest for strategic parity. There is undoubtedly some truth to this view, in that 
the VMF wanted a ballistic missile submarine with increased missile range and greater fire-
power, and political decision-makers were looking for a Polaris equivalent to brandish on the 
international stage. But in doctrinal terms, the fact that there was a second, tactical missile 
option for the Yankee complicates the “Red Polaris”123 narrative very considerably. This missile 
was the R-27K anti-ship ballistic missile, with the NATO designation SS-NX-13. 
 
 
119 The arrangement was not actually a copy of the Polaris boats, in that it was made up of two compartments 
of eight, rather than a single one. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 294-95. 
120 The U.S. Navy’s SSBN 598, 608 and 616 classes – collectively known as the ‘41 for Freedom’ – all shared 
the same 15,000 shp power plant based on the S5W reactor. The Yankee used a plant based on two VM-2-4s 
with a total output of 52,000 shp. See Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of 
U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 182. 
121  Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword, 117.  
122 MccGwire, “Soviet Military Doctrine,” MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, 96-97. 
123 Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword, 115-18. 
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Fig. 21: A Yankee-class SSBN underway. If this type had been equipped with the R-27K tactical ballistic 
missile, as was originally planned, it would have added another dimension to the challenge to U.S. sea 
control. (U.S. National Archives) 
As Robinson notes, the idea of using ballistic missiles against a moving target at sea was not 
entirely new.124 The RVSN and its partisans had been looking at the possibility as a way of 
driving home the obsolescence of naval forces – a perception which Gorshkov himself seconds 
in his writings. In technical terms, the viability of the ballistic missile as an anti-ship weapon 
was primarily a matter of reducing the target location error, or sufficiently alleviating its ef-
fects: 
“In principle, any ballistic missile could be used effectively against ships within range if nu-
clear warheads were employed, if the target’s position at time of warhead detonation could 
be accurately predicted or if the target could be accurately followed by a maneuvering 
weapon, if targeting data could be communicated promptly, and if the missile could be re-
targeted and launched promptly.”125 
 
Developed in parallel with the R-27 IRBM, which was the regular land-attack weapon carried 
by the 667A, the R-27K was designed to meet these criteria. The critical feature was the addi-
tion of a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) equipped with a one-megaton warhead, and a 
terminal guidance system.126 The high yield meant that weapon-associated inaccuracies of up 
 
124 Raymond A. Robinson, “Incoming Ballistic Missiles at Sea,” USNI Proceedings, June 1987, 67. 
125 Ibid. 
126 It has been suggested that this involved a passive radar homing system, which should have worked well 
enough against a carrier conducting flight operations. That said, if the specific emissions the seeker was look-
ing for were not present, a considerable degradation of terminal accuracy would be the result. 
 





to 2,600 meters would still have resulted in extensive damage to the carrier and that any escorts 
present within a 35 km2 area would have sustained either severe or moderate damage as well. 
The kill radius, within which the carrier would have been sunk outright or catastrophically 
damaged, would have been roughly 2,000 meters.127 Naturally, the targeting process would 
still have required offboard cueing – apparently using the satellite-based Kasatka tactical data 
link, which was later also used to target anti-ship cruise missiles.128 The missile’s footprint (i.e., 
the area within which the maneuvering warhead could find and home onto a target) has been 
estimated at about 30 nmi, although it is not entirely clear whether this refers to the longitudi-
nal axis, an estimated diameter, or a radius.129 It would follow that – even assuming the target 
location error is zero and 30 nmi is the footprint’s radius – a CVBG travelling in a straight line 
at 25-30 knots could escape damage if more than an hour elapsed between the last position 
update and the arrival of the missile over its target.130 However, with up to sixteen missiles 
available in a single attack, the carrier would have been unlikely to survive even if the area of 
uncertainty in which the CVBG could theoretically lurk after a given amount of time had 
elapsed, was considerably larger than this 30 nmi radius. Needless to say, there was no prac-
tical possibility for active defense against such an attack, although the reliance on a passive 
 
127 This is based on an airburst with a one-megaton yield, set to destroy an aircraft carrier using U.S. damage 
criteria. The Defense Nuclear Agency’s standard for severe damage to a carrier is a peak overpressure of 30 
pounds per square inch (psi). Moderate damage resulting in immobilization is expected at 20 psi for a carrier, 
whereas moderate damage to a destroyer is expected at 15 psi. See DNA, “Damage to Naval Equipment”. 
Effects calculations can be done based on Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear 
Weapons (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense; Energy Research and Development Ad-
ministration, 1977). Alex Wellerstein’s NUKEMAP (Alex Wellerstein, “Nuke Map,” https://nu-
clearsecrecy.com/nukemap/) is a practicable 21st century alternative. On a side note, serious radiation effects 
for an airburst of this yield do not appear to extend much beyond the 20 psi blast radius and would inflict 
few additional casualties. Surface bursts are a different matter. See Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear 
Weapons, 334.  
128 See Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 180. 
On Kasatka, (NATO designation: Punch Bowl) see Friedman, Seapower and Space, 166-67. Obviously, other – 
probably less timely – means of cueing could also be employed. 
129 Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 170. 
130 The possibility of escaping the footprint would actually be slightly better than that, unless the azimuth of 
the missile’s flight path is closely aligned with the carrier’s course. In practice, due to the extreme velocity of 
the missile, the footprint is likely to resemble a somewhat distorted ellipse rather than a perfect circle. 
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seeker would have made strict emission control (EMCON) at least a partially effective coun-
termeasure.131 
In line with what had earlier been reported, an imagery intelligence (IMINT) report 
released in 2010 confirms that the anti-ship R-27K was tested at the Kapustin Yar missile range 
sometime after March 1968, soon after the land-based test program for the R-27 IRBM had been 
concluded.132 Since it might have made sense to test the less technically complex land-attack 
version first, no matter which program was more highly prioritized at the time, it is difficult 
to draw any firm conclusions from this sequence. Interestingly, Zaloga states explicitly that 
both missiles were intended for use against targets of naval interest, which is in line with Her-
rick’s account of Soviet SSBN roles, sketched out above.133 It is also reported that the R-27K 
was tested from a modified Golf-class SSBN during 1973.134 On 1 November 1973, the possibil-
ity of R-27Ks also being deployed on Kara-class missile cruisers made it into the Presidential 
Daily Brief.135 In 1974, the CIA still expected the R-27K to enter service within the next two 
years.136 However, for reasons that remain difficult to verify, the VMF chose to abandon the 
ASBM project. Possible explanations include the even more urgent threat posed by Polaris, the 
changing role of Soviet SSBNs, technical problems with the missile system, the lack of a reliable 
‘kill chain’, or a connection with the SALT I arms control agreement. A combination of some 
 
131 On EMCON, see Robert G. Angevine, “Hiding in Plain Sight: The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations 
under EMCON, 1956-1972,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 2 (2011), 1-17; Jonathan F. Solomon, “Maritime 
Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaisance-Strike 
Networks,” Naval War College Review 66, no. 4 (2013), 87-116. It must have occurred to Soviet guidance de-
signers that the use of a passive radar seeker as the sole means of terminal guidance was not necessarily an 
optimal choice. Given that the R-27K was apparently designed by Chelomey’s OKB-52, which displayed a 
preference for combining active and passive radar seekers in the P-500 and P-700 anti-ship missiles under 
development during the same phase of the competition, the lack of any kind of active guidance is surprising. 
See Michal Fiszer and Jerzy Gruszczynski, “Carrier Killers: Soviet and Russian Naval Anti-Ship Missiles, Part 
I,” Journal of Electronic Defense, October 2003, 47-48. That said, one can imagine a variety of technical and non-
technical explanations for why this path was not chosen.  
132 National Photographic Interpretation Center, Missile-Related Activity at Kapustin Yar Missile Range Test Com-
plex C Site 2, USSR (S), September 1982, CIA Historical Collection, SECRET (declassified 11 March 2010). This 
source also confirms that the program was terminated in 1973.  
133 Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword, 116.  
134 Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 180. 
135 Central Intelligence Agency, The President's Daily Brief, November 1, 1973, 3. 
136 Central Intelligence Agency, NIE 11-15/74: Principal Judgements, December 17, 1974, CIA Historical Collec-
tion, TOP SECRET UMBRA (declassified 31 August 2001), 5. 
 





or all of these factors seems most probable.137 Perhaps the least plausible explanation is 
MccGwire’s insistence that the ASBM was also envisioned as a strategic ASW weapon for use 
against Polaris submarines and abandoned when it failed to provide an adequate capability.138 
Given that the R-27K’s radar-homing seeker head would have been quite useless against a 
submerged submarine, it is not clear which advantages over a regular ballistic missile could 
possibly have been expected by its designers.  
Leaving aside the question of whether a strategic ASW mission was ever intended for 
the R-27K, how might a Yankee armed with ASBMs have affected Soviet doctrine with regard 
to the anti-carrier mission? First of all, accounts differ as to whether land-attack and anti-ship 
missiles would have been carried by the same submarines. There was nothing to physically 
prevent such an arrangement, although Zaloga suggests that the R-27K would only have been 
carried by an outwardly indistinguishable 667V modification.139 Naturally, if a mix of missiles 
had been available for deployment on a single submarine, the flexibility of the Yankee would 
have increased substantially. At the manageable cost of installing the Kasatka data link and, 
presumably, an adapted fire control system, each submarine would have been able to switch 
roles as necessary – even in the course of a single patrol. A related possibility, which 
McConnell raises, would have been the employment of the Yankee’s anti-ship weapon “against 
surface ASW, assisting SSBNs in the initial ‘breakout’ and promoting combat stability”140 for 
operations in the Western Atlantic or the Eastern Pacific. (During the 1960s, surface ASW task 
 
137 Interestingly, MccGwire suggests that the changing role of the SSBN in Soviet strategy was the main factor. 
See Michael MccGwire, “Soviet Naval Programs,” in Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, 
ed. Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell (New York, NY: Praeger, 1977), 341, 346 n.22. 
138 See K. J. Moore, Mark Flanigan, and Robert D. Helsel, “Developments in Submarine Systems, 1956-76,” in 
Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, ed. Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell (New 
York, NY: Praeger, 1977), 170-73, 176-77. They appear to suggest that the missile would have been “retargeta-
ble after launch” (177), but it seems highly unlikely that this would have taken the form of mid-course up-
dates rather than the much more obvious solution of using an autonomous radar seeker onboard the reentry 
vehicle (RV). How such a seeker could have been effective against a submerged target is not discussed. As 
was more often the case in debates among the cognoscenti of literature analysis, they may be guilty of relying 
on a very literal interpretation of a few open-source statements from Soviet officials to make this case, which 
seems shaky in retrospect. 
139 Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword, 117-18.  
140 McConnell, “Military-Political Tasks of the Soviet Navy in War and Peace,” 3. Unlike most analysts, he is 
prepared to admit that he has “nothing concrete to go on here; it only seems a reasonable hypothesis.” (46) 
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forces often included an Essex-class anti-submarine warfare carrier (CVS) as well, which would 
have made this an anti-carrier mission of a different kind.) In effect, the Yankee would have 
provided for its own counter-ASW protection, and that of other units.141 
 Assuming separate land-attack and anti-carrier variants using essentially the same 
platform, the same tasks could still have been performed – just not by the same submarine. It 
would also still have been impossible for Western ASW forces to differentiate whether they 
were dealing with one version of the ‘submarine missile cruiser’ or the other. This would have 
confronted the Yankee’s hunters with the unpleasant reality of not knowing whether they were 
attacking the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear reserve, or ‘merely’ the VMF’s anti-carrier 
forces.142 However, as we will see later in this chapter, the U.S. Navy was not particularly im-
pressed by the potential for inadvertent escalation that is associated with strategic ASW, and 
would probably have seen any Yankee as legitimate quarry. 
Secondly, there were also new deployment options for a dual capable Yankee. If some 
had been assigned to anti-carrier duties, they could have been deployed in patrol areas much 
closer to home, which would have obviated the need to pass through SOSUS-monitored 
chokepoints during the outbound and inbound legs of their patrols. As a result, the surviva-
bility of these noisy platforms would have increased substantially, especially if they were as-
signed patrol areas in shallow waters or other areas with marginal acoustic conditions. In the 
event, relatively few Yankees were sent on forward patrols in any case, which led to a posture 
of de facto keeping most of them in home waters, even though the SS-N-6 could not reach U.S. 
targets from home waters.143 Had the same submarines been equipped with mix of land-attack 
and anti-ship missiles, they could simultaneously have provided both anti-carrier defense in 
the Northern Fleet area and theater nuclear coverage of Northern Europe – including the Po-
laris forward base at Holy Loch, Scotland. This would have presaged the later SSBN ‘bastion’ 
 
141 Ibid., 18. 
142 This problem of distinguishability is not completely unlike the one that the U.S. submarine force faced in 
the context of the Maritime Strategy’s far-forward SSN operations – the critical difference being that these 
operations were supposed to target SSBNs. Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear 
Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 139-40. 
143 On patrol rates, see Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword, 288 n.80.  
 





doctrine and added an important twist to it, while reinforcing the VMF’s basic direction of 
travel.  
Overall, the flexibility of a dual-purpose platform and the diversification of the anti-
carrier threat would probably have spurred greater U.S. investment in defensive measures, as 
well as strategic anti-submarine warfare earlier in the competition. On the Soviet side, it may 
well have resulted in the development of conventionally-armed ASBMs at some later date. 
What other implications a dual-purpose SSBN fleet would have had for the U.S. Maritime 
Strategy debates of the 1980s will never be known, but the possibility does make for some 
captivating counterfactual thinking. Following the VMF’s decision not to make the anti-ship 
ballistic missile a staple of its SSBN fleet, it took another forty years before the U.S. Navy had 
to seriously contend with the threat these weapons posed. However, the potential of ASBMs 
to complicate the leading navy’s sea control mission was not lost on future challengers.144 As 
of 2019, the reemergence of the ASBM concept remains an important driver of the U.S. Navy’s 
techno-doctrinal adjustment in the face of China’s 21st century take on oceanic area defense. 
 
5.3.4 The air threat: growing fangs 
While the Soviet submarines force was awaiting delivery of its first Project 675 and Project 651 
anti-carrier submarines in the 1960s, the AVMF’s naval strike force was also growing into a 
sea denial instrument to be reckoned with. A steady stream of Tu-16s had already been re-
ceived, with five regiments in service by 1960. Until the early 1970s, the number of missile-
carrying Badgers would increase to 250, a large fraction of which would serve in the Northern 
Fleet area.145 The fact that the aircraft itself had considerable potential for growth is perhaps 
 
144  The most comprehensive account of China’s ASBM development is still Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-
Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications (Washington, DC: 
Jamestown Foundation, 2013). See also Jonathan Solomon, “Defending the Fleet from China's Anti-Ship Bal-
listic Missile: Naval Deception's Role in Sea-based Missile Defense” (Master's thesis, Georgetown University, 
15 April 2011).  
145  Gordon and Komissarov, Soviet Naval Aviation, 1946-1991, 104; 124. Ibid., 104, 124.  
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best illustrated by the fact that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is not only still operating 
license-built Badgers in 2019 but actually building new airframes for the H-6J naval version.146 
On the other hand, the Soviet Badger of the early 1960s was still limited to the KS-1 
missile, which severely constricted its flight profile. The capability that the Kometa provided 
was steadily improved, which is a testament to Soviet improvisation skills:  
“In early 1958 a crew captained by […] Col. V.I. Dubina successfully launched both missiles 
in a single sortie, guiding them all the way in. Shortly afterwards the Black Sea Fleet mas-
tered a technique in which a single Tu-16KS guided three missiles (launched by several air-
craft of course). Later, multiple KS-1s were repeatedly launched by different aircraft on di-
verging headings differing by up to 45°, using this technique. During naval exercises the 
missile strike units practiced concerted attacks on converging headings from four or even six 
directions.”147 
 
While U.S. task forces might have struggled to defend against even this moderate threat in the 
early 1960s, the basic KS-1 was at best only ever a stopgap. Even in the mid-1950s, the longer-
term solution was expected to be a supersonic missile, which would also be carried by a su-
personic aircraft. By 1955, planning was well under way for both. A prototype of what would 
eventually become the Tu-22 (NATO designation: Blinder) flew in 1958. The corresponding 
missile would be the Kh-22, which Western naval forces would come to know as the AS-4 
Kitchen. The U.S. Navy could count itself lucky that major problems with the aircraft meant 
that the Kh-22 would not be operationally deployed until the early 1970s. As we will see, this 
threat would have been extremely difficult to counter in the 1960s. As things stood, however, 
the Badger would have to do the heavy lifting and would be equipped with a series of more 
capable missiles to improve its odds of overcoming the improving Western defenses. 
The first of these weapons was the Mikoyan K-10 (NATO designation: AS-2 Kipper), 
which not only doubled the standoff range of the KS-1 but also introduced supersonic speed 
and on-board active radar guidance.148 Moreover, the K-10 could be fired at an oblique angle, 
 
146  Jane's Defence Weekly, “China’s PLANAF Acquires New Variant of H-6 Strategic Bomber,” IHS Jane's, 
https://www.janes.com/article/83736/china-s-planaf-acquires-new-variant-of-h-6-strategic-bomber.   
147  Gordon and Komissarov, Soviet Naval Aviation, 1946-1991, 103. 
148 See Friedman, Seapower and Space, 143-45; Yefim Gordon, Soviet/Russian Aircraft Weapons: Since World War 
Two (Hinkley: Midland, 2004), 81-88. 
 





allowing the aircraft to make an 80 degree turn after launch, which would minimize its expo-
sure to CAP fighters.149 This in turn led the U.S. Navy to extend the CAP radius, and a succes-
sion of competitive adaptation cycles ensued, with each generation of Soviet missiles reaching 
further than the one before.150 The main disadvantage of the K-10 was that a Badger could carry 
only one, rather than a pair. Of course, this becomes less of a limitation if we allow that tactical 
nuclear use against carrier groups was a real possibility – and, given the strategic nuclear mis-
sion of U.S. carriers into the 1960s, it was. Soviet naval officers believed that the VMF had to 
be capable of preemptive attacks, either in the first moments of the war or the final moments 
of a crisis, and involving a volume of fire that would make sure that the carrier itself would be 
reliably disabled. The best chance of achieving this was to use tactical nuclear weapons from 
the outset. Writing in Voennaya mysl in 1962, one Captain First Rank Mamayev identified the 
problem the VMF was facing: 
“Since a carrier strike large unit always carries nuclear weapons, and has its own means 
for their delivery one simply can not speak of weakening such a grouping. In all cases one 
must strive for its destruction before the carrier aircraft have reached the take-off line […] 
It is therefore more correct not to speak of weakening but of the immediate destruction of 
the strike carriers at the beginning of combat operations. The mere weakening of a group-
ing of the enemy's carrier forces does not remove the threat of a sudden nuclear attack by 
him, and does not decrease the strain on the forces detailed to repulse an enemy incursion 
from the air.”151 
  
In fact, almost all of the missiles that were deployed on the new Tu-16K-10 (Badger-C) were of 
the nuclear-armed K-10S variant.152 This made the aircraft primarily a tactical nuclear platform 
with a conventional option, rather than the other way around. Equally importantly from the 
perspective of posture change, the K-10 was also the first anti-ship missile to fully embrace the 
‘mechanics’ of missile combat, by providing the ability to orchestrate saturation attacks from 
multiple vectors: “In a  group attack, up to eighteen missiles could be launched from one of 
 
149  Friedman, Seapower and Space, 144.  
150  Ibid., 143. 
151 Ye. Mamayev, "New Developments in Combat with Carrier Strike Large Units in the Initial Period of War", 
1962, CIA Historical Collection/Translations from "Military Thought," 6. Emphasis added. 
152 Gordon, Soviet/Russian Aircraft Weapons, 87. Reliable information on the warhead yield is difficult to come 
by, but at 1,000 kg the payload capacity of the K-10S was substantial.   
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several directions beyond the range of the ships’ surface-to-air missile systems without having 
the missiles’ guidance systems affect each other.”153 If all or most of these missile were nuclear-
armed, they could wipe out an entire carrier group in a matter of minutes. Based on the out-
comes of U.S. air defense exercises in the late 1950s (see Chapter 4), even a purely conventional 
attack of this size might have inflicted heavy damage. Overall, for two systems that were an 
expression of rapid technological change, the Badger and K-10 turned out to be a rather capable 
and long-lived combination. 
The same was not true of another system that became operational during roughly the 
same period as the Kipper. The KSR-2, developed by Aleksander Bereznyak (also the head of 
the Raduga design bureau from 1967 onwards), was intended as a one-for-one replacement 
for the obsolescent KS-1 and as such was designed to be light enough to be carried in pairs. 
With low-subsonic speed and a range of 160 km, the most dramatic improvement compared 
to its predecessor was the reliance on on-board active radar guidance. Although this was a 
sensible development to improve the survivability of the launch platform, it proved to be the 
missile’s Achilles heel, due to the low resistance of the seeker to electronic countermeasures 
(ECM). Together with its sensitivity to less-than-ideal weather conditions, this rendered the 
missile’s performance suspect from the outset.154 Moreover, although the Badger’s ability to 
carry two of the missiles, as opposed to a single K-10, theoretically doubled a regiment’s fire-
power, the salvo size remained limited to twenty.155 Given the poor performance of the original 
missile and the availability of a better alternative in the K-10, the KSR-2 was developed into 
an anti-radiation missile to target the U.S. Navy shipboard air search and engagement radars. 
This KSR-11 version was an important addition to the AVMF’s arsenal at the time, but it had 
an all-important limitation of its own: it could only home onto radars while they were still 
operating and quickly lost all guidance if the target’s air defense radar was shut down.156 
 
153 Gordon and Komissarov, Soviet Naval Aviation, 1946-1991, 116.  
154 Ibid., 111.  
155 Ibid. It is important to note that early Badger variants were built to carry a specific missile payload. The 
aircraft, missile, and guidance system were tightly integrated at the design stage and there was little flexibility 
built into the entire weapon system. Later versions, notably the Tu-16K-10-26 variant introduced in 1969, 
could carry both the K-10 and KRS-2/5/11, which was a very considerable improvement.  
156 Ibid. See also Gordon, Soviet/Russian Aircraft Weapons, 99-101.  
 





The final stages in the development of the missile-carrying Badger revolved around the 
Raduga KSR-5 missile (NATO designation: AS-6 Kingfish), which replaced the KSR-2, and its 
KSR-5P anti-radar variant, which replaced the KSR-11. Both missiles were far more capable 
than their respective predecessors. With supersonic speed in excess of Mach 2.5, increased 
ranges of up to 240 kilometers and much better ECM-resistance, they allowed the aging Tu-16 
to remain a somewhat competitive participant in the anti-carrier game into the early 1980s.157 
As for the supersonic missile platforms, the AVMF had been waiting for since the late 1950s, 
this was a much more vexed story, which resulted in repeated setbacks in the Soviet search for 
a credible, airborne anti-carrier capability. 
Fig. 22: An unarmed Tu-16 Badger shadowing USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) during the final phase of the 
Cold War at sea. Such close shadowing by Soviet assets was central to the VMF’s wartime employment 
concepts in the Mediterranean, but did not necessarily reflect those developed for the North Atlantic. 
(U.S. National Archives) 
 
The prototype of what would become the Tu-22 Blinder was developed in the mid-1950s as 
‘Aircraft 105’. The Tu-22K missile carrier and its Kh-22 payload were originally expected to 
enter service in the early 1960s. However, the technical problems with the aircraft and the 
 
157  Ibid., 109-15.  
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missile, which both pushed the limits of aeronautical engineering at the time, were such that 
the complete weapon system was not inducted into service until 1971.158 Ultimately, few mis-
sile-carrying Blinders were build and none of them were operated by the AVMF.159 Although 
it was operated by a few Long-Range Aviation regiments from the early 1970s onwards, the 
formidable Kh-22 was still waiting for a naval strike aircraft to carry it into battle.  
 That aircraft was the Tu-22M Backfire, which actually had “absolutely no structural 
commonality”160 with its earlier namesake and had been known as Tu-145 during its develop-
ment. What it did have in common with the Blinder was an extended period of teething trou-
bles, which meant that the first production aircraft did not become available until 1974. With 
its variable-sweep wing design, top speed of Mach 1.45, and heavy armament of up to three 
Kh-22M ASMs, this Tu-22M2 missile carrier would become the face of the airborne anti-carrier 
threat for the rest of the Cold War. In 1978, the further improved M3 version started produc-
tion. Like the Oscar-class of PLARKs that were under construction during the same period, 
these aircraft finally realized the vision of the late 1950s, of an effective deterrent and war-
fighting counter to the U.S. Navy’s carrier groups. Also, much like the Oscars, the mature Back-
fire would find its main use in a defense concept that was considerably more circumscribed 
and overall very different in complexion from the far-seas barrier that had once been imagined. 
The AVMF eventually deployed nine regiments of Backfires – two in each fleet area, as well as 
an independent regiment.161 The VVS had a further fourteen regiments that could be employed 
in support of naval missions if so directed. 
Together with the highly capable Kh-22M missile in both conventional and nuclear 
variants, these aircraft became a central pillar of the anti-carrier element of the Soviet naval 
posture. The missile had a range of up to 500 kilometers, which amounted to only about eight 
 
158 The complete story of the Blinder and Backfire is covered in great detail in Yefim Gordon and Dmitriy 
Komissarov, Tupolev Tu-22/Tu-22M (Hersham: Midland, 2012). On the Tu-22 development process, see ibid., 
esp. 6-31.  
159 Friedman, Seapower and Space, 151. 
160 Gordon and Komissarov, Tupolev Tu-22/Tu-22M, 191. According to the authors, this was largely a cover-
up of the failure of the original Tu-22 and of the steps that were taken to remedy the situation by building an 
entirely new aircraft, directed primarily at the RVSN and its partisans in the defense-industrial complex. 
161  Ibid., 330. 
 





minutes of flight time at Mach 3.162 With three different guidance variants and improved ECM-
resistance, it was much more difficult to counter for Western air defenses than any of its pre-
decessors. If it managed to score a hit, even the conventional warhead was powerful enough 
to “tear a 20-m2 (215—sq. ft) hole in a ship’s side and burn its way 12 m (30ft) into the interior; 
thus, the carrier would almost certainly go down after taking several hits even if the attackers 
were destroyed.”163 
 
Fig. 23: Unequal opponents: the massive Tu-22M Backfire strike aircraft and its nemesis, the F-14A 
Tomcat fleet defense fighter, in close proximity. (U.S. Department of Defense) 
 
Overall, we can conclude that the air threat to U.S. Navy surface task groups would have been 
much more severe earlier in the competition, if the Tu-22 and Tu-22M programs had not run 
into major difficulties. By the time the Tu-22M2 became available in numbers, U.S. fleet air 
defenses were in much better shape to counter it, even though the task still remained formi-
dable. As we will see below, the same was true of the tasks facing the attacking AVMF regi-
ments as well, which makes the outcomes of a potential engagement fairly difficult to assess. 
 
162  Gordon, Soviet/Russian Aircraft Weapons, 101-108.  
163 Gordon and Komissarov, Tupolev Tu-22/Tu-22M, 328. We will take a closer look at this statement in section 
5.4.2.  
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For the time being, it is sufficient to acknowledge that by the late 1970s, the AVMF’s anti-
surface capabilities were on a par with those of the VMF’s submarines. On paper, these forces 
were powerful enough to severely maul U.S. carrier groups within a 1,000 km radius from the 
Soviet coast and, with diminishing effectiveness, beyond. At sea, a number of additional ele-
ments would come into play. These will be further discussed in section 5.4.1 below.   
 
 
5.4 Containing the anti-carrier threat I: the ASW element          
5.4.1 A balanced system with stubborn imperfections 
Coming back to the threats the U.S. Navy faced from Soviet submarines, the American re-
sponse unsurprisingly fell into two main components: defense against the platforms them-
selves and defense against the weapons they carried, with anti-ship missiles in particular trig-
gering sustained techno-doctrinal adjustments. In this present section, we will look at the ASW 
part of the equation. As we will see, the Soviet approach of attacking the carrier with both 
long- and short-range submarine-launched weapons engaged a curious mixture of U.S. Navy 
strengths and weaknesses. Whereas wide-area ASW cued by SOSUS and other technical 
means improved greatly during the 1960s, and the independent hunter-killer groups also be-
came more useful as a result, ASW at the battle group level languished. Moreover, effective 
wartime coordination of the constituent elements of the increasingly intricate ASW complex – 
even those that were individually effective – was not a foregone conclusion. Hence, in its initial 
form, the Navy’s defense-in-depth approach to protecting its carriers may well have come 
apart at the seams, if sufficient pressure had been exerted upon it.  
In the early 1970s, the basic division between offensive, wide-area ASW and fleet self-
defense was further entrenched by the decision not to replace the ageing ASW carriers and 
instead add their mission load to that of the attack carrier force. The reclassification of the 
CVAs to general-purpose CVs was a sensible – perhaps even unavoidable – step in budgetary 
 





terms, and it did provide the carrier air wing with an organic ASW element that could reach 
far ahead off the main body.164 That said, the defensive ASW task was never an easy fit for the 
battle group organization and could only ever establish itself as a secondary mission. “To get 
the offensive-oriented carrier thinking defensively in an environment as foreign to its nature 
as ASW”165 proved to be a daunting task, and battle group defenses continued to lag behind 
for the remainder of the Cold War. 
Fortunately for the U.S. Navy, its sustained investment in operational-level, wide-area 
ASW – i.e., the coordinated prosecution of submarine contacts on an oceanic scale – did result 
in a highly professionalized and tightly coordinated system. The combination of a layered 
ASW effort with a continuing acoustic advantage would probably have averted much of the 
harm that a more capable VMF submarine force could do from the mid-1960s onwards. Need-
less to say, perfect situational awareness resulting in an efficient utilization of resources at all 
the various levels of the ASW effort nevertheless remained a distant aspiration. In a major war, 
even one that remained conventional, losses to submarines armed with increasingly lethal 
weaponry were inevitable. Whether a carrier – or carriers – would have been among them is 
not a question that can be answered in the abstract. However, a systematic examination of the 
evolution of the U.S. anti-submarine warfare complex provides some important indications as 




5.4.2 Operational intelligence: the ultimate force multiplier    
One of the most significant areas of progress in ASW during this second phase of the undersea 
competition was one that has long distinguished itself mainly by its opacity.166 Next to the 
 
164 The Carrier Air Groups were designated Carrier Air Wings (CVWs) in 1963.  
165 Scott Kelly, “Carrier ASW: Can Do,” USNI Proceedings 116, no. 1 (1990), 74.  
166 One side effect of this opacity is that this section can rely on relatively few high-quality sources. The most 
comprehensive study so far is Christopher A. Ford and David Alan Rosenberg, The Admirals' Advantage: U.S. 
Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014).  
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more visible elements of anti-submarine defense, operational intelligence (OPINTEL) can ap-
pear to be a world unto itself, and yet it was a key determinant of the performance of the ASW 
complex in its entirety. A brainchild of the British Admiralty, toughened up and refined dur-
ing the Second Battle of the Atlantic, the key contribution of the OPINTEL process was to fuse 
intelligence from a multitude of – primarily technical – sources into a consolidated situational 
picture.167 During 1939-1945, this was a task performed with increasing effectiveness by the 
Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Center (OIC), which was responsible for tracking all Ger-
man submarine operations and disseminating ‘actionable’ intelligence to the frontline com-
mands. At the center of the British system was the Submarine Tracking Room (STR), staffed 
by less than two dozen people even during some of the hottest phases of the battle. The deputy 
head of the STR, Patrick Beesly, describes the heart of the Allied ASW effort in the Atlantic as 
follows: 
“In the centre of the room was a large plotting table on which were displayed the current 
positions and routes of all British and Allied vessels and convoys in the North Atlantic 
and our estimate of the dispositions of the U-boats. On another chart table was a copy of 
the German Naval Grid […] and on the walls were other charts covering the South Atlan-
tic, the Indian Ocean, or Norwegian Sea. Graphs and charts showing the number and 
location of U-boats in port, training, or building, as well as Allied shipping losses and 
replacements occupied the rest of the wall space. […] The STR had direct communications 
by scrambler telephone or telex to […] all major maritime commands in the United King-
dom. There was similar direct communication with Bletchley Park [the main wartime sig-
nals intelligence center, MH] and direct telephone and telex lines to the principal DF [di-
rection finding, MH] stations throughout the United Kingdom.”168  
 
Based primarily on SIGINT, in the form of direction-finding cues and cryptanalysis of inter-
cepted wireless traffic, but taking into account any available information whatsoever, the STR 
provided sufficient situational awareness to route most convoys around German submarine 
 
167 On the British experience with OPINTEL during the Second Battle, see Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelli-
gence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939-1945 (London: Greenhill, 2000). The 
standard reference source remains: F. H. Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World 
War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979-1990). 
168 Patrick Beesly, “Operational Intelligence and the Battle of the Atlantic: The Role of the Royal Navy’s Sub-
marine Tracking Room,” in The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968, ed. James A. Boutilier (Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press, 1982), 179.  
 





concentrations. As the war progressed, the Allied navies also became more and more profi-
cient at using OPINTEL to vector independent offensive assets – HUKs and maritime patrol 
aircraft – towards confirmed or suspected U-boat positions. At the height of the OIC’s success,  
“intelligence could show precisely which areas, which convoys, and which ships were threat-
ened, as well as which were clear of danger. Maximum available strength could be concen-
trated at the decisive points and other, safer targets almost stripped of their defenses. […] In 
the STR we knew at least as well as Dönitz what his U-boats were doing.”169 
 
While it is difficult to quantify the impact of operational intelligence, it is evident that this 
intimate understanding of its resources and dispositions put the U-Bootwaffe at a decisive dis-
advantage even while the Allied ASW effort at sea remained patchy. As the Allied navies be-
gan to expand their coverage of the North Atlantic theater with increased force levels in the 
air and on the surface, and with better area sensors, like airborne radar and shipboard direc-
tion finding, their advantage turned into crushing superiority. By late 1944, the U-Bootwaffe 
found that the operational approach on which it had relied for most of the war had become 
untenable – fast runs on the surface, centralized control via wireless, and effective concentra-
tion of forces based on regular position reports now exposed the boats to mortal danger.170 If 
new tactical sensors, better platforms and more effective weaponry were immediately respon-
sible for this outcome, it was the operational-level “sensor”171 wielded by the OIC that told the 
forces at sea where to look – and, just as importantly, where not to look.   
While the British contribution remained at center stage throughout the Battle of the 
Atlantic, the U.S. Navy adopted many elements of the OIC’s system and developed an OPIN-
TEL system of its own, with separate nodes for the Atlantic and Pacific theaters and important 
differences in approach between them. The Atlantic node was integrated with the British effort 
to a very large extent, although bureaucratic frictions were unavoidable.172 Reflecting the dif-
ferent conditions in that theater, operational intelligence in the Pacific focused more on major 
 
169 Ibid., 184. 
170 See, e.g. Marc Milner, Battle of the Atlantic (Stroud: The History Press, 2014), 204. 
171 On the idea of OPINTEL as a sensor, see Ford and Rosenberg, The Admirals' Advantage, 6. 
172 Ibid., 8-12. On the U.S.-UK intelligence cooperation, see Alan Harris Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy: The 
Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998). 
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offensive operations and the Imperial Japanese fleet as a whole, but proved similarly effective 
in covering its areas of greatest concern.173 Overall, it is probably fair to say that neither of the 
U.S. OPINTEL hubs quite matched the uncluttered efficiency of the British system. The more 
critical finding, however, is that the U.S. Navy quickly accepted the paradigm of OPINTEL fu-
sion as a critical force multiplier. The approach it applied during the Cold War was very much 
an extension of the World War II system, even if they transcended the historical precedent in 
some respects – the sheer volume of data that had to be handled being the most important. 
In fact, the US Navy’s wartime plotting system never quite disappeared, even though 
it largely lay dormant during the first part of the Cold War naval competition. As we have 
seen, the most notable U.S. advances in oceanic surveillance during the first decade of the 
confrontation were of a technological nature. In addition to SOSUS, which made its first actual 
detections in 1962, the Navy worked on an improved direction-finding system to deal with 
burst transmissions that could not be triangulated with existing means – another Kriegsmarine 
innovation, adopted by the VMF in the late 1950s.174 Run by the Naval Security Group – the 
service cryptologic element – and known as CLASSIC BULLSEYE, this global system became 
operational in the early 1960s and eventually comprised twenty-one U.S. and eight Allied in-
stallations.175 Together, the SOSUS and high frequency direction finder (HF/DF) subsystems 
would form the foundation of the Navy’s wide-area ASW coverage for the rest of the Cold 
War. The Navy also developed a space-based electronic intelligence (ELINT) system, which 
 
173 Ford and Rosenberg, The Admirals' Advantage, 12-13. The standard accounts of the Pacific War from an 
intelligence-centric perspective are still: W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations 
in the Pacific during World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979); John Prados, Combined Fleet 
Decoded: American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (New York, NY: Random House, 1995); 
Edward J. Drea, MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945 (Lawrence, KS: Uni-
versity Press of Kansas, 1992). 
174 See Naval Historical Foundation, “Ocean Surveillance during the Cold War: Sensing, Fusion, Exploitation” 
(transcript of the 2010 Submarine Force Birthday History Seminar, Naval Historical Foundation, 2010), 2; 
Friedman, Seapower and Space, 175-76. On the German Kurier system for burst transmission, see Kathleen 
Broome Williams, Secret Weapon: U.S. High-Frequency Direction Finding in the Battle of the Atlantic (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 53-54.  
175 See Matthew M. Aid, “The NSA and the Cold War,” in Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and 
Beyond, ed. Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 45. For technical details of the 
system, see Nick England, “AN/FRD-10 Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA) Receiving System,” 
http://www.navy-radio.com/frd10.htm.  
 





later became known as CLASSIC WIZARD.176 Beating the Air Force to the punch, the service 
deployed its first ELINT satellites during 1960-1962, with Soviet air defense radars as their 
primary target.177 Naval-focused ELINT collection continued after the National Reconnais-
sance Office took over the services’ space-based reconnaissance assets, with a series of ocean 
surveillance spacecraft designated POPPY 1 through 7 (1962-1971) and PARCEA 1 through 8 
(1971-1987).178 Apparently, “it was not until the late sixties that the United States intelligence 
community began to evaluate the ability of elint [sic] satellites specifically to intercept the 
emissions of naval vessels and use them to track those vessels.”179 The OPINTEL function of 
space-based surveillance was initially used against the VMF’s Mediterranean squadron, the 5th 
Eskadra, and became fully established by the mid-1970s.180 It is, however, safe to assume that 
space-based ELINT played a more limited role in anti-submarine warfare operations than in 
oceanic surveillance more broadly, due to the relative lack of exploitable signatures, such as 
powerful radars. 
As for the OPINTEL system that would tie together these various assets, it was only 
when one more strand of technological innovation – the rise of automated data processing – 
met a growing operational need in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis that an integrated 
oceanic surveillance system began to come together.181 The Navy was first instructed to de-
velop an integrated surveillance system as early as 1964 and it began to implement aspects of 
 
176 See Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 59.  
177 Friedman, Seapower and Space, 101-103; Robert A. McDonald and Sharon K. Moreno, “Raising the Periscope: 
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veillance,” The Space Review, 2008, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1115/1; Dwayne A. Day, “Atop the 
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such a system soon thereafter.182 However, up until the late 1960s, ocean surveillance efforts 
were undertaken both in a centralized manner, by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and in a 
decentralized manner, at the level of fleets and operational commands. Information sharing 
between these various actors was complicated by the use of disparate methods of data collec-
tion, as well as by classification concerns.183 The use of computerized data processing to esti-
mate submarine and ship movements in real time was already technically possible, but the 
available data was filed in formats that were unsuitable for such treatment.184 In other words, 
“the U.S. Navy had elements that could be developed into an ocean surveillance system, but 
they had not been designed to work together.”185 
This began to change during 1969-1972, with the establishment of the Ocean Surveil-
lance Information System (OSIS). Based on the 6th Fleet’s pioneering efforts at improving its 
situational awareness vis-à-vis an increasing VMF presence in its area of operations, as well as 
earlier attempts of the naval intelligence bureaucracy to harmonize information sharing and 
move towards near-real time plotting of enemy positions, this proved to be a major break-
through.186 As Ford and Rosenberg explain, “[s]imply put, “ocean surveillance information” 
was OPINTEL painted on a global canvas and incorporating a wider variety of sensors and 
analytical inputs than ever before imaginable.”187 OSIS consisted of several elements, which 
were interconnected by the fastest data links available at the time.188 The central node, known 
as the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC), was erected in Suitland, Mary-
land and could be seen as a direct descendent of the Admiralty’s Submarine Tracking Room. 
Focused on ASW, it was charged with providing a unified picture of Soviet submarine opera-
tions.189 To this end, NOSIC analysts not only plotted submarine movements and wrote them 
 
182 Naval Historical Foundation, “Ocean Surveillance during the Cold War: Sensing, Fusion, Exploitation”, 4-
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up on a daily basis for their operational-level ‘consumers’. They also began to develop a digital 
library of submarine acoustic signatures that allowed the Navy to more easily identify the 
unique signature of each Soviet submarine, rather than just classify them.190 Just as important 
as NOSIC, although less narrowly focused on ASW, were the two Fleet Ocean Surveillance 
Information Facilities (FOSIFs) for the forward-deployed 6th and 7th Fleets, and three theater 
nodes known as Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Centers (FOSICs).191 Like their World 
War II precedents, these facilities were all about fusing intelligence inputs – whether they were 
derived from SOSUS, HF/DF, outside signals intelligence (SIGINT)  materials, imagery intelli-
gence, sightings, or other sources – into a single, coherent picture.192 OSIS was up and running 
by the end of this second phase of the competition, although its development continued into 
the 1980s and limitations remained.193 As the former OSIS practitioner and Director of Naval 
Intelligence, RADM Thomas Brooks, remembers,   
“[o]ur tasking was to maintain knowledge of where the Soviets were at all times and in real 
time. […] But did we ever achieve that? No, we never achieved that but we achieved a goodly 
 
190 Ibid., 62. Up to this point, individual submarines could sometimes be identified by skilled SOSUS or sonar 
operators, but there was no way of doing so reliably for each vessel. According to Ford and Rosenberg, this 
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sought to ‘fingerprint’ Soviet vessels based primarily on their ELINT signatures. See also: Day, “Above the 
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SR-71 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, for all-weather imaging radar coverage of Northern Fleet bases. One 
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ings, a snapshot of the entire basing complex on the Kola peninsula could be gleaned from these overflights. 
According to one former Air Force officer involved in the program, “the driving reason we established a 
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Sea.” Quoted in: Paul Crickmore, Lockheed Blackbird: Beyond the Secret Missions (Revised Edition) (Oxford: Os-
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by the late-career SR-71, displayed on pages 400-402, give some idea of why the Navy was the last service to 
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part of it. We […] tracked the most important and the most threatening of the Soviet naval 
platforms pretty much all the time and pretty much in real time.”194 
 
Needless to say, there were no guarantees whatsoever that this level of success in the peace-
time setting could be replicated under wartime conditions. Nevertheless, even if the system 
was degraded over time, it would still be extremely useful during a crisis as well as during the 
initial phase of the conflict. While SOSUS and direction finding alone could often provide good 
results up until the mid-1970s, the all-source nature of the system rendered it not only poten-
tially more accurate, but also more robust. With OSIS in place, a partial or temporary loss of 
SOSUS coverage became more bearable, although a complete loss of coverage would still have 
had a major impact on the level of situational awareness.195 The fact that it was “as much a 
process or approach as a specific type of information provided to operational commanders”196 
reduced the dangers of overreliance on potentially vulnerable elements of the system. As long 
as sufficient inputs could be generated from whatever sources were still available and one or 
more OSIS hubs remained in operation, operational intelligence would be a central component 
of the Navy’s ASW threat mitigation.  
This applied not only to the anti-SLOC scenario Allied planners continued to fret 
about, but also to the anti-carrier threat. To keep CVBGs from running into dangerous concen-
trations of Soviet submarines in the first place, a tightly synchronized, theater-level ASW effort 
was the primary requirement. If submarines could be detected early in the game and the rele-
vant information acted upon in time, the CVBG’s defensive screen would not have to bear an 
outsized share of the burden and was much less likely to be overloaded by multiple, coordi-
nated attacks. In effect, operational intelligence was at least as likely to keep U.S. carriers afloat 
as their ASW escorts were. That said, even at its best, OPINTEL could only set up engagements 
or avert them. In both cases, it could disrupt the VMF’s plans but it could not directly impact 
the opponent’s level of capability. This leads us to the second element of the maturing ASW 
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complex: independent, wide-area operations by fast attack submarines, maritime patrol air-
craft and, to a lesser extent, surface hunter-killer groups. 
 
5.4.3 Layered theater-wide ASW comes of age   
During the first half of the 1960s, the Navy’s approach to long-range antisubmarine operations 
matured considerably and took a form that remained current for the remainder of the Cold 
War confrontation, despite the shift towards a more aggressive forward ASW posture during 
the 1980s. Best described as a “layered”197 theater-wide approach, this element of the ASW 
complex exploited cueing – mainly from SOSUS and HF/DF during c. 1962-1972 and increas-
ingly from all-source OSIS hubs thereafter – to reacquire, track, and engage VMF submarines 
both during transit and in their area of operations. While the layered theater-wide approach 
was often described as a series of attritional “barriers”198 Soviet submarines would have had 
to pass through, this may not be the most accurate description of how this element of the ASW 
effort would have worked in practice. It is true that the geography of the two main theaters – 
the Norwegian Sea and the Northwestern Pacific Ocean – favored the erection of barrier zones 
at certain chokepoints. In the European rimlands, the Spitsbergen-Bear Island-North Cape gap 
and the Greenland-Iceland-Norway (GIN) or Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gaps are obvious 
candidates. In the Pacific rimlands, the tight chain formed by the Kuriles and the narrow gaps 
between the continental Asia, Sakhalin, and the Japanese archipelago constricted VMF forces 
to an even greater extent.199 Having said that, a major advantage of wide-area surveillance was 
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to allow long-range ASW forces to counter submarines – especially noisy ones, which made 
up most of the VMF’s inventory – almost anywhere in the theater. Hence, one of the most im-
portant effects of the new approach was to free up ASW forces that would otherwise be rigidly 
tied to the narrowest points of the submarine transit routes to increase their chances of acquir-
ing and engaging a “GOBLIN.”200 Hence, the ASW posture that Western ASW forces were 
expected to assume in wartime, based largely on static barriers in predictable locations, would 
probably have become more and more dynamic as the quality of OPINTEL outputs increased 
in the 1970s. There was simply no point in waiting for a good submarine contact generated by 
large-area surveillance to either reach a barrier – which might be many hundreds of nautical 
miles ahead – or go cold, if it could be pursued within the next air tasking cycle or by a friendly 
submarine standing in a favorable position close by. A less stringently doctrinaire view of what 
wartime ASW operations would have looked like would assume a more flexible, less predict-
able, layered approach in which every GOBLIN would have been prosecuted as far forward 
as reasonably possible, by the first suitable ASW asset that could be arrayed against it. At the 








200 GOBLIN is the ASW brevity code for a “submerged contact assumed to be hostile.” See C. H. Gates, “An-
tisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Lexicon” (Technical Document 1727, Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego, 
CA, 1990), 4.  
 





FAR FORWARD TO BEGIN WITH: THE ‘FAST ATTACKS’ 
The first layer (or layers), closest to the sources of the opponent’s submarine strength, would 
naturally have been formed by fast attack submarines. While SSNs could profitably be used in 
any area that sat astride a likely transit route and that was not patrolled by other ASW forces 
that might mistake them for a hostile contact, they were they only assets that could reliably 
operate inside Soviet sea denial zones. Hence, both US and British SSNs were earmarked for 
far-forward anti-submarine operations long before such operations became a bone of conten-
tion in the public debate about the Maritime Strategy. Palmer notes that As VADM John 
Thatch – the former Task Group ALFA commander and in charge of the Antisubmarine War-
fare Force of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT) – wrote in 1963,  
“[k]iller submarines will be especially valuable for employment in waters near enemy sub-
marine bases, where our surface ships and aircraft would become unduly exposed to in-
creased air and missile threats. Equipped with the very latest electronic equipment and wea-
ponry, these SSN’s [sic], with their highly trained crews, represent our first building block in 
the development of a truly ‘forward’ ASW strategy.”201  
 
When construction of the Sturgeon-class attack boats began that same year, the design included 
not only extensive quieting measures but also features for under-ice operations and forward 
reconnaissance. The UK’s Swiftsure-class attack submarines, the first of which was ordered in 
1967, adopted similar priorities.202 Also in 1967, the USN began to explore options for a follow-
on to the Sturgeons, the first of which was about to be commissioned. In a submission to the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the missions the next-generation attack submarine 
would have to perform were ranked in order of their relative importance: 
“1. forward area (i.e., operations near enemy bases, which would test the undetectability 
 of the submarine), 
 
201  John W. Thach, “The ASW Navy of the Seventies,” USNI Proceedings 89, no. 1 (January 1963), 
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2.  track/trail (e.g., of enemy ballistic missile submarines), 
3.  escort (direct support) [of CVBGs in particular, MH], 
4.  coordinated operations (open-ocean attacks on enemy submarines cued by  
 friendly forces or fixed detectors such as SOSUS), 
5.  ancillary (e.g., anti-ship, mining, surveillance, landing of personnel, training, devel-
opment).”203 
 
While the Los Angeles-class that eventually succeeded the Sturgeons was not a direct descend-
ant of this so-called CONFORM study, and direct support would probably have been rated 
higher in its original concept of operations, far-forward ASW remained very much at the top 
of the list of priorities. Thus, a strong focus on the VMF’s ‘front yard’ existed long before Soviet 
defensive bastions became an accepted fact in the Western discourse, and forward SSN em-
ployment a matter of public concern. While details of Cold War submarine operations mostly 
remain classified, more than enough information has leaked to verify that U.S. and Royal Navy 
SSNs from the Sturgeons and Swiftsures onwards have also frequently been deployed in the 
closest proximity to Soviet bases in peacetime.204 Again, this was true both before the 1980s 
Maritime Strategy was formulated and after it was put “on the shelf,”205 as the expression goes. 
Just how far forward Western second-generation SSNs like the Sturgeon- and Swiftsure-classes 
would have been deployed is more difficult to ascertain, but the density of expected contacts had 
been an important factor to consider from the outset. As Compton-Hall explains: “NATO SSNs 
would most economically and advantageously be employed where Soviet submarines are 
most highly concentrated. […] [T]he most productive ASW operations will probably take place 
in choke points, as far forward as possible, where geography or minefields imply a reasonably 
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dense enemy submarine population.”206 This logic, which almost perforce underpinned the 
efficient employment of assets that were both very effective and in short supply, was clearly 
not an invention of the early 1980s.  
Of course, none of this is to say that forward operations were the only variant of suc-
cessful SSN employment in wartime, or that all SSNs would have been deployed far forward. 
Having said that, the use of ‘fast attacks’ on other missions – defense of friendly SSBNs, direct 
support for CVBGs and other vital formations, insertion of special operations forces, as so forth 
– implied a drain on numbers that only rendered the logic of submarine ‘attack at source’ more 
compelling. Additionally, submarines operating deep inside the enemy’s home waters were 
well placed to provide critical intelligence on enemy methods and deployments in wartime, 
just as they so successfully did in peacetime.207  
One widely acknowledged peacetime intelligence-gathering effort that might not have 
played an important role during actual conflict is trail operations.208 While operations like 
these greatly improved the U.S. and UK understanding of Soviet submarine operations – 
again, in peacetime, with somewhat indeterminate implications for other scenarios – and pro-
vided some of the most important acoustic intelligence, there was no real reason to repeat such 
feats once the war had started. On the contrary, it would have been safe to assume that any 
skipper who failed to unflinchingly exploit a favorable tactical situation and ended up shoot-
ing second would not make it home.  
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The second-generation nuclear submarines that the U.S. Navy would have sent into 
the forward ASW battle during this second phase – thirteen Permit-class vessels built between 
1959-1967 and thirty-seven Sturgeon-class boats built during 1963-1975 – were designed ac-
cording to a very consistent set of preferences. Like the Skipjacks before them, they were of 
single-hull construction (with the exception of the bow section, which contained the sonar 
dome) and powered by a single S5W reactor driving twin steam turbines, but a single propeller 
shaft. Also like their predecessors, they combined the large passive sonar array of the earlier 
SSKs with the high sustained speed that only a nuclear submarine could attain. However, what 
made them ideal ASW platforms was the addition of extensive and effective noise reduction 
measures, which early nuclear submarines had lacked. The doomed USS Thresher was the first 
SSN to bring all these design characteristics together. The noise reduction aspect was much 
more strongly emphasized in the development of the Sturgeon class, which sacrificed two 
knots compared to the Permits and up to seven knots compared to the Skipjacks to make space 
for additional quieting measures.209 The systematic nature of this silencing effort resulted in a 
generous acoustic advantage vis-à-vis Soviet first- and second-generation boats. At the same 
time, lower levels of self-noise also increased the performance of the BQQ-2 sonar suite, which 
was already a first-rate system for its time. According to a contemporaneous estimate, the ad-
ditional passive conformal array – originally associated with LOFAR classification – was able 
to detect a snorkeling diesel at a distance of up to 75 nmi, in suitable conditions.210 This, in 
large part, explains the seemingly incongruous qualities the Navy sought for its ASW-focused 
‘fast attacks’: 
“The combination of silencing (often associated with low speed) and high maximum speed 
may seem paradoxical. It was not; indeed it became particularly rational with the introduc-
tion of the new long-range sonars. A very quiet submarine with excellent sonars could expect 
to detect relatively noisy Soviet submarines at very long range, tens of miles or more, far 
beyond weapon range. Therefore, she had to run in to shoot. Alternatively, she could make 
a deep high-speed end run outside the target submarine’s detection range to get ahead for a 
 
209  Friedman, U.S. Submarines since 1945, 146. On the proportional relationship between submarine tonnage 
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bow sector shot. Such shots were particularly important when U.S. submarines were 
equipped with a homing torpedo, a Mk 37, which was only about as fast as its likely Soviet 
SSN target.”211  
 
This also points us towards the major unresolved weakness of the second-generation SSNs: 
while they were very good in nearly every other respect, the possibility of a ‘torpedo crisis’ 
persisted almost until the end of this second phase of the competition. In fact, the situation 
was worse than the above description of the issue lets on. To successfully attack a submarine 
target, a torpedo requires a speed advantage on the order of 50 percent.212 In theory, the effec-
tiveness of the Mark 37 depended on a number of other variables and well-understood design 
limitations.213 By one unsourced estimate, this resulted in a “10-percent effectiveness against a 
20-knot submarine,”214 which one can probably interpret as a single shot probability of kill 
(SSPK) of 0.1 on average. In practice, according to a former commander of USS Skipjack, the 
weapon “had never hit anything that was going faster than 17.5 knots.”215 Designed during 
the era of the Type XXI scare, the Mark 37 was perfectly adequate when used as originally 
envisioned, against snorkeling diesels making a stolid 10 knots, and a major improvement 
over earlier models.216 Alas, the growing number of Soviet nuclear submarines obviated those 
 
211 Friedman, U.S. Submarines since 1945, 141. 
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design parameters, meaning they could generally outrun the Mark 37, unless it was fired from 
an exceedingly favorable tactical position. Thus, for a very substantial period of time, the as-
sorted advantages of the U.S. submarine force – in terms of both technology and skill – had to 
be mustered simply to get into a workable firing position vis-à-vis its otherwise inferior oppo-
nents. The only readily available alternative was the nuclear Mark 45 ASTOR. Tipped with an 
11-kiloton warhead, submariners would often half-jokingly credit the ASTOR with a Pk of 2 – 
“him and me.”217 From 1964 onwards, SUBROC provided an additional, stand-off option – but 
one that likewise involved nuclear use. Given the Navy’s ingrained preference for conven-
tional war and the rise of Flexible Response, neither was a satisfactory solution.  
The torpedo problem was eventually resolved with the introduction of the Mark 48 
Mod 1, large-scale deliveries of which began in 1972. After a lengthy development process that 
led to a contest between two possible variants of the same weapon, the Mod 1 was the torpedo 
the submarine force had been waiting for. Much depended on the new weapon more or less 
living up to the expectations: “All the analyses showed that if the Mark 48 didn’t work, we 
were out of business.”218 With an estimated speed of 55 knots, a maximum diving depth in 
excess of 2,500 ft, four times the seeker range of the modified Mark 37 and perhaps three to 
four times the reach, the new torpedo was the most important addition to submarine ASW 
since the Thresher design had brought together speed, silencing and the long-range sonar.219 
Within just a few years, the change to the Mark 48 resulted in a manifold increase in lethality 
with minimal changes to the ‘fast attack’ platforms themselves. Seeing that every submariner’s 
ultimate goal is to keep ‘surfaces = dives’, even those lucky enough to man the most advanced 
part of the VMF submarine fleet would now have to work much harder to make sure it re-
mained so.  
Ironically, almost simultaneously with the introduction of the Mark 48, a decisively 
improved version of the much-maligned Mark 37 – known as the NT37 – also became availa-
ble. Equipped with a completely new engine section, this rebuild could do 36 knots, which 
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was probably sufficient to kill most first-generation nuclear boats with a double shot at closer 
ranges. This weapon was widely exported and used by several smaller Allied navies until the 
end of the Cold War and, indeed, beyond. Meanwhile, U.S. ‘fast attacks’ ended up carrying a 
mixed complement of Mark 48s (against high-end threats), Mark 37s (against the large number 
of low-end diesels in the VMF), and obsolescent Mark 16 pattern-runners and Mark 14 
straight-runners (against surface ships that did not pose an immediate threat), which were 
eventually retired in 1975 and 1980, respectively.220  
Unlike the ‘torpedo crisis’ the Mark 14 had caused during World War II, the torpedo 
problems of the Cold War did not result in skippers risking their boats and the lives of their 
crew to execute ineffectual attacks with a weapon they knew they could not depend on. The 
more leisurely pattern of peacetime competitive adaptation allowed the Navy to eventually 
adopt an extremely capable weapon that continued to evolve, and versions of which will prob-
ably remain in service half a century after the Cold War ended. However, in what would ap-
pear to be a case of prioritizing platforms over payloads to a potentially pernicious extent, it 
took the service longer than it reasonably should have to fix a basic flaw – one that might have 
triggered echoes of one of the most painful episodes in the history of the submarine force. This 
is all the more difficult to understand because the case of the Mark 45 proves that the industrial 
base was perfectly capable of developing and producing a much faster, deeper-diving torpedo 
in the late 1950s. Yet, for fifteen years – from the introduction of the November-class in 1958 
until the Mark 48 became widely available in the fleet during 1973-1975 – the lack of a fully 
adequate, non-nuclear anti-submarine weapon remained a constraint on the submarine force’s 
effectiveness as the first line of ASW defense. While there is every reason to believe that the 
advantage of the ‘fast attacks’ over their nuclear-propelled opponents in the VMF remained 
 
220 Some sources mention a Mark 37NTS version in U.S. service. The effort to develop the NT37 did, indeed, 
involve the Naval Torpedo Station (NTS) at Keyport, WA – but no specific evidence is available to support 
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US Nuclear Submarines: The Fast Attack (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007); Edward Monroe-Jones and Shawn 
S. Roderick, Submarine Torpedo Tactics: An American History (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2014), 
152. Unfortunately, the Cold War chapters in this latter book contain little specific information on the stated 
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substantial, the loss of even a few of them to the dauntless close-in tactics the Mark 37 neces-
sitated would have been an unacceptable price to pay for the Navy’s institutional inertia in the 
torpedo field. 
 
WATCHING OVER THE MID-FIELD: MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT 
Once they had run the gauntlet of forward-deployed SSNs, suffering a greater or lesser degree 
of attrition at the hands of the Mark 37, VMF submarines would have been subject to aerial 
attack by maritime patrol aircraft acting upon SOSUS cues, direction finding fixes, or other 
OPINTEL. Unlike submarines, the ability of ASW aircraft to cover very long distances within 
just a few hours allowed them to operate throughout much of the theater without sacrificing 
their flexibility beyond the current patrol cycle. Whereas SSNs had to be prepositioned and 
could be successfully rerouted only in favorable circumstances, patrol aircraft could be sent 
out reactively to investigate a specific datum. At the same time, their long endurance also al-
lowed them to search much larger areas than a submarine or HUK could accomplish within 
any given timeframe. If, as RADM Hill emphasized, “[t]he antisubmarine battle must be con-
ceived as a contest in depth,”221 ASW aircraft added more to that depth than any other tactical 
element of the system.  
The undisputed queen of the wide-area surveillance and long-range air ASW disci-
plines – with excellent reach and endurance, a full on-board sensor suite, a 20,000-pound 
weapons load, and considerable potential for further growth and modification – was, of 
course, the P-3 Orion. 222 Derived from Lockheed’s Electra airliner and introduced in 1962, the 
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P-3 lacked the mean looks of many tactical aircraft and could make an almost benign impres-
sion upon the uninitiated. Submariners the world around knew otherwise: in the highly spe-
cialized business of ASW, the Orion ranked – and still ranks – high among the most effective 
killing machines ever devised. It carried a capable surface-search radar, an outfit of eighty-
four sonobuoys and associated on-board processing equipment, a magnetic anomaly detector, 
a modern ESM suite, and up to eight lightweight torpedoes (or three nuclear depth charges) 
in its internal bomb bay alone. 
While the acoustic search methods were initially primitive and arduous for the sensor 
operators, successive updates added automated processing and classification capabilities as 
well as data links for direct comparison of onboard findings with SOSUS tracks.223 By one ac-
count, every single aircraft of the P-3C configuration – first deployed in 1970 – contained a 
larger number of electronic parts than the entire fleet of 144 P-3Bs built just a few years ear-
lier.224 The concurrent introduction of the SSQ-53, or directional frequency analysis and record-
ing (DIFAR), sonobuoy and the associated processors were a particularly important addition 
to the P-3s array of capabilities.225 The DIFAR equipment was supported by an onboard library 
of acoustic signatures. While no sonobuoy could match the detection ranges or the level of 
detail that massive SOSUS arrays or the thousands of hydrophones in the sonar dome of a ‘fast 
attack’ could provide, the possibility to quickly locate and classify a contact with no more than 
a handful of DIFAR buoys made the P-3 an enemy to be reckoned with. While the SSQ-53 
remained its most effective passive sensor, the ‘workhorse’ of the patrol community went 
through a series of major upgrade that successively improved its ASW suite and also made 
the P-3 an important pillar of the Navy’s approach to anti-surface warfare, with the addition 
of the Harpoon anti-ship missile. With more than 550 aircraft built for the U.S. Navy alone and 
production continuing into the 1990s, the P-3 program was arguably among the most success-
ful in the history of U.S. naval aviation. The aircraft was also widely exported and more than 
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a hundred were built by Kawasaki Heavy Industries for the JMSDF. The capabilities and rug-
gedness of the Orion are such that it remains in service with the USN and more than a dozen 
other operators, sixty years after it first took to the air.226  
While other nations have designed capable ASW aircraft – the UK’s Hawker Siddeley 
Nimrod and multinational Breguet Atlantic being cases in point – and integrated many of the 
same capabilities, there is no doubt that P-3s would have borne the brunt of the Western aerial 
ASW effort in any confrontation with the VMF. The real strength of that effort was not derived 
from the aircraft and its onboard capabilities, however. Without cueing by OPINTEL, the great 
majority of MPA searches would have failed to produce tangible results, other than to keep 
any submarines they happened to encounter from snorkeling or messaging while the aircraft 
remained nearby. Indiscriminate area search operations would have been fairly unproductive 
even if they focused on choke points. For example, the GIUK line spans close to 650 nmi of 
water at its narrowest point – sufficient space for a well-handled submarine to make an unde-
tected transit, if the approximate time and location of its breakout were unknown. It was the 
existence of an architecture which could direct MPAs to areas of interest measuring tens or 
hundreds of square nautical miles, within theaters that comprise hundreds of thousands of 
square nautical miles, that made wide-area search truly profitable. All tactical elements of the 
ASW complex profited from cueing, but none more so than patrol aircraft, with their fast re-
action and short transit times. 
 
226 The last P-3Cs in U.S. active-duty patrol squadrons will be replaced by the P-8A Poseidon in the coming 
years. The P-3C will remain in use by other navies in the coming decades – possibly into the 2040s. 
 






Fig. 24: A P-3A Orion of VP-49 (“Woodpeckers”) patrols the North Atlantic, 22 January 1964. (U.S. 
Navy) 
 
Whereas the intelligence inputs that made cueing possible were variable, the operational com-
mand structure that was designed to exploit them was highly centralized. For example, area 
ASW operations in the Atlantic were handled by Commander, Task Force 84 (CTF-84), 
whether they involved MPAs, surface hunter-killer groups, or submarines assigned to the task. 
CTF-84 was also in charge of SOSUS stations in his area of responsibility. Immediate coordi-
nation and tasking of assets was provided by Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Centers 
(ASWOCs) in Keflavik, Rota, Lajes, Bermuda and Brunswick, ME. These in turn disseminated 
intelligence provided by their assigned MPAs.227 How the layered approach to ASW worked 
in peacetime is demonstrated by continuous tracking operations against Yankee-class SSBNs 
deploying into the Atlantic.228 During the first part of the transit, Norwegian P-3s based at 
Andøya and Bodø established and maintained contact. As a Yankee moved southwest through 
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the Norwegian Sea, U.S. Navy or allied P-3s operating from NAS Keflavik took over, with 
support from Avro Shackletons or Nimrods flying from RAF Kinloss. In the mid-Atlantic, cov-
erage was maintained from Keflavik and the British Isles and then passed on to Canadian 
MPAs from RCAF Greenwood and P-3s from Lajes and Bermuda.229 That the peacetime system 
worked well is testament to the close cooperation between a core group of NATO allies that 
made aerial ASW one of the few truly multinational success stories.  Broadly similar arrange-
ments were later developed in the Mediterranean and in the Western Pacific. 
It seems highly likely that the basic operational pattern described above would have 
persisted in a crisis, but would have changed significantly in wartime, as an almost exclusive 
focus on SSBNs would have been difficult to maintain. It is not clear that political considera-
tions would have allowed CTF-84 to quickly destroy any forward-deployed or transiting Yan-
kees, but – generally speaking – VMF submarines would have been attacked while transiting 
through successive MPA patrol zones. Designated patrol zones for ‘fast attacks’ might have 
been created between them, at some cost to the aerial element’s operational flexibility. Even-
tually, this combination of far-forward (and possibly interspersed) attack submarines and suc-
cessive ‘mobile barriers’ of anti-submarine aircraft promised sufficient effectiveness to obviate 
one of the main instruments of offensive ASW during the Second Battle of the Atlantic: the 
hunter-killer group. The changing role and ultimate demise of the HUK is the next strand in 
the U.S. Navy’s adaptation to the Soviet submarine threat that we must examine.  
 
THE SLOW DEATH OF THE SURFACE HUNTER-KILLER GROUP 
Based on their positive operational record in World War II and the experimentation of Task 
Group ALFA, the U.S. Navy operated nine carrier-centric hunter-killer groups during the 
1960s and into the early 1970s. Their natural mission was open-ocean, offensive ASW, but they 
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were also well suited to support carrier groups and convoys. This made them a valuable, ‘in-
termediate’ capability which could be used individually, or to reinforce other offensively or 
defensively oriented forces as necessary. Besides the Essex-class carrier, a typical group con-
sisted of four destroyers in close support and four more which could easily be detached from 
the main body to prosecute contacts further afield. The air wing consisted of fixed-wing S-2 
Trackers and rotary wing SH-3 Sea Kings. While the former were capable of basic sonobuoy 
tactics (as discussed in Chapter 4), the latter carried dipping sonars as their main sensors. The 
combination of the helicopters’ mobility with the capabilities of the dipping sonar – a device 
resembling an enlarged and more powerful sonobuoy suspended by a cable – made them a 
dangerous close-in complement to the MPA. Surface units could be provided with variable-
depth sonars that provided a somewhat similar set of advantages. In case of many FRAM II-
modernized destroyers this was the SQA-10.230 In case of the Knox-class ocean escorts (later re-
designated frigates), the more advanced SQS-35 was used.231 Both were more effective against 
submarines hiding under a thermal layer than hull-mounted units were. Other destroyers 
were, for the most part, equipped with the standard hull-mounted SQS-23 and SQS-26 sets. 
The latter was much more sophisticated in theory but had extended teething problems, which 
meant that the older SQS-23 was often more effective in real-world situations.232 The problems 
with the advanced convergence zone (i.e. long-range detection) and bottom-bounce (i.e. con-
tinuous tracking) features were eventually ironed out and the SQS-26 became the highly capa-
ble system it had been envisioned as – but it took the Navy until the mid-1970s to achieve 
this.233 By that time, the HUKs had already passed from the scene. Towed arrays, which were 
an even more impressive step up for the detection capabilities aboard surface ships, similarly 
came too late for U.S. hunter-killer task groups to make use of them. As was the case with 
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land-based MPAs, the main weapons of the HUK were the lightweight torpedo – principally 
the Mark 46, which was carried by the S-2 Tracker, SH-3 Sea King and drone anti-submarine 
helicopters (DASH), and which served as the ASROC conventional warhead and as a close-in 
defense weapon on surface ships – along with the nuclear depth bomb, which might or might 
not have seen actual use.234   
Like ‘fast attacks’ and patrol aircraft, hunter-killer groups profited from cueing by 
SOSUS, HF/DF, and other means and saw a corresponding rise in overall effectiveness. During 
the Second Battle, U.S. Navy HUKs – centered on four modified escort carriers and heavily 
relying on operational intelligence – had been responsible for fifty-three U-boat kills, or about 
ten percent of those lost at sea to direct enemy action.235 With even better cueing and a much 
more advanced set of sensors, there was a good chance that the HUKs would be able to repli-
cate this success to some extent. They would have been particularly useful again diesel-elec-
trics, which would also have found it much more difficult to run away than their nuclear-
powered sisters, and which remained difficult to track by passive means when operating on 
batteries. The high-power active sonars aboard postwar destroyers could largely obviate this 
advantage, once OPINTEL provided them with a good idea of where to look.236 However, this 
unique advantage was not sufficient to justify a replacement of the Essex-class carriers, which 
were thoroughly worn out by the late 1960s. In some cases, their strength decks – a load-bear-
ing static element of the carrier, which was essential for its structural integrity – had snapped 
in heavy weather.237 Short of a complete rebuild, only new construction could provide suffi-
cient air strength for future HUK operations. Due to the considerable investment in other ASW 
tools, the Air-Navy’s strong commitment to the expensive Nimitz-class attack carrier program, 
and the looming block obsolescence of the FRAM and early postwar destroyers (which also 
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saw heavy use for HUK duty), this was not an option that the Navy leadership could sell to its 
platform communities or to Congress. With P-3s and ‘fast attacks’ taking up much of the slack, 
the sun was setting on the venerable HUK concept.  
The last hunter-killer group was dissolved in 1974, and surface fleet ASW and battle 
group self-defense were essentially merged into one in the U.S. Navy. The HUK concept lived 
on for a few years in the debates about the Sea Control Ship – a small ASW carrier proposed 
in the early 1970s as part of ADM Elmo Zumwalt’s ‘high-low mix’, but never realized.238 As it 
were, even a CNO committed to the surface fleet in ways that his predecessors were not – 
Zumwalt was, of course, a destroyerman – could not arrest the demise of independent surface 
ASW groups. The VP and submarine communities had proven that they could effectively per-
form the wide-area role with limited support on the surface, and often none at all. The Air-
Navy preferred large-deck carriers because – for all the talk about SSBNs being the new capital 
ships – they were still very much at the heart of its organizational essence, leaving Zumwalt 
with very limited choice in the matter.239 The formal assignment of the ASW mission to the 
attack carrier force and the re-designation of CVANs as multipurpose CVNs was not intended 
to put an end to the debate, but it further diminished the chances that the HUKs would be 
resurrected any time soon.240 Thus, the provision of dedicated, carrier-centric ASW task forces 
largely devolved upon the Royal Navy, which could provide the core of up to three HUKs 
during the 1970s and 1980s, and other allied contributors, which could have provided several 
more.241 At the same time, the CVBG would be given a chance to up its game in anti-submarine 
defense. By the early 1970s, a change of pace along these lines was desperately needed. 
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5.4.4 The weakest link: battle group self-defense   
Coming to the final part of the ASW story during this phase of the competition, we must first 
note an interesting paradox. Assessments of U.S. Navy anti-submarine warfare easily are the 
most conflicted of any warfare area, to the extent that some see effective innovation leading to 
a sustained advantage, where others credit the world’s leading navy with “a tradition of sub-
standard ASW.”242 How does this discrepancy come about? A large part of the answer would 
seem to stem from the simple fact that critics have tended to focus on ASW in a narrowly 
defensive sense and at the battle group level, where others have preferred to look at the wide-
area architecture described above, and the significant advantages it conferred. Neither view is 
really accurate in isolation. Nor can they be aggregated into an undifferentiated whole, which 
would leave us with the self-contradictory belief that the Cold War Navy was both extremely 
good and very bad at one and the same thing. That said, both views contain a large kernel of 
truth, which we must sort out in the following.  
In a first step, it is important to establish that the U.S. Navy’s difficulties in CVBG self-
defense are well-documented, including by serving naval officers at the time. While the Navy 
has always been understandably tight-lipped about these matters, circumstantial evidence 
abounds of both quiet nuclear submarines and modern diesels – like the British-built Oberon-
class, Dutch Zwaardvis-class and German Klasse 206 – making their way into the ‘sacrosanct’ 
inner zone of the main body during exercises and turning it into a simulated killing ground.243 
While some aspects of his account may be open to debate, Thompson is certainly not mistaken 
in asserting that U.S. carrier defensive screens have proven less than impenetrable.244 In 1982, 
a U.S. officer pinned down the problem quite accurately, when he argued that  
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“the fact remains that main body ships are generally poorly protected from those submarines 
that penetrate the outer passive detection systems. This situation is unacceptable, as the rec-
ords of submarine warfare clearly show that all successful submarine attacks have been 
launched from the area currently left unsearched and unprotected.”245  
 
It is not clear that he included any formal or informal knowledge of Cold War exercise out-
comes in his assessment of what the record shows, but his colleagues agreed that the Navy 
had a real problem on its hands.  One U.S. submarine officer wrote that “[o]perating a subma-
rine against a carrier is too easy; the carrier’s ASW protection often resembles Swiss cheese.”246 
As a result, carriers were successfully attacked “time and time again”247 during exercises, ac-
cording to his account. Writing about diesel-electrics specifically, a supremely experienced 
British submariner agreed almost word for word, stating that “open ocean NATO fleet exer-
cises demonstrate, time and again, that a proportion of SSKs will get through the screen. Num-
bers are the key to success and the Soviet Navy has plenty.”248 Because well-designed diesel-
electrics were often more quiet than nuclear boats when running on batteries and also pre-
sented smaller targets to active sonar, they posed a greater problem than first- and second-
generation nuclear boats did in such close-in fights. As their nuclear counterparts got more 
quiet, the number of instances in which they made it through the screen probably increased 
quite significantly, but there is no reliable data that would allow us to quantify this shift. Ap-
parently, at tactical speeds, the Royal Navy’s Trafalgar-class SSNs (built during 1979-1991) 
were as quiet as the Oberon-class running on batteries.249 Of course, it must be remembered 
that Soviet diesels did not have rafted propulsion plants at this stage and were relatively less 
quiet than Western boats, while the VMF’s nuclear boats were consistently situated at the noisy 
end of the spectrum. New construction slowly began to change both of these deficiencies, but 
this only started to make a real difference from the mid-1970s onwards. Nevertheless, there is 
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no way around the fact that U.S. Navy battle groups were far more vulnerable to close-in sub-
marine attack than the service leadership was willing to admit.  
How did this state of affairs come about? Some have traced the deficiencies to the dis-
solution of the HUKs, which were specialized in ASW, and the false expectation that CVBGs 
– specialized in power projection at and from the sea – could take up the slack. In this view, 
“[t]he darkest hour for ASW occurred in the early 1970s, when […] the CV concept was 
adopted.”250 That said, warnings concerning the low quality of battle group ASW were never 
in short supply, either before or after that particular timeframe. The fact that many of the direst 
warnings from naval officers are from the 1980s points to a persistent problem that did not go 
away after CVBGs had been fully equipped with organic air ASW forces, and sufficient time 
to fully integrate them had elapsed. Providing one of the last Cold War accountings of the 
matter in 1990, a carrier ASW officer thought Byron’s pessimistic assessment of a decade ear-
lier – quoted above – was still “uncomfortably accurate”251, although “not quite as true as it 
used to be.”252 While he was confident that the problem could be substantially alleviated 
through diligent organization aboard the carrier, we must conclude that battle group self-de-
fense against submarine attack was, and remained, an Achilles’ heel for the Cold War U.S. 
Navy.253 As another practitioner wryly remarked in the waning days of the Cold War, “the 
U.S. Navy has never done well at battle group ASW. Whenever the same tactical platforms that 
do well at area ASW – MPAs, SSNs, towed-array frigates, etc. – are employed by the battle 
group commander, the results are very different.”254 In his terse and broadly accurate round-
up of the problem, he concluded that “the Navy’s battle group ASW performance adds up to 
less than the sum of its parts.”255  
The most convincing explanations for the bad state in which battle group self-defense 
remained throughout the Cold War are ultimately bureaucratic in nature. While it is true that 
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the hardware had its deficiencies and that there were never enough of the most capable sys-
tems, the increase in the ASW capability of the surface fleet was considerable during 1960-
1975. In outer zone defense, the S-2 Tracker was not nearly as capable as a P-3C, but its replace-
ment – the S-3 Viking – provided much of the same performance as an advanced land-based 
MPA, and with a higher level of automation.256 As a result, the battle group could maintain 
effective surveillance of the zone 200-300 nmi outward from the carrier, in which an Echo II 
would likely launch its missiles. In the middle zone, many of the surface escorts were essen-
tially the same ships that would otherwise have been attached to HUKs, often equipped with 
the initially problematic, but ultimately capable SQS-26 hull-mounted sonar. In some cases, a 
variable-depth unit was available as well. Towards the very end of this phase, the Spruance-
class destroyer introduced the even more impressive SQS-53 hull mounted unit, which re-
mained the standard on high-end ASW and multi-mission destroyers. Combined with rafted 
propulsion for lower self-noise and two embarked ASW helicopters, this made the Spruance 
an excellent submarine hunter – certainly in theory.257 Finally, in the inner zone, passive detec-
tion was severely degraded, but the SH-3 Sea King and its active dipping sonar were perfectly 
capable of detecting any submerged opponents that had made it thus far. Overall, then, a lack 
of high-quality ASW tools can at best provide a partial explanation for the plight of CVBG self-
defense. Critics of the Navy’s task force ASW performance point to other issues, which were 
of an organizational rather than a technological nature. According to one officer from the HS 
community,  
 
256 David Reade, “S-3 Viking Twentieth Anniversary Review,” Airborne Log, Fall 1993.  
257 From the late 1970s onwards, problems with the effectiveness of the screen appear to have persisted despite 
the introduction of even more capable tactical towed array sonar (TACTAS) systems like the SQR-18 and 
SQR-19. These were essentially miniature SOSUS arrays dispensed from a winch aboard an escort and towed 
behind the ship, which were supported by advanced onboard processing equipment. Together with em-
barked ASW helicopters like the SH-2 Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) and later the SH-60 
(LAMPS III), the long-range detection and classification of the towed array took surface ASW to the next 
level. According to Cote (Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet 
Submarines), the TACTAS/LAMPS combination “revolutionized surface ship ASW capabilities by combining 
the detection ranges heretofore only achieved at the tactical level by submarines deploying large, below layer, 
passive arrays with the rapid, long-range prosecution capabilities provided only by air ASW assets” (62). 
Nevertheless, penetrations of the inner zone continued and they still occur on a fairly regular basis today. 
 
                                              A shield and spear for the motherland 
 
  
  [327] 
 
“[t]he ASW module of a carrier is generally considered by the chain of command to be a 
“body locker” from which to draw officers to fill various administrative positions. […] The 
result is a frustrated officer who is not allowed to perform in his area of expertise. Those 
officers allowed to serve in the ASW billet to which they are assigned, serve under a lengthy 
chain of command that with rare exception […] will not have a single officer with more than 
a smattering of knowledge of, or expertise in, ASW.”258 
 
While it might come as surprise to some, this account is actually quite consistent with what 
one would expect from an at-sea military bureaucracy which has consistently venerated offen-
sive striking power, while often viewing those engaged in defensive or supporting tasks with 
mild disdain. As Kelly explains,  
“[a]lmost every officer in the chain [of command, MH] wears wings, and there is a very def-
inite ‘aviator mentality’ permeating every fiber of the ship. Carriers exist for power projec-
tion – and nobody does it better. The resulting state of mind quite naturally conjures up 
visions of F-14s thundering off the deck in afterburner, or A-6s bristling with bombs, far more 
readily than it does an S-3 buzzing around chasing something no one can see. After all, the 
carrier’s game is attack: to heap destruction on the enemy and drive him from the seas. To a 
carrier, arguing with shadowy nuisances that hide under water is the business of escorts.”259 
 
This order of priorities, on what OPNAV declared would be true multipurpose units to which 
no fixed air wing would be assigned, led to such mundane consequences as S-3 pilots having 
to fight for their launch spot in what is a uniformly tight schedule of air operations, and ASW 
helicopters routinely being diverted to other missions, such as over-the-horizon scouting, anti-
surface warfare, and plane guard duty.260 In other words, the weakness of battle groups’ close-
in defenses was to a large measure self-inflicted. The CVA culture that was at least partially 
responsible for this outcome was deeply ingrained and did not change simply because the 
‘higher-ups’ had decided that ASW squadrons should be allowed to usurp some of the pre-
cious deck space that more properly belonged to VF (fighter) and VA (attack) squadrons. 
Whether wartime pressures would have forced a change to the more balanced organizational 
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paradigm that remained elusive over decades invites speculation but will ultimately remain 
another one of the ‘known unknowns’ in this investigation.  
The most important question, of course, is one that is almost equally difficult to answer: 
just how vulnerable did the deficiencies of its large unit self-defense system leave the carrier 
in the face of determined opposition? To get a grip on this question, we must consider the 
comparative weakness of task force defenses in relation to the ASW complex as a whole. To 
ensure that the threat to the Navy’s central weapon system remained at a tolerable level, the 
elimination of technical and tactical deficiencies at the level of the battle group was not the 
only task that called for sustained investment, but certainly an important one. The balance of 
the evidence supports the view that the Navy did not do enough in this respect. Organic carrier 
group defenses were leaky in 1960, they possibly declined even further during 1970-1975, and 
they improved only modestly thereafter. As a result, CVBG self-defense depended on the 
much more effective wide-area elements to reduce the density of enemy submarines to a level 
which the organic assets could probably deal with. This was not an unrealistic expectation, but 
one that was contingent on the dynamics of the conflict overall. From the late 1960s onwards, 
Western area defenses were of sufficiently high quality to prevent submarines from ever get-
ting close to a CVBG main body in perhaps eight or nine out of every ten cases, but a perfect 
record could not be expected. Hence, as far as the ASW element is concerned, a very real pos-
sibility existed that the Soviet anti-carrier strategy might have succeed in some individual en-
gagements, even if it would likely have failed overall. It is fair to say that the close-in subma-
rine threat would probably have been manageable, but that it was never contained to the 
extent that the Navy could be confident – let alone certain – not to lose any flattops during 
hectic wartime operations, even in a war that stayed purely conventional. Any submarine that 
survived long enough to make it through the outer screen of defenses and into short-range 
missile or torpedo range stood a good chance of inflicting heavy damage. Because a carrier can 
take a far greater amount of punishment than a smaller ship can, this might or might not have 
translated into a permanent loss, but ‘mission kills’ were certainly plausible.  
Once a carrier was crippled, further losses might have been incurred as the enemy 
could be expected to concentrate additional resources against it, and any escorts would likely 
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have faced tactical and operational limitations in their attempts at shielding the capital ship 
from a mortal blow. Moreover, the collective risk to the battle group necessarily increased the 
closer to Soviet bases it was operating, due to both the higher density of submarines in those 
waters and the lower level of exposure to wide-area ASW defenses they would have faced 
before they could approach the carrier. Having said that, the fact that ‘attack at source’ opera-
tions using multiple carrier groups were nonetheless seriously considered far into the 1960s 
and again from the late 1970s suggests that this residual threat did not serve as an effective 
deterrent vis-à-vis the offensive-minded Air-Navy. In the next section, we will consider U.S. 
competitive adaptations in the area of fleet air defense, based on how Soviet land-based naval 
aviation and submarine-launched cruise missiles could be expected to come into play.   
 
5.5 Containing the anti-carrier threat II: fleet air defense 
5.5.1 The combined-arms sea denial challenge 
At the height of the second phase of the Cold War at sea, the U.S. Navy’s surface forces faced 
a maturing and increasingly intense air threat from Soviet missile-firing submarines, aircraft, 
and – to a much lesser extent – surface ships. As has already become clear, “the missile bomber 
changed the air defence problem because it had to be destroyed much further away from its 
target. Otherwise fleet air defence would have to concentrate on numerous relatively small 
missile targets rather than large bombers.”261 Essentially, the same problem applied to the mis-
sile-carrying submarine. At the same time, the reliance of missiles also reshaped the task that 
faced the attacker. To overcome the target’s defenses, missile strikes had to be concentrated in 
time and simultaneously dispersed along several attack vectors to create confusion and over-
stretch the defender’s resources. If anything, Hughes’ long-standing maxim that “fleet battles 
 
261  Norman Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet: Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War (Barnsley: Seaforth, 
2016), 281.  
 





are won by attacking effectively first”262 became even more central for both sides than it had 
been in competitions that predated the dawn of the missile age. In this section we will briefly 
consider the operational and tactical implications from the Soviet side, whereas the U.S. reac-
tions during the second phase are discussed in the section 5.4.2 below.  
What emerged from the VMF’s anti-carrier efforts from the early 1970s onwards was 
essentially a combined-arms, oceanic reconnaissance-strike complex – although not a very ro-
bust one.263 For the centralized, shore-based Soviet command system, coordinating attacks by 
a single element such as missile-carrying aircraft was a significant, but manageable chal-
lenge.264 Essentially, each platform or unit would be arrayed according to well-understood 
principles that could be adapted to the situation at hand and a set of parameters would be 
provided for the strike, which would then be faithfully executed by the at-sea commanders.265 
On the other hand, effectively orchestrating air-launched missile strikes with those launched 
from submarines and – less prominently – surface required a far greater number of unequal 
moving pieces to come together at just the right time and in just the right way, while still rely-
ing on the centralized command arrangements that were typical of the Soviet armed forces. 
That was another matter entirely.  
 On paper, the Soviet Navy clearly had the capability to conduct massive saturation 
strikes against multiple task forces, using the full array of platforms and weapons, with either 
nuclear or conventional warheads. Around the mid-point of this second phase of the confron-
tation, the CIA credited the VMF with a total of 871 ASM launchers on high-seas platforms, of 
which 404 were on submarines, 385 were provided by aircraft, and 82 by surface ships.266 In 
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practice, however, combined-arms strikes were difficult to pull off. To make sure that the var-
ious attacking units would effectively complement and support each other’s efforts, three main 
ingredients were required: operational concentration, tactical concentration, and exquisite co-
ordination and timing. 
 In concentrating its best assets for operations, the VMF always faced a major structural 
disadvantage: the “four-fleet handicap”267 of having to cover not just the North Atlantic and 
Pacific fleet areas, but to maintain an adequate level of preparations in the Baltic and the Black 
Sea as well. Soviet naval assets were deployed in support of an extended perimeter defense 
posture in the most literal sense – that is, as part of an all-around defense against attacks from 
a number of plausible operational directions. Within the Soviet strategic defense mindset, the 
mobility of U.S. carrier forces and SSBNs left few other options. Thus, submarines and surface 
ships in particular would certainly have remained dispersed to a very considerable degree, 
with no real opportunity to concentrate overwhelming forces in any individual area of opera-
tions. On the other hand, explicit provisions had been made to concentrate AVMF missile reg-
iments from different fleet areas. The speed with which aircraft could be redeployed from one 
end of the vast Soviet territory to another was a strong point of the system. According to Gor-
don and Komissarov, an entire division of up to sixty aircraft could be shifted between the 
Northern and Pacific Fleet areas in less than 48 hours, “with the aircraft armed and ready for 
action.”268 Having said that, even if each of the three other fleets would have been able to de-
tached a full division of strike aircraft to fight in the North Atlantic area, this would still have 
left the Northern Fleet – which had the plurality of anti-ship cruise missile launchers to begin 
with – with only about 56 percent of the dedicated ACW assets in the VMF.269 In a perimeter 
defense system with at least four main operational directions, operational concentration – even 
along such “interior lines”270 of sorts – would always remain structurally difficult.  
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Although careful planning and sufficient readiness levels were still required, a tactical 
concentration of significant portions of an individual fleet’s combined-arms assets within a 
likely area of operations was also relatively easy to achieve. The same could not be said of the 
third requirement, however: the orchestration of combined-arms strikes at the point of attack 
was found to be a difficult challenge. While maximum concentration and the closest coordina-
tion of the individual elements were clearly desirable, Vego found that “[d]espite the impres-
sion to the contrary, there seems to be no coordination among strikes by aircraft, surface ships, 
and submarines in most of the Soviets’ peacetime exercises. The reason is that the sheer num-
ber of Soviet platforms and their diversity complicate greatly any massed, coordinated strike 
by submarines, land-based aviation and large surface ships.”271 A late-1970s intelligence as-
sessment similarly assessed that “[w]henever possible, antiship attacks by Naval Aviation 
would be coordinated with attacks by other antiship forces, especially submarines and surface 
ships. It is unlikely, however, that all the various forces would strike simultaneously.”272 In 
other words, effective force concentration in time and space was likely to extend only to the 
individual elements of the ACW complex, such as aircraft or submarines. This does not mean 
that no synergies were possible. For example, Soviet planners envisioned using the airborne 
element of an anti-carrier strike force to weaken and disorganize a CVBG’s anti-submarine 
defenses.273 But the ideal of “delivering a massive, concentrated, and coordinated initial strike 
by composite forces”274 appeared to be difficult to attain. While Soviet command philosophy 
and technological limitations in command, control and communications certainly contributed 
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to this situation, one suspects that wartime friction would have wreaked havoc with such elab-
orate planning in any case.275 The advantages of relying on an overall, on-the-scene force com-
mander might have offset these effects to some extent, but there was little chance of the VMF 
adopting this essentially Western-style model. 
It is interesting to note that the Imperial Japanese Navy faced similar challenges in the 
development of its naval aviation component during the 1930s. Early schemes for the coordi-
nation of torpedo attacks from surface ships and naval aircraft had to be abandoned because 
they were found to be unrealistic.276 Close coordination between submarines and naval aircraft 
was even more difficult, of course, and there is nothing to suggest that it was even attempted. 
In the end, what remained was a paradigm of “melding all the aerial attack systems […] – 
horizontal bombing, dive bombing, torpedo bombing, and fighter attacks – into a single sys-
tem of massed aerial assault.”277 While the Japanese were ultimately quite successful in turning 
this into an operational effective means of naval warfare, they realized that “[t]he conduct of 
an operation of such complexity, precision timing, and risk required an expanded tactical or-
ganization, meticulous planning, rigorous training, skilled aircrews, and bold leadership to 
keep it from suffering a series of disastrous miscues.”278 If anything, what the VMF attempted 
was even more difficult. Instead of attacking from roughly 200-300 nmi away, as Japanese car-
rier forces were designed to do, the targets of Soviet ACW operations might be three or four 
times as far from Soviet shores. The decision to even launch a strike over such distances had 
to be based on a solid understanding of where the enemy was and what he might do next. 
Because carrier groups are fast-moving, distant operations required relatively recent ISR in-
puts, possibly even while the attack force was already in flight. Finally, the Soviet take on the 
idea of “closely phased operations by various types of aircraft”279 in this case required long-
range targeting using radars that would inevitably reveal the presence of a Soviet attack force, 
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even if it was not otherwise spotted. Hence, it is not surprising that the precise coordination 
with surface and subsurface assets would have posed additional problems that were best side-
stepped in practice – attractive as they might have been in theory.  
Instead of pursuing a perfectionist solution that was unlikely to work when put to the 
test, the VMF eventually chose to combine different techno-doctrinal solutions and approaches 
that were each adapted to the prevailing conditions in a particular theater.280 For oceanic de-
fense in the North Atlantic, the main weakness of the Soviet ACW system was scouting and 
reconnaissance. As we have seen, Echo- and Juliett-class submarines required offboard target-
ing support for their long-range ASMs to be effective. The same was true of the Kynda- and 
Kresta I-class, which were also armed with the SS-N-3b Shaddock but accounted for a much 
smaller fraction of the Soviet anti-carrier potential. Badgers and Backfires had powerful target-
ing radars of their own, with a much better radar horizon than a surfaced submarine, but they 
still required reconnaissance and cueing ahead of, and during, a raid to be effective. The main 
attempt at an effective solution to the targeting problem up until the mid-1970s was the Tu-
95RT (Bear-D) ELINT and maritime reconnaissance aircraft. 
 A variant of the mid-1950s strategic bomber first introduced in 1964, the Tu-95RT had 
excellent range and endurance, and ample space for a massive radar and electronics installa-
tion. By the standards of its time, the aircraft offered an impressive level of capability: “A sin-
gle TU-95RT could monitor an area of 8-10 million square kilometers […] in a single sortie and 
classify the detected targets. A regiment of Bear-Ds could survey more than 90 million sq km 
[…] and shadow two or three CTFs without let-up for 15-20 days.”281 There were also im-
portant downsides to the AVMF’s reliance on the Bear-D, however. First of all, only a limited 
number were built, with twenty-six available in the Northern Fleet area and an equal number 
in the Pacific.282 To perform their mission, they would have to operate against U.S. carrier 
groups repeatedly, on an almost daily basis. If too many of these critical assets were lost to 
enemy action in the process, the capability of the entire oceanic ACW system would decline 
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accordingly.283 While the Bear-D’s original role of actually guiding ASCMs onto target during 
the latter stages of their flight, as was the case with the Shaddock, was reduced to providing 
targeting data to the next generation of missiles prior to launch, it was still a potential weak 
link in the system. Because the Soviet dependence on the Bear-D was well-understood, it could 
be countered by means such as ‘blip enhancers,’ which allowed escort vessels or even fleet 
auxiliaries to emulate the radar signature of a carrier.284 If the carrier could not be positively 
identified by radar from stand-off ranges, the attacking force would then have to rely on other 
types of reconnaissance aircraft to make the identification – most likely employing visual 
means, which would require a self-sacrificial level of effort on the part of the aircrews in-
volved.285  
An alternative – or perhaps rather complementary – technological approach to recon-
naissance and targeting was provided by specialized satellites developed from the mid-1960s 
onwards. Known to the Soviets as US-A and US-P, and to the West as the Radar Ocean Recon-
naissance Satellite (RORSAT) and Electronic Intelligence Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite 
(EORSAT), they were both less vulnerable and able to cover a much larger area more quickly 
than a manned reconnaissance flight could.286 The exact capabilities of the two spacecraft are 
still a matter of some discussion. U.S. sources from the 1970s credit the RORSAT with the abil-
ity to detect an aircraft carrier even in difficult weather conditions and smaller ships in good 
weather, while later analyses are more skeptical – the exact merits of these claims are impos-
sible to assess without access to Soviet data.287 The EORSAT could detect shipborne radar emis-
sions and apparently locate them to within two kilometers of the source, but like any passive 
sensor, it depended on the enemy using his radars in the first place.288 Solomon makes the case 
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that EMCON procedures often proved very effective in avoiding the detection and localization 
in peacetime.289 Whether it would have been possible in a wartime situation for a carrier group 
to maintain effective EMCON for weeks at a time is, of course, a slightly different question. 
While full-scale simulated strikes against land targets were still possible from aircraft carriers 
observing EMCON procedures, performing an actual strike against an alerted opponent was 
yet another matter.290 
 As a 1983 intelligence report found, the RORSAT/EORSAT combination was “primar-
ily a weapon targeting system for use during wartime or a crisis.”291 Under normal conditions, 
only one or two satellites of each type were in orbit, each with a lifetime of a few months at 
most. A full deployment in a state of tensions or a conflict was expected to be seven RORSATs 
and four EORSATs, with coverage focused on the most relevant portions of the Northern hem-
isphere.292 Whether this expectation, which appears to have been deductively arrived at by 
assuming that targeting data had to be less than two hours old for a strike to have a chance of 
success, corresponded to actual Soviet planning remains an open question.293 What is known 
is that, rather than providing two separate routes to the same target, the capabilities of the two 
spacecraft were supposed to be synergistic.294 We also know that the RORSAT in particular 
suffered debilitating technical failures that may (or may not) have reduced Soviet confidence 
in the system.295 Despite this troubled developmental history and the limitations of Soviet sat-
ellite ocean reconnaissance, the space-based ISR component of the anti-carrier complex ap-
pears to have been effective enough to justify the installation of the associated Punch Bowl 
satellite receiver on all of the most capable missile shooters and to eventually start retiring the 
Tu-95RT without a one-for-one replacement.296  
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While it lasted, the combination of more capable long-range reconnaissance assets with 
increasingly sophisticated missiles and strike aircraft certainly constituted significant progress 
in targeting U.S. task forces. It is also safe to say, however, that the basic vulnerability of the 
system to ‘breaks’ in the kill chain remained. Even the monstrous Oscar-class PLARK could 
not, by its own efforts, overcome the intractable problem of targeting and coordination that 
had beset its predecessors all along. Without timely inputs from RORSAT/EORSAT or another 
capable ISR asset, this potential apex predator was almost entirely blind. The North Atlantic 
was simply too vast and the sensor ranges of individual platforms too limited to eliminate 
such dependencies altogether.  
 
This did not equally apply to the Mediterranean theater, where U.S. and Soviet forces 
often operated in close proximity to begin with. While close shadowing of CVBGs might also 
have been employed in the North Atlantic theater in a crisis, it was pervasive in the Mediter-
ranean. It was there that the idea of a “battle of the first salvo”297 took its most concrete shape. 
While long-range reconnaissance by Bear-Ds and other AVMF recce assets was frequently car-
ried out, it was the near-constant presence of so-called Auxiliaries, General Intelligence (AGIs) 
and the maintenance of a surface presence in the immediate vicinity of U.S. task forces that 
stand out the most.298 AGIs and other shadowing forces, collectively known as “tattletales,”299 
were also present in other theaters, but the confined nature of the Mediterranean theater meant 
that a Soviet preemptive attack was both more likely to succeed and possibly the only real 
chance to inflict severe damage on the Sixth Fleet presence before U.S. maritime supremacy 
would begin to tell.300 The use of modified trawlers as well as regular warships in a role that 
would see them sunk in the first minutes or hours of a war may strike the Western observer 
as a desperate measure but, within the context of a U.S.-Soviet general war, one can see why 
the VMF came to consider it a practical and cost-effective solution to the difficult operational 
 
297 See e.g. Alan D. Zimm, “The First Salvo,” USNI Proceedings 111, no. 2 (1985).  
298 Friedman, Network-Centric Warfare, 218-19.  
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intelligence problem it faced. At the same time, the reliance on close shadowing locked the 
Soviet presence in the Mediterranean into the preemptive approach, with few other options.  
Overall, it is still safe to say that the VMF’s recce-strike complex for anti-carrier warfare 
remained relatively rudimentary and inflexible throughout. Its complexion changes somewhat 
if we think about the Soviet approach primarily in terms of a strategic defense effort that would 
have relied on tactical nuclear weapons, perhaps even from the outset. The CIA’s assessment 
in the early 1970s was that the Soviet approach to ACW provided only a “limited conventional 
warfighting capability”301 and was geared primarily towards tactical nuclear use. In either 
case, the losses that Soviet strike forces were expected to suffer were extremely high. This was 
apparently true even of the most capable regiments that had been reequipped with the Tu-
22M2/3. According to Tokarev, “flying the Backfire in distant ocean combat” was strictly “a 
one-way ticket.”302 The 50 percent loss rates he mentions far exceed anything that Western 
nations were willing to subject their bomber crews to, even during the darkest days of World 
War II.303  
Of course, the chances of survival were even more slim for any surface ships deployed 
in close proximity to U.S. naval forces. Although we are now in a much better position to un-
derstand the Soviet Union’s naval posture on its own terms, one can still see without too much 
difficulty how the famous epithet of the “one-shot navy”304 came into being. Having said that, 
if the scenario in question is a tactical nuclear war at sea, even a single shot might have been 
crippling enough to see U.S. surface forces constrained in their pursuit of offensive operations 
or even withdrawn from far-forward combat areas altogether, if only for political reasons. 
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Fig. 25: Graphic representation of a Soviet combined-arms ACW exercise from a 1972 CIA intelligence 
report. (CIA, Soviet Capabilities to Counter US Aircraft Carriers, 23) 
 
By far the most important fact to note, however, is that this fledgling and increasingly sophis-
ticated recce-strike “system-of-systems”305 could not possibly deal with the threat from what 
had quickly become the more relevant threat to the Soviet homeland: the United States’ SSBN 
fleet. Although the USSR did make progress in oceanic surveillance and attempted to expand 
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its oceanic cueing and targeting system to SSBNs, an ASW equivalent to the anti-carrier com-
plex was nowhere in sight.306 As the number of U.S. ballistic missile submarines swelled to an 
eventual forty-one, as the ranges of the fleet ballistic missiles they carried increased – from 
1,200 nmi in the Polaris A1, to 2,500 nmi in the A3, to 3,200 nmi in a reduced-payload Poseidon 
– and the number of warheads each missile carried grew from one in the A1 to up to fourteen 
in the Poseidon, it became obvious that an effective strategic defense and damage limitation 
effort was slipping further and further out of reach. Whatever successes the massive ACW 
program had produced, they were unlikely to be replicated against the much more elusive, 
and at the same time more severe, nuclear threat from under the sea. We will return to this 
point in the final part of the chapter. In the meantime, even the impact of the combined-arms 
sea denial posture on the U.S. carrier force is worthy of closer examination, however – not least 
because it was moderated by a series of techno-doctrinal adaptations that once again changed 
the balance between attacker and defender in important ways. 
 
5.5.2 Twilight of the carrier force? 
The 1960s and 1970s were a critical period in the evolution of the U.S. carrier force. The central 
role the carriers had briefly played in strategic deterrence withered away as quickly as it had 
emerged. Towards the other end of the conflict spectrum, the flattops once again demonstrated 
their considerable value in crisis response and limited war scenarios. What the heavy reliance 
on naval air power during the Vietnam War – specifically from 1964 to 1972 – partially ob-
scured, however, was that the relevance of sustained investments in a large carrier fleet was 
looking increasingly tenuous as far as a possible shooting war with the Soviet Union was con-
cerned.307 Although presence and limited war were seen as worthy pursuits for the carrier 
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fleets, the fact remains that the long-term sustainability of a posture centered on CVAs was 
not assured. The threat to the relevance of carrier forces was long-term, rather than immediate. 
At least while the limited war in Vietnam loomed large, “[t]he debate was less over the funda-
mental worth of carriers in principle and more over the numbers needed.”308 Even the much-
maligned ‘whiz kids’ in Robert McNamara’s Pentagon were not trying to do away with the 
attack carriers altogether.309 But from the early 1970s onward, the principle of replacing CVAs 
one-for-one would no longer apply. As a result, the number of carriers would begin to fall, 
initially from fifteen to thirteen.310 Based on the Air Force’s assessment, which we can take to 
be as hostile towards naval air as was reasonably possible within the U.S. defense establish-
ment, we can also conclude that eight carriers were the politically conceivable minimum at the 
time. In other words, the very worst case from the Navy’s perspective might have been a dra-
matic reduction in attack carrier strength of 50-55 percent over a 10-15 year period. Had it not 
been for the continuous, large-scale use of carrier air power in Southeast Asia, the downward 
pressure on the force structure would probably have been pronounced enough to bring about 
at least part of this reduction. Against the backdrop of Vietnam, however, “OSD’s analytical 
bark was worse than its budgetary bite”311 and the established Navy force structure centered 
on fifteen attacks carriers remained unchanged. Thus, Pay’s conclusion that the new genera-
tion of nuclear-powered carriers that would eventually form the backbone of the Air-Navy of 
the 1980s “owed their survival”312 to the conflict in Southeast Asia is hardly an exaggeration. 
The underlying issues that had invited close scrutiny of the carrier-centric posture in 
the first place did not end there, however, and they still boded ill for the long-term. It is true 
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that naval aviators over North Vietnam had to face an exceptionally dense and increasingly 
unforgiving air defense system based on current Soviet technology. In fact, “[s]trike groups 
had to penetrate what at that time was the most intense and modern air defense environment 
in existence.”313 But carrier operations off North Vietnam were still an exercise in largely un-
opposed power projection right up to the coast.314 The value of the carriers in such scenarios 
was not in doubt. However, if the comparative advantage of the Navy’s capital ships in trans-
oceanic power projection flowed primarily from their ability to operate with impunity a mere 
90 nmi off the enemy’s coast, their viability in higher-intensity contingencies was dubious at 
best.315 At a more fundamental level, then, the carrier-centric posture was “threatened by a 
naval warfighting strategy that saw CVAs as irrelevant to general war.”316 If the carrier force 
no longer provided an offensive edge vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and was reduced to providing 
a handy complement to land-based tactical air forces in lower-intensity conflicts, would the 
political level still see the need for fifteen carrier battle groups and, if so, for how long? Hence, 
it is unsurprising that the question of survivability once again came to the foreground, as soon 
as the Navy began to refocus its carriers on scenarios involving combat at sea against the VMF. 
This led to a crisis of sorts, but one that was ultimately mitigated rather successfully and with 
the carrier’s potential to once more embrace a more offensive role still largely intact. In this 
section we will trace the developments and decisions that led to this outcome.  
  As discussed in the previous chapter, the debate about carrier vulnerability had a long 
pedigree, even during the early Cold War. In fact, what Vlahos calls the “panacea-weapon 
threat”317 – the threat posed by cheap missiles to expensive capital ships – predated the first 
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aircraft carriers by half a century. In the 1950s and 1960s, the now diminished role of the tor-
pedo as the erstwhile ‘panacea weapon’ was taken over by the anti-ship missile.318 The exist-
ence of such missiles by itself was not sufficient to reshape the debate, however. There are 
three main reasons why the debate about the survivability and long-term viability of carrier-
centric forces intensified considerably during the second phase of the Cold War at sea, and in 
the immediate post-Vietnam era in particular. One of those reason was the increasing viru-
lence of the Soviet missile threat, which also saw its first demonstration on the world stage. 
Among naval officers and outside experts, the ASM threat had registered much earlier, but the 
event that was probably most significant in amplifying it was the sinking of the INS Eilat 
shortly after the Six-Day War. A British Z-class destroyer of World War II vintage, sold to 
Israel in 1955, the Eilat was operating in the Mediterranean off the Sinai Peninsula on 21 Octo-
ber 1967, when she was engaged by Soviet-provided Komar-class missile boats and sunk by 
three successive P-15 (SS-N-2 Styx) missile hits.319 This made her the first vessel in the history 
of naval warfare to be lost to ASMs in combat. With the sinking of the Eilat, the ASM threat 
and its possible implications began to seep into the public consciousness.320 The story did not 
end there, of course: The 1973 Battle of Latakia, in which Israeli missile boats sank all five of 
their Syrian opponents, showed that the capabilities of the Styx could be resoundingly de-
feated by a mixture deliberate planning, good tactics, and electronic countermeasures.321 At 
the same time, Latakia also served to reinforce the expectation that missile combat at sea would 
be highly lethal. 
The second source of renewed concern was the very visible susceptibility of the carrier 
fleet to accidental damage resulting in major loss of life. The 1960s saw three large and well-
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publicized carrier fires, all of them cause by malfunctions or mishandling of munitions or py-
rotechnics. The 1966 fire aboard USS Oriskany killed 44 sailors and left 156 injured.322 The 1967 
Forrestal fire was the worst of the three, killing 134 and injuring 161.323 The USS Enterprise fire 
in 1969 killed 28 and injured 314.324 All of the conflagrations involved fueled aircraft and live 
ordnance; the Enterprise fire resulted in eighteen separate explosions, including a number of 
500-pound bombs detonating on the flight deck.325 All three carriers required extensive repairs, 
but none of them came close to suffering mortal damage. Despite the deficiencies in munitions 
handling, firefighting and damage control that these incidents revealed, the fleet carriers had 
once again shown their ability to survive one of the worst possible scenarios on a ship laden 
to the hilt with jet fuel and ammunition: an inferno on the flight deck. What appears to have 
stuck in the public mind, however, was the ease with which a carrier could turn into a bonfire 
and be put out of action even in low-threat environments, and by events far less malicious that 
a Soviet missile attack. Inevitably, the carrier fires were also picked up on by the Navy’s bu-
reaucratic competitors. An anecdote related by ADM James L. Holloway, later CNO from 
1974-1978, is quite revealing in this regard:   
“In November 1967, as I was leaving a meeting of the Joint Navy-Air Force Technical 
Standards Committee in the OpNav conference room at the Pentagon, an Air Force general 
turned to me (I was in blue service uniform), pointed to a large photograph of a Forrestal-
class aircraft carrier hanging on the wall, and said, ‘Nice picture. What kind of ship is 
that?’ I answered, ‘That’s an aircraft carrier.’ He paused, smiled smugly, and said, ‘Oh yes, 
I didn’t recognize it. It isn’t on fire!’”326 
 
This points us in the direction of the third reason, namely, that the challenges posed by techno-
doctrinal developments and contemporary events were amplified by interservice rivalry and 
forged into a bureaucratic weapon to undermine the carrier’s future viability. A new nuclear-
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powered aircraft carrier was one of the biggest line items in the U.S. defense budget and, as 
such, made an excellent target for force reductions that might translate into additional spend-
ing on other priorities – not least because every carrier cut from the force structure also meant 
that fewer surface escorts were required. Holloway, who was later put in charge of defending 
the nuclear carrier from bureaucratic and political attacks, leaves little doubt about the fact 
that the Navy took this threat extremely seriously.327 
 
By the time of the Congressional Hearings on the funding of CVAN-70, which would 
become the USS Carl Vinson, carrier vulnerability had become a real bone of contention, with 
some members of Congress vigorously arguing the case for smaller, cheaper carriers – a theme 
that would repeat itself during the mid-1970s, with equally limited consequences.328 The Navy, 
for its part, had to acknowledge that the aircraft carrier was vulnerable to ASM attack, just like 
other surface units, but it also managed to spin the issue in such a way as to reaffirm the role 
of the carrier, including in a major war:  
“Although the anti-ship missile poses a threat to the carrier, this is poor logic upon which 
to base a reduction of carrier force levels. If our carriers cannot survive the Soviet missile 
threat then neither can any other surface ship, and our national strategy depends on that 
ocean shipping.  
The Soviet antiship cruise missile forces are, however, most vulnerable to our attack car-
riers. Therefore, our attack carrier force must be strong enough to survive and defeat the 
Soviet missile threat to assure the continued use of the ocean lines of support which are 
absolutely essential to the success of our national strategy.  
By sustaining a modern attack carrier force in being, the U.S. Navy can maintain naval 
supremacy over the USSR and all other nations supported by the Soviets as well as provide 
control of the sea where it becomes necessary in the national interest.”329 
 
Ultimately, this conservative argument carried the day, although it is probably also fair to say 
that the “putting too many eggs in too few baskets”330 argument could not be conclusively 
refuted either. In fact, dangerous illusions about what could be expected of the carrier had 
already taken hold at the level of public perception. As Vlahos puts it, “the image of the Capital 
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Ship has become irrevocably confused with the popular demand for invulnerability. So great 
a ship, at such great cost, can only be justified, it seems, if it is invincible.”331 In truth, the ex-
pectation that carriers could be reliably shielded from harm in a general war was never realis-
tic at any point during the Cold War at sea.  
At the same time, however, the large-deck carriers were still highly survivable com-
pared to smaller surface units. The VMF apparently expected that it would take up to twelve 
conventional missile hits – but only a single nuclear hit, which once again serves to demon-
strate the attraction for the inferior party of escalating to the tactical nuclear level  – to reliably 
put a carrier out-of-action.332 While the ASM’s promise of at least a “theoretical single-hit kill 
probability”333 was intact with regard to smaller surface ships, which could conceivably be 
sunk by an (un)lucky conventional hit, this was a most unlikely outcome for a Cold War-era 
attack carrier. At the same time, however, the question of survivability cannot, by any means, 
be reduced to platform type alone. There can be important differences even within the cate-
gory of large-deck attack carriers and, even more importantly, in the ‘defense-in-depth’ tactical 
system that surrounds them. Survivability is clearly not a constant, even for ships of a more or 
less established type, and sensitive to both technological and doctrinal adaptations. 
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Fig. 26: The USS Enterprise is burning off the coast of Hawaii, 14 January 1969. The conflagration was 
set off by an accidental warhead detonation of a 5-inch unguided rocket on the flight deck and quickly 
turned into the third major munitions fire aboard an attack carrier in as many years. (U.S. Navy) 
 
What measures were taken, then, to ensure that the carrier would remain a useful instrument of naval 
power projection into the 1980s and beyond? In the remainder of this section, we will look at two 
basic types of counter-ASM adjustments: those in passive defense of the carrier and those in 
battle group active defense, both of which took place at more than one level. The first and most 
obvious way of thinking about carrier survivability is in terms of the passive defense features 
of the ships themselves – that is, the ability of the carrier to sustain battle damage and remain 
in the fight or, at the very least, survive the engagement. Here, at least some of the desired 
improvements could, in fact, be attained simply by building bigger carriers, which – and not 
to anyone’s surprise – suited the offensive-minded Air-Navy well. The tonnage of Cold War-
era carrier classes increased from 45,000 tons in the Midway design, to 60,000 tons in the For-
restal, to 80,000 tons in the Kitty Hawk, to 93,000 tons in the Enterprise, to 100,000 tons in the 
 





Nimitz-class.334 Of course, survivability was only one of a number of variables that drove this 
continuous upsizing. In some cases, such as the increased magazine size and aviation fuel 
storage of Nimitz-class carriers, other priorities were found to be more important. In addition, 
the flight deck itself – and, to an extent, the hangar deck below – remained the most vulnerable 
part of the ship, due to its particular exposure and the inevitable presence of large amounts of 
jet fuel and ordnance in a wartime situation. Overall, though, there is no doubt that passive 
defenses improved considerably as a result of increased size. An assessment of the possible 
advantages of smaller, more numerous, but less survivable carriers over the large-deck carrier 
concept is more complex.335 It is difficult to argue that the U.S. Navy’s continued commitment 
to the status quo of fewer, ever larger carriers was altogether unreasonable. At the same time, 
alternative concepts might also have been viable, if seriously attempted.  
What is abundantly clear is that any situation in which sheer size might – or might not 
– save a carrier from destruction had to be avoided in the first place, to the greatest extent 
possible. Hence, a second category of measures that can be described in terms of passive de-
fense was designed to reduce the effectiveness of the Soviet recce-strike complex. We have 
already touched upon the EMCON practices introduced during the 1960s and 1970s. While 
these were undoubtedly important, it was the combination of several approaches involving 
deception, dispersal and concealment that was expected to safeguard the valuable CVAs and 
ensure that their vulnerabilities remained at an acceptable level. Angevine’s discussion of the 
Haystack concept of hiding the carrier’s position within the task group formation shows that 
these efforts date back to the late 1950s, when nuclear use was temporarily considered more 
likely.336 The main achievement of the concept in exercises was to prolong the survival of the 
carriers by a few crucial hours, but not to render them truly survivable in a more prolonged 
conflict.337 In the late 1960s, the threat posed by Echo- and Charlie-class submarines led the U.S. 
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Navy to take these efforts further and, inter alia, strengthen acoustic deception to avoid suc-
cessful detections whenever possible. These efforts, apparently centered on the Pacific Fleet 
and known as Project Uptide, appear to have been rather successful, although it is less clear 
how widely they were adopted in the fleet.338 The USN also learned how to counter the new 
capabilities provided by satellite-based ocean reconnaissance, tracking EORSATs and ROR-
SATs continuously and directing forces to implement deception and concealment measures.339 
To what extent these measures degraded the performance of Soviet ISR is not known, but there 
is a body of anecdotal evidence to suggest that concept development, specialized hardware, 
and repeated exercises were well worth the investment.  
 At the same time, defending carriers against missile attack also depended on the U.S. 
Navy’s development of its own aerial reconnaissance-strike complex of sorts, to provide situ-
ational awareness and direction to battle groups’ active defenses. These defenses were arrayed 
in depth, in three main layers: the outer/combat air patrol layer, the area defense/surface-to-air mis-
sile layer, and the ship point defense layer.340 Perhaps the most critical element of the entire sys-
tem was airborne early warning (AEW). With long-range ASMs as the main threat, this was 
the only approach that could provide adequate reaction times against Soviet strike aircraft in 
particular. Early experiments with carrier-based AEW started even during World War II and 
involved a number of modified TBM Avenger torpedo bombers. During the 1950s and into the 
early 1960s, the similarly configured AD Skyraider took over this task. Starting in 1958, the 
purpose-built E-1 Tracer considerably improved upon the capabilities of these early platforms. 
Finally, the 1960s saw the prolonged development period of what would eventually become 
the ultimate airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft: the Grumman E-2 Hawkeye, 
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the latest (E-2D) variant of which is still being built in 2019. The E-2 did not initially perform 
very well and the program actually was on the brink of failure for much of the 1960s. The E-
2A version had to be heavily modernized almost as soon as it entered service and the mature 
E-2C did not see full-scale introduction until the mid-1970s.341 Notwithstanding these trials, 
AEW and the concept of the airborne combat information center (CIC) formed the backbone 
of fleet air defense against an opponent armed with long-range ASMs.342 As we have seen, the 
distant layer of the task group air defense system – the combat air patrol zone – was successively 
extended outward. Even with the somewhat limited capabilities of the AEW variant Skyraider, 
the AD-5W, the surveilled zone soon extended at least 200 nmi from the center for the task 
group.343 The mature E-2C could make detections at ranges of up to 250 nmi from the aircraft, 
which would itself be on station 50 nmi or more from the center, and track 300 targets simul-
taneously.344 The E-2s were – and, as a matter of fact, still are – central to the integrity of the 
outer layer, keeping CAP fighters organized and directing them in the face of Soviet deception 
attempts.345  
Equally important was the platform that would do the fighting at the outer edges of 
the battle group’s defense-in-depth. As was the case with the AEW system, the process of ac-
quiring a fleet defense fighter that fit the bill was drawn-out and painful – even more so, in 
fact, than the E-2s road to real capability. The first of three main attempts at covering the grow-
ing requirements of fleet air defense was an aircraft known as the F6D Missileer.346 A subsonic, 
low-performance ‘missile truck,’ the F6D was to carry a complement of six long-range Eagle 
air-to-air missiles. The Eagle/Missileer package would have complemented the Typhon long-
range SAM, and together the two systems would have constituted a massive improvement in 
defending against Soviet saturation raids.347 However, as we have seen in Chapter 4, Typhon 
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was eventually canceled in 1963 over its excessive costs. The same fate befell the airborne Ea-
gle/Missileer component, which was axed almost immediately by the incoming Kennedy ad-
ministration. This left the Navy with a very considerable shortfall in fleet air defense capabil-
ities. Instead of a balanced force of Missileers and F-4 Phantoms, the F-4 would now have to fill 
a role it was not designed for. As far as the long-range CAP requirement was concerned, 
SECDEF McNamara famously placed his hopes in the multi-service TFX program, later desig-
nated the F-111, with the explicit intention of cutting acquisition costs.348 The F-111B naval 
variant proved to be overweight and underpowered, and was itself canceled in 1967, after all 
tweaks had proved insufficient to turn it into a truly capable and cost-effective platform.349 
What remained of the TFX debacle was a less-than-stellar engine, the new AWG-9 radar, and 
a long-range air-to-air missile (AAM), which would be known as the AIM-54 Phoenix. For a 
brief period, the Navy even considered going back to the original concept and turning its new 
A-6 Intruder medium attack aircraft into a subsonic fleet defense missile-carrier.350 This intri-
guing possibility was soon abandoned in favor of a completely new, supersonic fighter pro-
gram. By the early 1970s, this VFAX/VFX concept had begun to morph into the consummate 
fleet defense fighter of the Cold War: the F-14 Tomcat. All told, the Navy had lost almost a 
decade in which the relatively short-legged F-4 Phantom had to hold the line in the face of 
repeated, dramatic shifts in acquisition policy. It is fascinating to consider how this process 
would have unfolded if the AVMF had managed to successfully bring the Tu-22 Blinder and 
Kh-22 missile into frontline service en masse in the early-to-mid 1960s. As it turned out, both 
sides struggled almost equally in their attempts to bring mature, high-end systems into series 
production at bearable cost – a familiar story, if ever there was one.  
The F-14 entered service in 1974, far over budget and still subject to controversy, but 
with very considerable potential for growth. Together with the E-2C, it formed the frontline in 
battlegroup defense for the next 30 years. In the 1970s, Tinajero called the E-2/F-14/AIM-54 
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combination “the most critical elements in the carrier air defense system.”351 Both the Tomcat 
as a platform and the Phoenix as its main payload had significant flaws, however. The TF-30 
engines in the F-14A were not only on the weak side, but also prone to frequent mechanical 
problems as well as compressor stalls, which could be irrecoverable, resulting in ejection or 
death of the crew.352 The Phoenix easily had the longest range of any AAM at the time, in excess 
of 60 nmi, but its powered flight phase was relatively short, its susceptibility to ECM raised 
question marks, it produced a visible smoke trail, and the effectiveness of its continuous rod 
(CR) warhead in likely fleet air defense scenarios was not assured. In fact, the General Ac-
counting Office concluded that the Navy’s own testing “showed that the effectiveness of the 
F-15A/Phoenix is marginal at best against the current and postulated threat,”353 even as late as 
1979. The details were withheld, but we can surmise that this referred to supersonic ASMs in 
particular.354 Originally, the Navy had considered buying an even heavier missile with a sec-
ond, terminal-phase rocket booster. The Phoenix did away with the second stage, which left it 
with much less energy to spare for radical course adjustments and made it less effective against 
fast and maneuverable targets.355 Meanwhile, the CR warhead, which was fairly typical at the 
time, might not have been powerful enough to inflict catastrophic damage on a heavy, bomber-
sized aircraft like the Badger or Bear.356 A damaged aircraft will likely be forced to abort a long-
range mission and may still be lost in any case, but only if there is sufficient structural damage. 
The missile was even less likely to be effective against a supersonic missile, because the CR 
design depended on exact lateral placement at the point of detonation, which is more difficult 
to achieve against a smaller, faster target – if that target could even be reached in the first place. 
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As a result, the U.S. Navy discarded the CR design in later designs, including in the late-Cold 
War AIM-54C version of the Phoenix. 
 
 
Fig. 27: A F-14A Tomcat from VF-111 (Sundowners) launches an AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile. (U.S. 
National Archives) 
 
Overall, the introduction of the E-2/F-14A/AIM-54 combination extended the Navy’s battle 
group defenses further out and provided great potential for the future. Having said that, it 
began to come into its own only towards the end of this second phase, and its wartime effec-
tiveness in its ‘maritime air superiority’ design scenario has remained untested. Nonetheless, 
after a long and grueling bureaucratic battle, the service now had a credible outer defensive 
layer to counter AVMF saturation attacks, ideally before they could fully materialize. As To-
karev shows, the Soviet side took the threat posed by this outer layer extremely seriously and 
expected grievous losses, which is itself quite significant.357 Fiszer and Gruszczynski agree that 
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“the E-2 and F-14 tandem became a nightmare for Soviet long-range reconnaissance and mis-
sile-carrying aircraft for years to come.”358 As was the case in the U.S. Navy threat assessment, 
the AVMF had to credit its opponent with the full theoretical capability inherent in those sys-
tems – even if it remained unrealized during most of the second phase of the Cold War at sea. 
The next layer of a CVBG’s defenses was the intermediate SAM engagement zone. Here, 
the cancellation of Typhon caused a real capability gap with regard to countering large satura-
tion attacks in particular. The main limitation of the existing Terrier, Tartar and Talos systems 
– although not the only one – was the inability of their radars to track and engage a large 
number of targets simultaneously.359 This imposed debilitating limitations on the practical rate 
of fire and made saturation a very real possibility. If we add in the fact that the main problem 
the shipboard SAM batteries had to deal with might very well have been leaking missiles, ra-
ther than aircraft – and that their kill probability against smaller, faster objects was bound to 
be lower – we can see that the inability to bring the Typhon to fruition was a serious set-back 
at the time. The most impressive part of the system on paper was the SPG-59 radar, which 
allowed for simultaneous tracking and missile guidance against up to 20 targets.360 In reality, 
however, the radar proved overly expensive and unreliable during the prototype stage, which 
directly led to the program’s cancelation. As Gussow and Prettyman conclude, “[t]he concepts, 
so brilliantly put forward by the Typhon team, could not be translated successfully into hard-
ware by existing U.S. industries.”361 The Typhon’s SCANFAR derivative, which was installed 
aboard the nuclear-powered cruiser USS Long Beach and USS Enterprise, was equally unsatis-
factory. The near-term solution to fill in the resulting gap was a totally reconfigured and con-
siderably more advanced missile built into the existing Tartar airframe: the RIM-66 Standard 
Missile. With better range, reliability, and a secondary capability against surface targets, this 
was a significant upgrade to existing capabilities. 
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At the same time, however, the pressing need for an effective shipborne counter against 
large missile raids remained. Therefore, another ambitious development program was 
launched, with much higher stakes than the Navy had faced a decade earlier and a determi-
nation to avoid making the same mistakes all over again. The fact that this Advanced Surface 
Missile System (ASMS) program – known as Aegis after 1969 – turned into such a significant 
and long-lasting success makes the fact that it came close to failing as well all the more inter-
esting. Concerns over cost-effectiveness and a prolonged dispute over the need for nuclear-
powered escorts saw Aegis almost continually teetering on the brink during the early 1970s.362 
It was only in 1975 that the program’s future financing was finally assured – much to the credit 
of its chief architect, RADM Wayne Mayer, but also after President Ford himself had made it 
clear that he was taking an interest.363 The advanced surface AAW system that was starting to 
take on a very concrete shape at this time had three main elements: (1) the SPY-1 phased array 
radar, which made it possible to track several hundred targets at once; (2) an entirely novel 
battle management system designed specifically to counter saturation raids with a hitherto 
unseen degree of automation, and (3) the improved SM-2 missile and related equipment.364 
Once these components had been forged into a reliable ‘system of systems,’ Aegis was perfectly 
suited to accomplish what its predecessors could not: killing bombers and ASMs en masse.  
The fact that this resulted in one of the Cold War’s most palpable capability gains for 
U.S. Navy surface forces is not in any doubt. Nevertheless, we still need to ask how much of a 
difference Aegis really made in reshaping the competition in the U.S. Navy’s favor. In this re-
spect, the main thing to remember is that the first Aegis-equipped cruiser, USS Ticonderoga 
(CG-47), was not commissioned into the Navy until 1983. All but three ships of her class of 
twenty-seven were commissioned after 1985. Hence, the impact of Aegis on naval operations 
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was only beginning to alter the dyadic offense-defense balance at sea and Cold War tensions 
had begun to fade by the time that Aegis-equipped ships became available in numbers. Given 
the much larger number of ships that could profit from it in the near term, the so-called New 
Threat Upgrade (NTU) for existing Terrier and Tartar equipped ships could actually have been 
more immediately significant than Aegis.365 At things went, the NTU – which was designed to 
allow forty-one legacy cruisers and destroyers to fire the SM-2 and combat large raids much 
more efficiently – came too late as well and would have begun to significantly change the 
AAW balance around the same time as Aegis.366 Moreover, it should be emphasized that even 
Aegis and NTU did not provide anything like a perfect defense against large numbers of ad-
vanced ASMs. Saturation became much more difficult to achieve but was still possible.367 
Hence, factors like raid size and geometry, timing, and the effectiveness of Soviet ECM re-
mained extremely important. Only under ideal circumstances – the rarest of states in any war-
time scenario – could the first and second layer be expected to catch all the incoming missiles. 
This brings us to the final layer of the CVBG’s air defenses: the close-in defense zone. An 
effective last-ditch active defense was critical if the number of ‘leakers’ was to be whittled 
down to such an extent that a battle group could remain fully combat-capable and coherent 
even in the aftermath of a major saturation attack. The fact that at least some ASMs – perhaps 
a significant portion of them, especially until Aegis ships became available in numbers in the 
late 1980s – would probably make it through the first and second lines of defense was well-
understood and accepted. As one study put it, “[s]ome ‘leakage’ missiles through the defenses 
appears inevitable.”368 The second phase of the Cold War at sea saw the introduction of several 
new systems to make sure that fleet air defenses could keep killing missiles even after they 
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had made it through the outer and intermediate zones and were approaching their targets. 
The first point defense system to come into play against these leakers would be the Basic Point 
Defense Missile System (BPDMS), which used the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missile as its effector. 
These missiles were also installed aboard the carriers themselves, starting in 1967.369 It is not 
clear that the original version of the missile was very effective against supersonic ASMs in 
particular, but the system went through several upgrades to increase its capability along with 
the original Sparrow anti-air missile.370 Against those leakers that BPDMS failed to shoot down, 
the Navy instituted a succession of ‘soft-kill’ systems including electronic countermeasures – 
 the SLQ-17, SLQ-32 and WLR-8 – as well as chaff and decoy dispensers like the Mk33 RBOC 
and improved Mk36 SRBOC.371 These were particularly effective against older ASMs that had 
not been designed with a strong ECM suit of their own, but electronic defense remained a very 
dynamic area for the remainder of the competition. 
As the very last line of defense against missiles that were still incoming after they had 
run the gauntlet of active defense measures, the 1970s saw the development of the well-known 
Mk-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) – basically a M61 Gatling gun directed by a 
Ku-band radar to automatically engage targets that fit the parameters of an ASM with a stream 
of armor-piercing 20 mm shells at a rate of 50 rounds per second.372 There were some doubts 
during the system’s development phase as to its effectiveness against newer Soviet ASMs, 
which were both fast and rather sturdily built.373 The fact that the VMF selected a 30 mm gun 
for its similar AK-630 CIWS may (or may not) indicate that the critics had a point. In either 
case, Phalanx was integrated on a wide range of U.S. Navy combatants – as well as some sup-
port ships – beginning in the early 1980s. 
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All told, the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter ASMs and implement an effective defense-
in-depth of its CVBGs increased very significantly during this second phase – as did the VMF’s 
capability for large-volume missile attacks. Looking at the net outcome concerning this aspect 
of the competition, is not clear that the carrier had become fundamentally more vulnerable 
than it had been during the first phase of the confrontation. What is clear is that severe damage 
to one or more carriers remained a distinct possibility in a U.S.-Soviet war at sea, that irreversi-
ble carrier losses were less likely, and that escalation to the tactical nuclear level would quickly 
have tipped the balance against the carrier. The survivability of escorts and support ships grew 
in line with the total defensive firepower of the system, although they were individually more 
susceptible to irreversible damage than were the carriers. Apart from the fairly general con-
clusion that U.S. Navy adaptation efforts were quite successful in maintaining the notional 
dyadic offense-defense balance, much would have depended on the specifics of the scenario –
including such factors as technological and tactical surprise, deception, and ECM/ECCM ef-
fectiveness, which are extremely difficult to gauge. 
If we look at the big picture, however, there is one finding concerning the second phase 
of the competition that is more significant than any of these: while the perceived shift towards 
greater carrier vulnerability was eventually also ’reversed’ at a largely perceptual level during 
the late 1970s and the Maritime Strategy debates of the early 1980s, the actual shifts that had 
taken place at the level of strategic nuclear weapons platforms proved irreversible. Specifi-
cally, this phase saw the capabilities of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile submarines grow to 
such an extent that the entire Soviet oceanic defense paradigm was up for a radical reassess-
ment by the mid-1970s. The shape and meaning of these developments will be explored in the 
final section of this chapter.  
 
5.6 The turn of the tide 
In the mid-1970s, the VMF had available to it three basic options for the further development 
of its posture. The first option was to embrace a more globalized approach to naval operations, 
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as many in the West feared it would. The second option was to continue to strengthen its oce-
anic defense perimeter and possibly expand it further, without changing its underlying pos-
ture, which remained centered on homeland defense. The third option was to retract and re-
turn to a more circumscribed version of perimeter defense focused on the peripheral seas that 
bordered the Soviet Union – primarily, the Barents and Arctic Seas in the North, and the Sea 
of Okhotsk in the East. With one notable exception, the leading Western analysts inside and 
outside the circles of government all agree that the Soviets chose the last of these three options 
and implemented a concept of bastion defense focused on the near seas, starting in the mid-
to-late 1970s.374 This section will seek to provide a sense of how and why this momentous shift 
came about. Although we cannot be certain with regard to Soviet motivations without access 
to materials that remain buried in Russian archives, it is possible to provide a relatively 
straightforward answer to that important question and, although other factors may have been 
part of the equation, a convincing case can be made in favor of this over other explanations.  
 In the first instance, it is important to acknowledge that there appears to have been 
some debate in Soviet naval and military circles over the merits of a more offensive approach 
– specifically, one targeting Western SLOCs, as NATO had long expected the VMF would. 
Herrick finds several instances in which VMF theoreticians appeared to argue for a more de-
termined interdiction effort. The first such indication came in a major military-theoretical pub-
lication – Boyevoi put’ Sovetskogo voenno-morskogo flota, which Herrick translates as The Combat 
Course of the Soviet Navy – in 1974.375 The second indication came in Gorshkov’s The Sea Power 
of the State itself, which appeared the year after. This was maintained in two reworked editions 
of the book, which appeared in 1976 and 1979.376 None of these statements claimed more than 
a secondary role of SLOC interdiction, but they pointed towards the possibility of a more of-
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fensive approach in the future. Together with other, less prominent statements, this led Her-
rick to conclude that “[b]y 1979 the Navy showed signs of having switched to favoring instead 
of opposing the anti-SLOC mission.”377 A related debate considered alternative options for 
achieving a SLOC suppression effect, which once again included strikes against ports of em-
barkation and disembarkation as a potentially more efficient approach than attacks on convoys 
at sea.378 References to SLOC interdiction also continued into the 1980s, which may indicate 
that it had become a more accepted, if still secondary, mission.379 How, then, are we to interpret 
this apparent shift, given that the established Western narrative emphasizes the retrenchment 
aspect of the bastion defense posture? 
 To understand why VMF officers suddenly began to talk up the relevance of interdic-
tion, which they had long opposed as either too difficult to achieve or altogether unnecessary 
and undesirable, we once again have to ‘zoom out’ and consider the bigger picture. Two fac-
tors stand out in particular. The first is the growing stature of conventional war scenarios in 
both sides’ military planning as the 1970s wore on.380 As the possibility of a prolonged, con-
ventional war began to look more and more plausible, the importance of SLOC defense for 
NATO increased more or less proportionally. As was noted in the Soviet debate, extensive 
prepositioning of U.S. materiel in Europe reduced the immediate necessity of interdiction, but 
its importance would grow the longer the conflict continued.381 As had been the case during 
the 1950s, Western analysts and planners were acutely aware of this fact and unsettled by the 
possibility of a Soviet interdiction effort.382  
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The second, and even more salient, factor that we can identify as pushing Soviet naval 
authors towards a greater emphasis on SLOC interdiction had to do with the overall develop-
ment of the VMF’s mission structure. As we have seen, homeland defense and strategic strike 
were the defining priorities during the critical decision-making period of the early 1960s. But 
by the early 1970s, U.S. aircraft carriers had been reoriented towards limited war missions and 
the main strategic threat came from a much larger number of SSBNs, armed with missiles of 
increasing reach and destructive power. The parameters of the VMF’s strategic strike mission, 
on the other hand, were about to change completely, with the introduction of submarine-
launched ballistic missiles that could be fired against U.S. targets from the Soviet Union’s near 
seas. As we will see, the desire to act against the SLOCs is best seen as one of a number of 
symptoms of the escalating pressure for major posture change that this entailed. 
To arrive at an appropriate assessment of the Soviet debate about interdiction and see 
why it is best seen as a sideshow rather than as the main event, we can use as our starting 
point several recently released and very substantial U.S. intelligence reports on this issue. In 
1978, and in a lengthy assessment of Soviet intentions and capabilities, the CIA found that 
“[i]nterdiction is a secondary mission to which the Soviets would allocate a small part (perhaps 
10 percent) of their operational attack submarine force. Selected attacks on shipping, over a 
wide area of ocean, would in part be intended to disperse Western naval resources.”383 Three 
years later, an interagency report prepared together with the ONI,  Defense Intelligence 
Agency and National Security Agency on the same question found that “it is not currently the 
intention of Soviet planners to conduct a large-scale interdiction campaign against sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) in a major war with NATO, although we believe they intend some 
interdiction.”384 Finally, as late as 1985, a study of the most recent developments in the Soviet 
interdiction debate concluded that “although the frequency of [the appearance of articles on 
 
383 Central Intelligence Agency, The Role of Interdiction at Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations: An Intelli-
gence Assessment, May 1978, CIA Historical Collection, TOP SECRET (declassified 14 June 2017), i; Central 
Intelligence Agency/National Foreign Assessment Center, The Role of Interdiction at Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy 
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384 Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for Interdicting Sea Lines of Communication in a 
War with NATO, November 1981, CIA Historical Collection, TOP SECRET (declassified 1999), 1. Emphasis 
added.  
 





the topic in Soviet journals in the previous three to four years; MH] suggests an increased 
Soviet interest in this mission, the substance of the articles does not appear to signal a change 
in Soviet naval mission priorities.”385 Even more significantly from the perspective of posture 
analysis, the review stated that “we see no evidence in writings or exercises that the Soviets 
are deemphasizing other missions in a way that would free additional submarines for SLOC 
interdiction.”386 As any good posture analysis would remind us, the range of possible activities 
and missions may be vast, but the same asset cannot be allocated twice. Each of these findings 
represents the bottom line of an extensive review of the subject and serves to emphasize the 
fact that, while interdiction was seen as potentially more desirable under the changed circum-
stances of the 1970s and 1980s, the VMF was not willing to back this up with a meaningful 
investment of scare resources. 
Declassified intelligence reports provide one element of a reality check on Soviet am-
bitions to interdict the SLOCs towards the end of this phase of the competition. To explore this 
matter further, it also makes sense to briefly look into Soviet submarine building decisions 
with regard to the types that were not firmly linked to either the anti-carrier program or stra-
tegic deterrence. While Western observers like to describe these submarines as ‘attack subma-
rines,’ in line with the terminology they are used to, the VMF simply used the term atomnaya 
podvodnaya lodka (APL). This could include true general-purpose nuclear submarines as well 
as types that were actually more specialized, but that did not fall in the PLARK or PLARB 
categories. The main examples of general-purpose submarines during the second phase of the 
Cold War at sea were the Project 671 APLs, which NATO designated the Victor-class. The most 
obvious example of a more specialized APL was the Project 705, or Alfa-class to NATO. 
The base version of the Victor was developed alongside the Charlie- and Yankee-class 
starting in 1958 and shared with the latter the same VM-4 twin reactor installation. It retained 
Soviet characteristics like the double hull, but its layout with a more teardrop-like shape and 
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single screw also appears to have been influenced by Western designs.387 It was easily the fast-
est among the second-generation Charlie-, Victor-, Yankee-class (CVY) designs, with a top speed 
of 33 knots. The efforts that were made to pair high speed with improved quieting measures 
made it the most versatile of the bunch as well.388 Project 671 (Yorsh) submarines were armed 
with six standard, bow-mounted 533 mm torpedo tubes and a dozen reloads, which cannot be 
described as a very heavy complement if we are to think of it as a long-range hunter. It is also 
worth noting that the bow sonar was larger than in the other second-generation designs.389 As 
we have seen, Soviet sonar technology significantly lagged behind Western standards, but the 
Victor was certainly a more capable platform for ASW work than its general-purpose prede-
cessor, the Project 627/November. The VMF was apparently quite sanguine about its Project 671 
submarines, the first of which joined the fleet in 1967. Over the next five years, fourteen more 
were built, which made this the second-largest (sub)class of APLs in the Soviet Navy. 
At the same time, the expectation that the design had further potential for growth and 
improvement led to the development of a substantially improved Project 671RT variant, 
known as the Syomga in Russian and as Victor II to NATO, with seven additional units joining 
the fleet between 1972 and 1978. The Victor II had several important new features that provide 
a window into the VMF’s priorities in the mid-to-late 1960s. Perhaps the most important inno-
vation was the introduction of ‘rafted’ machinery for better noise suppression.390 At its most 
basic, this entailed the extensive use of rubber mounts to achieve acoustic decoupling from the 
hull – a technique that had been introduced in the West a full decade earlier in the Thresher/Per-
mit-class.391 Partly as a result of these measures the submarine had an enlarged diameter and 
was almost 10 meters longer. The Victor II also introduced an interesting weapon: a heavy 650 
mm torpedo known as the 65-76 Kit. With wake-homing terminal guidance and a 450-kilogram 
warhead, this was an anti-surface weapon that could cripple a carrier and might sink an escort 
 
387 Polmar and Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 157. 
388 As was the case with the other Soviet second-generation designs, the intent of building a quiet submarine 
was only very partially fulfilled – certainly by Western standards. 
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outright.392 Wake-homing torpedoes are notoriously difficult to defend against and, as far as 
we know, the U.S. did not develop a reliable countermeasure to these weapons. The fact that 
the Soviet designers went to the trouble of integrating two larger-diameter torpedo tubes into 
Project 671RT indicates that this was considered a relevant capability for these submarines, 
which were apparently expected to help counter CVBGs as well as enemy submarines. The 
latter task was also supported by the installation of a more capable sonar set. 
The same priorities were still evident in the final iteration of the design, the Project 
671RTM Shchuka. With an even stronger emphasis on quieting, based on information that the 
Walker spy ring provided, and the addition of a towed array sonar, this Victor III-class became 
a truly dangerous opponent for Western attack submarines.393 While it was still not as quiet as 
either the Sturgeons or the Los Angeles-class, it was certainly an acoustic match for the Permit-
class.394 Resulting in a class of twenty-five vessels, this was also the largest APL program of 
the Cold War. With the first 671RTM joining the fleet in 1979, they remained in continuous 
production until 1990. It also provided the basis for the more advanced Akula-class, which was 
a follow-on in terms of design philosophy and even in designation (Project 971 Shchuka-B).  
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Fig. 28: The Victor I originated a lineage of true high-seas, general-purpose APLs, which were ulti-
mately integrated into the more circumscribed, near-seas posture of the late 1970s and 1980s. (U.S. 
National Archives)   
 
The acquisition of a total of forty-seven multi-mission APLs from 1967 onwards contributes to 
our understanding of the development priorities that shaped Soviet naval posture during this 
phase, but several interpretations remain plausible. The Victor I/II-class vessels were equally 
compatible with an expansion or contraction of the defensive perimeter, with a focus on inter-
diction or SSBN protection. Similarly, the strong emphasis on quieting in the Victor III is con-
sistent with a realization of the general tactical value of noise reduction, based on the revela-
tions of the Walker spy ring, but also with the search for a survivable platform that could 
operate in the central Atlantic, or even off the coast of the United States, much like U.S. and 
UK submarines operated just off the Soviet coast. It is only when we view this debate in the 
broader context of Soviet posture change that a clearer picture begins to emerge. We will fur-
ther discuss the motivations behind the VMF’s shift. However, as far as the Victors are con-
cerned, there is little reason to second-guess Jordan’s assessment that they were designed as 
ASW submarines to contribute to combined-arms defense against Polaris – while it was still 
considered possible – and as escorts for the vulnerable Yankees as they transited to their launch 
 





areas through the GIUK gap.395 The flexibility of the Project 671 design also served the VMF 
well as it shifted from selective forward deployments to bastion defense and helps explain 
why the Victor and its derivatives saw a continuous production run lasting a quarter of a cen-
tury. 
Besides the increasingly formidable Victor, we also have another important data point 
to help us make sense of Soviet APL design priorities: namely, the Project 705 or Alfa-class. 
Although these submarines were built during much the same period as the Victor I/II, the Alfa 
was a different beast altogether. For starters, its hull was made of welded titanium, which most 
Western analysts though was physically impossible or, at the very least, far too expensive to 
pull off. It was only after one particularly diligent intelligence officer had managed to find an 
actual piece of titanium that could be traced to the Alfa in a scrapyard that U.S. intelligence 
changed its mind.396 Instead of the pressurized-water reactors in other Soviet and Western de-
signs, its single reactor used a liquid-metal coolant that allowed for considerably higher energy 
density.397 This translated into a top speed of 41 knots, which was second only to the record-
breaking Papa. Until the U.S. Navy specifically modified the Mk 48 torpedo in the early 1980s, 
it was probably fast enough to outrun the ASW weapons arrayed against it – at least in some 
scenarios.398 The Alfa’s armament was comparable to the Victor I-class, with the addition of the 
533 mm version of the SS-N-15 ASW missile. Beside its unusual reactor installation and high 
speed, the most remarkable feature of the Alfa was the unusual degree of automation that was 
incorporated into the design, which was difficult to achieve technically. In practice, this re-
sulted in a much smaller crew but also in widespread reliability problems due to the unprec-
edented degree of complexity of the combat system.399  
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Whereas the Victor was a multi-purpose, ‘swing-role’ submarine, the Alfa really was a 
thoroughbred interdictor – just not one designed to operate in far-seas scenarios for extended 
periods of time. On the contrary, it has been likened to a short-range “interceptor”400 that could 
be quickly pushed out to sea to counter an emerging threat. What it emphatically was not is a 
long-endurance ‘convoy killer’ for duty west of the GIUK gap. Given that the basic design goes 
back to the late 1950s, the Alfa is best seen as part of the layered defense system that was envi-
sioned at that time. In fact, its very high speed was most advantageous if it was transiting 
through a defended zone not too far from Soviet shores, because “navigating at 'hot rod' speed, 
the 'Alfa' would sound like a freight train and be acoustically 'blind'.”401 Ultimately, after the 
prototype had suffered a serious reactor accident, only five were built of the production vari-
ant, with the last one being commissioned in 1981. Some of the technological advances found 
their way into the Project 945 or Sierra-class APL of the 1980s, which eventually suffered a 
similarly truncated production run. Overall, the balance sheet of the Alfa program was decid-
edly mixed, but consistent with what we have already learned. 
To sum up our findings so far, we can see that APLs did become a more prominent 
element of the VMF’s force structure, during the 1970s in particular. As a result, the theoretical 
far-seas interdiction capability of the VMF submarine force was also expanded – not so much 
as a matter of design, but in line with its general capability development. Although neither the 
Victor nor the Alfa reflected a desire to build a ‘convoy killer,’ they could still sink merchant 
ship in significant numbers if tasked to do so – as could the submarines in the anti-carrier 
program and, in theory, even the SSBN fleet.402 However, despite the exhortations by offen-
sive-minded officers, an expansion of Soviet far-seas ambitions that might have led to such 
employment concepts is not what Western intelligence services observed in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.  
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rather vulnerable SSBN resources at the time.   
 





On the contrary, analysts discovered such a notable shift towards a more narrowly 
defensive and geographically constrained posture that they were able to overcome some of 
the most deeply ingrained and incrusted Western ideas about the Soviet Navy and its opera-
tional preferences. As has been abundantly documented, it was this realization and acceptance 
of the fact that the VMF had settled on a geographically focused defense in what became 
known as the Northern and Okhotsk bastions that led to the development of the Reagan era 
Maritime Strategy.403 But why did the Soviet Union ultimately start to turn away from its focus 
on extending the oceanic defense perimeter that had marked the 1960s and early 1970s? Alt-
hough we cannot be certain of Soviet motivations based on the currently available evidence, 
there is little doubt that this story revolves around the development of the U.S. and Soviet 
SSBN forces. 
The linchpin in this regard is the VMF’s failure in coming to grips with what became 
known as the “counter-Polaris task.”404 As we have seen, there was never a convincing ASW 
equivalent to the massive, open-ocean anticarrier complex – and for good reason. While the 
‘improvised’ George Washington-class SSBNs of the early 1960s were fairly noisy and the lim-
ited range of the Polaris A1 missile forced them to patrol east of the GUIK gap, within the 
theoretical reach of Soviet defenses, both these limitations were quickly eliminated. From the 
Lafayette-class onward U.S. ballistic missile submarines were significantly quieter than any So-
viet submarine until the introduction of the Akula-class in 1984 and with the 2,500 nmi range 
of the Polaris A3, they could hit the Soviet homeland from their forward base in Holy Loch – 
in fact, they could do so without even leaving the pier.405 While the VMF did construct power-
ful ASW forces centered on systems like the Project 1143 (Kiev-class) helicopter-carrying ASW 
guided missile cruiser, the Project 1134A (Kresta II-class), Project 1134B (Kara-class) and Project 
1164 (Slava-class) large ASW ships, and the Ilyushin Il-38 ASW aircraft, the idea of hunting 
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U.S. SSBNs in the central Atlantic was quite obviously untenable.406 Given their own limita-
tions and limited numbers, Victor I/IIs could not perform this mission all by themselves, either. 
The last of the ’41 for Freedom’ was commissioned in April 1967, at around the same time as 
the first Victor I, and even a decade later there were still far too few APLs to even seriously 
consider tracking and destroying the more quiet and plentiful Western SSBNs. Against Polaris 
A3 and its successors, damage limitation – whether preemptive or in the early days of a war – 
was simply no longer the promising course of action that it had once been, when it looked like 
the aircraft carrier might be the worst of the Soviet Union’s strategic defense problem. Even 
after much a quieter APL became available in numbers, in the form of the Victor III, U.S. intel-
ligence still believed that the Soviet anti-SSBN capabilities would continue to deteriorate and 
that “Soviet naval anti-SSBN operations will continue to be modest”407 into the 1990s. 
Given that homeland defense remained central to the VMF’s mission, how could the 
service cope with this turn of events? The intuitive and almost inescapable answer was that it 
needed an actual matching force – one that would be similarly invulnerable and capable of 
inflicting catastrophic damage on the continental United States without having to run the 
gauntlet of Western ASW defenses in the North Atlantic. Because of the basic geostrategic 
asymmetry in which the U.S. could safely forward-base its SSBNs in Scotland and Spain, and 
the Soviet Union had no such options, duplicating the capabilities provided by Polaris did not 
create such a matching force. What was needed to offset the U.S. advantage in nuclear power 
projection from the sea was an intercontinental-range SLBM. The SS-N-6 carried by the Yankee 
had a range of 2,500 kilometers. What Soviet engineers had to achieve to allow Soviet SSBNs 
to confine their patrols to the heart of the Soviet defense zone was to triple that range. The 
quest for the corresponding missile began in the early 1960s but the usual lag time and the 
sheer difficulty of the task meant that it was not until December 1971 that a prototype was 
ready for testing. The R-29 (SS-N-8 Sawfly) was ultimately accepted into service in 1973. With 
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excellent reliability even during the test program, a range of 7,800 kilometers, an 800-kiloton 
warhead, and penetration aids to defeat future U.S. missile defense systems, the R-29 was a 
real game changer for the Soviet Navy. As Polmar and Noot emphasize, it allowed the VMF 
to “outflank the U.S. anti-submarine strategy of detecting and attacking Soviet submarines as 
they steamed south, through the Norwegian Sea and the [GIUK] gaps. The new Soviet SSBNs 
could remain within the more easily protected Arctic waters, or even in port, and still reach 
out to strike American cities.”408 In what amounts to the most brilliantly concise description of 
what this really meant, they state that the submarine-launched missile was “in essence becom-
ing a mobile ICBM.”409  
 
 
Fig. 29: Into the bastions: A Delta II caught on the surface, with its distinctive ‘hump’ containing an 
expanded missile battery of sixteen R-29Ds. These missiles could reach every part of the United States 
from Soviet-controlled waters. (U.S. National Archives) 
 
To carry the new missile, the Yankee was developed further, with characteristic pragmatism, 
into the Project 667B Murena (NATO designation: Delta I), which was in turn modernized into 
the 667BD, 667BDR, and 667 BDRM (Delta II-IV) subclasses. The improvements from each sub-
class to the next were substantial but evolutionary. All Deltas carried variants of the R-29, 
which was developed further into the R-29D, R-29R, and R-29RM, relying on much the same 
philosophy. A total of forty-three Deltas were built between 1972 and 1990, and they remained 
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the centerpiece of Soviet/Russian sea-based nuclear deterrence into the 2010s. While the spe-
cifics of the further development of the Soviet SSBN force – including the development of the 
Project 941 (NATO designation: Typhoon) heavy SSBN and its R-39 missile, which began to 
enter service towards the very end of this phase – are fascinating in themselves, any particular 
emphasis upon them only serves to obscure the thoroughgoing shift in the VMF’s posture that 
was embodied by the basic Delta I/R-29 combination. The nature of that shift is easily summa-
rized: with Western SSBNs as the main threat and nuclear parity at sea as the main claim the 
VMF could still lay to defending the homeland, the further expansion of the oceanic defense 
concept became a secondary concern and the more focused defense-in-depth of the Arctic 
SSBN patrol zones became the main event. 
This final section has made the case that what ultimately determined the Soviet Union’s 
naval trajectory towards the end of the second phase was its inability to counter Polaris sub-
marines by classical naval means. This does not mean that the VMF did not try, but – by all 
reasonable standards – its efforts were doomed from the outset. Against a large SSBN force 
like the ‘41 for Freedom,’ strategic defense was no longer a promising approach, certainly with 
the technological means at hand at the time. As a result, the Delta and SS-N-8 became the next 
best thing to a viable strategic defense: an actual matching force that could target the U.S. 
population centers, as well as SSBN bases on the Eastern seaboard from Northern Fleet piers. 
Because these long-range strike forces were the VMF’s most relevant contribution to homeland 
defense from the mid-1970s onwards, defending the SSBNs from enemy encroachment into 
their likely patrol areas and strikes by Western naval forces against its bases became a central 
element of the new Soviet naval posture. The carrier threat had not disappeared, but it paled 
in comparison to the havoc that even a single SSBN could wreak. While U.S. carrier groups 
were a more attractive threat to plan against, because they could be countered more effectively 
using existing technology, the VMF’s posture developed much like our analytical model 
would have us expect: it was visibly refocused on the more severe threat, with what we can 
describe as a moderate amount of lag time. Alternative explanations may gain in stature as 
new evidence becomes available, but based on the materials that are currently open to civilian 
 





researchers, this is by far the most consistent and logical explanation of the VMF’s dramatic 
posture change in favor of a near-seas ‘bastion defense’ during the 1970s.   
 
5.7 Summary 
The second phase of the Cold War at sea was, in a very real sense, the decisive one. While the 
U.S. Navy’s efforts to exploit the Soviet shift towards near-seas SSBN defense make for a fas-
cinating story in itself, the timeline does not bear out triumphalist accounts that focus primar-
ily on the 1980s Maritime Strategy as the decisive factor in turning the competition in the 
United States’ favor. In making sense of this finding and reviewing the implications of the 
second phase for our understanding of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry at sea, two strands of the narra-
tive are key. First, Soviet military thinkers correctly understood that the aircraft carrier’s 
“pulsed”410 firepower took on an entirely new significance in the nuclear age. Their attempts 
to counter that threat were modestly successful, but the resulting ACW system-of-systems re-
mained brittle. This circumstance somewhat eased the task the U.S. Navy faced, but the chal-
lenge to surface ship survivability nonetheless remained a serious one. The ASW response, 
based on the across-the-board advantage the U.S. already enjoyed in underwater acoustics and 
wide-area defenses more generally, was formidable, although serious deficits remained in bat-
tle group self-defense. The AAW response did not result in the same level of advantage and 
might have proved insufficient, had the AVMF successfully deployed the Tu-22/Kh-22 combi-
nation during the early 1960s. Ultimately, the developmental difficulties on the Soviet side 
were such that the U.S. Navy had sufficient time to field the E-2 Hawkeye, F-14 Tomcat and 
AIM-54 Phoenix, and to begin development of a next-generation air defense system before the 
air threat took on its most serious form, in the guise of the Tu-22M/Kh-22M and the subma-
rine/ship-launched P-700. It did not, however, deploy any Aegis-equipped ships in time to 
preempt that threat and any naval war up until 1983 would have been fought without the 
benefit of Aegis-equipped units, with wide-spread coverage becoming available only in the 
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late 1980s. Hence, it is probably fair to say that battle group defenses depended on combat air 
patrol fighters and last-ditch – especially ‘soft-kill’ – defenses to a higher degree than was 
strictly desirable during this second phase. It should thus be emphasized that the U.S. Navy’s 
adaptation efforts in both ASW and AAW were unevenly successful, and potential failure 
points can be identified. 
Secondly, if has become clear that the U.S. decision to shift the naval contribution to 
strategic deterrence from the carrier and its attack squadrons to the missile-carrying subma-
rine did more to shape the course of the competition than any countermeasure designed to 
offset the Soviet high-seas posture that emerged in the 1960s. If it had led the Soviet Union to 
pour massive resources into an unproductive area like strategic ASW, the U.S. reliance on 
SSBNs could have functioned as a ‘competitive strategy’. Instead, the VMF successfully estab-
lished parity in sea-based deterrence from the mid-1970s onward. As ACW defense lost some 
of its urgency and the ’41 for Freedom’ irrevocably slipped beyond the reach of its own ASW 
forces, the VMF confirmed that its force development, doctrine and deployments remained 
responsive to the main, nuclear threat to the homeland. In line with its consistent emphasis on 
strategic defense, the second phase of the competition thus ended with the VMF retreating 
from its earlier focus on contesting Western sea control at the forward edge of its defensive 
zone in the North Atlantic. What remains of the U.S.-Soviet competition up to the realization 
of this retrenchment is a wealth of evidence on how the U.S. Navy sought to maintain its sub-
stantial advantages and why the Soviet sea denial challenge in the North Atlantic did not suc-
ceed in creating denied zones for Western naval forces, even while it was the declared aim and 
focus of Soviet naval strategy to do so. We will go on to explore the broader significance of 
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[6] 
   Conclusions 




6.1 Naval supremacy sustained 
As the Cold War at sea entered its final phase, several important outcomes of the long-term 
competition between the U.S. and Soviet navies were already becoming apparent. First, it was 
increasingly difficult to overlook that the VMF was making strides in traditional areas of 
weakness, specifically in submarine acoustics and quieting, based on its intelligence successes 
of the past decade. In other words, the Soviet Navy was now capable – at least in principle – 
of narrowing and perhaps closing the technological gap in crucially important areas of U.S. 
advantage. Hence, we can state with some confidence that its decision to turn its back on the 
oceanic focus of the previous decade was not due to a lack of technological competence. 
Secondly, due to the United States’ own intelligence breakthroughs, it had become apparent 
that the VMF was not exploiting its advances to further expand its defensive perimeter and 
was instead refocusing its efforts on the near seas – specifically on the Barents Sea, the Arctic, 
and the Sea of Okhotsk. Soviet maritime balancing had resulted in an impressive array of 
capabilities, some of which could reach far into the Atlantic and the Pacific, and would 
continue to do so. But the idea that the Soviet Navy was hell-bent on ‘going global’ was on its 
way out. Third, there could also be little doubt that fears to the effect that the U.S. Navy might 







exaggerated. In terms of relative capability – the only terms that matter – the VMF never 
reached a point at which it could expect to perform its oceanic denial mission with a high 
probability of success. For all its experiments with forward operations, in a global war 
involving the superpowers, there would be only one global navy. Even more importantly, the 
prospect of a climactic campaign for the control of the North Atlantic had abated and unless 
we are to dilute the main premises of a Third Battle of the Atlantic beyond recognition, the 
scenarios of reference during the final phase of the Cold War are difficult to describe in those 
terms. 
What contemporary analysts could not know, of course, is that the Soviet near-seas 
naval posture that emerged in the mid-1970s would not eventually give way to another 
attempt at expanding the defensive perimeter outward in the future, up to and perhaps even 
beyond the GIUK gap. In fact, in the early 1980s, the U.S. intelligence community still expected 
the future Soviet defensive perimeter to extend up to 3,000 kilometers from Soviet shores.1 
There were several options available to the VMF that had not been seriously explored at this 
stage. For example, the AVMF had never fielded long-range escort fighters to protect its strike 
aircraft – or, indeed, attempted to provide them with air engagement radars and AAMs of 
their own. Although neither of these options was technically straightforward or easy to 
implement in practice, both routes nevertheless remained open. Once the needs of bastion 
defense were met, the VMF could also have deployed truly silent APLs or a cheaper and more 
numerous alternative to the Oscar-class. While these platforms would not have escaped 
eventual attrition in the ASW environment of the GIUK gap and the western North Atlantic, 
they could certainly tie down precious resources and thus contribute to bastion defense and a 
Soviet war effort more broadly.   
 With hindsight, Soviet submarine construction during the late 1970s and 1980s was 
almost certainly insufficient to both meet the requirements of bastion defense and forward-
deploy large numbers of capable, first-line platforms at the same time. While peacetime 
attempts at operating far forward drew considerable attention, they were ultimately token and 
 
1   John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy 1977-1986, Newport Paper 19 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), 109.  
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experimental.2 Similarly, Tokarev’s suspicion that the Backfire force would have been very 
heavily disadvantaged in distant operations is difficult to discount.3 It is true, of course, that 
the bastion concept still encompassed a capability for oceanic perimeter defense, and that there 
was always going to be some overlap between the two, but the paradigm had shifted. The VMF’s 
core mission for the remainder of the confrontation would be to defend its SSBN deployment 
areas in waters adjacent to the Soviet homeland and the clear implication was a much more 
focused and intense sea denial effort in the peripheral seas in the High North and the Far East. 
To claim that the continued acquisition of long-range-capable platforms like the Victor III and 
TU-22M3 could only mean that oceanic defense remained the VMF’s chief priority is to gloss 
over the utility of these platforms, which were the products of ongoing acquisition programs 
first launched in the 1960s, in near-seas operations and to ignore the other core elements of 
posture – namely, doctrinal preferences and observable deployment patterns. If we take these 
elements into account, as indeed we should, the main outcome of the first two phases of the 
Cold War at sea was clear-cut: At the end of our investigation period, after 35 years of peacetime 
competition at sea, the U.S. Navy stood undefeated, its global naval supremacy intact. In this 
concluding chapter, we will both review our findings concerning the why and how of this 
outcome, as proposed in the original research question, and weigh their broader significance.  
 
6.2 The limits of sea denial: seven significant findings 
In setting out the terms for this investigation, we asked a question that is central to our 
understanding of the underlying dynamics of the Cold War at sea as well as of its eventual 
outcome: Why, given the significant technological and operational strides that the VMF made, did the 
long-term naval competition between the Cold War superpowers end with U.S. naval supremacy largely 
intact? With that question still firmly in mind, we can sum up the findings of this dissertation 
by formulating seven significant conclusions. Although we may not be able to expand any of 
 
2  The most famous episode is covered in Peter Hennessy and James Jinks, The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy 
Submarine Service since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2015), 564-71.  







them into social-scientific generalizations, all of them remain relevant today and for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
THE SOURCES OF LONG-TERM ADVANTAGE 
To understand the principal result of the Cold War at sea – the U.S. Navy’s retention of a 
meaningful advantage over its challenger in a notional naval war in the North Atlantic theater 
– there are three elements of the U.S. approach to competitive posture change that deserve 
particular emphasis. First, the U.S. Navy reacted early to a projected threat that had not yet 
materialized. As we now know, this threat was systematically exaggerated by U.S. and allied 
analysts, based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Soviet naval posture, which in 
reality was geared towards near-seas defense rather than SLOC interdiction. However, this 
overreaction – which was shaped both by the U.S. Navy’s struggle for bureaucratic relevance 
and by entrenched assumptions based on recent historical experience – nevertheless laid the 
foundation for a long-lasting superiority in undersea acoustics, submarine ASW and wide-
area anti-submarine defense. Although it played a critical role in the U.S. adaptation to an 
expected high-seas submarine threat, the focus on forward carrier operations did not lead to a 
similarly sizeable advantage in fleet air defense during the first phase of the competition.  
This points to the importance of several factors that were present in the ASW effort and 
either absent or less pronounced in the AAW effort. In its adjustment to the expected long-
range submarine threat, the U.S. Navy could draw on an acute awareness of the strategic 
significance of a submarine campaign against the SLOCs, a strong basic research program 
coming out of World War II, a vigorous experimentation effort, and the submarine 
community’s ongoing search for a new role. The Soviet air threat was also recognized as 
significant by naval planners, but the focus of naval aviators during much of the 1950s was on 
the nuclear mission, which flowed directly from national priorities and interservice 
bureaucratic pressures, while the surface fleet as a whole faced competing demands. It does 
not come as a surprise, then, that fleet air defense did not develop at the same pace as ASW 
defense during this early phase, with knock-on effects during the following decades.  
 
                                              Conclusions 
 
    
  [379] 
 
 Secondly, rather than settling for a modest advantage, the U.S. Navy exploited its initial 
successes and further built upon them without letting up. Thus, the service not only developed 
the concept of the multi-purpose, nuclear-powered, fast and silent attack submarine and made 
it the centerpiece of its forward ASW effort. It also made sure that successive classes of SSNs 
were built back to back and in sufficient numbers to stay ahead of the expected Soviet nuclear 
submarine program well into the future. The fact that the VMF did not deploy a truly 
comparable submarine until the late 1970s, when the first Victor IIIs entered service, 
demonstrates asymmetries in posture planning, but it is also indicative of the U.S. Navy’s 
margin of technological advantage from the late 1950s onward. Not only did the VMF fail to 
catch up in general-purpose submarine design during the investigation period – for all we 
know, it did not even fully understand how serious the discrepancies in acoustic quieting and 
underwater sensing were, until the Walker spy ring spelled it out for its Soviet handlers in 
detail. Of course, this level of advantage was not achieved across the board and the 
competition in fleet air defense was altogether less lopsided, but the cascading advantage 
achieved in SSN development during the late 1950s and early 1960s remains an excellent 
example of the U.S. Navy’s decisiveness in committing to what was then a radical concept, 
and the service’s relative agility in implementing that concept and developing it further. 
Thirdly, in countering Soviet initiatives, the U.S. response generally focused on 
breaking potential strategic challenges down into more manageable, techno-doctrinal problem 
sets and formulating solutions to them. Instead of adjusting its strategic outlook, the U.S. Navy 
applied this problem-solving, technologically focused approach to successive challenges and 
mitigated them sufficiently to be able to sustain its organizational preference for offensive 
power projection. If Soviet sea denial fell short of changing its competitor’s mind about 
forward operations, it was not least because the U.S. Navy’s response was effective in 
disassembling the VMF’s challenge into its individual component parts and countering them 
at the techno-doctrinal level.  If there is such a phenomenon as an “engineering approach”4 in 
American strategic and military culture, the Navy’s pursuit of the Cold War competition at 
 
4  Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military 







sea could certainly be described in those terms. While it must be said that a focus on techno-
doctrinal solutions does not necessarily lend itself to replication at other times and against 
different opponents, we should nonetheless acknowledge that it served the leading sea power 
well enough during the 35-year period we have investigated. 
 
THE ‘THIRD BATTLE’ WAS NOT DECIDED BY THE FAR-FORWARD ENDGAME 
The 1980s have long been considered a defining period for the U.S. Navy. After two decades 
of perceived neglect at the hands of successive administrations, the Reagan era brought a 
windfall not only of funds to replace ageing ships, aircraft and equipment but also of public 
recognition and renewed confidence in U.S. naval capabilities. Of central importance in 
achieving this “naval renaissance”5 was a series of strategic concepts collectively known as The 
Maritime Strategy. The undeniable success of naval planners in clarifying the U.S. Navy’s 
purpose as an organization, its role in implementing a national military strategy, and its 
unique contribution to the U.S.-led Western security system at large still makes this an 
extremely relevant period to study. It may thus come as a surprise that this investigation 
should depart from the established narrative and find that the Cold War competition at sea 
was essentially decided during the second rather than the final phase of the competition.  
 The timeline, however, is very clear in this regard. Two periods are critical to our 
understanding of how U.S. naval supremacy was ultimately maintained. During the first 
period, the U.S. Navy established a technological lead, primarily centered on ASW, that the 
VMF could not overcome in time to allow it to compete at eye level in the central Atlantic. 
During the second period, the VMF adjusted its posture in line with its recognition of the fact 
that carriers were no longer the main threat, and that its primary mission of homeland defense 
should be refocused on its countervailing force of SSBNs and on their protection. Insofar as 
the U.S. Navy ‘won’ the Cold War at sea, it did so by turning practically the entire North 
Atlantic into a hostile environment for Soviet assets by the early 1970s and making sure that 
its SSBNs could not be countered by Soviet ASW assets like its carriers potentially could be by 
 
5  The idea of a ‘renaissance’ is explored in Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval Renaissance: The U.S. Navy in the 
1980s (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990).  
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the Soviet ACW effort. For all the serious internal challenges and shortcomings the U.S. Navy 
faced during the 1960s and 1970s, these achievements nonetheless predated the Reagan 
defense built-up.  
 Hence, this study makes the case that the competition was actually decided early on; 
and to the extent that it was not decided early on it, it was still decided long before The Maritime 
Strategy came along. The lag times associated with many of the key adaptations that came into 
the fleet during the 1980s confirm this. As we have seen, Aegis development began in the 1950s 
and the system had been extensively tested by the late 1970s. The Los Angeles-class SSN was a 
late 1960s design. The Tomahawk missile program dates back to the early 1970s. The 
Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser was another 1970s design. The list goes on. A similar 
point can be made about the employment concepts of most of these systems, which did not 
change radically in the Maritime Strategy environment. It is certainly true that the Maritime 
Strategy debates succeeded in “making many more or less implicit ideas explicit,”6 but the core 
elements – including far-forward carrier operations and ASW, under-ice submarine 
operations, the Outer Air Battle, and expanded use of EMCON and deception measures – were 
extensions of existing capabilities and concepts, many of which were anything but novel.  
What followed in the 1980s was the exploitation of the advantages that the U.S. Navy 
had successfully built and maintained during the first and second phases, and the integration 
of existing and projected capabilities into a more developed ‘umbrella’ framework that 
proceeded from the knowledge that the VMF had already voluntarily ceded the high seas as a 
main focus of the Cold War competition. The final phase of the Cold War at sea saw the 
culmination of the U.S. Navy’s success in maintaining a meaningful advantage over its Soviet 
counterpart. The Maritime Strategy secured the gains that had been made over the preceding 
decade and further expanded the margin of advantage that already existed at the end of the 
second phase. It can be credited for explaining the state-of-the-art of U.S. naval operations with 
a clarity and focus that had long been absent in both the Navy’s internal debates and in the 
public discourse. It reasserted naval supremacy both intellectually and through its forceful 
displays of American seapower. The claim that it also decided the Cold War naval competition 
 







in the U.S. Navy’s favor, on the other hand, is difficult to square with what we know about the 
longer-term dynamics of that competition and, thus, not supported by this investigation. 
 
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF SEA-BASED NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCES 
The history of the Cold War naval competition is, first and foremost, the history of seapower 
during the formative years of the nuclear age. ‘Strategic’ nuclear weapons fundamentally 
changed the dynamics of naval competition, certainly as far as the Soviet side was concerned. 
The Soviet obsession with the vulnerability of the homeland to sea-based strikes can almost 
certainly be traced to factors that predate the nuclear age, but the extent to which nuclear 
weapons amplified that concern is difficult to overestimate. For the Soviet armed forces of the 
Cold War era, war at sea was about strategic defense against a nuclear-armed naval opponent, 
front and center. While its level of ambition and elements of its posture changed over time, 
this was the VMF’s organizational essence throughout the Cold War period. To claim that any 
other mission rose to the same level of importance or influenced Soviet naval posture planning 
to the same extent would require us to willfully ignore troves of the best available evidence 
and to inflate the importance of secondary concerns far beyond what the evidence supports.  
 As a result, we cannot fully understand the Cold War at sea if we examine it primarily 
through the prism of conventional naval operations. The U.S. Navy did not share the Soviet 
Navy’s single-minded concern with strategic defense of the homeland – in the immediate 
sense of developing and deploying its forces to counter Soviet sea-based delivery systems, that 
is. The fact that even the anti-SSBN operations envisioned during the Maritime Strategy era 
were still justified as a means to an end with reference to SLOC defense illustrates just how 
stark the difference in outlook was.7 There was no need, however, for both competitors to 
subscribe to the same logic for the dynamics of the confrontation to be driven by the existence 
of sea-based nuclear strike forces to an extent that is not widely understood outside a small 
group of issue experts. What we can take away from this historical reality is that both the 
context in which a naval competition takes place and the specific outlook of the opponent are 
 
7 Linton F. Brooks, “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy,” International 
Security 11, no. 2 (1986), doi:10.2307/2538958, 81-82. 
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deeply important in understanding its dynamics, as well as its eventual outcome. Naval 
postures should be expected to reflect not only narrowly defined naval concerns, but also the 
interaction between the competitors’ security concerns more broadly – even those, and 
perhaps especially those, that strike the Western observer as alien, irregular, or irrational. 
 
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT SEA SHOULD BE A FOCUS OF RESEARCH 
While the strategic nuclear element played a more fundamental role in shaping the Cold War 
naval competition, the lack of scholarly attention that has been paid to the prospect of tactical 
nuclear war at sea is remarkable in and of itself. TNW were introduced early in the competition 
and they became a pervasive feature of both sides’ naval postures, especially in anti-submarine 
defense but also in Soviet anti-ship missiles and in some surface-to-air missile warheads. What 
is less clear is that the U.S. Navy’s uneasy relationship with its TNW arsenal was matched by 
similar wariness and unease on the Soviet side.8 In fact, nuclear war at sea was one of the areas 
in which the VMF may have enjoyed a significant advantage. Given that it was also the weaker 
of the two competitors and the one that was likely to be driven back and eventually pinned 
against the Soviet coast as a conflict progressed, we have to ask whether measures designed 
to make a U.S. conventional win more likely did not also significantly increase the probability 
of nuclear war at sea, rendering it a rather more likely scenario than most treatments of the 
subject would have us believe. 
Of course, as long as the nuclear “balance of terror”9 held, the VMF’s sea denial posture 
did not actually have to carry the main burden of protecting the Soviet homeland. But if U.S. 
and Soviet planners felt the war could remain conventional, as they increasingly thought 
possible from the early 1970s onwards, the limitations of the VMF’s ability to deter a U.S. naval 
push up to, and perhaps beyond, the Arctic circle fully came into play. The consequences are 
difficult to estimate in counterfactual terms, but the possibility that the U.S. Navy might have 
been disabused of the notion that the VMF would not use tactical nuclear weapons at sea 
relatively early in a conflict should strike us as rather significant. Interestingly enough, this is 
 
8  Desmond Ball, “Nuclear War at Sea,” International Security 10, no. 3 (1985), doi:10.2307/2538940, 25-26. 







an issue that did not figure very prominently in later criticisms of the far-forward Maritime 
Strategy of the 1980s.10 How exactly the U.S. Navy imagined it would prevent the VMF from 
falling back on the routine use of TNW as it was pushed back into its main defensive zone has 
remained obscure. Of course, TNW will not necessarily figure as prominently in future naval 
competitions. But since their role is not well understood even in the Cold War case, and their 
attraction as a means of countering U.S. naval supremacy still persists, we would do well to 
study them much more closely than has hitherto been the case. 
 
THE ENDURING CHALLENGE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER VULNERABILITY 
Much of this investigation has revolved around the development of Soviet anti-carrier forces 
as a response to the U.S. Navy’s ‘attack-at-source’ paradigm. The VMF invested a very 
significant share of its resources in anti-carrier warfare and, for a time, embraced it as its main 
priority. The U.S. Navy’s efforts to ensure the future viability of its attack carriers were 
similarly complex and resource-intensive and we have already concluded that they were 
highly significant in mitigating the anti-carrier threat to the extent that more aggressive carrier 
operations remained thinkable and bureaucratically viable even in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The ways in which technical and doctrinal solutions were combined in pursuing that 
outcome remain highly instructive today and for the future.  
 There is, however, a more general finding on carrier vulnerability to be drawn from 
this investigation as well – one that may ultimately be more significant: while it is true that 
carrier vulnerability was significantly modulated by techno-doctrinal developments on both 
sides of the Cold War competition, it is ultimately best seen as a constant rather than a variable. 
Like any warship, including previous capital ships, aircraft carriers that are deployed into the 
jaws of enemy defenses in a great power conflict may suffer significant – perhaps crippling – 
damage. Overall, U.S. fleet carriers from the Essex-class onwards have proven exceptionally 
 
10  A rare treatment of the subject in the context of the Maritime Strategy is Donald C. F. Daniel, “The Soviet 
Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at Sea,” Survival 29, no. 4 (1987), doi:10.1080/00396338708442367, 318-35. 
Daniel believes that the Soviets would have been reluctant to use TNW first in an at-sea scenario, unless they 
were already being used on land (334), but there is little in the way of high-quality evidence to suggest that 
this was so. In the absence of such evidence, mirror-imaging was (and still is) a distinct possibility. 
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sturdy and survivable, despite suffering extreme damage in some cases. They are less likely to 
be lost to such damage than any other type of warship. But they have never been, and will 
never be, invulnerable or unsinkable. At the same time, they have proven themselves capable 
of operating in high-threat environments in the past and their survivability has grown, if not 
in proportion to the threat, then certainly to such an extent as to keep them viable unless, and 
until proven otherwise. 
 Historically, there has been only one factor that could quickly and reliably tilt the 
balance between threat and survivability in the attacker’s favor: an ACW paradigm that fully 
embraced the destructiveness of tactical nuclear weapons would have rendered far-forward 
operations suicidal. Given that some leakage of missiles and torpedoes cannot be prevented 
in a real-life scenario, all-nuclear saturation attacks executed with some skill, using adequate 
platforms and weapons, could spell the end of any carrier battle group – no matter how well 
trained, led, equipped, or organized. This was true under Cold War conditions, and it remains 
true today. 
 
THE FULL POTENTIAL OF SEA DENIAL REMAINS UNEXPLORED 
One of the most interesting questions that the outcome of the Cold War naval competition 
raises is whether the VMF’s failure to create credible sea denial zones beyond the near seas is 
primarily case-specific or if naval postures designed to achieve negative aims are doomed in 
general. Due to the nature of the investigation and because there are no truly comparable cases 
on record, we cannot possibly resolve that issue based on the findings of this dissertation. 
However, this may amount to a significant finding in itself. Since the historical data on large-
scale, oceanic sea denial in the missile age is limited and the Soviet challenge was somewhat 
abridged by the VMF’s reversion to the near-seas focus, we do not know what a maximum sea 
denial effort by one significant naval power against another can (or cannot) achieve. Thus, 
statements to the effect that sea denial postures are doomed to fail are certainly not sufficiently 
grounded in historical fact to amount to viable generalizations, and the same would seem to 
be true of countervailing claims as well. Can an all-out sea denial challenge drive a leading sea 







indication, the capabilities that are necessary to achieve effective, full-scale sea denial will 
certainly not come cheap and there is, in fact, likely to be significant overlap with a sea control 
posture in the later stages of the challenge. 
 
PAST MISCONCEPTIONS ARE A CAUSE FOR CONCERN TODAY  
Looking back at Western assessments of the threat posed by the VMF on the high seas, several 
aspects of the analytical record should strike us as remarkable. First, it is encouraging that 
some analysts – often those who went against the grain, challenging organizational 
conformism and conventional wisdom, as Robert Herrick and Michael MccGwire did in their 
respective countries – made many of the right judgement calls early in the competition, based 
on limited information and working mostly from Russian-language sources. Because there are 
limits to what such individuals can achieve in the bureaucratic environment, there is a definite 
role for open-source analysis and expert debate outside the confines of government agencies 
in exploring such perspectives further. Based on the Cold War record, political decision-
makers and officials who work to stifle such exchanges, including through rampant over-
classification, would be doing the adversary a favor.  
Secondly, it took the Western naval and intelligence bureaucracies decades to 
understand their Soviet opponent and even then, it was largely as a result of the contrarian 
perspectives of individual analysts ultimately taking hold. Even at the end of our investigation 
period, parts of the U.S. Navy itself were still actively resisting the finding that the Soviet 
Union’s naval posture was, in fact, geared towards zone defense rather than SLOC 
interdiction. Of course, it is not surprising that large organizations are much less agile than 
individual analysts in reexamining accepted precepts and heuristics. The evidentiary 
requirements for organizational change should be higher than those an individual analyst can 
reasonably apply. After all, the consequences of writing an intelligence report or publishing a 
book and those of implementing significant change to an aspect of the national military 
strategy are of a different magnitude as well.  
What is worrying, however, is that organizational resistance to change often appears 
to have been based on unquestioned assumptions rather than on an existing, evidence-based 
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understanding of the adversary’s calculus. Many of these assumptions were based on 
valuable, but not necessarily transferable experiences from past wars and competitions, which 
the VMF ended up defying. It is difficult to fathom how the lack of experience in naval warfare 
over the last several decades impacts the quality of our judgements today, or how it will bear 
on the quality of future research, but there is ample reason to guard against the intellectual 
indolence and disregard for conflicting evidence that was characteristic of many mainstream 
products of Cold War naval analysis. 
 
6.3 Facing a future war at sea 
 
Although this investigation has been focused on a particular historical case, it was not 
undertaken in a vacuum. The second decade of the 21st century has seen the return of long-
term strategic rivalry as the central reality of international relations. Ongoing and future sea 
denial challenges will differ in important ways from those of the Cold War era. They will be 
shaped, among other factors, by altered public perceptions of conventional military 
operations, the changing and unclear nuclear-conventional balance, the prospective lethality 
of next-generation ship-killing weapons, the uncertain potential of new technologies like 
directed energy weapons and artificial intelligence, and the lack of responsive military-
industrial capacities in the West.  
At the same time, many of the broader questions that arose in the course of the Cold 
War competition will no doubt ring familiar for any student of U.S. defense planning in the 
early 21st century: Can the U.S. remain politically engaged and militarily effective in shielding its allies 
overseas from coercion and political destabilization, even as prospective opponents develop new 
technologies and doctrines that are designed to undermine its forward military posture? How are stable 
deterrence and credible crisis response possible even as the vulnerabilities of U.S. naval and theater 
forces continue to grow? Far from being an exercise of purely historical interest, then, this 
investigation can also speak indirectly to more contemporary concerns about anti-access and 







and on Russia’s resurgent armed forces in particular.11 As the underlying ideas and 
technologies spread, other actors may follow suit, potentially making power projection from 
the sea a much harder proposition that it has been at any time since the downfall of the Soviet 
Union.12 It would seem therefore worthwhile to explore systematically and in detail the legacy 
of an earlier era that differed in circumstances but posed roughly similar problems, as far as 
the question of operational access is concerned. 
Critics will be quick to point out some notable differences between the case examined 
here and newly emerging naval competitions: three decades of technological change, the 
diminished importance of the strategic nuclear balance, much higher levels of integration in 
the global economy, and a real reluctance to firmly commit to the military containment of 
potential adversaries, among others. Yet, even if one is inclined to grant all of these objections, 
the requirement for maritime operational access remains at the heart of the United States’ 
global defense problem. As has long been recognized, effective deterrence short of the threat 
of all-out strategic nuclear war rests on the ability to instill in the opponent the firm recognition 
that a quick military victory, or one that comes without disproportionate costs and risks, is not 
in the cards.13 The United States has, for the past seventy-five years, consistently forward-
deployed a significant, but not preponderant, share of its military forces in support of treaty 
allies and ‘strategic partners’. To avoid a breakdown of conventional deterrence, or to deal 
with any such breakdown in the event, it must rely on its ability to logistically sustain and 
augment these frontier forces as necessary. This has led to a renewed awareness that, without 
firm control over critical sea lines of communication, neither of these tasks looks feasible. 
Moreover, given that the U.S. has continues to invest heavily in carrier-centric power 
projection, any opposing land power would gain considerable advantages, in addition to its 
geographical proximity and much lower spending on naval forces, if this offensive potential 
 
11 See: Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge,” 
Survival 58, no. 2 (2016), doi:10.1080/00396338.2016.1161906, 95-116; Martin Zapfe and Michael C. Haas, 
“Access for Allies? NATO, Russia and the Baltics,” The RUSI Journal 161, no. 3 (2016), 
doi:10.1080/03071847.2016.1193355, 34-41. 
12 This case was expertly made in Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Why AirSea Battle?” (CSBA/Office of Net 
Assessment, Washington, DC, 2010).  
13 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 63-66.  
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cannot be effectively arrayed against it.14 This is certainly no less true today than it was half a 
century ago. 
However, despite our awareness of the continued relevance of these and other factors, 
the likely realities of a future war at sea have not sunk in. Our awareness of the extreme 
lethality of modern naval combat remains theoretical and the assumptions that are applied to 
potential conflict scenarios are often entirely naïve. To expect that a 21st century war at sea can 
be fought without grievous losses in ships, aircraft, sailors and aircrew far beyond anything 
the U.S. public – let alone those of its allies – are accustomed to, is to fundamentally 
misunderstand the nature of any such conflict. Given that such misunderstandings will, if 
anything, increase the likelihood of conflict, the time has arrived for naval analysts to firmly 
embrace the core of their profession and to consider earnestly and in great detail the 
















14 The fact that China is investing heavily in anti-carrier forces, as did the Soviet Union before it, is testimony 
to the continuing relevance of this potential in the eyes of possible opponents. See e.g. Roger Cliff et al., 
Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, 
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1.  Einleitung 
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die Dynamik des militärischen Wettbewerbs auf See 
zwischen den Supermächten USA und Sowjetunion über einen Zeitraum von rund 35 Jahren, 
von 1946 bis 1981. Im Mittelpunkt stehen die langfristigen Anpassungsmuster zwischen den 
bürokratisch hauptverantwortlichen Organisationen: der United States Navy (USN) und der 
Voyenno-morskoy flot SSSR ("Militärisch-maritime Flotte der UdSSR", kurz: VMF). Während des 
fraglichen Zeitraums bereiteten sich die beiden führenden Marineorganisationen und ihre 
Alliierten intensiv auf einen Krieg in den Weiten des Nordatlantiks, des Westpazifiks und 
ihrer Nebenmeere vor. Wäre ein solcher Konflikt tatsächlich ausgebrochen, wären zum ersten 
und zugleich vielleicht auch zum letzten Mal in der Seekriegsgeschichte Lenkflugkörper und 
Atomwaffen in großem Umfang zum Einsatz gekommen. 
 Die Geographie des bestimmenden, nordatlantischen Schauplatzes stellte die NATO 
dabei vor beträchtliche Schwierigkeiten. Um die in Europa stationierten Kräfte der USA in 
einer Krise verstärken und das Gesamtdispositiv im Konfliktfall weiter aufrecht erhalten zu 
können, war der Schutz der Seeverbindungen quer über den Atlantik unabdingbar. Westliche 
Analysten erwarteten lange, dass sich die Seestreitkräfte der NATO-Verbündeten und damit 
 






vor allem die U.S. Navy schnell in einer „Dritten Atlantikschlacht“1 wiederfinden würden. 
Diese Vorstellung erwies sich zwar als weitgehend unzutreffend. Unter den gegebenen 
Umständen musste die NATO jedoch mit einem entschlossenen Vorgehen der VMF gegen die 
verwundbaren Verbindungslinien rechnen. 
Die Idee einer „Dritten Atlantikschlacht“ wird dabei in dieser Dissertation zwar als 
nützlicher Bezugsrahmen für die maritime Mächtekonkurrenz des Kalten Krieges 
aufgenommen. Zugleich wird jedoch festgehalten, dass dies nur für einen Teil des Kalten 
Krieges auf See sinnvoll möglich ist. Dieser kann in drei Phasen unterteilt werden. In der ersten 
Phase (ca. 1946-1960) begann sich die U.S. Navy auf die Machtprojektion gegen sowjetische 
Landziele zu konzentrieren, während die VMF den Aufbau eines geschichteten 
Verteidigungssystem gegen nukleare Trägerangriffe vorantrieb, das gegen Ende dieses 
Zeitrahmens nur wenig in den Nordatlantik hineinragte. Die zweite Phase (ca. 1961-1981) war 
geprägt von der Verlagerung des strategisch-nuklearen Potentials der U.S. Navy von ihren 
Trägerverbänden hin zur U-Boot-Flotte. Unterdessen entwickelte die VMF ihr ozeanisches 
Verteidigungsdispositiv entscheidend weiter und bildete zugleich eine erste, noch sehr 
begrenzte Fähigkeit für Atomschläge gegen Ziele auf dem amerikanischen Kontinent aus. Dies 
führte nicht zuletzt auch zu einem verstärkten „Sicherheitsdilemma auf hoher See.“2 
Gegen Ende dieser Phase kam es jedoch zu einem erneuten sowjetischen 
Paradigmenwechsel. Anstatt weitere Ressourcen in ein immer umfangreicheres, ozeanisch 
ausgerichtetes sea denial-System zu investieren, konzentrierten sich die Bemühungen der 
Sowjetmarine ab Mitte der 1970er Jahre wieder wesentlich stärker auf die Nahzone. Der 
Schwerpunkt der sowjetischen Ambitionen auf See war von nun an wieder die Barentssee und 
im Fernen Osten das Ochotskische Meer. In der dritten und letzten Phase (1981-1991) 
versuchte die U.S. Navy anhand der Maritime Strategy der Reagan-Ära diese Verschiebung in 
eine umfassende Überlegenheit umzumünzen. Während die ersten beiden Phasen durchaus 
als umfassende Vorbereitungen auf der Ebene der „Posture“3 für den Fall einer „Dritten 
 
1 Vgl. Owen R. Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarine, 
Newport Papers 16 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2003).  
2 Interview mit CAPT Peter M. Swartz, USN (ret.), Arlington, VA, 12. Mai 2016.  
3 Vgl. Karl-Peter Stratmann, "Die Sicherheit des NATO-Abschnitts Mitteleuropa als strategisches Problem: 
Untersuchungen zur Glaubwürdigkeit der gegenwärtigen NATO-'Posture'” (Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität, 1978), 6. 
 






Atlantikschlacht“ beschrieben werden können, ist die dritte Phase aufgrund ihres Fokus auf 
dem maritimen Nahbereich der Sowjetunion schwer anhand dieses Konzepts zu fassen.  
Der Schwerpunkt der vorliegenden Untersuchung liegt auf den beiden Phasen, die 
schließlich zu dem stillschweigenden Eingeständnis der Sowjetunion führten, mit der US-
Marine auf hoher See nicht länger sinnvoll konkurrieren zu können und vielleicht auch nicht 
zu müssen. Statt in der dritten Phase, wie oft behauptet wurde, muss der Wettbewerb auf 
hoher See im Wesentlichen während dieser früheren Phasen entschieden worden sein. Das 
letztendliche Ergebnis der Seemachtkonkurrenz des Kalten Krieges wirft dabei wichtige 
Fragen auf: Wie ist es der U.S. Navy gelungen, ihren militärischen Vorsprung langfristig zu stützen 
und zu erhalten? Warum gelang es der Sowjetmarine nicht, ein wirksames System zu entwickeln, um 
die Projektionskräfte der US-Marine dauerhaft in Schach zu halten? Dies sind die Fragen, die diese 
Dissertation anhand einer theoretisch fundierten Analyse der ersten beiden Phasen des Kalten 
Krieges auf See untersuchen will. Konkret beschäftigt sie sich mit dem Wettbewerb zwischen 
der sowjetischen sea denial-Posture – ein etwas schmälerer und weniger umstrittener Begriff 
als das anti-access/area denial des frühen 21. Jahrhunderts – und den Anstrengungen der U.S. 
Navy zur Erhaltung der Seeherrschaft durch „transozeanische“4 Machtprojektion. 
Die beiden Hauptteile der Untersuchung sind dabei in vier Kapitel gefasst, wobei zwei 
dieser Kapitel konzeptioneller Natur und zwei auf die Empirie der Mächtekonkurrenz auf See 
fokussiert sind. Kapitel 2 befasst sich mit der einschlägigen theoretischen Literatur. Das 
Kapitel plädiert für einen hybriden Ansatz, der Elemente der System- und 
Organisationstheorien kombiniert, um das bestmögliche Gleichgewicht zwischen analytischer 
„Hebelwirkung“ und empirischer Präzision in unserer Betrachtung der historischen 
Datenlage zu erreichen. Kapitel 3 entwickelt anschließend die Annahmen, die dem hybriden 
Ansatz zugrunde liegen sowie ein Kausalmodell als Leitfaden für die empirischen Teile. 
Ebenfalls in diesem Kapitel werden die Prozessanalyse (process tracing) als primäre Methode 
und mehrere unterstützende Methoden vorgestellt, die sich im Wesentlichen aus den Arbeiten 
führender Marineanalysten speisen.5 Die beiden folgenden Kapitel präsentieren die 
 
4 Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” USNI Proceedings 80, Nr. 5 (1954), 
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1954/may/national-policy-and-transoceanic-navy.  
5 Siehe etwa: Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2013).  
 






Ergebnisse der Prozessanalysen. Kapitel 4 beschäftigt sich mit der ersten Phase (1946-1960) 
wobei die zentralen Dimensionen der amerikanischen-sowjetischen Seemachtkonkurrenz – 
die Anti-U-Boot-Kriegführung und die Flottenluftverteidigung – nacheinander betrachtet 
werden. In diesem Kapitel werden die Grundlagen für den langfristigen Vorteil der US-
Marine offengelegt, der weitgehend auf diese erste Phase zurückzuführen ist. In Kapitel 5 wird 
analog vorgegangen, wobei zunächst die Verlagerung der sowjetischen Anstrengungen hin 
zu einer ambitiöseren, ozeanischen „Posture“ mit Fokus auf die amerikanischen 
Trägerkampfgruppen und anschließend die erneute Ausrichtung auf den Nahbereich 
untersucht wird. Anhand dieses process tracing lassen sich viele der Trends und 
Entscheidungspunkte identifizieren, die schließlich zum Erhalt der langfristigen 
Überlegenheit der U.S. Navy führten. Im Schlusskapitel werden die wichtigsten 
Schlussfolgerungen und Beobachtungen nochmals zusammengefasst und die Ergebnisse einer 
Bewertung aus der Perspektive des 21. Jahrhunderts unterzogen. 
 
2.  Einbettung in die Literatur 
Während geostrategische Rivalitäten zwischen Seemächten und Landmächten – wie auch 
zwischen rivalisierenden Seemächten – Generationen von Staatsmännern, Marinestrategen 
und Historikern beschäftigt haben, haben die Sozialwissenschaften in den vergangenen 70 
Jahren nur sporadisches Interesse gezeigt. Das interdisziplinäre Feld der strategischen 
Wissenschaft, das sich zunächst mit Fragestellungen im Kontext der thermonuklearen 
Revolution und anschließend mit dem – scheinbaren – Wegbrechen dieser Forschungsagenda 
in den 90er Jahren befasste, ist in dieser Hinsicht nur in Teilen eine Ausnahme. In der breiteren 
Subdisziplin der Security Studies sind diese Fragestellungen noch weniger verankert.6 Die 
 
6 So kommt etwa die führende intellectual history der Disziplin ohne einen einzigen Verweis auf diese 
Zusammenhänge aus. Vgl. Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). Wichtige Ausnahmen von der Regel sind: Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and 
Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper, 1962); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001), esp. 114-25; George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics: 
1494 -1993 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988); Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Hegemonic Threats and Great-
Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005), doi:10.1080/09636410591001465; Jack S. 
Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?,” 
International Security 35, no. 1 (2010), doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00001, 7-43. 
 






Kombination theoretischer und historischer Ansätze hat jedoch großes Potential, wenn es 
darum geht, das Phänomen der Mächtekonkurrenz auf hoher See und hier insbesondere den 
Fall des Kalten Krieges besser zu verstehen.  
Die – meist zeitgenössische – Spezialliteratur über den Kalten Krieg auf See bietet 
hierfür eine solide Ausgangbasis. Gleichzeitig ist sie in Teilen schwer zugänglich und 
insgesamt stark fragmentiert geblieben. Ein Großteil der verfügbaren Informationen wurde 
noch nie zu einer lesbaren Synthese verwoben. Obwohl es sich hierbei um ein Defizit handelt, 
das in Form einer wissenschaftlichen Einzelleistung schwer zu beheben ist – außer vielleicht 
durch eine bislang ausständige, monumentale Gesamtbetrachtung in mehreren Bänden – sind 
nennenswerte Fortschritte durchaus möglich.  
Was diese vorliegende Untersuchung betrifft, so liegt die Zahl der verwertbaren und 
hochwertigen Quellen, auf die zurückgegriffen werden kann, zumindest im höheren 
dreistelligen Bereich. Die Dissertation erschließt als Beitrag im Bereich der strategischen 
Wissenschaft somit kein historisches Neuland. Indem sie jedoch eine theoretisch unterfütterte, 
analytische Darstellung der Rivalität zwischen der U.S. Navy und der Sowjetmarine in den 
Jahren 1946-1981 liefert und den fragmentierten Kenntnisstand zu einer prozesszentrierten 
Synthese weiterentwickelt, leistet sie einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verständnis dieser 
maritimen Mächtekonkurrenz, die in jüngster Zeit aus gutem Grund wieder stärker ins 
Interesse der Nachwelt gerückt ist. 
 
3.  Theoretische Grundlage und Analysemodell 
Die Entwicklung eines angepassten Analyserahmens für die vorliegende Untersuchung 
bedurfte einer umfangreichen Beschäftigung mit mehreren relevanten Strängen der 
Theoriebildung im Bereich der Internationalen Beziehungen und der strategischen 
Wissenschaft. In Kapitel 2 der Dissertation werden mehrere wichtige Säulen eines solchen 
Rahmens identifiziert. Erstens wird festgehalten, dass sich strategische Rivalitäten tendenziell 
um die Ausbildung beziehungsweise den Erhalt militärische Vorteile drehen und dass diese 
Vorteile nicht in erster Linie vom Stand der Wehrtechnik im internationalen System bestimmt 
werden, wie es die offense-defense theory behauptet hat, sondern durch die Akteure selbst 
 






geschaffen werden.7 Zweitens wird festgestellt, dass Strukturtheorien allein nicht erklären 
können, wie sich militärische Wettbewerbe im Laufe der Zeit entwickeln und warum sie in 
spezifischen Fallstudien zu den beobachteten Ergebnissen führen. Obwohl 
Bedrohungswahrnehmungen der hauptsächliche Treiber der militärischen Anpassung sind, 
sagen sie uns per se nur wenig über die Reaktionen, die auf der Ebene des einzelnen Staates 
formuliert werden und die zudem stark von den Präferenzen militärischer Organisationen auf 
der Ebene unterhalb der außenpolitischen Entscheidungsfindung beeinflusst werden. Drittens 
wird klar, dass ein hybrides Framework, das Erkenntnisse der Organisations- und 
Bürokratietheorie aufgreift, viele der Lücken schließen kann, die eine systemische Perspektive 
für sich genommen hinterlassen würde.  
In Anbetracht dieser Zwischenergebnisse wird im Kapitel 3 ein Analyserahmen 
ausformuliert, der in besonderem Maße darauf ausgerichtet ist, die Muster und Dynamiken 
militärischer Anpassungsprozesse jenseits einer rein strukturellen oder rein 
organisationsbezogenen Anschauungsweise bestmöglich fassen zu können.  Nachdem sich 
gezeigt hat, dass ein theoretischer beziehungsweise konzeptueller Ansatz „von der Stange“ 
diesem Anspruch nicht gerecht werden kann, handelt es sich hierbei um ein „modulares 
Framework“8, das Elemente des neoklassischen Realismus mit Erkenntnissen aus der 
Organisationstheorie harmonisch verbindet. Die Hauptkomponenten dieses Analyserahmens 
sind (1) die strukturtheoretische Erkenntnis, dass externe militärische Bedrohungen in einer 
langfristigen strategischen Rivalität der primärer Treiber des Staatsverhaltens sind, (2) die 
Einsicht, dass militärische Vorteile von den Akteuren selbst geschaffen und aufrechterhalten 
werden, und sich keineswegs direkt aus systemischen Entwicklungsprozessen ergeben,  (3) 
eine Fokussierung auf Marineorganisationen als bürokratische Akteure, die durch eine 
 
7 Siehe dazu: Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We 
Measure It?,” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998), doi:10.1162/isec.22.4.44, 44-82; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under 
the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 02 (1978), doi:10.2307/2009958; Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive 
Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 
(1984), doi:10.2307/2600696, 219-38; Keir A. Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” Security 
Studies 4, no. 4 (1995), doi:10.1080/09636419509347600 660-91; George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the 
International System (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 2002); Jonathan Shimshoni, “Technology, Military 
Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship,” International Security 15, no. 3 (1990), 
doi:10.2307/2538911, 187-215.  
8 Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1997), 30-31. 
 






komplexe Mischung organisationaler Eigeninteressen mit gesamtstaatlichem 
Verantwortungshandeln motiviert sind, und (4) die Erwartung, dass die Reaktionen 
militärischer Organisationen auf externe Bedrohungen durch ihre Perzeptionen der äußeren 
Umwelt aber auch durch innerstaatliche Entwicklungen geprägt sind, die sich ihrer 
unmittelbaren Kontrolle entziehen. 
 
Abb 1. Analyserahmen: Anpassungsprozess militärischer „Postures“ 
 
Dieser Rahmen wird einerseits im Zuge der detaillierteren Auseinandersetzung mit der 
theoretischen Literatur in Kapitel 2 vorgezeichnet und Schritt für Schritt entwickelt und 
andererseits im Kapitel 3 näher spezifiziert. 
 
4.  Methodik 
Ebenfalls in Kapitel 3 werden die Methoden dargestellt, die im Rahmen des 
Forschungsprozesses zum Einsatz kamen, der in den folgenden Kapiteln abgebildet ist. 
Während als Hauptmethode die Prozessanalyse (process tracing) zum Einsatz kommt, macht 
unser Erkenntnisinteresse zugleich auch den Einsatz einer Reihe von unterstützenden 
Methoden notwendig, die ursprünglich von professionellen Marineanalysten während des 
Kalten Krieges (weiter)entwickelt wurden. Hierbei ist insbesondere auf die Hardware-
Analyse und die Literaturanalyse zu verweisen. Ihr Einsatz erfolgt unmittelbar im Zuge des 
 






process tracing, um aus dem vorhandenen Datenmaterial brauchbare Schlüsse über die 
einzelnen Prozessschritte ableiten zu können.  
Wie viele Schlüsselbegriffe, -methoden und -ansätze in den Sozialwissenschaften ist 
auch die Prozessanalyse in Teilen umstritten. In ihrer Grundform sehr intuitiv, ist sie gerade 
in jüngster Zeit zum Gegenstand einer spezialisierten Methodenliteratur geworden. Diese 
Entwicklung scheint zumindest teilweise darauf abzuzielen, eine zentrale Methode der 
politikwissenschaftlichen Forschung gegen den Vorwurf der szientistisch orientierten 
Sozialwissenschaften zu immunisieren, wonach sie im direkten Vergleich mit quantitativen 
oder quasi-quantitativen Methoden nicht ausreichend spezifiziert sei. Dieser Diskurs wird 
kurz nachvollzogen und anschließend eine pragmatische Einordnung unseres Verständnisses 
der Prozessanalyse vorgenommen. 
Im Bereich der unterstützenden Methoden ist unter anderem auszuführen, inwiefern 
sich die Hardware-Analyse von den vielfach kritisierten "Bean Counting"-Übungen abhebt 
und zu erläutern, warum sie wesentliche Rückschlüsse auf der Basis beobachteter 
Entscheidungen in der Entwicklung von Marinesysteme liefern kann.9 Um zu solchen 
Schlussfolgerungen zu gelangen, müssen wir über die einfache Beschreibung der 
gegnerischen Streitkräftestrukturen beziehungsweise deren Entwicklung auf der Zeitachse 
deutlich hinausgehen. Vielmehr sind es die organisatorischen Annahmen und Präferenzen, 
die in die Waffenentwicklung einfließen, die eine Analyse von Plattformen und 
Waffensystemen aufdecken soll. Ziel ist es, ein besseres Verständnis der anderen Dimensionen 
einer „Posture“, insbesondere der Doktrin und der Dislozierung, sowie unter Umständen auch 
der zugrundeliegenden Bedrohungswahrnehmungen zu erlangen. 
Die wichtigste Ergänzung zur Hardware-Analyse während des Kalten Krieges war ein 
Ansatz, der sich verstärkt auf öffentliche Äußerungen sowjetischer Entscheidungsträger und 
interne Debatten konzentriert, um die Inhalte der Marinedoktrin und -politik freizulegen. Die 
Grundidee in diesem Fall war es, durch eine detaillierte Exegese mündlicher und schriftlicher 
Statements wichtige Erkenntnisse über strategische und operative Prioritäten über zukünftige 
Entwicklungen zu gewinnen. Die Methode stützt sich damit in hohem Maße auf die 
 
9 Vgl. Joshua M. Epstein, Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 131. 
 






hermeneutische Sensibilisierung des Analysten. Anstatt zu versuchen, die verlorene Kunst der 
Analyse russischsprachiger, meist in marxistisch-leninistischer Terminologie gehaltener 
Materialien wiederzubeleben, nähert sie sich die Dissertation den vorhandenen 
literaturanalytischen Erkenntnissen aus der Perspektive des kritischen Konsumenten. In 
Summe ergibt so sich eine differenzierte Methodik, die in den beiden folgenden Kapiteln ein 
relativ ausgewogenes Bild der Mächtekonkurrenz auf See vermitteln kann. 
 
5.  Prozessanalyse der ersten Phase: 1946-60 
Während der ersten Phase des Kalten Krieges auf See nahm die sowjetische Herausforderung 
rückblickend nur langsam Fahrt auf. Dennoch wurde deutlich, dass sich die sowjetische 
Landmacht ernsthaft und mit erheblichem Ressourceneinsatz gegen die Marinefähigkeiten 
des westlichen Bündnisses wappnen wollte. Obwohl die entsprechende 
Streitkräfteentwicklung im Laufe dieser Phase deutlich an Kontur gewann, war es allerdings 
die U.S. Navy, der es gelang ein tragfähiges Fundament für eine dauerhafte Überlegenheit zu 
schaffen. Im Fokus stand dabei die erwartete Bedrohung durch sowjetische U-Boote im 
mittleren Atlantik. Diese Bedrohung wurde auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks gut verstanden 
und ihr Gewicht war aufgrund der historischen Erfahrungen unzweifelhaft. Außerdem 
konnte sich der Aufbau entsprechender Abwehrfähigkeiten auf Forschungsprogramme aus 
der Spätphase des Zweiten Weltkrieges, die eine starke Grundlagen-Komponente aufwiesen. 
Die Entwicklung eines dauerhaften Vorteils in der passiven Akustik nach dem Krieg beruhte 
unter anderem auf wichtigen Erkenntnissen dieser Forschungsanstrengungen. Drittens führte 
die Überschätzung des Potenzials der sowjetischen U-Bootflotte für offensive Operationen, 
basierend auf fragwürdigen Annahmen über ihren Zweck, zu einer stärkeren techno-
doktrinalen Reaktion, als es ein genaues Verständnis der Problematik vielleicht erlaubt hätte. 
Dies bedeutete auch, dass Entwicklungswege, die ansonsten auf größeren bürokratischen 
Widerstand gestoßen wären – wie etwa die Umstellung auf Jagd-U-Boote mit Nuklearantrieb 
als zentrales Element der U-Bootabwehr – frühzeitig und energisch verfolgt wurden. 
Schließlich unterstützte die Idee, dass die VMF auf die Durchtrennung der Seeverbindungen 
der NATO zielte, auch eine frühzeitige Ausrichtung auf die U-Jagd gegen nuklear 
 






angetriebene Boote. Infolgedessen plante die U.S. Navy bereits gegen diese potentiell noch 
schwerwiegendere Bedrohung, bevor sie überhaupt zustande kam.  
Zusammen mit sowjetischen techno-doktrinalen Präferenzen und 
Designentscheidungen, die im Nachhinein fragwürdig erscheinen, erlaubte diese 
Kombination von Faktoren der US-Marine die Ausbildung einer dauerhaften Überlegenheit 
in der Unterwasserkriegführung. Während historische Kontingenzen zweifellos eine wichtige 
Rolle bei der Realisierung der zugrundeliegenden Vorteile spielte, trägt die komplexe 
Beziehung zwischen überzogenen, aber bürokratisch bequemen, 
Bedrohungswahrnehmungen und Reaktionen auf der Ebene der U-Bootabwehr wesentlich 
dazu bei, die Ergebnisse dieser frühen Phase der Mächtekonkurrenz auf See zu verstehen. 
Gleichzeitig waren die Reaktionen der USA auf die Bedrohung durch die sowjetische U-Boot-
Flotte so groß, dass sie das Sicherheitsdilemma auf See zusätzlich anfachten und in den 
folgenden Jahrzehnten weitere Rückkopplungsschleifen nach sich zogen.  
Dies gilt insbesondere für das kontroverse attack at source-Konzept, das zuvorderst aus 
bürokratischen Gründen entwickelt wurde. Angesichts des starken Gewichts, das frühen 
Schlägen gegen sowjetische Marine-Infrastrukturen an Land zugewiesen wurde, war es in 
besonderem Maße geeignet, das Sicherheitsdilemma weiter zu verschärfen. Gleichzeitig 
konnte der Bedrohung durch die Träger noch mit relativ konventionellen maritimen Mitteln 
begegnet werden, was später gegenüber den Polaris-U-Booten nicht mehr möglich war. 
Obwohl sich erst in den 1960er Jahren ein spezialisiertes, unterseeisches Element der anti-
carrier warfare (ACW) herauszubilden begann, wurden die Umrisse dieser Reaktion in den 
späten 1950er Jahren bereits in der Entwicklung der sowjetischen Marineluftstreitkräfte 
sichtbar. 
 
6.  Prozessanalyse der zweiten Phase: 1961-1981 
Die zweite Phase des Kalten Krieges auf See war in vieler Hinsicht von entscheidender 
Bedeutung. Während die Bemühungen der U.S. Navy, die sowjetische Rückbesinnung auf die 
Nahbereichsverteidigung strategisch nutzbar zu machen auch weiterhin ein faszinierender 
Gegenstand der Forschung sind, steht die Prozessanalyse triumphalistischen Aussagen über 
 






den allesentscheidenden Einfluss der Maritime Strategy der 1980er Jahre klar entgegen. Um 
diese Schlussfolgerung nachvollziehen zu können und die Auswirkungen der zweiten Phase 
auf unser Verständnis der amerikanisch-sowjetischen Rivalität auf See offenzulegen, sind zwei 
Stränge des Narrativs entscheidend. Erstens verstanden die sowjetischen Militärtheoretiker 
schon früh, dass die „gepulste“10 Feuerkraft des Flugzeugträgers im Atomzeitalter eine ganz 
neue Bedeutung gewann. Ihre Versuche, dieser Bedrohung entgegenzuwirken, waren 
zumindest teilweise erfolgreich, auch wenn das daraus resultierende ACW-System im Kern 
fragil blieb. Dieser Umstand erleichterte zwar die Aufgabe der U.S. Navy, die 
Überlebensfähigkeit von Überwasserschiffen zu gewährleisten, blieb aber dennoch eine 
ernstzunehmende Herausforderung.  
Die Reaktion im Bereich der U-Jagd, die auf dem massiven Vorteil basierte, den die 
USA in den frühen 1960er Jahren in der Unterwasserakustik genossen, bleibt ein 
Musterbeispiel für einen zielführenden Anpassungsprozess, obwohl ernsthafte Defizite in der 
Selbstverteidigung der Trägerkampfgruppen bestehen blieben. Die Reaktion in der 
Flottenluftverteidigung führte nicht zu demselben Ergebnis und hätte sich als unzureichend 
erweisen können, wenn die VMF die Kombination aus überschallschnellen Anti-Schiff-
Raketen und einer überlebensfähigen Trägerplattform – wie geplant – den frühen 1960er 
Jahren erfolgreich umgesetzt hätte. Letztendlich waren die Schwierigkeiten in der 
Technologieentwicklung auf der sowjetischen Seite so groß, dass die US-Marine unter 
anderem genügend Zeit hatte, die E-2 Hawkeye, F-14 Tomcat und AIM-54 Phoenix einzuführen 
und mit der Entwicklung eines Luftverteidigungssystems der nächsten Generation (Aegis) zu 
beginnen, noch vor die Bedrohung in Form von Tu-22M/Kh-22M ihre bislang schwerste Form 
annahm. Es bleibt jedoch festzuhalten, dass ein Seekrieg bis 1983 ohne mit dem Aegis-System 
ausgerüstete Einheiten geführt worden wäre, wobei eine weitreichende Abdeckung erst Ende 
der 80er Jahre möglich wurde. Somit kann man mit Fug und Recht behaupten, dass die 
Verteidigung der Kampfgruppen in wesentlich höherem Maße von den Abfangjägern der 
combat air patrol und von Verteidigungssystemen der „letzten Meile“ abhängig war, als es in 
dieser zweiten Phase wünschenswert war. Es ist daher hervorzuheben, dass die 
 
10 Wayne P. Hughes and Robert Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2018), 84. 
 






Anpassungsbemühungen der U.S. Navy in U-Jagd und Luftverteidigung nicht gleichermaßen 
erfolgreich waren. 
Zweitens wird deutlich, dass die Entscheidung der USA, den maritimen Beitrag zur 
strategischen Abschreckung von den Trägergruppen und ihren Angriffsgeschwadern auf die 
Raketen-U-Boot zu verlagern, den Verlauf der Mächtekonkurrenz auf See stärker prägte als 
jede gezielte Gegenmaßnahme, die getroffen wurde, um die in den 1960er Jahren entstandene 
ozeanische „Posture“ der VMF ausgleichen zu können. Wenn sie die Sowjetunion dazu 
veranlasst hätte, massive Ressourcen in einen unproduktiven Bereich wie die strategische U-
Bootabwehr zu investieren, hätte das Vertrauen der U.S. Navy in ihre SSBNs als eine 
„competitive strategy“11 fungieren können. Stattdessen etablierte die VMF ab Mitte der 70er 
Jahre erfolgreich einen Ansatz der Parität in der seegestützten Abschreckung. Nachdem das 
ACW-Element einen Teil seiner Dringlichkeit verloren hatte und die westlichen SSBNs sich 
mit ihren immer weiter reichenden Raketensystemen dem Zugriff der sowjetischen 
Abwehrmittel vollends entzogen hatten, zeigte sich einmal mehr, dass die sowjetische  
Streitkräfteentwicklung weiterhin vor allem auf die größte nukleare Bedrohung für das 
Heimatland reagieren würde.  
Im Einklang mit der konsequenten Betonung der strategischen Verteidigung endete 
die zweite Phase des Wettbewerbs damit, dass sich die Sowjetmarine vom vorderen Rand 
ihrer Verteidigungszone im Nordatlantik in ihre nördlichen „Bastionen“ zurückzog. Was von 
der US-amerikanischen und sowjetischen Konkurrenz bis zu diesem erneuten 
Paradigmenwechsel übrig bleibt, ist eine Fülle von Anschauungsmaterial dafür, wie es der 
U.S. Navy gelingen konnte, ihre erheblichen Vorteile über lange Zeit aufrechtzuerhalten, und 
warum es dem sowjetischen Herausforderer nie wirklich gelang, „Sperrzonen“ für westliche 
Seestreitkräfte zu schaffen, obwohl es das erklärte Ziel und der Schwerpunkt der sowjetischen 




11 Siehe dazu: Thomas G. Mahnken, ed., Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).  
 






7.  Schlussfolgerungen 
Im abschließenden Kapitel der Dissertation werden die Ergebnisse der Prozessanalyse 
zusammenfassend behandelt und in den heutigen Kontext eingeordnet. Sieben Punkte 
erscheinen dem Autor diesbezüglich von besonderer Bedeutung:  
1. Die bereits erwähnten Faktoren, die zur Entstehung und Erhaltung eines 
amerikanischen Vorteils insbesondere in der Unterwasserkriegführung beitrugen, 
werden nochmals breiter diskutiert. 
2. Es wird festgestellt, dass die Ausbildung und Erhaltung dieser Vorteile entscheidend 
in den ersten beiden Phasen der Konfrontation stattfanden und die Maritime Strategy 
der Reagan-Ära diesbezüglich eine untergeordnete Rolle spielte.  
 
3. Die zentrale Rolle seegestützter strategischer Nuklearwaffen wird besonders 
hervorgehoben. Aus westlicher Sicht wurde lange unterschätzt welch bestimmende 
Rolle die strategische Verteidigung im sowjetischen Marinekalkül spielte. 
 
4. Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die Rolle taktischer Nuklearwaffen in westlichen 
Analysen aufgrund der operativen und taktischen Präferenzen westlicher 
Seestreitkräfte nie entsprechend durchdacht und gewürdigt wurde. Dieses 
Versäumnisses sollte sich die Forschung in Zukunft dringend aufnehmen und ein 
wesentlich besseres Verständnis dieses unterschätzten Faktors herausarbeiten. 
 
5. Die Verwundbarkeit von Trägerkampfgruppen erweist sich als Gemeinplatz 
westlicher „Posture“-Debatten. Zugleich wäre sehr wohl mit schweren Schäden und 
eventuellen Verlusten beim Einsatz dieser Hochwerteinheiten zu rechnen gewesen. 
Während die konventionelle ACW-Bedrohung minimiert werden konnte, war dies im 
Bereich der taktischen Nuklearwaffen nie der Fall.  
 
6. Ob sea denial-Ansätze grundsätzlich zum Scheitern verurteilt sind oder bei 
entsprechend konsequenter Umsetzung die Fähigkeiten einer überlegenen Marine 
aushebeln können, lässt sich auf der Basis der Untersuchung nicht eindeutig 
 






beantworten. In der Tat dürfte das Potential jedoch wesentlich höher liegen, als dies 
im Kalten Krieg zur See der Fall war. 
 
7. Die massiven Fehleinschätzungen westlicher Analysten über mehrere Jahrzehnte 
hinweg zeigen nachträglich den Wert vertiefter Reflexion bei der Beurteilung des 
Gegners auf der Basis unvollständiger Informationen, auch wenn ein direkter 
Vergleich mit heutigen oder zukünftigen Mächterivalitäten schwer möglich ist. 
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